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A b s t r a c t
This thesis is concerned with the relationship between the mass media and national 
identity. It uses (methodological triangulation\involving multiple methods and multiple ' 
sets of data to investigate the ways in which the mass media and television in particular 
have contributed to the formation of national identity in Taiwan. The Taiwanese casej; 
markedly points to the inadequacy of a widely heldfassumpfioiTftbout the influence of 
the media on the formation of national identity: that national media foster national I 
identity and global media weaken national identity. The thesis argues against this' 
simplistic assumption, which reflects two dominant perspectives in the study of 
nationalism and communicationC&he diffusionist view of national identity-formation, 
and$lhe transmission view of communication. Both perspectives underestimate the 
complexity of the media-identity relationship and cannot adequately accommodate the 
Taiwanese case. This thesis provides an alternative perspective that stresses national 
identity-formation as a conjunctural mediation process between media representation 
and audience reception, whereby the powerful media and the active audience co-exi t. 
As a constitutive part of the national discursive space that contains both text and reader, 
television has helped to create among the Taiwanese audience an imaginable 
community of solidarity, constituting both the symbolic textures of national identity and 
the contexts in which that identity is experienced. Through the conjunctural mediations 
between media representation and audience reception, the respondent families in the 
present study have subscribed to a national identity that necessarily assumes a hybrid 
form. Yet despite (or indeed because of) Taiwan's ambiguous statehood, the 
respondents' hybrid identifications with the 'nation' can best be summed up in the term 
'Taiwan-centred identity'. The findings of this thesis extend beyond the Taiwanese case 
to the broader theorisation of the role of the media, especially television, in the 
formation of national identity in an age of globalisation.
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N o t e  o n  R o m a n is a t io n  a n d  T e r m in o l o g y
The Pinyin system has generally been used for the transliteration of Chinese names 
throughout this thesis. However, the spelling of such names as Chiang Ching-kuo, 
Chiang Kai-shek, Kuomintang, Lee Teng-hui, Mao Tse-tung, Sun Yat-sen and Taipei 
follows the Wade-Giles system, since these forms are more widely known in the 
literature. Also, the English spellings preferred by authors for their own names are 
retained.
The terminology used to categorise 'ethnic' groups is always problematic not least 
because of the frequency of inter-ethnic marriage in Taiwan. In this thesis, the foliowii g 
rules of usage are followed.
Taiwanese (Taiwanren in Mandarin Chinese): The term 'Taiwanese' is used in this 
thesis to refer to all inhabitants of Taiwan, i.e. it includes a variety of ethnic 
backgrounds -- the so-called Hokkien, Hakka and 'Mainlander' groups, and the 
aboriginal. The current population of Taiwan is 23 million. Speaking diverse ethnic 
languages, the inhabitants of Taiwan now share Mandarin, which has been the only 
official language in Taiwan since 1945. Among the Taiwanese, the Hokkien is the 
largest ethnic group (roughly 76 per cent of the population), followed by the Hakka 
(about 12 per cent of the population), the 'Mainlanders' (approximately 11 per cent of 
the population), and the aborigines (about 1 per cent of the population), who consist of a 
number of different tribes.
The Taiwanese aborigines (Yuanzhumin in Mandarin Chinese): The term 'Taiwanese 
aborigines' refers to the non-Chinese people who have lived in Taiwan for millennia. 
The group is sub-divided according to further ethnic and/or linguistic distinctions.
'M ainlander' (Waishengren in Mandarin Chinese, literally 'people from outside the 
province'): The term 'Mainlander' originally refers to the people who came with the 
KMT from the Chinese mainland after the end of the Second World War. It is 
sometimes (misleadingly) used to refer to the Taiwan-born offspring of these people. 
The term 'Mainlander' is arguably not an accurate ethnic marker since it contains people 
from diverse parts of China. Unlike the Hokkien or the Hakka, the 'Mainlander' group
9
does not share a single ethnic language but speaks a variety of mother-tongue languages. 
Furthermore, the proportion of people who were actually bom in the mainland is 
becoming less and less significant even within the 'Mainlander' group; and their 
Taiwan-bom offspring do not necessarily accept the label 'Mainlander'. Since this term 
is problematic as a classification of an 'ethnic' group in Taiwan, it appears in quotation 
marks throughout the thesis apart from its use in the informants' verbatim statements.
’Native Taiwanese’ (Benshengren in Mandarin Chinese, meaning 'people from this 
province'): The term 'native Taiwanese' is used to refer to the Chinese people who 
settled in Taiwan before 1945 and their offspring. It includes the Hokkien group and the 
Hakka group, who originally came mainly from the Fujian and Guangdong provinces of 
China in successive waves of migration from the late sixteenth century. Both these 
groups have their own distinct ethnic languages. However, the term is problematic for 
its implicit exclusion of the Taiwan-bom 'Mainlanders' and even the aborigines. 
Therefore, like the term 'Mainlander', the term 'native Taiwanese' is also used in 
quotation marks in this thesis.
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1 .
Introduction
This thesis seeks to resolve an apparent paradox pertaining to the role of the media (and 
television in particular) in the formation of national identity in Taiwan. Despite two 
compelling and apparently unfavourable cultural forces (national television and 
transnational television), a sense of political identification with Taiwan has grown 
among the population, and the adjective 'Taiwanese' has increasingly become 
synonymous with 'national'. Decades of top-down national media control aimed at 
fostering a supposedly 'national' (i.e. unified 'Chinese') identity have not prevented a 
'local' identity from growing; nor has the 'global' culture accessible via Taiwan's high 
cable/satellite penetration weakened this identity.
The paradoxical relationship between the mass media (and television in particular) and 
national identity in the Taiwanese case has two further dimensions. On the one hand, 
from 1971 to 1996 in Taiwan there were only three terrestrial television channels, all of 
which were owned and/or controlled by the Chinese Nationalist Party (also known as 
Kuomintang, KMT — the political party which formerly ruled China and fled to Taiwan 
when it was defeated in 1949 by the Chinese Communist Party, CCP). The KMT 
exploited the mass media deliberately to promote Chinese nationalism. On the other 
hand, in the run-up to, and following, the process of political democratisation in the late 
1980s there was a remarkable multiplication of channels in Taiwan, to an extent 
unmatched by other Asian countries, and this made available a huge provision of 
foreign programmes to the Taiwanese audience.
1.1 T h e  A im  o f  t h e  T h e sis
This thesis addresses the aforementioned paradox by exploring whether and how the 
media, and television in particular, have contributed to the configuration of national 
identity in Taiwan. The question will be approached in a manner different from the
11
conventional theories, which simplistically posit that national media necessarily bring 
into being and strengthen national identity while global media necessarily undermine 
that identity. Both national and global media have become part and parcel of Taiwan's 
shifting media landscape. Thus, the intersection between the two is a key concern of the 
present study, although the empirical focus is more on the role of national media.
Drawing on insights from the fields of nationalism, media studies and cultural studies, 
the thesis offers a contribution to the interdisciplinary study of national identity- 
formation in relation to the media. Questions surrounding the genesis, diffusion and 
construction of national identity, and especially the impact of the media on the 
continuity and contingency of that identity, have generated an intense debate amoi g 
scholars. These questions are studied here with particular reference to the case of 
Taiwan.
By using a variety of methods and multiple sources of data, the thesis probes how the 
sense of national identity has been discursively represented by the media and television 
in particular in Taiwan, particularly since 1971. It also examines how the Taiwanese 
audience has engaged with a spectrum of mass-mediated identities, accommodating 
them in different ways within the changing political and media landscapes. In relation to 
both questions, the concept of a shifting 'national cultural space' offered by Philip 
Schlesinger is vitally important. As he points out, 'national cultures are not simple 
repositories of shared symbols to which the entire population stands in identic il 
relation,' but rather they are complex 'sites of contestation in which competition over 
definitions takes place' (Schlesinger, 1991: 174). Equally important is the observation 
that audiences are not passive recipients; instead, as Morley and Robins point out, they 
'continually ... recompose and redefine their boundaries' (Morley and Robins, 1995: 46) 
in their everyday lives.
The changing media landscape facilitated by technological advance has put the question 
of national identity into sharp focus, particularly with the advent of transnational 
television with accelerated cross-border cultural flows, and has given impetus to an 
ever-growing body of research. The Taiwanese case is especially interesting in this 
respect. In terms of both media consumption and national politics, a profound 
transformation has taken place since the late 1980s. On the one hand, Taiwan has 
embarked on a rapid process of media globalisation, with a level of cable/satellite
12
penetration that is among the highest in the world. On the other hand, Taiwan has 
experienced a political transition from authoritarianism to democracy, and during this 
transformation different nationalist discourses have competed for electoral support, wi-h 
the issue of national identity emerging as a subject of constant debate in the pubhc 
domain.
Under these circumstances, the Taiwanese audience has engaged with the multivalent 
cultural forces in (re-)making a sense of national identity in the reconfigured 'national 
cultural space', with national television emerging as one of the most important 
constituents. Thus, following Schlesinger's suggestion, this thesis aims to examine 
'alternative accounts of national identity, and the motivations, strategies and practices of 
various groups in producing these [accounts]' (Schlesinger, 1991: 171). Yet, as Halliday 
observes, 'nationalism allows of no challenge to its authority in the name of these 
[sub]groups, nor to alternative definitions of identity, and commitment, that members of 
these sub-groups may feel' (Halliday, 2000: 164). The tension between Chine, e 
nationalism (promoted by the KMT) and alternative definitions of national identity in 
the post-Second World War context of Taiwan provides a case in point.
To contextualise these intricate questions, it is worth emphasising in this introductory 
chapter how far-reaching the transformation in terms of both nationalist politics and 
media globalisation has been. In what follows, therefore, I will first give a brief account 
of nationalist politics in Taiwan and, secondly, consider Taiwan's move into the world 
of global media.
1.2 N a t io n a l is t  P o l it ic s  in  T a iw a n
In 1996, Taiwan became the first Chinese society to choose its head of state by secret 
universal ballot. Within less than a decade from 1987, the country had accomplished a 
transition from an authoritarian society to the first Chinese democracy (Chao and Myers, 
1998). This achievement, which has been variously hailed as 'a quiet revolution' 
(Copper, 1988), a 'political miracle following on an economic miracle' and as 
'puncturing the myth that authoritarian politics -  rather than democracy -  is more 
suitable to Asian, and particularly Chinese, societies' {Far Eastern Economic Review,
13
14 March 1996: 18). The impact of these dramatic changes on the formation of national 
identity in Taiwan is one of the main concerns of the present analysis.
1.2.1 The Driving Force behind the Political Transition
None of these dramatic changes can be adequately assessed without considering the 
development of nationalism in Taiwan. First of all, since the end of the Second World 
War, two distinct nationalisms' with conflicting ideas of the nation have co-existed in 
Taiwan. Both have engaged in national myth-making and competed with each other for 
legitimacy and support. Secondly, the transition to democracy in Taiwan is much more 
than a simple result of high economic growth. For one thing, Taiwan's democratic 
transition has signalled not only a transition from authoritarianism to democracy, but 
also a shift from Chinese nationalism to what is probably best referred to as a ‘Taiwan- 
centred identity’, a term chosen in preference to ‘Taiwanese nationalism’ because the 
latter is exclusively used in the sense o f ‘Taiwanese independence’. Besides, although it 
has to do with the expression of a particular kind of nationalist sentiment, Taiwan- 
centred identity is at the same time more complex, being more open than ‘Taiwanese 
nationalism’ to the question of unification versus independence. Having said that, the 
importance of the shift from Chinese nationalism to a Taiwan-centred identity in 
Taiwan’s democratic transition cannot be underestimated. To explain this point further, 
I shall first consider the growth of this identity since the political transition of 1987-88 
and then its return in the run-up to the democratic transition.
Nothing more clearly demonstrates the growth of Taiwan-centred identity since 1987 
than the democratic transition itself. Indeed, in a sense, Taiwan's democratisation is 
tantamount to Taiwanisation, with each feeding on and strengthening the other. The 
swiftness and frequency of constitutional amendments testify to this fact. These 
amendments put an end to the world's longest period of rule under martial law (38 
consecutive years) and the longstanding bans on organising political parties and 
publishing new newspapers. For the first time, the parliamentary bodies and the 
President were elected directly by the citizens of Taiwan. The blacklisted exiles were 
allowed to return home, and the dissidents advocating Taiwanese independence were 
released from prison. The KMT has since softened its territorial claim to the Chinese 
mainland, though the goal of unification with Mainland China remains national policy.
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The growth of Taiwan-centred identity is clearly manifested in the birth of multi-party 
politics. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), an embodiment of Taiwane- e 
nationalism, has secured its position as the largest opposition party, whereas the New 
Party, a breakaway faction from the KMT that defends Chinese nationalism in Taiwan, 
has lost support and is now of little political significance. The signs of growing Taiwan- 
centred identity are no less revealing within the ruling party itself. While the KMT 
remained in power after the political transition of 1987-88, it 'had to change out of all 
recognition to win [elections]' (.Economist, 7 November 1998: 7). Not surprisingly, in 
recent years politicians have been eager to capitalise on the growth of this Taiwan- 
centred identity.
Understandably, China has been aware and wary of the rise of a resilient Taiwan- 
centred identity. The Chinese government attempted to reverse the trend by launching 
missile tests off the island to intimidate a rising Taiwan-centred identity after the visit of 
Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan's first native-born President, to the United States in 1995 and 
during Taiwan's first Presidential election in 1996. It is reported that China has pointed 
an increasing number of missiles at Taiwan, at the rate of 50 more per year, in addition 
to the 300 it already has (Guardian, 24 April 2001). China also demanded of American 
President Clinton that he should publicly spell out the 'three noes' during the President's 
state visit to China in 1998, i.e. the United States would not support 'two Chinas'; nor 
'one China, one Taiwan'; nor Taiwan's membership in important international 
organisations such as the United Nations.
1.2.2 The Search for National Identity
Over the last century, Taiwan has been the object of two large-scale programmes of 
assimilation launched by external regimes, the first by the Japanese colonialists, the 
second by the KMT government. Both these attempts to 'nationalise' the Taiwanese 
from above exacerbated pre-existing misconceptions among Taiwan's inhabitants 
concerning their polity and their identity.
The Japanese colonial government exercised discrimination against local culture and 
prohibited the use of the Taiwanese language and the Chinese script for the purpose of 
assimilating the Taiwanese. The KMT followed suit, taking political and cultural 
measures to impose yet another national identity. Chief among these measures was
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KMT’s way of 'prolonging' the Chinese civil war, the 'mission to retake the mainland' 
being touted as something sacrosanct in order to encourage the Taiwanese to sacrifice 
their civil and political rights to help the KMT defeat the Chinese communists. Yet, 
after Taiwan's loss of its China seat in the United Nations Security Council in 1971, the 
ambiguities surrounding Taiwan's juridical statehood became even more pronounced. 
The myth of the KMT regime as the sole legitimate government of all China began o 
evaporate, and the incongruence between the Chinese KMT state and the Taiwanese 
people became increasingly evident.
Taiwan's political transition since the late 1980s also suggests that there was previously 
a definite upsurge of Taiwanese consciousness (or Taiwan Yishi in Chinese). As early as 
the late 1970s, the dissidents in favour of Taiwanese nationalism held mass rallies 
against the then authoritarian KMT and pushed hard for democratisation. The KMT 
responded by introducing more repressive measures of political control and cultural 
censorship, and charged the dissidents with advocating Taiwan's independence. Other 
Taiwanese nationalists, however, continued to apply pressure to KMT. They gathered 
under the banner Dangwai (meaning 'outside the Party [the KMT]') and won seats th it 
were open to the ‘native Taiwanese’ in national by-elections in the early 1980s. 
Eventually, in 1986, they organised the DPP, disregarding the KMT's intention to 
maintain repression. The KMT, on this occasion, did not respond with the use of force, 
thus suggesting that it had calculated the high political cost of a crackdown, but the DPP 
was not officially legalised until 1989. In 1986, President Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang 
Kai-shek's son and successor, who claimed that he was himself 'already Taiwanese', 
promised that he would introduce political reforms.
As demonstrated above, the democratic transition was a two-way process, signalling the 
surge of Taiwanese nationalism as much as the adaptation of the state to popular 
demands. This might account for 'why the regime, having shown little interest in 
political change prior to the emergence of the opposition, suddenly reversed its stand' 
(Cheng and Haggard, 1992: 16), and might help us to understand how this far-reaching 
transformation became possible. Indeed, as one observer noted, 'ten years ago, all this 
would have seemed like a fantasy' (Buruma, 1996: 78). On balance, it seems that the 
rise of Taiwanese consciousness was 'the invisible hand rocking the cradle of 
democratisation in Taiwan,' and 'the most powerful force driving Taiwan's new-born
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democracy is not a rising standard of living but a peculiar kind of nationalism' (Buruma, 
1996: 78).
All these phenomena suggest that what ultimately gave rise to Taiwan's transition to 
democracy was a significant shift of power from predominantly China-centred 
nationalist ideas about the nation and the national past to a Taiwan-centred nationalism. 
If this assessment is valid, it is necessary to explain why Taiwanese nationalism was 
able to return in the late 1970s against a state-sanctioned Chinese nationalism. To begin 
with, each of the two nationalisms inherited their pre-war legacy. This thesis thus 
provides an historical account of how Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism 
intersect to give rise to a Taiwan-centred identity. It challenges certain assumptions 
about Chinese nationalism that are found in the literature. It also seeks to compensate 
for what, with a few notable exceptions (see: Kerr, 1965, 1974; Meisner, 1964; Mendel, 
1970; for the recent literature, see Fix, 1993; Geoffroy, 1997; Hughes, 1997; Wachman, 
1994) is a neglect of Taiwanese nationalism in the literature.
1.3 W h y  T e l e v is io n ? W h y  T a iw a n ?
The spread of global media and the multiplication of television channels have 
challenged national television systems in many countries. The eventual outcome is not 
certain; different analysts have been led to different conclusions. Elihu Katz, writing 
about the Israeli case, laments that, because of the growing number of television 
channels, national television no longer binds the nation together (Katz, 1996). By 
contrast, James Curran, discussing the British case, argues that national television 
remains dominant and still binds the nation together (Curran, 1998). Despite their 
different estimates of the extent to which multi-channel television has weakened 
national identity, both scholars agree that national television plays a positive role in 
national identity-formation and that the saturated media environment has a negative 
effect upon national identity.
In Taiwan, since 1971, there has been a strong national television system consisting of 
three terrestrial television channels broadcasting mainly domestically produc< d 
programmes. The system was formerly under the tight control of the KMT, with its 
commitment to Chinese nationalism. In addition, to a greater extent than in Israel, the
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UK and many other countries, the multiplication of television channels has reached a 
very high level of access in Taiwan. However, the question remains open as to whether 
Taiwan's national identity has been forged by national television, or whether ti e 
multiplication of television channels has weakened that identity. It must be stressed, 
though, that when considering the media-identity relationship, the multiplication of 
television channels is not the only important concern. We also need to ask: who controls 
the media channels?
When examined more closely, the political economy of the media (and television in 
particular) in Taiwan appears to be very complex. First, from the beginning of its rule 
on the island, the KMT monopolised the media, and especially broadcasting, in order to 
confer Chinese identity on the Taiwanese and indoctrinate the population with Chinese 
nationalism. It seems reasonable to assume that television could be of particular 
importance to a Chinese society like Taiwan. As Anderson argues, owing to its writing 
systems and the enormous variety of mutually unintelligible spoken languages, we- 
consciousness (among the literate elite) was created 'out of signs, not sounds' (Anderson, 
1991). By extension, television and radio may both be viewed as media with a strong 
potential to make a community out of signs and sounds among different ethnic and 
linguistic groups. It should have been the medium for both 'the efficiency and 
complementarity of communication among individuals' (Deutsch, 1953: 162), thereby 
helping to shape a homogeneous nation.
Secondly, by 1998 Taiwan had achieved a very high level of cable television 
penetration -  covering about 80 per cent of all households (compared with 43.4% in 
1994 and 54.2% in 1995; Directorate-General of Budget Accounting and Statistics, 
1996: 44) and offering viewers some 60 to 80 television channels. The number of cable 
television households grew rapidly and is still growing. Not only does this represent a 
very rapid increase in the number of channels available to Taiwan's population, but it 
has also provided access to an increasing number of programmes made outside Taiwan, 
especially in the United States, Japan and Hong Kong.
Thus, Taiwan is a very suitable choice as a case study to assess the role of television in 
the formation of national identity. However, an analysis informed by the determinist 
cause-and-effect model is of limited use (cf. Gauntlett, 1998). There are several grounds 
for this conclusion: (1) The KMT did have intentions and needs to promote Chinese
18
identity through the channels of national television. (2) National television under KMT's 
control consistently reflected much more Chinese nationalism than Taiwan-centred 
nationalism. (3) National television did not significantly change its emphasis on 
Chinese nationalism, not least before the political transition of 1987-1988. (4) Changes 
in national television since political transition have not reflected a simple Taiwanese 
nationalism. Therefore, there seems to be little point in trying to establish a direct link in 
the cause-and-effect sense between national television and national identity.
In addition to the long-term state control of the national media, there are also conflicting 
pressures arising from the growth of foreign programming which might be thought to 
undermine national identity. However, I will suggest in this thesis that this latter 
argument is not valid because it lacks empirical evidence. The multiplication of 
television channels in Taiwan does not seem to have (1) fragmented the audience, or (2) 
weakened national identity, or (3) functioned as a medium of national differentiation.
It is Taiwan's uniqueness in terms of the degrees of post-war media control and ongoing 
media globalisation that makes it a fascinating case study of the relationship between 
the media (and television in particular) and national identity-formation. The thesis docs 
not question whether television has played a role in national identity-formation »n 
Taiwan. Rather, it is concerned to identify precisely what that role has been. Thus, the 
key questions to be addressed are: How can we define and characterise television's role? 
Is it possible that the convergence in Taiwan of global, national and local cultural forces 
in a distinct form of ‘national identity’-  Taiwan-centred identity -  might not be as 
paradoxical as at first sight? How far can the media be powerful while the audience 
members are active, and, in what sense?
To explore the role of the media (and television in particular) in the formation of 
national identity in Taiwan, I will present an empirical analysis of both media 
representation and audience reception, examining two central questions: (1) What 
images and discourses of nationhood have been represented in the media texts? (2) Ho n  
has the audience made use of terrestrial and cable/satellite television and interpreted the 
media texts, thereby constituting a sense of national identity? First, the media texts to be 
analysed were produced between 1971 and 1996 and include a sample of television 
serial drama synopses and two domestically produced films which were popular at the 
time of their release. This period is chosen for special attention because of its socio-
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political significance in Taiwan's modem history. 1971 saw loss of the KMT's seat in 
the United Nations and the emergence of television as a nation-wide medium in Taiwan; 
1996 was the year when the first ever presidential election by direct vote was held in 
Taiwan and when the KMT no longer owned all of Taiwan's terrestrial television 
channels. Secondly, the analysis of audience reception will be based on two waves of 
in-depth interviews with 19 television families with a high degree of diversity in terms 
of family members' ethnic background, gender and age.
1.4 T h e  St r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  T h e s is
The rest of the thesis is divided into two parts.
The first part, consisting of Chapters 2 to 5, is intended to ground the research by 
establishing theoretical, historical and methodological perspectives. Chapter 2 draws 
insights from the literature on the intersection of national identity and the media. 
Chapter 3 sets the scene historically in Taiwan, addressing the character of the Chinese 
nationalism that was subsequently imported by the KMT from the Chinese mainland 
into Taiwan, and the clash between that nationalism and its locally nurtured counterpart. 
Chapter 4 considers the dominance of the one-party state in Taiwan's political-economic 
formation of the national media, and examines the state-media relations which helped 
the KMT regime to consolidate its power on Taiwan. In Chapter 5 I detail the rationale 
behind the empirical research design for the thesis and explain how each empiric d 
analysis was conducted.
The second part consists of four empirical chapters. Chapter 6 presents a content 
analysis of the sampled television serial drama synopses, investigating the patterns of 
Taiwan's television representation. Chapter 7 offers a qualitative analysis of two 
historical films which were laden with nationalist ideologies and discursively set the 
boundaries of nationhood in their respective historical contexts. Chapter 8 explores the 
past and present experiences of the respondent families with the medium of television. 
Chapter 9 focuses on the questions of how the informants interpreted the two films and 
how they positioned themselves with respect to the question of national identity.
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Chapter 10 brings together the empirical findings of the research in an assessment of the 
role played by the mass media and television in particular in the formation of national 
identity in Taiwan.
21
Part I
Theory, History and 
Methodology
In the first part of this thesis, a large literature is drawn on selectively to consider the 
relationship between the media and national identity-formation from theoretical, 
historical, and methodological perspectives.
Chapter 2 focuses on a theoretical account of the relationship between the media and 
national identity-formation, an area of interest in which theories of nationalism, nation 
building and media imperialism provide insightful yet inconclusive answers. These 
theories disagree in terms of their emphasis on the positive or negative effects of the 
media on national identity-formation, but all of them share, in varying degrees, a view 
of the media as all-powerful and the audience as passive. It will be argued that they air o 
tend to focus on a macro level of analysis (media-culture-identity) and neglect the key 
micro-level relationship between the text (representation) and the reader (reception). In 
order to address the relationship in question at both the macro and micro levels, this 
chapter argues that the interaction between media representation and audience reception 
should be grounded in the historical conjunctures specific to a given society.
Given the weight of nationalism in Taiwan's political change, which arose as a 
consequence of the contest between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism, a 
historical examination of nationalism in Taiwan is indispensable. Chapter 3 thus 
explores the origins and development of the two major nationalist currents (Chinese and 
Taiwanese). Then, Chapter 4 looks closely at the role of the state in Taiwan's political 
economy of the media since 1945 and the importance of the media in supporting the 
KMT regime.
Chapter 5 lays the methodological foundations for the thesis. Essential among the 
guiding concepts are the dominant ideology thesis, the polysemy thesis, and the 
relationship between text and audience. I argue for a critical synthesis between the 
theses of dominant ideology and polysemy. Drawing insights from the relevant 
literature on media representation and audience reception, I then proceed to set up three 
case studies including a content analysis of television serial drama synopses, a textual 
analysis of national cinematic texts, and in-depth interviews with television families.
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2
Nationalism, National Identity 
and the Media
This chapter takes issue with conventional theories of the media-identity relationship as 
reflected in the ideas of development communication, media imperialism and cultur d 
globalisation, and points to the complexity of national identity-formation and the 
consequent need to examine this complexity with reference to its historically specific 
conjunctures.
By drawing key concepts from the literature, the chapter seeks to establish the 
theoretical basis for the thesis. The central questions are: national identity and its 
relationship to nationalism, the role of the media in the historical rise of nationalism, 
and the debates raised by the increasing interconnectedness of the global and the local 
resulting from the enhanced role of transnational communication media.
2.1 N a t io n a l is m  a n d  N a t io n a l  I d e n t it y
I shall begin the investigation of national identity with a discussion of theories of 
nationalism.
2.1.1 Theories of Nationalism
Nationalism has been theorised from two major perspectives: the modernist and the 
primordialist. The proponents of modernist views see the 'nation' as the product of 
modernity, exemplified by the historical rise of nationalism, the bureaucratic state, the 
industrial economy of capitalism and secular social norms (Anderson, 1991; Gellncr, 
1983; Hobsbawm, 1983, 1990). The modernist views are challenged by other write s 
who emphasise the importance of primordial elements (ethnic origins, shared myths,
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symbols, historical memories, and roots, etc.) in the process of modem nation-formation 
(Hutchinson, 2000; Smith, 1986, 1991).
The modernist views of nation-formation can be summarised as follows:
• Nations are theorised as political communities with consolidated territories. They 
are defined as those communities which aspire to control ’a chunk of the earth's 
surface' (Miller, 1995: 25) for the purpose of self-government in accordance with 
ideas of popular sovereignty and the principle of political legitimacy, which 
prescribes that nation and state should be 'congruent' (Gellner, 1983: 1).
• Nations are seen as arising from a new configuration of state-culture relationships, 
one which arises from the demands of what may be broadly defined as a capitalist- 
industrial economy (Gellner, 1983). Within this context, a culturally homogeneous 
formation is created by means of a standard vernacular language and print culture 
(Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983).
• The rise of nations is seen to have been accelerated by a radically changed 
understanding of space and time, which create the foundations for the popular 
imagination of a nation-as-community (Anderson, 1991; Cooke, 1989).
• Nations are seen to have been forged by 'invented traditions' (Hobsbawm, 1990), 
that is, the sustaining myths beloved of nationalists can be borrowed, revived, 
transformed, or simply invented (though, of course, not entirely fabricated).
The arguments from the modernist perspective, in a nutshell, can be read as a powerful
refutation of the claim by nationalists around the world that nationalist traditions have a 
pre-modem origin. For example, Gellner explicitly argues against such nationalist 
claims by saying that 'nationalism is not the awakening of nations to be self-conscious: 
it invents nations where they do not exist' (Gellner, 1964: 169). Hobsbawm also 
explicates this modem novelty of nations: 'the basic characteristic of the modem nation 
and everything connected with it is its modernity' (Hobsbawm, 1990: 14).
However, the modernist views of nationalism have not been received without challenge. 
The most notable critiques are those of Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson, who 
emphasise nationalism's primordial elements, especially its ethnic origins (Hutchinson,
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2000; Smith, 1986). However, the debate between the two schools of thought does not 
necessarily imply two mutually exclusive polarities. Beiner offers an even-handed 
assessment of both views when he remarks that 'a radically modernist view of nations 
serves to debunk nationalist myth-making, whereas the view that national sentiment is 
linked to authentically pre-modem cultural resources helps to legitimise these 
sentiments of national belonging' (Beiner, 1999: 6).
From the above, it is clear that the nation is principally defined in theories of 
nationalism as a modem construct, although certain primordial elements can be 
mobilised to shape a nation. This relationship between nationalism and modernity is 
developed further in by Anthony Giddens in his elaboration of the notion of 'ontological 
security' and by Michael Billig in his concept of 'banal nationalism'. The notion of 
'ontological security' emphasised by Giddens has generated widespread discussion 
among scholars (e.g. Billig, 1995: 44; Silverstone, 1993; Tomlinson, 1991: 85-90). 
Giddens defines 'ontological security' as follows:
The phrase of [ontological security] refers to the confidence that most 
human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the 
constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action. A 
sense of the reliability of persons and things, so central to the notion of trust, 
is basic to feelings of ontological security; hence the two are 
psychologically related. (Giddens, 1990: 92)
It follows that nationalism and nationalist sentiments arise from the situation in which 
the 'sense of ontological security is put in jeopardy by the disruption of routines' 
(Giddens, 1985: 44). Accordingly, Giddens sees nationalism as a primarily 
psychological phenomenon (Giddens, 1985: 218), arising from the drive to regain a 
sense of ontological security under the threat of social disruption in the conditions of 
modernity. Silverstone argues that Giddens exaggerates 'the fragility of ontological 
security in conditions of modernity as compared to the pre-modem' (Silverstone, 1993: 
579) and 'belatedly considers the media as significant factors in creating modernity' 
(Silverstone, 1993: 580). Nevertheless, there may be something to be gained by 
applying Giddens' notion to the social disruptions caused by war, external threat, and 
national crisis, which often seem to move nationalism forward.
On a different front, Billig's thesis of banal nationalism suggests that contemporary 
social life is replete with taken-for-granted nationhood. He sees 'banal nationalism' in 
the use of 'prosaic, routine words, which take nations for granted, and which, in so
25
doing, inhabit them. Small words, rather than grand memorable phrases, offer constant, 
but barely conscious, reminders of the homeland, making "our" national identity 
unforgettable' (Billig, 1995: 93). In other words, the discourse of nationhood is 
everywhere, including the media, and often becomes so obvious (banal) that we do not 
notice it. Though Giddens and Billig seem to focus on different aspects of nationalism, 
there may be scope for the two theses to converge, as I shall seek to show in the 
application of their views to the case of national identity in Taiwan.
2.1.2 Culture, Community and Identity
'Culture', 'community' and 'identity' are among the terms used regularly by theorists . >f 
nationalism. Too often, though, these terms are used vaguely and sometimes in a 
circular way. Gellner, one of the most influential theorists of nationalism, defines the 
terms as follows:
What is meant by culture? Basically, a non-genetic mode of transmission, 
located in an on-going community. A community is a population which 
shares a culture. ... Culture and community are defined in terms of each 
other: culture is what a population shares and what turns it into a 
community. ... Meaning, culture, community -  these notions interlock with 
each other. The circularity of their definitions, their interdependence, does 
not matter. (Gellner, 1995: 45-46, italics in the original)
Although one may agree with Gellner's point that the concepts of culture and nationality 
are indeed intimately linked, his argument is not entirely satisfactory, especially whm 
he suggest that 'the classification of men by "culture" is of course the classification by 
"nationality"' (Gellner, 1964: 157).
The complexity of the word 'culture' has been well described by Williams (1976: 87). 
The word 'community' is no less problematic as it has been mostly used and taken as a 
'warmly persuasive word' (Williams, 1976: 76), regardless of competing definitions and 
its use on different political agenda. As Neil Smith puts it, 'community is ... the least 
specifically defined of spatial scales, and the consequent vague yet generally affirmative 
nurturing meaning attached to "community" makes it one of the most ideologically 
appropriated metaphors in contemporary public discourse' (Smith, 1993: 105). Similarly, 
Stuart Hall suggests that 'identification' is a more appropriate concept than 'identity', for 
the former refers to a process of dynamic articulation rather than static fixity (Hall, 1996:
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1-3). For all these reasons, I shall use the terms 'culture', 'community' and 'identity' with 
considerable caution and, where appropriate, further clarification in the present study.
Anderson's seminal work Imagined Communities illustrates the ways in which a 
community is imagined on the national scale but says relatively little about the idea of 
community itself (Anderson, 1991: 7). In discussing the idea of community, we need to 
understand it within the specific context in which the community is imagined; and more 
importantly, the question of power should not be left out. Various definitions of 
community have revolved around two key formulations: community in terms of shared 
geographical place, and community in terms of a shared culture/social position. Each 
model of community, based on a particular locale or a shared culture, is considered as 
crucial to the production of identities (Mayo, 2000: 39). However, both models of 
community may be questioned.
(1) Community based on shared place
Nationalism is characterised as a kind of'spatially based' ideology (Smith, 1993: 110). 
However, the national community has become increasingly destabilised, since the 
territorial homeland is no longer the only 'place' which mobilises popular allegiance 
(Mittelman, 2000: 72-73). The identities which hitherto provided a basis for attachment 
within particular places, have been de-territorialised and re-territorialised by the 
expansion of transnational flows of goods, capital and people, and by the synchronised 
access to information across formerly rigid boundaries of separate national communities. 
This view is most clearly expressed in the oft-quoted phrase of Jashua Meyrowitz that 
there is 'no sense of place' (Meyrowitz, 1985):
Electronic media have had a tremendous impact on group identity by 
undermining the relationship between physical location and information 
access. ... The identity and cohesion of many groupings and associations 
were fostered by the fact that members were 'isolated together' in the same 
or similar locations. ... Electronic media begin to override group identities 
based on 'co-presence,' and they create many new forms of access and 
'association' that have little to do with physical location. (Meyrowitz, 1985: 
143-144)
For Meyrowitz, the changes that the electronic media have brought about are 
profoundly new and different from other homogenising forces in the sense that the 
electronic media provide people with experiences of being with others (Meyrowitz,
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1985: 146). But, as Ferguson argues, the reverse might be the case: 'rapid technological 
changes in global communications have made temporal and spatial concerns more 
paramount and more problematic than previously' (Ferguson, 1989: 152). She argues 
that 'the determinist assumption that communication technology almost unilaterally 
possesses the power to render time-space differences insignificant can be denied by an 
abundance of historical, anthropological and psycho-social evidence, irrespective of any 
technology'(Ferguson, 1989: 153).
Taking these competing views into account, it is fair to say that the sense of place is still 
present in today's globalised world, although it no longer exists in the way it used to: the 
sense of place multiplies rather than dies in a global age.
(2) Community based on a shared culture
The second model of community is based on the notion of a shared culture. First of all, 
we need to consider the question of power relations involved in the making of such a 
community and identity (Bauman, 1990: 45). The process of making a 'shared' culture 
does not necessary serve the interests of all and is quite often at the expense of minority 
cultures. Secondly, we need to consider that the members of a given (political or 
cultural) community might in effect be more heterogeneous than is usually supposed. 
For instance, the so-called Chinese nation actually comprises more than fifty minority 
ethnic groups which are officially recognised; but, according to Gladney, up to 350 
other applicant ethnic minority groups are excluded from official recognition (Gladney, 
1998: 108). Even within the majority ethnic group (i.e. the Han people) there is in effect 
a great diversity of spoken languages and local particularities. Thus, national 
communities, even those deemed to be long established, are not as homogeneous as is 
often supposed and usually involve a social and cultural diversity on the basis of 
language, ethnicity, religion, etc.
The essentialist assumption, which reifies nations as homogenous communities, is 
widely held in discussions of the Chinese nation. As Modood observes, 'when non- 
Chinese people, for example, talk of "Chinese Civilisation", their starting point often is 
that it has coherence, a sameness over centuries, and a reified quality' (Modood, 2000: 
178). An extreme variant of the essentialist view is that of'the clash o f civilisations' put 
forward by Huntington (1993), which implies an internal sameness within each
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'civilisation'. This assumption is so widely held that even Hobsbawm, himself in  
influential theorist who adopts a thoroughly modernist view of the nationalist 
phenomenon of Western Europe, argues in his Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (in a 
primordialist tone) that China is 'among the extremely rare examples of historic states 
composed of a population that is ethnically almost or entirely homogeneous' 
(Hobsbawm, 1990: 66). In the thesis, I challenge this essehtialist assumption made 
about the Chinese nation, and argue that 'the Chinese nation' is far from homogeneous 
and historic but instead heterogeneous and modem. A detailed account of how the 
timeless 'sameness' of Chinese nationhood was created in the modem era will be given 
in the next chapter. Suffice it to say here that although many nationalists explicitly value 
homogeneous communities, nations are never perfectly homogeneous entities. Some 
nations include a minority (or even, as in the case of Taiwan, a majority) which does not 
always identify with the stipulated national ideal.
Thirdly, and perhaps quite inevitably in the Gellnerian sense, definitions of national 
culture and national identity tend to be circular: a nation is often defined in terms of a 
shared culture, and a national culture is defined in terms of values or beliefs shared by a 
nation. Involving as it does a mix of historical, political, economic, social, cultural and 
linguistic factors, a particular national identity is not uniformly accepted by everyone 
residing within the boundaries of particular nation-state, however strongly nationalists 
themselves feel about it. More often than not, dominant definitions of national identity 
are linked to the group that is numerically, economically or politically dominant within 
a country (Thomas, 1997: 4-5), which runs against the ideal of universal citizensh p 
with equal rights.
Much harsher criticisms of 'community' come from some writers who are closer to the 
post-structuralist or post-modernist perspectives. I will not repeat here those criticisms 
which tend to deconstruct altogether the idea of community and are preoccupied with 
the social differences among individuals. To be sure, conventional conceptions of 
community are theoretically flawed in some aspects and should be interrogated. But this 
does not mean that we should go as far as to abandon them as ideas or ideals altogether 
(see Morley, 2000: 6).
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(3) Conceptualising ’national identity ’
The conceptual difficulties involved in the ideas of culture, community and identity 
make it even more formidable to define what is meant by ’national identity', although it 
is generally referred to as 'a specific form of collective identity' (Schlesinger, 1991: 153) 
or 'an abstract collectivity' (Scanned and Cardiff, 1991: 277). In order to unravel the 
tangled thread of national identity-formation, it is necessary to reformulate conceptions 
of national identity in certain respects. First, the idea of national identity as a monolithic 
and fixed entity should be replaced by a more fluid and flexible conception. As Hall 
points out, identities are 'points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which 
discursive practices construct for us' (Hall, 1996: 6).
Secondly, national identity needs to be seen, not categorically but relationally, as 
consisting of interconnected structures created through the repeated articulation of 
cultural differences between multiple national histories/traditions and historically 
specific conjunctures (Hall, 1996: 4-5).
National identity-formation as a process necessarily involves discourse and difference. 
As Hall argues, 'identities are constituted within, not outside, discourse' and 'identities 
are constructed through, not outside, difference' (Hall, 1996: 4). For the purpose of this 
thesis, 'national identity' is considered to denote a system of cultural signification which 
defines a national political community and constructs individuals as members of the 
nation. This consideration is informed by the dynamic notion that national identities are 
'constituted within a system of social relations and require the reciprocal recognition of 
others. Identity ... is not to be considered a "thing" but rather a "system of relations and 
representations'" (Schlesinger, 1991: 154). This points to a shift away from 'nation' itself 
as an unquestionable pre-given towards an analysis of the power relations between the 
dominant and subordinate forces. This shift, in turn, prompts us to ask how the sense «f 
national identities is discursively constructed through the channels of communication 
and how individuals appropriate and reproduce nationhood in their everyday lives.
2.2  N a t io n a l  Id e n t it y  a n d  t h e  M e d ia
The question of national identity is of profound importance to the modern world, not 
least because the nation-state, far from withering away, remains a very significant actor.
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The end of the nation-state (Ohmae, 1995), and by implication national identity, has 
been predicted for a very long time, yet nation-states continue to thrive. But, as Held 
(2000: 172) argues, 'states today remain very powerful, if not more powerful than their 
predecessors in earlier centuries'. States have become deeply involved in the emerging 
transnational governance system (Sassen, 1996), and it is argued that nation-state 
formation is itself a constitutive part of globalisation rather than a process contrary to it 
(Greenfeld, 1992; Robertson, 1992).
Before addressing the relationship between national identity and the media in general, 
there are two fundamental questions worthy of note. The first is whether nationil 
identity is necessary to stabilise a national political community and whether it is the best, 
or only, basis for that community. In other words, to what extent is it the political 
consequence of state formation and social inclusion, rather than the establishment of a 
viable national culture itself, that really counts? To what extent is the legitimacy of a 
nation-state embedded in a distinct national culture, or based on democratic- 
constitutional norms (Klusmeryer, 1996: 91)? Should the consolidation of a national 
identity be grounded in the universal realisation of national citizenship (Habermas, 1994) 
rather than the establishment of a homogeneous national culture? The former ground 
alone may not be sufficient to sustain a national identity, whereas the latter ground 
would seem to be wrong and even dangerous.
A second fundamental question concerning national identity is about change. The 
change brought about by the external cultural forces has acquired a topical relevance 
since the advent of globalisation. Again, a uni-linear, causal relationship between 
culture and identity seems taken for granted, so that cultural nationalism is typically 
promulgated in defence of national culture against media imperialism. However, 
cultural identity changes all the time, and this changing formation has always been in 
process (Hall, 1996). This being the case, it seems surprising that so many nation-states 
are concerned with the influx of cultural products from outside. The cause for this 
concern lies elsewhere, I would suggest, reflecting an oversimplified conception of the 
relationship between media and national identity. This, combined with imperatives 
around nationalist agendas, predisposes nationalists to consider that the media equaiS 
culture, and culture equals identity. From this, it follows that national communication
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fosters national identity while global or transnational communication weakens it, as 
discussed below.
2.2.1 National Media and National Identity
Policy-makers around the globe have customarily regarded the media as a key means of 
creating and strengthening a shared national identity. Nonetheless, the complex 
relationships between communication and national identity remain open to debate.
(1) National media and the rise o f  nationalism
In relation to the role of media and communications in the process of national identity- 
formation, some insights worthy of note are those of Anderson, McLuhan and among 
others (Anderson, 1991; Deutsch, 1953; Eisenstein, 1979; Habermas, 1994; Innis, 1951; 
McLuhan, 1987). In varying degrees, all these authors point to the importance of 
printing in the historical rise and spread of nationalism.
The role of printing in the standardisation of vernaculars and the expansion of a national 
culture has been emphasised by several authors (e.g. Eisenstein, 1979; Innis, 1951; 
McLuhan, 1987). McLuhan even describes printing as the ’architect’ of nationalism 
(McLuhan, 1987: 172). Anderson takes a similar view of printing as fundamental for the 
development of national cultures but makes more explicit the link between printing and 
capitalism. For Anderson, printing lays the basis for national consciousness and 
capitalism, as a driving force, accelerates its spread (Anderson, 1991). On the one hand, 
he highlights its importance as a means of communication which is able both 10 
disseminate national consciousness across long distances and to preserve cultural 
traditions across generations. On the other hand, he recognises the crucial agency of 
capitalism, without which the spread of the printed word beyond the control of church 
and state would have been impossible. As he puts it, 'nothing serves to "assemble" 
related vernaculars more than capitalism, which, within the limits imposed by grammars 
and syntaxes, created mechanically reproduced print-language capable of dissemination 
through the market' (Anderson, 1991: 44).
From the above, it is clear that printing contributed to both the historical rise and spread 
of nationalism. What is not clear is how far and to what extent television — though
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commonly seen as a more powerful and accessible medium than the printed word 
(Calhoun, 1991) -  has contributed to the formation of national identity in the 
contemporary era.
(2) National media and nation building
Early empirical studies can be found in the work of scholars interested in the theme of 
communication and nation building (also known as the communication version of 
’modernisation theory' or 'development communication').
It has been argued that in the wake of de-colonisation following the Second World War, 
the formation of new states usually preceded the consolidation of nations (Martinussen, 
1997); hence the urgency for such states of achieving successful 'nation building'. What 
emerged in practice, however, was often a form of state nationalism that was intended to 
make a nation congruent with the state.1 At the same time, radio broadcasting and 
television, as the then new media, came to prominence in the western countries. Against 
this backdrop, there was an enthusiastic attempt to put the then fashionable social theory 
of modernisation into practice.
Modernisation theory -  especially its communications version -  holds that the media 
play a crucial role in promoting economic development to achieve successful nation 
building in new states through attitude change and the encouragement of innovative 
behaviour. Almost unanimously, the most prominent proponents of this theory, 
including Daniel Lemer, Lucian Pye, and Wilbur Schramm, posit that the success of 
nation building and societal modernisation depends in large measure on the penetration 
of mass communications, especially the audio-visual media. The reasoning behind this 
stemmed from the desire of people in newly independent nations, who may have 
witnessed sudden and violent changes, for the speedy establishment of a 'viable 
nationhood'. These theorists therefore advocated the precedence of communications in 
initiating and accelerating modernisation and nation building in these transitional 
societies (Pye, 1963: 3-5).
1 Taiwan after 1945 could be understood in the same way, except that, as we will discuss in the next 
chapter, the state that was built in de-colonised Taiwan was imposed from the outside.
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In the dominant paradigm of development communication, summarised by Rogers, the 
audio-visual media is seen as the vehicle by means of which technological innovations 
are transferred from development agencies to their clients, thereby stimulating an 
appetite for change by means of a 'climate of modernisation' (Rogers, 1976: 49). 
According to this view, experiences of modernisation can easily be replicated in other 
states, including those in the Third World. Modernisation theorists believed that 
modernisation was capable of transplanting development models and media 
technologies already successfully applied in western countries to less developed 
countries. This line of argument is now generally seen as much too optimistic and is 
criticised by some as reflecting 'overtones of ethnocentrism and uni-linearism' (Hannerz, 
1992: 263). Moreover, the optimism widely shared by the proponents of development 
communication was not bome out in practice. As Lemer laments, the 'revolution of 
rising expectations' which the media, as 'magic multipliers' or 'change agents', were 
supposed to inspire in emerging nations turned ultimately into 'revolutions of rising 
frustrations' (Lemer, 1963: 330).
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that, on the one hand, the rise of nationalism 
and the consolidation of nation-states were linked to the emergence of national 
mediated communications. On the other hand, applications of national mediated 
communications in the task of building a nation were not always effective.
2.2.2 Transnational Media and National Identity
Two processes relating to transnational media and national identity have come into 
conflict. One is the cultural protectionism expressed through resistance against foreign 
cultures; the other is the transnational cultural flow accelerated by information 
technologies and the audio-visual media. Few countries want either to open or close the 
domestic market completely to the outside world. Yet any compromise policy wou.d 
inevitably have to deal with undesirable influences introduced by global media; the 
worst scenario for many countries would be the undermining of national identity 
(Thomas, 1997). Countries have found it difficult to turn their back on the globalising 
forces along with the influx of exogenous cultures that they entail. On the other hand, 
their efforts to protect indigenous cultures have often been misdirected. To put it 
differently, according to Hannerz, there are actually two kinds of 'provincialism': a
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provincialism of closure and a provincialism of openness (Hannerz, 1992: 260). The 
former refers to defensive isolation from foreign cultures, while the latter contains 'too 
much deference and mindless mimicry on the part of the periphery toward the centre' 
(Hannerz, 1992: 260).
(1) Provincialism o f  closure/openness: exemplars
China and Singapore took the first option and were among the predominantly Chinese 
societies where unlicensed ownership of satellite-receiving dishes was banned for the 
purpose of excluding unwanted programmes from abroad. Both countries genera! 'y 
regarded cultural globalisation as a threat to their national identities.
In 1978, China started to open her doors gradually to the rest of the world. By the 1990s, 
the level of government concern at the political consequences of new media penetrating 
the country had reached fever pitch. Typical of this was Yang Weiguang, Vice Minister 
of Radio, Film and Television and the General Director of China Central Television 
(CCTV), who gave a strong warning over the rapid spread of new electronic media, 
especially satellite broadcasting. 'If we do not act resolutely and effectively now,' Yang 
stated, 'the US and other Western countries may achieve their goals of disintegrating 
China by trans-border broadcasting and other new media technologies, just as they did 
to the USSR and other Eastern European countries' (Huang et al., 1997: 18). Tfrs 
remark epitomises the most common charge levelled by the Chinese authorities at 
information and entertainment from abroad -  that of 'spiritual pollution' (and/or that of 
'peaceful evolution') -  since it is seen to undermine the essence of Chinese civilisation 
and, of course, the legitimacy of the continuing communist dictatorship in China (Lull, 
1997).2
Reflecting a similar mindset, despite immersing himself in Western culture, Lee Kuan 
Yew of Singapore has asserted that Western notions of participatory democracy cannot 
be applied to Asian countries because of major cultural differences. He appears
2 The Internet is no exception. The Chinese state has taken strict measures for the purpose o f 'controlling 
coverage and blocking access to foreign news sites,' thereby ensuring that 'its version o f  events was the 
only version most Chinese heard' {Washington Post, 20 April 2001: A25).
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particularly aggrieved that Western countries (notably America) have 'foisted their 
system indiscriminately' on Asian societies (Zakaria, 1994: 10).3
In contrast to the above cases, Taiwan seemed much too eager to make the best of the 
trend towards globalisation. Since the mid-1990s, when it developed a hunger for 
exogenous culture and foreign capital, Taiwan has initiated a series of projects aimed at 
greater internationalisation. The most ambitious of these involves establishing Taiwan 
as the Asia-Pacific's regional media centre and enticing foreign media industries (print, 
audio-visual media, multimedia and other information technologies) to move there. In 
this case the state attracted participating consortia by levying no income tax for the first 
five years of the project (Government Information Office, 1996: 1120). Although this 
ambitious aim remains largely unfulfilled, it represents a major policy shift, and the 
consequences for Taiwan's domestic market have been decreasing regulation and 
rapidly expanding consumption.
In the Western hemisphere, there is a more complex situation. A supranational project 
of European integration, intended to challenge the economic strength of America, Japan 
and the newly industrialised countries, has been under way. In the area of 
culture/identity, for example, the Green Paper Television without Frontiers, published 
by the Commission of the European Communities in 1984 and further developed since 
then, involved an attempt to foster a unified European cultural identity. Not surprisingly, 
in view of the implied homogenisation of such a culturally diverse territory, the policy 
behind it has been subjected to severe criticism. As Collins points out, both advocates 
and opponents of Television without Frontiers based their arguments on similar 
nationalist precepts that culture and political institutions should be isomorphic (Collii. $, 
1990b: 200). The nationalist notions of community on which a European identity were 
to be based were condemned as wishful thinking (Schlesinger, 1993; Servaes, 1993). 
Even if it were possible to fortify Europe against the threat of Americanisation, the 
problem of defining European culture would remain (Stevenson, 1995). Billig shares 
this view but argues differently. Even if a unified cultural identity for Europe were
3 In opposition to the view that Asian values are somehow sacrosanct, Kim Dae Jung (who became South 
Korea's President in 1998), writing in 1994, rejected Lee Kuan Yew's assertion that 'culture is destiny' and 
criticised the Orwellian vision it represents; instead, he was optimistic about democracy's compatibility 
with Asian culture (Kim, 1994).
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successfully established, so he argues, the very idea of nation (and national 'boundary- 
consciousness') would remain intact (Billig, 1995).
(2) In critique o f  a global culture
How far an essentially supranational European identity will be strengthened by fostering 
pan-European television (which is not yet viable) seems open to doubt (Collins, 199c ). 
As discussed earlier, an oversimplified conception of the media-identity relationship has 
found expression over recent decades in contributions both by proponents of 
development communication and critics of media imperialism. This problematic 
conception lies at the heart of the idea of a global culture, which appears to comprise 
four component arguments: (1) There is a global culture (2) which is mainly the result 
of cultural homogenisation caused by Westernisation/ Americanisation (3) and which 
tends to undermine national identity. (4) Therefore, given that national identity is 
threatened by other cultures from within and without a country, a form of policing of 
culture becomes necessary. I will now examine each of these component arguments in 
turn.
(i) A global culture? The seemingly contrary cases mentioned above should not be read 
simply as dichotomies of East versus West, South versus North or the like, but rather as 
a result of different attitudes to intensified trans-frontier communication as one of the 
most conspicuous phenomena of globalisation. These responses also reflect degrees of 
enthusiasm for (or fear of) transnational cultural flows (and, of course, of the 
international capital flows underlying them).
It is impossible to sustain the argument that increasing globalisation brings about a 
global culture that is literally universal or homogenous, not least because the influx of 
that culture ’does not enter into a vacuum, or inscribe itself on a cultural tabula rasa, but 
enters into a various kinds of interaction with already existing meanings and meaningful 
forms' (Hannerz, 1992: 262). Nor, in turn, should we assume that there exists a single, 
homogenous, global culture (Schlesinger, 1997: 373).
(ii) Globalisation as Americanisation? Notwithstanding the existence or otherwise of 
such a culture, we must also consider the extent to which it is synonymous with 
Americanisation, the extent to which it is a consequence of Americanisation, and more 
importantly, how far it amounts to cultural homogenisation.
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On the first issue, we reasonably might question whether it is plausible to define a 
global culture in terms of American culture at all. Critics of media imperialism (Schiller, 
1992) have imputed to the U.S.-based cultural industries a desire for economic 
dominance, accusing them of dumping cheap cultural goods with the intention of 
arresting cultural development in target countries, of promoting (albeit indirectly) an 
'American way of life', or of spreading commercialism, consumerism, violence and 
pornography. Such charges may not be entirely without foundation, but are not easily 
verified. The criticism pitched against American cultural products should not blind us to 
the possibilities — as argued by Pool — that without them, some of the substantial 
developments of political democratisation and competitive cultural productions in the,'e 
disadvantaged countries might not have occurred (Pool, 1983; 1990).
Let us assume for the sake of argument, therefore, that a global culture is one that is 
designed to cater for different segments of global audiences with diverse cultural 
tastes/traditions. De-nationalising cultural production in the first place might be the 
condition to meet the needs of such audiences. A culture defined as simultaneously 
global and American might arguably be a contradiction in terms. This also raises the 
question of how much the so-called 'Americanness' is still manifested in the American 
cultural products, including the many Hollywood films which appeal to a global 
audience (Wang et al., 2000: 68-69).
In opposition to the media imperialism thesis, Appadurai writes that 'the crucial po in t... 
is that the United States is no longer the puppeteer of a world system of images but is 
only one node of a complex transnational construction of imaginary landscape' 
(Appadurai, 1996). However, Appadurai's argument does not appear to reflect the 
reality that the United States was and still is the most powerful player in the 
transnational flow of news, images and other cultural products. In no case should the 
United States be seen as 'only one node' in the transnational network of cultural flows; 
rather, that flow operates on unequal and asymmetrical terms, with the United States 
playing a dominant role.
Having said that, it is equally problematic to assert that there is cultural homogenisation 
and that the issue of national identity can be reduced to a simple formula: the more ore 
consumes American cultural products, the less one possesses a sense of one's own 
national identity. First and foremost, globalisation also encompasses -  and is not the
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antithesis of — localisation (Pieterse, 1995: 49). Or, as Hall points out, the possible 
consequences of cultural globalisation largely remain an open question. The weakening 
of local/national identity is not the only scenario that might be introduced by cultural 
globalisation; there is 'the possibility that globalisation might lead to a strengthening of 
local identities, or to the production of new identities' (Hall, 1992: 308, emphasis in the 
original). Hall thus offers some major qualifications of the cultural homogenisation 
argument. He argues that the tendency towards cultural homogenisation and 
globalisation is significantly countered by the tendency towards cultural localisation 
with an emphasis on cultural differences. Moreover, globalisation is influencing 
everywhere; the United States and the West (including Japan) are themselves more 
profoundly affected than countries at the periphery by cultural globalisation (Hall, 1992: 
305).
(iii) National identity under threat? The issues around these debates on the intended 
and unintended consequences of transnational communication are too numerous _o 
consider here. Assuming that even if there was such a global culture and even if it could 
easily be identified as a kind of Americanisation, its actual effect on the formation of 
national culture or identity in a given country would still be a matter of contention. As 
Smith reminds us, not only is the transcendence of nationalism difficult to envisage, but 
so also is a global culture that is 'essentially memoryless,' since such a culture is 
incapable of binding people into any kind of group (Smith, 1990: 179). For Smith, it is 
clear that national culture and national identity remain unrivalled by their so-called 
'global' counterparts. As Hutchinson argues, 'since ... national differentiation is 
occurring in a period of an allegedly global homogenisation of peoples, we need a more 
nuanced account of the possible forms of accommodation between national and 
transnational organisations than one that assumes the suppression of the former' 
(Hutchinson, 2000: 655).
Moreover, for Pool, there is another obvious reason why no global culture could 
threaten the survival of a national identity. As he asserts, many constitutive elements of 
what has come to be known as a national culture were originally imported from abroad 
and 'sometimes the very things that symbolise a culture's identity turn out to have 
resulted from foreign intrusion' (Pool, 1990: 66).
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Of course, none of the above views (of Smith, Hutchinson, and Pool) is implausible. 
However, each of them can be challenged. Smith fails to recognise that the cultures of 
nations are overlapping and interweaving, and he thus tends to underestimate the 
potential power of the transnational culture. Moreover, he and Hutchinson, as scholars 
who emphasise the lasting power of ethnic origins in the formation of nations, seem to 
have too much confidence in the viability of national culture vis-a-vis transnational 
culture. The reverse is the case with Pool's argument: in proving the innocence of 
transnational cultural influences on any national cultures, he allows little room for a 
significant distinction between the cultures of the 'nations'.
(iv) Defending national identity by cultural policing? Despite legitimate rationales 
for state intervention in regulating cultural flows (see, e.g., Price, 1995), the view that 
there is a threat posed by transnational cultural flows to national identity is equally 
problematic. It is usually accompanied by proposals for strengthened border patrols 
against foreign cultural threats and provides a powerful rationale for excluding or 
discriminating against cultures that differ too much from the indigenous one 
(Klusmeryer, 1996). The practices of state policing of culture are not only directed 
outwards against the influx of foreign cultures, but can also be exercised inwards 
against cultural diversity within a given country. Thus, it bears the stamp of hegemony, 
because whether the hegemony maintenance comes from the state or a dominant ethnic 
group, its aim is generally to homogenise the people within a country.
Such a discourse of 'threat' generally implies that the national identity concerned exists 
as a monolithic entity. Given that an identity in any case involves cultural construction, 
and that identities at any level are always negotiated, this is very hard to justify. From a 
non-essentialist point of view, a national culture or identity is constantly changing, re­
constructing itself or otherwise being re-negotiated by its adherents, of whom a 
significant (or insignificant) number at any given time may not even subscribe to it at all. 
Yet no matter how uncertainly constructed, provided it genuinely 'belongs' to a nation, it 
is difficult to speak of any sort of fundamental 'threat' surrounding it. For these reason, 
it is not really sustainable to argue that global communication necessarily results in the 
weakening of a national identity (though it probably does), or that a national identity 
reaches a crisis point as the result of global communication. As soon as the idea of
40
'threat* or 'crisis' has been constructed, it leads to an unfortunate result that any violeat 
means of homogenising and 'nationalising' the nationals becomes justifiable.
2.3  C u l t u r a l  G l o b a l is a t io n  a n d  H y b r id is a t io n
In this section I attempt to connect the above discussion with a broader agenda, namely, 
the intricate relationship between cultural globalisation and hybrid identities.
As a buzzword in both public and academic discourse, globalisation remains poorly 
defined, variously evaluated, and hotly debated. The difficulties involved in defining 
'globalisation' are captured in the remark that 'there does seem to be broad agreement 
that something is happening, but rather less agreement about precisely what it is' 
(Cochrane and Pain, 2000: 42). Some core characteristics of globalisation can 
nevertheless be identified as part of the multidimensional process that is taking place 
across nation-state boundaries: for example, the intensification of economic and cultural 
flows, and the compression of time and space. All of these are said to be turning the 
world into a single place (Cochrane and Pain, 2000; Mittelman, 2000: 5-6).
It is usually argued that the cultural identities of countries at the receiving end of global 
cultural flows are eroded by cultural homogenisation, and new forms of hybrid culture 
are thus emerging. Of particular relevance here are the concepts of 'hybridisation' (or 
'creolisation'), 'cosmopolitanism', and the 'global-local nexus'. I shall offer a brief 
discussion of each of these in turn.
2.3.1 National Identities as Hybrid Formations
The notion of 'hybridity', as opposed to the essentialist idea of a fixed (group-based or 
placed-based) identity, has gained currency in the literature on cultural globalisation and 
national identities (Bhabha, 1990; Hall, 1992; Hannerz, 1996). It is argued that the 
increased mobility of peoples, capital and goods has brought about the mixing of 
different cultures and the emergence of hybrid forms of culture/identity everywhere 
(Appadurai, 1996). Bhabha offers a useful definition of hybridity:
All forms of culture are continually in a process of hybridity. ... [Hjybridity 
to me is the 'third space' which enables other positions to emerge. This third 
space displaces the histories that constitutes it, and sets up new structures of
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authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood 
through received wisdom. ... The process of cultural hybridity gives rise to 
something different, something new and unrecognisable, a new area of 
negotiation of meaning and representation. (Bhabha, 1990: 211; cf., Rowe 
and Schelling, 1991: 231)
(I) The hybridisation thesis: strengths and weaknesses
The term 'hybridity' is not entirely satisfactory. First, it has a derivative meaning that 
refers negatively to 'something less than the "species" from which they are derived' 
(Modood, 2000: 185) with 'a loss of purity, wholeness, authenticity' (Pieterse, 1995: 54- 
55).
Secondly, the term implies an ontological purity of formerly separate identities and 
indigenous cultures, which merge subsequently to become hybrid identities/cultures. 
The problem of the concept is that it 'evokes the myth of pure indigenous cultural forms, 
which are then supposed to be "hybridised" along with globalisation' (Alasuutari, 2000: 
263).
Thirdly, the hybridisation thesis tends to celebrate hybrid forms of culture/identity 
uncritically and does not take the question of power seriously. The hybridisation thesis 
thus runs the risk of sanctifying the fa it accompli caused by asymmetrical power 
relations exerted by colonialism andJ or state violence (Pieterse, 1995: 55)
Nevertheless, the hybridisation thesis still has its strengths. First, by employing the 
metaphors of 'routes' in place of 'roots' (Gilroy, 1993; Hall, 1995) the hybridisation 
thesis not only has an empowering potential but also rescues us from falling into an 
essentialist position (Pile and Thrift, 1995: 10). Furthermore, it enables us to transcend 
the homogenisation arguments offered by the crude version of the media imperialism 
thesis.
A point of departure in discussing cultural hybridisation is that the hybridisation thesis 
itself needs to be tested. Some commentators therefore call for empirical studies which 
give substance to the impact of global media/culture on local media/culture (Alasuutari, 
2000: 259; Wang et al., 2000). Similarly, as Pieterse argues:
A theory [of hybridisation] which ... focus[es] on fuzziness and melange, 
cut-and-mix, criss-cross and crossover, might well be a relief in itself. Yet,
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ironically, of course, it would have to prove itself by giving as neat as 
possible a version of messiness. (Pieterse, 1995: 55)
Moreover, cultural hybridity does not assume precisely the same form around the globe. 
As Mittelman cautions us, 'empirically, it is important to ground a study of changing 
global structures, for they have not been experienced uniformly across regions, and the 
reactions vary widely. There is no substitute for understanding the many layers that 
form a particular sense of time and place' (Mittelman, 2000: 11).
(2) Rethinking hybridity
In order to explore cultural hybridisation empirically, as a phenomenon that 
accompanies cultural globalisation, the notion of hybridity needs reformulation. First, 
'hybridity' cannot be conceptualised as a fused culture/identity in which all its 
constitutive cultures/identities are no longer distinguishable and cease to function 
socially. Contrary to usual supposition, the idea of national identity is not invalidated by 
the rise of hybrid identities. Writing in the British context, both Hall and Modood 
emphasise an emerging new type of hybrid ethnic identity (Hall, 1991; Modood, 2000). 
As Hall explains:
Third generation young Black men and women know they come from the 
Caribbean, know that they are Black, know that they are British. They want 
to speak from all three identities. They are not prepared to give up any one 
o f them. ... Because they need to know that difference, that difference that 
makes a difference in how they write their poetry, make their films, how 
they paint. It makes a difference. ... They need it as a resource. They are all 
those identities together. (Hall, 1991: 59, emphasis added)
Following Hall, Modood argues that this new form of identities/ethnicities in the British 
case is 'a form of complex Britishness. ... Because in Britain there are people who want 
not just to be Black or Indian in Britain, but positively want to be black British or 
British Indians' (Modood, 2000: 186). Clearly, as noted above, the hybrid forms of 
identity do not necessarily run against the quest for a national identity as one which is 
renegotiated rather than cancelled (i.e. re-territorialised but not yet borderless). In other 
words, there is room for overlapping allegiances.
Secondly, 'hybridity' is better conceptualised as opening up spaces for accommodation 
as well as resistance between different senses of belonging to the nation, than merely as 
a harmonious state of cultural mixing that can always be celebrated. The process of
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hybridisation is replete with ambiguities, conflicts, contradictions, and the potentials for 
domination as well as empowerment. Pieterse aptly captures this dynamic nature of 
hybridisation:
Relations of power and hegemony are inscribed and reproduced within 
hybridity for wherever we look closely enough we find the traces of 
asymmetry in culture, place, and descent. Hence hybridity raises the 
question of the terms of mixture, the conditions of mixing and melange. At 
the same time it's important to note the ways in which hegemony is not 
merely reproduced but refigured in the process of hybridisation. (Pieterse,
1995: 57, emphasis in the original)
This leads to a third reformulation of the concept, indicating that 'hybridity' is not '"as 
the label of flattening sameness"... [with] undifferentiated Difference (with a capital D) 
[which] marked unproblematically against a EurAmcentric standard' (Morley, 2000: 
232).
Extending these reformulated conceptions of hybridity to the Taiwanese context, it is 
perhaps misleading to assume that there is a presumably Taiwanese identity with 
undifferentiated difference, and that there is a unified Sino-centric identity to which the 
former stands in opposition. As I will argue later in the empirical chapters of this thesis, 
in the Taiwanese case, the national identity has come to encompass of late a wide range 
of hybrid formations. It is the ways in which they have creolised and the contexts in 
which people appropriate (and are distributed) along this 'continuum of hybriditics' 
(Pieterse, 1995: 56) that need to be the focal points for further exploration. Of course, 
this continuum of cultural hybridisation cannot properly be conceptualised without 
taking into account the interplay of the local and the global.
2.3.2 The Local and the Global
Amongst the competing propositions which are concerned with the media-identity 
relationship at the intersection of the global and the local are two of particular 
importance: (1) the national media forge national culture and thus contribute to national 
identity-formation; (2) with the multiplication of television channels, the increased 
access to the foreign media weakens or endangers national identity. Both propositions 
are problematic as they assume either positive or negative media effects (national versus 
foreign media) on national identity. It is noteworthy that neither proposition places the
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audience at the centre of theorisation, but rather each implies the existence of a 
generally passive audience.
Katz considers both the positive and negative effects of television. In his judgement, 'the 
rapid multiplication of channels' means that television has ceased to function as 'the 
medium of national political integration' (Katz, 1996: 22-23). This implies th it 
previously audiences shared a limited number of television channels, which promoted 
integration into the nation, whereas now television is segmenting its audiences as the 
number of channels increases. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Curran shares a similar 
premise that national television is a positive force for national integration, though he 
disagrees with Katz's view that this role is now being undermined by the multiplication 
of channels.
However, the premises of both their arguments can be questioned, i.e. the ideas of a 
fragmented or unified audience and of the global/local divide. First, it is premature to 
substantiate the claim of either an already fragmented audience or a unified audience. In 
either case, it remains an open question whether national identity would become weak ^ r. 
Secondly, the global/local distinction should not be held in absolute terms. As Massey 
argues,'... there has never been a historical moment untouched by the world beyond; in 
that sense the global has always been part of the construction of the local' (Massey, 
1994: 116).
In this sense, some commentators argue that there is a simultaneous phenomenon of 
global localisation and local globalisation. For Massey, 'the global is part of the local, 
not just as an invasion, nor even as a patently evident cultural mix, but as part of the 
very constitution of its "heartlands." Those who are not displaced should recognise 
our/their global connections just as do those who have recently migrated' (Massey, 1994: 
118). Or, as Giddens states, 'globalisation can ... be defined as the intensification of 
world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local 
happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa. ... Local 
transformation is as much a part of globalisation as the lateral expansion of social 
connections across time and space' (Giddens, 1990: 64). The interplay of the global and 
the local does not simply result in a weaker or robust national identity. However, as 
noted earlier, the idea of a global culture is questionable; likewise, what it means to be 
'local' is also subject to change. Indeed, It is hard to find something inherently local,
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since, as Hannerz argues, 'not all cultures are local, in the sense of being territorially 
bounded' (Hannerz, 1992: 262). Therefore, the 'local' should not be used as an all- 
embracing phrase set up in stark contrast to the 'global'. Nor can the local always be 
equated with the 'national' (Srebemy-Mohammadi, 1996).
But, to be fair to the arguments held by Katz and Curran, it is true that national identity 
is increasingly open to challenge, especially in the contemporary media-saturated 
context. It is equally true that the relationship between communications and national 
identity might be re-structured in the globally dimensioned environment of today, in 
which instantaneous electronic communications provide an unprecedented degree of 
'connectedness' between nations, cultures and localities. We all are becoming a bit more 
cosmopolitan than ever in the sense that we are exposed by the media to other cultures 
without leaving home (Robbins, 1998).
This proliferation and prevalence of mediated experience, along with other factors, 
contributes to 'the plurality of choices which confronts individuals' (Giddens, 1991: 8 V 
84). Indeed, the cultural landscape that is profoundly shaped by the globalisation of 
media has, as some scholars observe, confronted us with a choice between a 'cultural 
home' and the 'cultural supermarket' (Hall, 1992: 303; Mathews, 2000) where diverse 
cultures are on offer and identities become detached and/or disembedded.
To a certain extent we may agree that there are indeed a wide range of identities 
available to us. But at stake here is how freely people can actually choose between 
identities in their local and global forms, namely, a presumably local cultural home and 
the presumably global cultural supermarket. It can be argued that, first, the 'choice' 
being constantly made between identities -  ranging from the local to the global -  is not 
out of freedom but because, in an age of late modernity, as Giddens points out, 'we 
all ... are forced to do so -  we have no choice but to choose' (Giddens, 1991: 80-81). Of 
particular importance in this respect is that we should not overstate the freedom of 
choosing between identities through the acts of consumption alone. As Billig observes,
One can eat Chinese tomorrow and Turkish the day after; one can even 
dress in Chinese or Turkish styles. But being Chinese or Turkish are not 
commercially available options. (Billig, 1995: 139)
In a similar vein, Kellner states that 'in modernity, identity becomes more mobile, 
multiple, personal, self-reflexive, and subject to change and innovation. Yet the forms
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of identity in modernity are also relatively substantial and fixed; identity still comes 
from a circumscribed set of roles and norms' (Kellner, 1991: 141). Thus, the individual 
freedom to choosing identities is not actually free from the coextensive social 
constraints. As Dunn argues, 'identity is forged in the encounter between a conscious 
and reflexive self striving for its own realisation and the limits of biography, society, 
and history' (Dunn, 1998: 63, emphases added). Arguing for a social relational theory of 
identity formation, Dunn emphasises the importance of 'providing a picture of the 
dialectical interplay between self-determination and social determinism' (Dunn, 1998: 
63, emphasis in the original)
Secondly, 'detached (or disembedded) identities' should not be overstated. Rather, the 
very meanings of identities are about attachments to, and embeddedness in, times and 
places. Few really qualify as footloose cosmopolitans in the narrow sense of 
cosmopolitanism, meaning a 'noncommitment and unfeeling detachment from particular 
affective and concrete ties [to specific times and places, etc.]' (Cheah, 1998: 24). The 
(actually existing) cosmopolitan figure is not likely to be the one who freely travels 
between cultures, picking a little bit from here and a little bit from there, with no need 
of home(land), no attachment to any particular culture and without a sense of national 
identity. As Robbins argues, 'instead of an ideal of detachment, actually existing 
cosmopolitanism is a reality of (re)attachment, multiple attachment, or attachment at a 
distance' (Robbins, 1998: 3). From this, we might argue that the choice between a 
cultural home and the cultural supermarket is not confined to be an either-or one. As 
noted above in the discussion of cultural hybridisation, there is a possibility that 
allegiances forged at different levels ranging from the local to the global can overlap.
To elaborate further on the idea of cosmopolitanism, we may draw from the work of Ulf 
Hannerz, to whom cosmopolitanism means 'a willingness to engage with the Other' and 
requires 'competence' to 'make one's way into other cultures' (Hannerz, 1992: 252-253). 
From this perspective, cosmopolitanism should not be seen as the opposite of 
nationalism. Nor does the engagement with other cultures necessarily result in the loss 
of self (culture/identity). As Robbins observes, 'like nations, worlds too a. e 
"imagined." ... There is a growing consensus that cosmopolitanism sometimes works 
together with nationalism rather than in opposition to it' (Robbins, 1998: 2).
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This being the case, some of the assertions made by Appadurai and others are arguably 
premature. According to him, nationalism today is receding at the advent of what he 
calls a post-national global order in which a wide range of postnational, de-centred 
identities makes national identity irrelevant (Appadurai, 1996). But I wish to argue that 
it remains as relevant as ever to take nationalism seriously in an increasingly 
globalised/cosmopolitan world. As Cheah remarks, the postnationalist thesis mistakenly 
'takes the distending of the hyphen [between nation and state] in contemporary 
globalisation as a sign of the disintegration of both nation and state' (Cheah, 1998: 33). 
Moreover, as one of the leading authorities on theories of cosmopolitanism, Hannerz 
concludes that global cultures do not provide a robust alternative loyalty although for 
some people the nation has worked 'less well as a source of cultural resonance' (Hannerz, 
1996: 88). Equally, I agree with Anthony Smith's remark that national identity 'is likely 
to continue to command humanity's allegiances for a long time to come' (Smith, 1991: 
176) but for reasons different from his. The continued importance of national identity is 
not due to its robustness vis-a-vis other forms of identity, but because the national and 
the cosmopolitan do not always develop independently of each other. Nor do they 
necessarily stand against each other as if there could only be either cosmopolitanism or 
national identity. The same goes for the dynamics of the global and the local.
2.4 C o n c l u s i o n
This chapter has addressed a number of interlocking concepts which are central to the 
media-identity relationship in question, linking the discussion with the ongoing debase 
over cultural globalisation, localisation, and hybridisation.
We may conclude from the competing ideas available in the literature that in some cases 
national communication may not strengthen national identity and transnational 
communication may not undermine national identity. Overall, the argument in this 
thesis should not be read as a defence of a global cultural hybridity or as a rejection of 
the media imperialism thesis. My position is that I am not satisfied with either line of 
argument. As has been discussed in this chapter, the uncritical celebration of cultural 
globalisation/hybridisation is dangerous; equally, to reduce the complexity of the 
media-identity relationship is to endorse something akin to the crude version of the 
media imperialism thesis.
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I argue further that much has been missing in the theory of cultural 
hybridisation/globalisation, especially the recognition that power relations in the 
process of cultural mixing remains unequal within and between nations. Similarly, the 
media imperialism thesis oversimplifies the complex relations between media and 
national identity, positing that the availability of cultural product undermines national 
identity. Instead, I argue that the media-identity relationship is shaped by the changing 
historical conjectures, especially state-society relations and the global-local nexus. 
Undoubtedly, neither thesis by itself can support an unqualified generalisation on the 
global scale.
In the remainder of this thesis, therefore, I will examine the Taiwanese case with the aid 
of reformulated concepts derived from the insightful yet inconclusive debate on 
nationalism, cultural globalisation and hybridisation. As explained earlier in this chapter, 
the process of cultural hybridisation does not take place on equal terms, and by 
extension individuals may not evaluate the component elements of the hybridised 
identity with equal weight. We should see 'national identity' as a system of cultural 
signification which helps to define a national political community and construct 
individuals as members of that community. We need to shift from an essentialist and 
unquestionable view of 'nation' to an analysis of the power relations between the 
dominant and subordinate forces in both the media representation and audience 
reception of nationhood. We thus need to consider how the sense of national identity is 
discursively constructed thorough the media and how individuals appropriate and/or 
reproduce nationhood in their everyday lives. Through a close examination of the 
historical conjunctures specific to the Taiwanese case, this research seek to attain some 
kind of qualified generalisation about the role of the media, and television in particular, 
in the formation of national identity.
With this aim in mind, I shall first turn to the contingent particularities of the Taiwanese 
case in the next chapter. As will be seen, in tune with the modernist view of nationalism, 
Chinese nationalism and its Taiwanese counterpart are more modem than are often 
supposed, and the state is the dominant force in the promotion of Chinese nationalism 
and the suppression of Taiwanese consciousness in Taiwan.
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3.
Nationalist Politics and Taiwan
What makes Taiwan a fascinating case for the study of nationalism is precisely the 
historical contingency which has placed the question of Taiwan at the heart of the 
Chinese nationalism that has been upheld for decades by the Chinese national' it 
regimes on either side of the Taiwan Strait.
The contribution of this chapter is built upon a disagreement with some western 
theorists of nationalism who tend to contrast China with the Western 'norm'. This 
contrast involves a number of binary oppositions:
• Historic versus modem : Scholars often use the Chinese case to question modernist 
theories of nationalism (e.g. Guibemau, 1996), assuming that Chinese nationalism 
stands in contrast to nationalism in the West. It is seen to embody antiquity and 
thus to have no need for modernity (as expressed in the collapse of Empire and the 
rise of industrialism). This assumption is so widely held that even Hobsbawm, a 
modernist theorist, endorses it (Hobsbawm, 1990).
• Ethnic versus civic: It is argued that Chinese nationalism is ethnic in character by 
comparison with its civic counterparts in Western Europe (e.g. Smith, 1991).
• A weak versus powerful influence of printing in the rise of nationalism: In contrast 
to the West, the printed word is seen to have had little effect on the historical rise 
of nationalism in China (Anderson, 1991).
I argue that the rise of nationalism was historically new to all of the Chinese societies, 
including China and Taiwan. Moreover, Chinese nationalism and its Taiwanese 
counterpart are less ethnic in character than is often supposed. I also pay special 
attention to the role of printing in the pre-modem absence (as well as modern presence) 
of nationalism in China (and, by extension, in Taiwan).
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The chapter begins with an historical overview of Chinese nationalism, which 
originated in Mainland China and was brought to Taiwan by the Chinese Nationalist 
Party (Kuomintang, KMT) from 1945 onwards. Chinese nationalism did not emerge 
until the late nineteenth century; before that, China was an Empire, perhaps 'the last of 
the old empires' (Habermas, 1998: 106). Its rise began after the cession of Taiwan to 
Japan and therefore had less significant influence in colonial Taiwan itself. Moreover, 
the nationalism that emerged in colonial Taiwan was another nationalism -  Taiwanese 
nationalism (also known as 'Formosan nationalism' in the early literature, e.g., Meisner, 
1964; Mendel, 1970) -  a phenomenon that will be addressed in the second half of this 
chapter.
3.1 C h in e s e  N a t i o n a l i s m  a n d  T a iw a n
Chinese nationalists across the Taiwan Strait have for decades claimed that the idea of 
the Taiwanese nation (or identity) was artificially created to persuade residents of 
Taiwan to cleave from the Chinese mainland.1 However, this perspective overlooks the 
issue of whether Chinese nationalism (which originated in Mainland China) itself might 
also be a modem invention. As the following historical review suggests, two strands of 
nationalist movements emerged and grew in Mainland China and Taiwan. Also, there 
was no such a thing as Chinese nationalism before the impending collapse of the Qing 
(Manchu) Empire; and before the rise of Chinese nationalism, Taiwan had already been 
ceded to become, in legal terms, part of Japan.
There was no nationalism in China before the impending collapse of the Qing Empire, 
when Sun Yat-sen organised the Association for Reviving China (Xingzhonghui, the 
predecessor of the KMT), China's first revolutionary group, against the Manchu rulers 
in 1894. From then onwards, China experienced a painful and prolonged transformation 
from an Empire to a national state. What nationalism manifested in China was a 
formidable task of transforming a 'civilisation' into a 'nation' (Kedourie, 1970: 65) -- a 
notion which was alien to China. As Lin concludes, 'Chinese national consciousness did
1 Halliday observes that 'for some, notably Kedourie or Hobsbawm, nationalism is, by dint o f its very 
artificiality and modernity, to be questioned; in polemical contexts o f interethnic conflict modernism can 
be used as a tool o f delegitimation -  against the other. Since "they" are recent invention, "they" have no 
legitimate claims' (Halliday, 2000: 156). Similarly, in the eyes o f Chinese nationalists, Taiwan has no 
legitimate claim to nationhood or statehood.
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not emerge from internal historical evolution but came instead through a traumatic blow 
struck from the outside' (Lin, 1979: 62).
3.1.1 The Traditional Chinese World Order
'The Chinese world order', coined by the Sinologist John Fairbank, refers to a set of 
cultural mentalities embedded in a traditional Sino-centric world (Fairbank, 1968). Ti e 
Sino-centric world extended far beyond the territories under Chinese administrative 
power, and China took a superior attitude towards its neighbouring peoples and applied 
a universal culturalism to them. As Fairbank points out, it was arguably a world without 
international relations, a world of a hierarchical order with China as its summit 
(Fairbank, 1968). It was a world (tianxia, or t fien-hsia, literally 'under the heaven') in 
which the Chinese imperial court, with its Confucian culture, was dominant and 
unchallenged by any of the neighbouring political and cultural formations. The 
Sinologist Joseph Levenson clearly illustrates what this Chinese world order meant:
Tien-hsia [Tianxia] signifies 'the (Chinese) Empire' -  alternatively, 'the 
world'; as t'ien-hsia, China is the world. And kuo \guo>\ is a local political 
unit, a part of 'the Empire' in classical times, and in the modem world, 'the 
nation'. (Levenson, 1958: 99, italics in the original)
The maintenance of the traditional Chinese world order thus accounts for the lack of 
nationalism in Chinese history. I argue that the late arrival of industrialisation and the 
absence of capitalism only partly explain why historically there was no nationalism in 
China. The point is that China was a world very different from that of Western Europe, 
where the international state-system was gradually formed mainly through the mutual 
competition among the states in military and economic terms (Tilly, 1975). This 
longstanding Chinese world order was inimical to the development of nationalism in 
China. Thus, for the Chinese, as Townsend argues, 'there was no concept of, or need for 
nationalism, in this world devoid of cultural or interstate competition' (Townsend, 1992: 
98-99).
The Chinese world order was primarily built on what was seen as the superior 
Confucian culture. A basic tenet in Confucian political thinking was the importance of 
maintaining the boundaries between what was perceived as China (the civilised world) 
and 'the rest' (the barbarian world). Nevertheless, these boundaries were not strictly 
defined by the notion of ethnicity; barbarians could easily become Chinese as long as
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they had been sufficiently cultivated by Confucian ethics (Bookman, 1992). In such a 
'world', there were virtually no clearly demarcated borders between China and 'the rest', 
not even the Great Wall. By the same token, Sinicised barbarians (e.g. the Manchus) 
were accepted as 'Sons of Heaven' by the Chinese 'with equanimity' (Anderson, 1991: 
13).
The mutually reinforcing concepts of cultural superiority and universal kingship were 
the products of 'the Chinese world order' and its underlying 'culturalism'. However, 
since it was by this time no longer based on descent from one particular ethnic group, 
nor located within clearly delineated borders, this consciousness could best be described 
as supranational. Since the Confucian ideology was seen as having a universal currem y 
that could be acquired by anybody, it followed that political legitimacy could be 
extended to non-Han groups such as Manchus and Mongols. Moreover, provided that 
these minorities accepted the prevailing orthodoxy, it was believed that they could 
exercise kingship in the same way. An important consequence of this was that the 
loyalty of their subjects was to the Confucian principle of 'rule-by-virtue', regardless of 
which ethnic group wielded it, rather than to a particular regime or nation state. At the 
same time, China's kinship-based social structure precluded identification with any unit 
higher than the family and clan.
3.1.2 Print and Nationalism in China
As a primary means of mass communication, printing has been widely recognised as a 
catalyst for the rise of nationalism. Yet, despite the fact that China was one of the first 
societies to use them, print and paper did not engender nationalism until the turn of the 
twentieth century. To assess the impact of printing on the rise of nationalism in the 
Chinese case, we need to take into account the writing system and the traditional 
Chinese world order: printing did have an influence on the rise of Chinese nationalism 
when the Chinese world order collapsed in the late nineteenth century. In other words, 
the absence of nationalism in pre-modem China cannot simply be explained away by 
'the absence of capitalism' (Anderson, 1991: 44).
Although Anderson correctly states that the Chinese script itself'created a community 
out of signs rather than sounds' (Anderson, 1991: 13), he attributes printing's failure to 
promote political and social transformations in China to the country's lack of capitalism.
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Hence, in contrast to printing's role as an agent of social change in the West, it exerted 
only a 'weak' influence in China (Anderson, 1991: 44, n.21). His argument can be 
qualified by making explicit the socio-political implications of the Chinese writing 
system. Since it was unsuited to representing the countless vernaculars spoken by 
ordinary people (as was Latin in Europe) and was composed principally of ideographs 
rather than phonetic elements, the Chinese script was never universally used as a means 
of mass communication. Due to the nature of the writing system, in contrast to the case 
of Western Europe, printing in China had little chance to create 'unified fields of 
exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars' and hence 
could not lay 'the bases for national consciousness' (Eisenstein, 1979: 44).
Over thousands of years in China, the only printed word, wen yen , remained the 
classical literary language and the preserve of elite classes such as civil servants, 
intellectuals and the gentry. Because of this 'sacred' writing system and the help of 
printing, a horizontal alliance among the elite was formed; and the elite effective y 
exerted its social control in the old Chinese world order. This writing system, together 
with printing, forged a high degree of cultural homogeneity among the elite in China, 
Korea, Vietnam and other places in East Asia. In other words, possessing literacy was 
akin to possessing a cultural capital that perpetuated the huge class divisions on which 
the continued imperial social order depended. Thus, China used to be a society in which 
the written language effectively precluded rather than facilitated access to literacy and 
the communication of ideas. Since the written/printed word was used in China as one of 
the principal agents of social stability, it is misleading to argue that printing was 'weak' 
in China.
Taken together, therefore, it was the Chinese world order and the nature of the Chine e 
writing system, rather than the absence of capitalism, that conditioned the influences of 
printing in making social change (e.g., the rise of Chinese nationalism) in China. There 
are some other grounds for this argument. First, the erosion of the Chinese world order 
did give rise to the political press in the late Qing period (Judge, 1996), when capitalism 
barely took root in China. Moreover, Chinese nationalists such as Sun Yat-sen did use 
printing to exert their profound influences upon the elite classes and finally overthrow 
the Qing Empire.
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Secondly, nationalism did not exceed the circle of the elite classes even after the 
Republican Revolution of 1911. The critical factor for this was that there was no 
language cutting across all classes and all regions to unite the 'nation'. The classical 
literary language, wen yen, was unsuited for this task, but there was no alternative 
written language -  not even for Mandarin, let alone the wide variety of other spoken 
languages in China. Against this background, some asserted in the Republican period 
that the Chinese characters should be abandoned and the Chinese spoken languages 
should be Europeanised (Romanised). But this radical move was opposed by many 
because, if this move succeeded, the Chinese people would not only speak differently 
but also write differently, thereby causing the already divided China during the period 
of warlordism (roughly between 1912 and 1928) to separate even further. Afterwards, 
while preserving the Chinese characters, the intellectuals finally invented a new literary 
language, paihua (or baihua), based on spoken Mandarin, and made efforts to promote 
it among the Chinese people (Goldman, 1973). Later, after the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) was established, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) further simplified 
the Chinese characters.
3.1.3 The Rise of Chinese Nationalism
Though Anderson does not appropriately assess the power of printing in stabilising the 
Chinese world order, I agree with his argument that 'the Middle Kingdom -  which, 
though we think of it today as Chinese, imagined itself not as Chinese, but as central' 
(Anderson, 1991: 12-13). This centrality, or as it has been called the 'Middle Kingdom 
Complex', was accepted as an authentic belief which it was the responsibility of the 
cultural elite to keep alive. Lucian Pye warns that 'the traditional Chinese "Middle 
Kingdom Complex" or the concept of Han chauvinism should not be treated as the same 
thing as Chinese nationalism' (Pye, 1993: 109). Chineseness was a symbolic, cultural, 
and (loosely defined) ethnic entity, sustained by interdependent infrastructures such as a 
unified script, an educated elite, etc. But this should in no way be construed as 
conferring the status of nation (McNeill, 1986). As will become clear in the following, 
the matter of who should be included in the newly established Chinese nation had 
confused the nationalists themselves.
55
(1) The invention o f  the Chinese nation
There was hardly any sense of national identity among the Chinese people. Not until 
1899 was the very term minzu (the equivalent of ’nation' in English) introduced into the 
Chinese vocabulary. The same is true of the Chinese term for 'nationalism' (minzu 
zhuyi). Even the Chinese 'national father', Sun Yat-sen, did not begin using both terms 
until 1904 (Hughes, 1997: 3). Sun Yat-sen was clearly aware of the absence of the 
'Chinese nation' he wished to promote when he gave a series of speeches in 1924. In the 
speeches which were later collected as Three Principles o f the People (San min zhu yi), 
he bitterly complained that the Chinese people had only family and clan groups and 
there was a lack (loss) of 'national spirit' because the Chinese were fragmented as 'a 
heap of loose sand' (Sun, 1969: 1). It is worth noting that the speeches were made a 
decade after the establishment of Republican China. This illustrated that although the 
revolution of 1911 tore down the old Empire, the 'nation' was yet to be built or imagined. 
People in rural China only began making sense of the notions of 'China' and 'Chinese 
nationality' as late as the late 1930s, when the Japanese troops ravaged China (Johnson, 
1962; Waldron, 1995). The same is true of the overseas Chinese in South East Asia 
(Anderson, 1998).
It is also worthy of note that all the ethnic groups mentioned by Anderson belong 
culturally to the Han, China's largest ethnic group. But there are more than 50 other 
officially acknowledged minorities which presently make up China. Suffice it to say 
that a Chinese nation of which the Han and other minority groups (such as Tibetans) are 
inclusive is a modem invention, involving a form of national myth-making which 
conflated the Empire with the nation-state. As will be argued in the following 
paragraphs, the Han was exactly the 'nation' that the Chinese nationalists in the late 
nineteenth century attempted to make, although the 'nation' was later extended to 
include other ethnic groups within the confines of the former Qing Empire. The process 
of expanding the meaning of the Chinese nation clearly demonstrated how the Chinese 
nationalists created the boundaries of nationhood.
At first, Chinese nationalism was synonymous with anti-Manchu nationalism amidst the 
impending traditional Chinese world order. The seeds of the collapse of culturalism had 
been sown around the time of the Opium Wars (1839-1842), and by the end of the 
nineteenth century most of its pillars had been undermined. The first target of what
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nationalist feeling there was at this time was the Manchu ruling class, who were blamed 
for China’s inability to stand up to the challenges posed by the powers. Since the 
Manchus had themselves been foreign aggressors, the nationalist revolt could at the 
same time be construed as anti-imperialist in character, yet its basic appeal was to Sino- 
centric sentiment as a means of reasserting the 'superior' ethnic-Han Chinese culture and 
values. By the time it erupted in the 1911 revolution, its strategy had not developed 
much beyond the elemental desire to overthrow the Manchus. The Chinese nation was 
imagined by the revolutionary nationalists not to include the Manchus. It was therefore 
not surprising that instead of the emergence of an integrated Chinese nation, all that 
followed was the collapse of the Empire and chaos on an unprecedented scale.
Subsequently, the 'nation' was re-invented to include all 'Chinese', regardless of ethnic, 
linguistic or religious differences, from within the former Manchu Empire. After the 
Republican revolution of 1911, Sun Yat-sen reinterpreted Chinese nationalism to 
include all the ethnic groups (the Manchus included) to make the Chinese nation, which 
was to be formed by five main ethnic groups (the Han, Manchus, Mongols, Muslim, ai d 
Tibetans). The 'five-barred flag' was adopted by the early Republic to reflect this 
reinterpretation (Hoston, 1994: 190).
(2) Two rival heirs to Chinese Nationalism
The development of Chinese nationalism split into two contrasting currents: a culturally 
syncretistic nationalism on the one hand and an iconoclastic anti-traditional nationalism 
on the other. The former was chiefly represented by the KMT and the latter was 
represented by the CCP. However, both currents of nationalism were similar insofar as 
the traditionalist unifying myth of 'all under heaven' 'was readily transferred [from 
culturalism] to state nationalism, which asserts that the state represents the true interests 
of its people as a whole, who constitute a nation in being or becoming, whatever their 
past cultural and political difference' (Townsend, 1992: 113). This is shown by the fact 
that once the modem Chinese states (the KMT state in the Republican era and the 
Communist state in the post-1949 era) were established, they asserted sovereignty over 
old imperial territories and extended the definition of 'Chinese' to incorporate non-Han 
peoples into a Chinese polity under their control.
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This was actually an all-embracing concept of'the Chinese nation', which was employed 
to include all ethnic groups as well as to claim the territories of the former Empire. As 
Lucian Pye asserts, 'it is important to distinguish Chinese nationalism from all the 
powerful sentiments associated with Chinese cultural and ethnic identity' (Pye, 1993: 
110). Pye also finds it ironic that, despite its enormously rich cultural heritage, the 
nationalism displayed by China today appears relatively contentless. He recommends 
seeking definitions of Chinese nationalism, not from the claims of the nationalists 
themselves, but from what China was and who the Chinese used to be.
What was (or is) Chinese nationalism is hard to decide, but Pye probably comes as close 
as we will get when he asserts that 'Chinese nationalism is not something Chinese 
society can use to limit the Chinese state. Rather, Chinese nationalism is what the 
leaders of the day say it is, and this means that it becomes a defence of their formulation 
of what the consensus should be' (Pye, 1992: 231-232). Since 1949, the two heirs vO 
Chinese nationalism, the CCP and the KMT, have represented two rival states across the 
Taiwan Strait, and accordingly Taiwan has become an agenda of central importance to 
Chinese nationalism.
3.1.4 Taiwan in Chinese Nationalism
At the end of the nineteenth century, Taiwan was regarded as China's least significant 
province. A mere 50 years later it was considered the most significant. What is 
remarkable is that both these contrary assessments were considered to be in the best 
interests of China as a whole.
The first assessment, by the Qing Empire, entailed hiving off Taiwan in 1895 to appease 
Japan, presumably in the hope that the integrity of the rest of the country would not be 
further threatened. The second assessment, by the KMT in Taiwan after 1949, was 
based on the need to include Taiwan in the ROC, the political recognition of which 
depended on its territorial possession of at least one constituent province. An important 
consequence of both these circumstances has been that for most of the last hundred 
years, the dominant perspective surrounding any discussion of the Taiwan question has
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been essentially nationalist. This has been particularly the case since 1949.2 Both the 
CCP on the Chinese mainland and the KMT on Taiwan itself have insisted that the 
island be re-united within the framework of a single Chinese nation (under their 
respective regimes).
First of all, Taiwan was not included as a part of China in the versions of the draft 
constitutions that were written for the republic established in 1912. Secondly, when 
Taiwan was mentioned in the Chinese nationalist discourses, it was not explicit y 
regarded as a territory that the new republic purported to include. For example, in Sun 
Yat-sen's Three Principles o f the People, Taiwan was listed alongside Korea, Vietnam, 
and others as 'the lost territories' (Sun, 1969: 13-14) by the old standards of the Qing 
Empire. Under Japanese colonial rule, the Taiwanese who went to China were treated 
by the Chinese 'as foreigners in the same way as Koreans' (Hughes, 1997: 5).
The above examples represented the KMT view on Taiwan. But there was no difference 
on the part of the CCP, another heir to Chinese nationalism. A thorough analysis of 
CCP documents between 1928 and 1943 shows that the CCP recognised the Taiwanese 
nationalist movement which took root under Japanese colonial rule as 'a national 
liberation by a distinct Taiwanese nation (minzu)' (Hughes, 1997: 13). Mao T s e - tu rg  
himself was said to take a similar view on Taiwan. In 1936, Edgar Snow, an American 
journalist with close connections to the CCP, had an audience with Mao. The 
conversation between Snow and Mao clearly reveals that Mao tended to see the 
Taiwanese as a distinct nation who had a right to self-determination (Snow, 1972: 128- 
129).
The Chinese nationalist view on Taiwan only started changing in 1942, when Chiang 
Kai-shek made claim to Taiwan. The claim that 'all the territories Japan has stolen from 
the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan], and the Pescadores [Penghu Island], 
shall be restored to the Republic of China' (quoted in Hughes, 1997: 6) received 
recognition from the United States and Great Britain at the Cairo Conference in 1943, 
when Chiang met Roosevelt and Churchill.
2
The territorial claims made by the CCP and KMT largely overlap, especially in respect o f policies 
concerning the independence o f Tibet and the Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang. Until recently, the KMT also 
laid claim to Outer Mongolia, now known as the People's Republic o f Mongolia.
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After the Second World War, the civil war between the KMT and the CCP resulted .n 
the defeat of the KMT. Chiang Kai-shek and the remaining KMT forces fled to Taiwan 
in 1949. It was the CCP's turn to lay claim to Taiwan with the aim of 'liberating' the 
island from KMT control. The KMT claimed Taiwan for the simple reason that it 
represented its last stand. At the same time, the CCP's claim to Taiwan showed that the 
CCP could not afford to be less 'nationalist' and 'patriotic' than the KMT. This 
confrontation between the CCP and the KMT during the Cold War confirmed that 
Taiwan had secured its position as a critical dimension of the Chinese nationalism to 
which both the KMT and CCP regarded themselves as the only legitimate heir. Making 
claim to Taiwan as part of China has been vital to the legitimacy of the KMT and the 
CCP in both domestic and international politics. It enabled the KMT to secure its status 
as the legitimate government of China in the United Nations up to 1971. The Taiwan 
issue was also crucial for the CCP. As Hughes argues:
If CCP dictatorship was to be established on the strange hybrid of 
nationalism and proletarian revolutionism, what is particularly relevant for 
the long-term significance of Taiwan in PRC politics is how the former 
element comes to take on an increasing prominence as belief in the 
revolution and CCP governance declines. (Hughes, 1997: 14-15)
3.2 Taiw anese N ationalism  and C hina
Two major historical factors characterise Taiwan society above all others: one is that for 
centuries the island has been settled by people who emigrated from south-eastern China. 
Secondly, they have been mostly dominated by a succession of foreign regimes: the 
Spanish, the Dutch, the Manchus, the Japanese, as well as (from the perspective of some 
Taiwanese), the Chinese Nationalist regime that took over Taiwan at the close of the 
Second World War.
In 1590, when the Portuguese navigators 'discovered' the island and named it 'Formosa', 
Taiwan was also 'new' to the Chinese. Prior to its 'discovery' by Western navigators, it 
had been settled only by aboriginal, non-Chinese peoples who today comprise roughly 1 
per cent of the population. The Han Chinese people did not constitute Taiwan's majority 
population until the seventeenth century. By 1642 the Dutch, who had annexed the 
island after receiving the message that it remained unclaimed even by China, were 
firmly in control (Goddard, 1966: 51). It was in this year that the Dutch East India
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Company (DEIC), having expelled the Spanish from the north of the island, set up a 
political administration and began to levy taxes from the inhabitants (Wu, 1995: 20). In 
1661, Koxinga (also known as Zheng Chengong), a Ming Dynasty (1369-1644) loyalist, 
expelled the DEIC in turn and set up a Chinese regime. This was the first time that 
Chinese people had exercised political control of Taiwan, and waves of migration from 
China ensued, driving the aboriginal population into the mountainous interior of the 
island (Lai et al., 1991: 13). However, Koxinga's regime, whose declared aim was to 
recapture the mainland from the Manchus and banish them to beyond the Great Wall, 
lasted only until 1683, when his grandson surrendered the island to the Qing (Manchu) 
Empire (1644-1911).
The Manchu Emperor regarded this newly acquired territory as hua wai zi di (literally, 
'a place outside the [Chinese] civilisation'). He gave orders to evacuate to the mainland a 
significant number of the inhabitants (including Koxinga's defeated armies) and 
prohibited any further emigration in the other direction for fear of future rebellions 
against the Qing Empire. However, as the population of China expanded, the regin e 
was increasingly unable to prevent people from sailing there illegally from China's 
south-eastern seaboard. Up to 1722, a law prohibited emigration for all except relatives 
of Taiwan residents, but after this date the law was no longer enforced. It was not 
actually abolished however until 1875 (Tu, 1993).
Although there was a degree of economic integration, Taiwan's political integration 
with China during Manchu rule was tenuous (Moody, 1992: 40). Not until in 1685 did 
the Qing dynasty bestow any administrative structure of its own on Taiwan, and then 
only by making it a prefecture of Fujian province. For most of the period it appears to 
have been regarded as a lawless society populated by random immigration from the 
coastal provinces of China. From time to time fierce fighting broke out amongst tl e 
different ethno-linguistic communities; however, the local government does not appear 
to have intervened. There are some records of rebellions against the Qing (Moody, 
1992), but despite the weakness of the centre, there is little evidence before 1895 for 
supposing that a distinct Taiwanese consciousness developed.
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3.2.1 The Birth of Taiwanese Consciousness
The real attempt by the Qing dynasty to bring some order to the island was made in 
1885, when, in belated recognition of its economic and political importance, Taiwan 
was declared a separate province of China. Its first governor, Liu Mingchuan, initiated a 
programme of early modernisation (Goddard, 1966: 176).
Subsequently, Japan demanded Taiwan as reparation following the first Sino-Japanese 
war, and the crumbling Qing regime duly sacrificed it in the Treaty o f Shimonoseki of 
1895. The response of the Taiwanese themselves to being made the scapegoat for the 
Qing regime's impotence was to declare a republic of their own. They named their new 
state Taiwan Minzhuguo (literally, 'the Democratic Republic of Taiwan'). This was 
arguably the first attempt in Asia to build a republican state. It was also extremely short­
lived and little evidence about the social penetration of the ideals of its proponents 
survives (Tu, 1996: 1124).
Once Japan had established solid control of Taiwan by 1905, the process of early 
modernisation begun by Liu Mingchuan only accelerated and Taiwan's separation from 
the Chinese mainland inevitably became even more marked. The Japanese colonisers 
worked efficiently to develop its first colony Taiwan. There were also significant 
advances in aspects of mass education, literacy, medical care, and communications. 
Furthermore, for the first time in the history of the island, a functioning legal and police 
system was established (Beasley, 1987; Ho, 1984; Tu, 1993).
The combined result of these developments under Japanese colonial rule was a society 
becoming more economically self-sufficient, socially integrated and politically stable. 
However they were viewed, these conditions had conferred on the Taiwanese a sense of 
a separate destiny sufficient to lay the basis for a separate Taiwanese consciousness (Ho, 
1984; Lai et al., 1991). At the same time, the awareness-raising effect of developments 
overseas spurred on the rise of a Taiwanese nationalist movement demanding equal 
citizenship and self-government. The rise of a Taiwanese nationalist movement was 
also stimulated by external developments such as the Chinese Republican Revolution uf 
1911, Taiwanese students' experiences of constitutional democracy in Japan during the 
Taisho period (1911-1925), the American President Wilson's declaration in 1918 of the
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principle of national determination, and the mass demonstrations for Korean 
Independence in the spring of 1919 (Wu, 1971: 76-77).
In 1920, the local bourgeois Lin Xian-tang and a group of Taiwanese students in Tokyo 
set up the so-called Xinminhui or 'Association of New Citizens', the aim being to raise 
Taiwanese nationalist sentiment and initiate a long-term struggle for both self- 
government and equal citizenship. Since previous experience of armed struggle against 
the combined forces of the Japanese military and police had proved futile, the strategy 
adopted was liberal rather than radical. Their actions included publication of a 
nationalist newspaper and journals, the lobbying of the Diet (Japanese parliament) for a 
Taiwan-based assembly, and eventually the organisation of the first political party in 
Taiwan's history, the Taiwan People's Party (TPP, established in 1927, was banned m
1931 by the Japanese colonial government), to press for devolution and autonomous 
self-government (Wu, 1971:142, 150).
Many obstacles were placed in the way of the nationalists' attempts to publish and 
distribute newspapers and periodicals. Lin Xian-tang's first publication, the Taiwan 
Youth Periodical (later renamed Taiwan), first appeared in 1920. Published in Japanese 
with a section in Chinese, it circulated predominantly among Taiwanese students in 
Japan. A second periodical, the Taiwan Minbao, appeared three years later in Tokyo. It 
took years of lobbying for permission to publish in Taiwan itself and it was not until
1932 that the Taiwan Xinminbao finally appeared there. Although the same restrictions 
were placed on language as before (only one third of the content was in Chinese), the 
Taiwan Xinminbao was the only Taiwanese-owned and operated newspaper ever to 1 e 
published daily throughout the 51-year rule of the Japanese colonial government. Over 
the next five years its circulation rose from 10,000 to 50,000, making it the second 
biggest-selling newspaper in Taiwan. It was forced by the Japanese colonial government 
to be incorporated into a Japanese-owned newspaper when the second Sino-Japanese 
war broke out in 1937 (Robinson, 1984: 323; Wu, 1971: 551-552, 558, 568).
Of the campaigns launched by the early Taiwanese nationalists, the most notable was its 
annual lobby (from 1920 to 1934) of the Diet for a Taiwanese assembly with legislative 
and fiscal powers to be elected by the residents of Taiwan. Calling for an end to the 
despotic rule of the Governor-General, they demanded that Tokyo should allow Taiwan 
to become an autonomous dominion. Although there was some support among the
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Japanese for some of the Taiwanese nationalists' aims, pleas for a parliament tended to 
be regarded as a Trojan horse of independence and national self-determination (Wu, 
1971: 156). Nevertheless, while local Japanese-owned newspapers tried to discredit 
these claims, Tokyo-based Japanese newspapers did show a degree of sympathy (Wu, 
1971: 168-174).
In 1921, the limitations on access to print media prompted Lin Xian-tang and others to 
set up cultural organisations for promoting Taiwanese national consciousness. They 
organised meetings throughout the island involving activities such as public speaking, 
newspaper reading clubs, and theatrical and other performances using Taiwanese 
vernaculars. Additionally, study camps were organised in summer vacations to teach 
students Taiwanese history and related knowledge (Wu, 1971: 92).
In 1927, news of the massacre of communists in Shanghai by Chiang Kai-shek's KMT 
caused a major split in the Association for Taiwanese Culture (Jian, 1997: 65-66). In 
Taiwan itself the remnants of the Association for Taiwanese Culture together with the 
Peasants' Association turned leftwards in sympathy, eventually becoming the Taiwanese 
Communist Party with the declared aims of overthrowing Japanese imperialism and 
seeking national independence for Taiwan (Jian, 1997: 141-142). The right, meanwhile, 
remained true to its liberal reformist tradition by re-organising itself under the banner of 
the TPP. Initially this was sanctioned by the colonial government, a move which was 
doubtless designed to dissuade the growth of a more militant opposition. As such it 
became the first legal political party in Taiwan's history but not for long: four years later, 
in 1931, it too was banned (Wu, 1971: 150).
What was demonstrated by these early nationalist campaigns was above all their pursuit 
of self-government and full citizenship rather than unification with China or separation 
from Japan. Before the Taiwanese nationalists' left-right split, there had been no call for 
complete independence from Japan, still less for a 'return' to China. Moreover, it was 
significant that even after the split, the national liberation strategy of the left (the 
Taiwanese communists) entailed the establishment of a national identity that was 
distinct from those of both Japan and China. Viewed from either a liberal or communist 
perspective, Taiwanese nationalism was arguably civic in character and in no sense a 
ramification of the incipient ethnic Chinese nationalism on the mainland. In any case,
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despite divisions on strategy, the cause of self-government continued to receive support 
amongst the population at large until the Japanese were defeated.
3.2.2 The Coming of fChinaf
The defeat of the Japanese at the end of the Second World War brought the Taiwanese 
not only de-colonisation but also the prospect of self-government. During the war and 
especially prior to an eventually abortive plan of seizing Taiwan for use as a base for an 
amphibious attack on the Japanese Mainland, the U.S. had launched a propaganda 
campaign via broadcasting and leaflets. The aim was to persuade the local population o 
assist this military operation or at least to behave as neutrals (Dreyer, 1995: 281; Kerr, 
1965: ch.2).3 Upon Japan's surrender in August 1945, American propaganda and world 
news entered Taiwan, raising the expectation of self-governance among the Taiwanese 
(Kerr, 1965). The actual outcome — no self-governance and China's takeover of 
Taiwan -  was a cruel blow to the Taiwanese (Lai et al., 1991: 51). It seemed to Taiwan 
nationalists that, as in the case of the Qing dynasty's ceding of Taiwan to Japan, the 
Taiwanese had once again not been consulted.4
When the Japanese troops surrendered in 1945, most Taiwanese rejoiced to see the end 
of Japanese rule. However, their excitement soon faded as they saw the poorly 
disciplined soldiers and officials arriving as late as in October 1945 from the Chine e 
mainland in sharp contrast to that of the relatively disciplined Japanese. The islanders 
soon realised that returning to the motherland was going to be far from auspicious (Kerr, 
1965; Lai et al., 1991; Peng, 1973; Wu, 1995). A common expression of the time 
characterising the transfer of Taiwan from the Japanese administration to the Chinese 
administration was gou zou zhu lai or 'out with the dogs, in with the pigs' (see Lai et al., 
1991:93).
It was undoubtedly this clash of rising expectations and disappointed reality that 
culminated on February 28 1947 in what later became locally memorised as Ererba
3
In 1945 the number of radio sets in Taiwan was estimated at 50,000 (Kerr, 1965: 63); in 1947, when the 
February 28 Incident occurred, the number was 100,000 (Lai et al., 1991: 106).
4 Taiwan's post-World War II status was a contentious matter. Some have argued that the diplomatic 
realignments which ensued from the de-colonialisation o f Taiwan failed to take into account the then 
prevailing principles o f national self-determination as they applied to de-colonised areas all over the 
world (Chen and Lasswell, 1967).
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shijian (the February 28 Incident). In a savage crackdown, thousands of protesters 
against the KMT were killed by troops despatched from the Chinese mainland and 
many more were jailed and tortured (Kerr, 1965; Lai et al., 1991). Observers report < d 
that the government that had taken over the island just two years earlier killed thousands 
of Taiwanese. The New York Times correspondent Tillman Durdin reported on March 
29 1947 that 'these witnesses estimate that 10,000 Formosans were killed by the 
Chinese armed forces. The killings were described as "completely unjustified" in view 
of the nature of the demonstrations.'5 The death toll caused by the Incident varied 
considerably from 6,000 (Lai et al., 1991) to 28,000 (The Economist, 8 March 1997: 76). 
Most of them were native educated doctors, lawyers and landlords. Clearly, this incident 
marked a defining moment in the history of Taiwan. It was followed by a regime of 
KMT police suppression wielded with varying degrees of severity right up to 1987, 
when martial law was finally lifted. It is not surprising that, up to the turn of the 1990s, 
the February 28 Incident and the subsequent 'white terror' (an anti-communist witc i- 
hunt) of the 1950s remained officially ascribed to the actions of Communist agitators, 
and discussion of them was taboo in Taiwan. The fact was, however, that without 
eliminating the native opposition in this way, it is unlikely that the KMT state would 
ever have been able to consolidate itself on the island.
It took more than a decade after the Incident for another opposition group to emerge. It 
was not until 1960 that the fragmented and weakened opposition reassembled under a 
different banner as an informal association of native politicians and liberal intellectuals 
of'Mainlander' origin attempting to organise a political party. Using the columns of the 
Free China Semi-Monthly, a liberal periodical published by Lei Zhen, they criticised 
Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship and called for a real 'Free China' instead of the KMT's 
self-styled version. During the same period, native scholar Peng Ming-min drafted the 
1964 Declaration o f Taiwanese Salvation with an explicit appeal to Taiwanese self- 
determination. Soon afterwards, both Lei Zhen and Peng Ming-min were imprisoned 
(see Hughes, 1997: 33-36). In January 1972, following the ROC’s expulsion from the 
UN and completion of his ten-year prison sentence, Lei Zhen addressed his Jiuwang 
Tucun Xianyi (A Proposal fo r the Survival o f  the Country) to Chiang Kai-shek, in which 
he proposed to rename the ROC the Democratic Republic of Chinese Taiwan
5 Available online from http://cinemaspace.berkeley.edu/Papers/CityOfSadness/thread.html.
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(Zhonghua Taiwan Mingzhuguo). Coincidentally, this echoed the same name (Taiwan 
Mingzhuguo) by which the short-lived republic declared in the late nineteenth century 
had been known. Lei’s justification was that that ‘the territories we are now governing 
used to be called “Taiwan”. If we include “Taiwan” in the official name of the country, 
then the country [the ROC based on “one China” policy] will since no longer exist as a 
myth’ (cited in Li, 1995: 79, translations are mine). This second wave of Taiwanese 
nationalism since the defeat of Japan was stopped in its tracks by KMT suppression.
The third wave began to gather momentum in 1971. This was the year in which the 
Republic of China on Taiwan was expelled from membership of the United Nations 
(and replaced by the Beijing-based government of the People's Republic). This was a 
move that brought the KMT's project of constructing Taiwan as a microcosm of all 
China open to challenge.
Following Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations, the most noteworthy of many 
political magazines to emerge were The Taiwan Political Review and The Formosa 
Magazine. All were critical of the KMT and demanded democracy. The KMT 
responded by confiscating or suspending the publications and even imprisoning the 
publishers. Such dissident journals provided a key vehicle for the arguments of 
Taiwanese nationalists, who had gathered sufficient momentum in 1986 to set up their 
own political party—the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)— even 
before the KMT had officially withdrawn its ban on the formation of opposition 
groupings. The KMT must have known that this third wave of the democratic 
movement with implicit Taiwanese nationalist appeal was unstoppable.
Before moving on to map the later trajectories of Taiwan nationalism, I will examine in 
turn some linked strands from which the knot of Taiwan's national identity question has 
been tied.
(1) The marginalisation o f  the ethnic majority
It has been claimed that for the sake of consolidating and legitimating an authoritarian 
regime and minimising potential ethnic conflict (and even secession movements), the 
state tends to recruit from and therefore incorporate the ethnic majority (Smith, 1991:
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41). Over the first two decades of the KMT rule in Taiwan, however, the very opposite 
was the case. In practice this meant that 'Mainlanders' simply filled the political vacuum 
left by the departing Japanese occupiers. All the top positions of power on the island 
within party, government and military were assigned to 'Mainlanders' who had taken 
refuge with Chiang Kai-shek's defeated armies after 1949. Since no national elections 
were held until 1969, this meant that Taiwan's ethnic majority was effectively excluded 
from political participation for the first two decades of KMT rule. Even then only a 
limited number of seats in the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly were open to 
contest for the purpose of supplementing the seats previously occupied by delegates 
'representing' Mainland constituencies.
In fact it was not until the 1970s that 'native Taiwanese' were recruited to any of the 
ROC’s ruling circles. The initiative here was taken by Chiang Kai-shek’s son Chiang 
Ching-kuo, who, on assuming the premiership in 1972, appointed three 'native 
Taiwanese' members of the 19-member Executive Yuan,6 the national cabinet of the 
Republic of China (ROC). This was part of a 'Taiwanisation' policy designed to 
strengthen the regime’s legitimacy over Taiwan and thereby to compensate for its lost 
international legitimacy (Moody, 1992: 5; Wu, 1995). Although the policy took effect 
slowly — ‘native’ membership of the Executive Yuan was still only 7 in 1986 (Domes, 
1993: 121) — these efforts at ‘Taiwanisation’, which are still commended by DPP 
figures today, did help the KMT to improve its relations with the ethnic majority in 
Taiwan. Nevertheless, the continuing political dominance of ‘Mainlanders’ was by ro 
means compromised. Even in 1987, the last year of Chiang Ching-kuo's rule, the ethnic 
composition of top positions of the ruling party, national cabinet, military, police and 
parliament were still far from proportional. Although they made up less than 13 per cent 
of the population, 'Mainlanders' occupied most of the top positions in state organs and 
up to 96 per cent of the top positions in the military (Kau, 1996: 57, 59; Moody, 1992: 
59).
(2) Prolongation o f  the civil war
The outcome of the civil war between the Nationalist and Communist Parties was the 
establishment of the PRC in October 1949. Paradoxically, though, the war on the
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opposite side of the Taiwan Strait has never ended. It has been cynically prolonged for 
more than four decades, and has affected every aspect of Taiwan politics since, 
including the Leninist structure of the ruling KMT and the resulting authoritarian style 
of governance.
In 1949 it seemed unlikely that the KMT government could survive without external 
support, notably from the United States. Prior to the Korean War, U.S. policy toward 
Taiwan was confused. But, following the PRC’s intervention in the Korean conflict, and 
principally as a means to contain the spread of international communism, it was firmed 
up into U.S. recognition of the KMT regime as the sole legitimate government of China 
(Gold, 1993: 171; Moody, 1992: 67). As long as Taiwan was embroiled in intermittent 
disputes as one of the parties to a civil war and there was no plebiscite to prove 
otherwise, there seemed no alternative for other countries such as Japan but to go along 
with the KMT regime (Gold, 1993; Kerr, 1965; Moody, 1992).
In retrospect, the consolidation of the KMT on Taiwan depended not only on the 
regime's ability to legitimate its representative status as the government of China but 
also on its maintenance of the one-party dictatorship by means of state repression. Thus, 
the advocacy of Taiwanese independence was inevitably tarred with the brush of 
collaboration with the rival Communist regime (Tsang, 1993: 2-3). The situation was 
loaded with ironies, not the least of which was that the Taiwanese people were being 
prevailed upon to sacrifice their civil rights for the sake of recovering the mainland, a 
cause which was not only futile but also superfluous. In short, the KMT had boxed itself 
into a comer. Its argument, as Moody points out, was circular: its rule over Taiwan 
could only be justified by its claim to the whole of China, while its claim to rule the 
whole of China functioned as the prerequisite of its rule over Taiwan (Moody, 1992: 4- 
5).
(3) The mismatch between the state and the governed
At the beginning of his introduction to In the Shadow o f China, Tsang states:
6 One o f the three was Lee Teng-hui, who became in 1984 the Vice President o f  ROC and in 1988 
succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo as the first native-born President o f ROC in Taiwan.
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The history of Taiwan since 1949 is a paradox. For all practical purposes, it 
is an independent state. However, its government has most vehemently held 
that an independent state of Taiwan does not exist. (Tsang, 1993: 1)
The paradox highlighted by Tsang is that for the KMT Taiwan was only a temporary 
base, since it claimed that it formed the government of the whole of China. The chief 
means by which the Chinese nationalists have achieved this is the 1947 Constitution of 
the Republic of China, which represents for them a sacred source of legitimacy, known 
in Chinese as fatong. However, their constant struggle over half a century to preserve 
fatong has not only widened the gap between the polity and the governed but created a 
whole range of political anomalies. For the KMT to narrow the gap in any way would 
be tantamount to undermining its claim to be the sole and legitimate government of all 
China. Hence the necessity, from the KMT's point of view, to retain the four-tier 
political system in Taiwan as if the government still governed the whole of China.
At the apex of this system was the central government, ostensibly for all China. Below 
that were ranged the Taiwan provincial government and the Taipei and Kaohsiung 
municipal governments. The third level comprised municipalities (shi) and counties 
(xian), and the fourth towns (xiang) and districts (//). Administratively such a structure 
was superfluous, since the territories controlled by the ROC government coincided with 
those of the 'province' of Taiwan. However, if the ROC government had reduced this 
structure by even one tier, at either central or provincial level, at a stroke it would have 
become a government of Taiwan alone. Many political debates addressed this anomaly, 
but for all the old reasons of self-preservation the KMT remained reluctant to amend the 
1947 constitution (Tsang, 1993: 5) until the late 1990s.
A further political anomaly was manifested in the non-elective parliamentary bodic 3, 
which demonstrated an inability to replace members elected in 1947 from Mainland 
constituencies to the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan upon 
expiry of their terms of office. According to the KMT's conception of legitimacy, if the 
ROC government reconstituted these bodies by holding elections only in territories 
under its control, it would lose its claim to represent the whole of China. Thus, in order 
to maintain the myth, it continued to regard these ageing members as representatives of 
the entire Chinese nation. Not until January 1989, when a law was passed requiring 
these members to retire by the end of 1991, was this anomaly resolved.
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(4) The promotion o f  Chinese nationalism
Taiwan's residents were divided by two conflicting mentalities: those of the 
'Mainlanders' and the 'native Taiwanese'. As we have seen, mutual antagonisms arose 
between these two groups almost as soon as Chiang Kai-shek's troops set foot on the 
island. I have also considered some of the political consequences for the Taiwanese of 
the KMT regime's need to present itself as the representative of the people of the whole 
of China. There were also far-reaching cultural consequences. Public discourses tended 
to be overloaded with high-pitched patriotic sentiments. Social infrastructures, 
particularly educational and military programmes, were full of explicit political and 
nationalist indoctrination.
Another important way in which the KMT sought to bolster its image as the guardian of 
Chinese traditional culture was to establish in Taipei a Committee for Chinese Cultural 
Renaissance. Headed by President Chiang Kai-shek himself, this was Taiwan's response 
to Communist China's so-called Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960s, 
and was a vehicle for the promotion of Chinese nationalism. An ideological dispute was 
whipped up between the two rival states on the theme of 'Cultural Renaissance' versus 
'Cultural Revolution'. The Communists on the Chinese mainland declared war on 
traditional Chinese culture and religion, attacked Confucian values, destroyed ancient 
temples, tortured practitioners and scholars of tradition, and banned traditional opera 
and literature. By contrast, the KMT in Taiwan promoted a renaissance of Chinese 
traditions, art forms, Confucianism and Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles o f  the People. 
Much of the posturing was done by the two rival party leaders (Mao Tse-tung and 
Chiang Kai-shek) personally, and in both territories the cult of personality ran riot.
In Taiwan the KMT strove to characterise Chiang Kai-shek as the inheritor of Chinese 
culture and the island itself as the repository of China's cultural heritage. To be loyal to 
Chiang therefore also meant to be patriotic to the Chinese nation. The converse was 
deemed to be true, of course, and the consequences for Taiwanese subjectivity of th.s 
ideological battle to make Taiwan more Chinese than the Chinese mainland were 
profound. These practices were accompanied by a simultaneous suppression of 
Taiwanese local culture and languages. Schoolchildren were punished for speaking their 
mother tongue in school. Though they had to memorise the names of Mainland rivers 
and mountains, they learned next to nothing about the island they lived on. Main roads
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in Taiwanese cities were renamed after Chiang Kai-shek or Sun Yat-sen. Streets in 
Taipei were renamed after Mainland cities such as Beijing or Nanjing, as if the whole of 
China had been transplanted there. Native place names that even the Japanese had 
retained were replaced by the KMT. Until the early 1990s the KMT continued to mark 
in people’s identity cards their places of origin in the Chinese mainland.
3.2.3 The Return of Taiwanese Consciousness
The result of this bombardment by Chinese nationalism, however, was that Taiwanese 
consciousness returned to the political front. In using the term 'returned', I deliberate 
imply its earlier emergence but do not mean the two are one and the same. In its ear’y 
form, as already explained, Taiwanese consciousness moved forward the campaigns for 
home rule, the goal for which the Taiwanese had struggled under Japanese colonialism 
and in the early years of the KMT regime (Kerr, 1965, 1974; Lai et al., 1991). Despite 
differences between Taiwanese nationalism of late and its predecessor in the 
colonial/post-war times, the agenda of Taiwanese nationalism since the 1970s has 
remained clear: to aim by means of civic strategies for a polity based upon popular 
sovereignty. In the run-up to the political transition of 1987-1988 and over the decade 
since the transition, Taiwanese nationalism has played a pivotal role in Taiwan's far- 
reaching political transformation.
As has been noted, the one-party state in Taiwan limited the range of electoral 
competition and political participation for nearly half a century. Nevertheless, since the 
1970s, international isolation coupled with the emergence of the middle class created by 
steady economic growth within the island has given rise to an emergent civil society in 
Taiwan. As Taiwan's middle class grew stronger, the non-KMT native elite started to 
challenge KMT's authoritarianism in various ways. One involved the first mass 
demonstration against the KMT since 1949. This took place in Zhongli during 
communal elections in 1977. Two years later, following de-recognition by the U.S. and 
the KMT's suspension of national elections of 1978, the so-called Formosa Incident 
erupted in Kaohsiung. This was a mass rally calling for a new Parliament 
comprehensively re-elected from a constituency which included 'native Taiwanese'. The 
subsequent suppression, military trial and imprisonment of the organisers stimulated 
anti-KMT sentiment throughout the country, and it was significant that throughout
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succeeding national elections in the early 1980, they garnered considerable sympathy 
and support from voters (Li, 1987).
During the 1980s, a series of collective actions and social initiatives were launched 
against the KMT. Issues ranged from environmental protection through agricultural 
policy and freedom of speech to women's rights (Hsiao, 1990). These popular 
movements accelerated a resurgence of Taiwanese consciousness and, as explained 
earlier in this chapter, in 1986 a new political party was (illegally) established for the 
first time since 1945. The general expectation was that the KMT government would ban 
it. However the desire of the Taiwanese people had finally become obvious enough 
even for Chiang Ching-kuo to realise that this would be counter-productive. More 
surprising however was Chiang's move to lift martial law, repeal the ban on opposition 
newspapers, and to legalise opposition parties. This dramatic change, which suggested 
that even a powerful authoritarian state had to make concessions to the rise of civil 
society and Taiwanese consciousness, symbolised one of the most significant chang es 
of course in Taiwan's post-war history.
During the period 1989 to 1997 elections were held in Taiwan almost every year. 
Although the DPP increased its support in the local and county mayoral elections, the 
KMT retained its overall majority in the national legislature. It appears that the DPP’s 
retention of its pro-independence stance still deters electors from supporting the party in 
elections to the national legislature or presidency. For example, in the run-up to the 
1991 National Assembly election, the DPP provoked the anger of the mainland CCP by 
declaring itself in favour of a referendum on independence, thereby scaring the 
electorate at large. Whilst they were in favour of a strengthened opposition, the majority 
of voters remained reluctant openly to support independence. More recently, the DPP 
has responded to this electoral trend by shifting its focus from mass-movement issues to 
public policy concerns.
Paralleling the softening of the DPP's radicalism, a split opened up within the KMT 
between the faction around Lee Teng-hui (the first native-born president of the ROC on 
Taiwan) and the old hard-line 'Mainlanders' over the 'Taiwanisation' of the party, a trend 
initiated by Lee in order to form a strategic alliance with the DPP in the interest of 
ongoing political democratisation and constitutional reform. Consequently, 
democratisation led to concessions by the KMT over the most sensitive event — the
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February 28 Incident of 1947. In 1992, the government, led by the ruling KMT party, 
admitted the KMT's responsibility for the 1947 killings. In 1995, President Lee Teng- 
hui unveiled a monument to the victims in Taipei and made a public apology for the 
KMT's behaviour; and the legislature passed a bill to compensate victims. Since then, 
progress in rehabilitating the victims of the February 28 Incident has been under way. In 
1997, a few days before the 50th anniversary of the Incident, the legislature voted to 
make February 28 a national holiday {The Economist, 8 March 1997: 76). These 
changes, in retrospect, paved the way for a unique hybridisation between the tv o 
strands of nationalism.
3.3 Conclusion
This historical account of nationalism in China and in Taiwan has provided evidence of 
the role of printing in mobilising national consciousness in the two cases. It has also 
pointed to the fact that nationalism only emerged in China and/or Taiwan after the 
collapse of the old Chinese world order. As we have seen, the issue of Taiwan only 
came on to the agenda of Chinese nationalism in the 1940s and has since secured its 
significance. The problem is that since the early twentieth century, people in Taiwan 
have gradually developed a different, if not necessarily opposing, image and expectation 
of nationhood. Therefore, there were actually two distinct and conflicting nationalist 
movements in Taiwan after the end of the Second World War, when Chinese 
nationalism imported from the mainland met its Taiwanese counterpart. Both strands of 
nationalism have survived and changed (or changed to survive) in recent decades and 
have had a profound influence on the formation of national identity in Taiwan.
The return of Taiwanese consciousness, I have argued, paved the way for the long 
transition of Taiwan from an authoritarian polity to an increasingly sustainable 
democracy, which, in turn, has forged in Taiwan a relatively new political culture. 
Within this new political culture, the unprecedented combination of freedom of the 
press and political participation has made it possible for the power of the state, which 
formerly only revolutionary violence was capable of influencing, to be potentially 
restricted and redefined by public opinion. The reconfigured relations between state and 
society have continued to develop.
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Taiwan’s democratisation has made it possible, for the first time in the Chinese societi s^, 
to negotiate one's national identity rather than have it imposed from above or defined 
for one merely by ethnic origin. In terms of its future prospects, I agree with Tu Wei- 
ming when he points out that what it means to be Chinese has changed (Tu, 1994, 1996), 
and that 'Chineseness' in Taiwan is no longer incompatible with Taiwanese 
consciousness. However, where I part company with him is in his assertion that 'it is not 
inconceivable that de-Sinicisation will be a precondition for a new Taiwanese cultural 
identity' (Tu, 1996: 1117). I wish to argue that, while it is true that what it means to be 
Chinese has changed, so has what it means to be Taiwanese. Thus, it follows that the 
Taiwanese nation (however defined) of today may encompass not only the 'native 
Taiwanese' but also people of 'Mainlander' origin and their offspring. It is therefore 
constituted in terms of territorial and civic factors that emphasise equal citizens!; p 
among the people of Taiwan rather than ties of descent alone. This is not to deny that 
the renewed concept of nationhood itself may for some time be perceived, as it is still 
conceived in many Chinese communities, as foreign.
In later chapters I will examine the role of the media, and television in particular, in the 
complex process of interaction between the state and the nation in giving rise to a 
redefined national identity in Taiwan. Prior to this examination, the next chapter will 
profile the media landscape in Taiwan, as this will help us to understand how the KMT 
used to control the media for the purpose of promoting Chinese nationalism and how 
the mediated national culture was strictly regulated from above but subsequently 
became more open to challenges posed from below (and from outside Taiwan).
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4
The Political Economy of the 
Media in Taiwan
This chapter seeks to demonstrate the centrality of the media in the consolidation of the 
Chinese Nationalist regime (KMT) in Taiwan, and to identify the main trends and 
characteristics of the KMT's media policy and their implications for the formation of 
national identity in Taiwan. It also examines the KMT's exploitation of television o 
assert its ideological hegemony and repress political dissent, particularly dissent arising 
from the emergent Taiwanese nationalism.
The chapter first explores how the political economy of national media has formed since 
the end the Second World War, when the KMT took over Taiwan following the defeat 
of Japan's colonial rule. Then, it examines the factors contributing to the changes in 
Taiwan's television landscape, especially since the late 1980s, when satellite and cable 
television took root and spread over the island, and when the political transition turned 
the island nation from an authoritarian society into a nascent democracy.
4.1 M edia  M atter s: T he K mt as A  D iasporic  R egim e
Few political parties in the world are as powerful as the KMT, which exercises 
dominant power in the spheres of Taiwan's national politics, economy, and culture.1 In 
view of the fact that the KMT was originally a regime in exile in Taiwan, how can we 
explain this transformation? Clearly, many factors are important, but certainly the media 
have been especially significant in helping to build such a powerful diaspora regime. 
The argument here, in a nutshell, is that the media not only contributed to the
1 The KMT was considered to be probably the world's richest political party ( The Economist, *>0 
December 1998). According to The Economist, the KMT owns 'majority stakes in at least 30 l:'g 
Taiwanese firms, and minority (but often controlling) stakes in 300 more' ( The Economist, 9 March 2000). 
That makes the KMT a '$20 billion business Empire' (The Economist, 9 March 2000).
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consolidation of the KMT regime in Taiwan, but also became a constitutive part of that 
regime.
Let us first consider the question of how the KMT, as a regime in exile following its 
defeat and withdrawal to Taiwan in 1949, was able to survive and subsequently prosper 
in Taiwan, where it had to govern a somewhat alienated majority population (i.e. the 
'native Taiwanese'). How did the KMT overcome all these difficulties and legitimise i.s 
principal aim of consolidating itself in Taiwan with a view to mobilising the population 
to retake the mainland? In fact, in order to achieve this aim, the KMT needed to create a 
national identity in Taiwan which was congruent with the Chinese homeland to which it 
continued to lay claim.
But, however widespread it may be among nationalists themselves, the conception of a 
nation-state as a ready-made 'package' incorporating a national identity based on shared 
descent, history, language, ethnicity or whatever is quite unrealistic. (This is especially 
so in the case of Taiwan, as was made clear in the previous chapter’s discussion of the 
development of Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms.) A major problem with this 
agenda, of course, was that conceptions of nationhood among the population the KMT 
now controlled were largely contradictory. The 'Mainlander' incomers, on the one hand, 
for whom the idea of a nationalist cause was still barely a generation old, were actually 
'in exile' and were separated from the homeland in which they were expected to realise 
their aspirations. The 'native Taiwanese', on the other hand, though living in their own 
homeland, had already had one alien Japanese identity imposed upon them and were 
unlikely to be enthusiastic about submitting to another.
Another obstacle was the lack of a common language. The majority of Taiwanese had 
no command of Mandarin, while the Mainlanders’ spoke no local Taiwanese 
languages.2 Probably about two-thirds of the Taiwanese population at large were far 
more familiar with Japanese (Lai et al., 1991: 93-96). For their mother tongue, most 
Taiwanese spoke one or more of a range of'dialects' such as Hokkien and Hakka which,
It should be emphasised here that even within the ‘Mainlander’ group there was great linguistic 
diversity, since they came from many different provinces o f China, speaking a variety o f provincial and 
local languages. Furthermore, in the early years o f KMT rule in Taiwan, Mandarin had yet to become a 
common language even for ‘Mainlanders’.
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although mostly stemming from the same Sino-Tibetan roots as Mandarin, were so far 
removed from it as to be, certainly in their spoken form, virtually separate languages.
A third threat to the KMT's consolidation of its own brand of national culture was the 
impact of foreign culture, particularly from the United States and Japan. On the one 
hand, Japanese culture was deemed to have left behind a negative influence, whereas, 
on the other hand, it was feared that military and economic dependence on the United 
States might lead too far in the direction of cultural dependence. Indeed, Chiang Kai- 
shek himself is said to have suggested that too great an emphasis on materialism could 
have a demoralising effect on the population and thus weaken their resistance fo 
communism (Lee, 1980).
Among the obvious means to KMT's initial end of establishing a uniform national 
culture were policing, compulsory military service and compulsory education. Just as 
pivotal to its design, however — particularly in view of its alarm at the effectiveness of 
Communist propaganda in the battle for the mainland — was the control of the media. 
One of the main aims of this chapter therefore is to examine the KMT state's attempt, in 
the face of these problems, to use the media to define a national culture. The focus will 
be on the post-Second World War period from 1945 up to the political reforms of 1987- 
88 .
A key feature of the state's ideological intervention in the media and cultural domains, 
according to Winckler, is that it intensified throughout this period and only started 
slackening its grip in the run-up to the transition (Winckler, 1994). This is in contrast to 
the level of authoritarianism in the political arena generally, which declined gradually 
throughout, and markedly so from the 1970s onwards, when Chiang Ching-kuo began 
to introduce his so-called Taiwanisation programme. Regarding the cultural sphere 
generally, Winckler is correct. However, where the regulation of broadcast media, and 
television in particular, is concerned, it was only after the transition period that the 
KMT began to relax its controls.
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4.2 M edia  Control  Since  1945
Apart form martial law, the Broadcasting Act and the Publication Act, the KMT sta<:e 
was never short of means to censor the press, print and broadcasting. Some of the 
relevant laws, such as the General Mobilisation Law of 1942 that had existed in the 
mainland, were brought with them to Taiwan by the KMT. Three major features of the 
KMT's cultural policy, which the party instituted from the beginning of its rule, were 
'Mandarinisation', 'Mainlanderisation', and 'fortification'. All were applied to the 
regulation of print and broadcast media. The aim of the first of these policies was to 
promulgate the use of Mandarin Chinese as widely as possible and establish it as the 
national language. 'Mainlanderisation' would seem to be an apt description of who 
controlled the media in Taiwan, for an inevitable consequence was that most of the 
important media were put in the hands of the 'Mainlanders'. The third of the policies 
bears the stamps both of anti-communism and cultural protectionism. Here the intention 
was to strengthen popular antagonism against the CCP and to fortify media culture 
against foreign (especially American and Japanese) influences.
4.2.1 Print Media: Newspapers and Magazines
During the first five years of the KMT's rule, the total circulation of newspapers in 
Taiwan was relatively small. From 1945 up to the February 28 of 1947 Incident, there 
were about 20 dailies, many of them new titles. Since the majority of Taiwanese knew 
little Chinese, most of the newspapers contained a Japanese section. Following the 
Incident, 11 Taiwanese-owned titles were banned by the Nationalist Governor-General 
of Taiwan, Chen Yi, who had been sent by Chiang Kai-shek to govern Taiwan in 1945. 
Others went bankrupt as a result of the severe inflation caused by the worsening civil 
war on the mainland, but as more 'Mainlanders' arrived and more Mainland newspapers 
were transferred to the island, the total number of newspapers increased to about 40. 
Most of them were owned by the government, the KMT, the military or others who 
were affiliated with the power circle. Only two newspapers, The Independent Evening 
Post (Zili Wan Bad) and the Public Critique Daily {Gong Lun Bao), were owned by 
native non-KMT Taiwanese (Chen and Zhu, 1987: 25, 28, 35, 81).
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From 1950, KMT control of the press was considerably tightened. The size, selling 
price and number of titles were all restricted. Japanese-owned paper plant was 
confiscated, paper imports from abroad were prohibited, and the distribution of 
newsprint was centralised. No newspaper was permitted to exceed six pages in size. In 
1958 the limit was increased to eight pages and in 1967 to ten. The prices of all titles 
were set at a single level. Printing and distribution was strictly limited to registered 
locations. From 1951, by which time the government itself owned seven newspapers, 
the establishment of new titles was further restricted through a licensing system which 
favoured ’Mainlanders' (Chen and Zhu, 1987: 59). This inequity was further exacerbated 
by the fact that since most advertising in that period consisted of government 
announcements, the KMT was able indirectly to control the revenues earned from it. In 
this way, the KMT-owned Central Daily (Zhongyang Ribao in Chinese) and the 
provincial government-owned Taiwan New Life Daily (Taiwan Xinsheng Bad) were 
able to absorb two-thirds of advertising expenditure between them, while eight privately 
owned newspapers shared the remainder. This was mainly to the disadvantage of the 
papers owned by the ’native Taiwanese'.
Press freedom was tightly controlled. Here, too, papers owned by the 'native Taiwanese' 
suffered more, since they tended to be more critical of the government. In 1960, tor 
instance, Li Wan-ju, the publisher of the Public Critique Daily, was implicated in a 
campaign to organise a new political party. The Public Critique Daily was closed in 
1961, never to reappear. For reporting this, the Independent Evening Post was 
suspended twice. Around this politically sensitive time, when 31 newspapers between 
them shared a total circulation of about 700,000, the granting of publication licences 
was suspended altogether (Chen and Zhu, 1987: 110).
The KMT claimed to control the print media primarily through post-publication 
censorship but it also had other methods. It ensured that, in keeping with their 
Mandarinisation policy, newspapers were staffed by writers whose command of 
Mandarin Chinese was of a suitable standard. More often than not, these we e 
'Mainlanders' whose political credentials were deemed to be equally 'suitable'. Much of 
the time, self-censorship ensured that damaging material was never written in the first 
place. Often the KMT would 'place' a story out of the need for anti-communist
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propaganda or enhancement of its own image, in which case it would stipulate how it 
should be handled (Tien, 1989).
As Taiwan's economy began to take off around 1963, the market for newspapers 
expanded significantly, and by 1971 total circulation had doubled. Over the same period 
a series of mergers and take-overs resulted in the party-owned Central Daily yielding its 
circulation to the privately owned China Times (Zhongguo Shibao) and United Daily 
(Lianhe Bao). This was an example not so much of privatisation as of cronyism, since 
the two titles, which between them had a circulation of over 70 per cent of the total 
newspaper market in Taiwan, were owned by members of the Central Standing 
Committee of the KMT (the KMT's equivalent to the CCP's politburo). These two 
publishing companies then went on to swallow up many other publications, eventual y 
turning themselves into conglomerates. Despite the resulting concentration of 
ownership, till 1988 the total number of titles remained at 31, made up of 24 daily, 5 
evening and 2 English-language titles. Of these, the government and party admitted to 
owning 11 titles between them, although there are grounds for supposing that they 
continued to control or subsidise many of the remaining 20.
The third major privately owned paper was The Independent Evening Post, which was 
published by the late Wu San-lian, a non-KMT political figure in Taiwan who, like Li 
Wan-ju, was involved in the unsuccessful campaign in 1960 to form an opposition party. 
The relative freedom of his newspaper from interference is accounted for by his friendly 
relations with Chiang Ching-kuo. Nevertheless, public institutions and official agenc* *s 
were forbidden to subscribe to the paper (Tien, 1989: 244).
The case of magazine publishing in Taiwan is of special note, for although the KMT 
characteristically discouraged political content, magazines became important channels 
for political dissent. One reason for this was undoubtedly that the spotlight of political 
censorship tended to be trained on the more frequently appearing newspapers. 
Nevertheless, magazines were subject to broadly similar restrictions (Winckler, 1994: 
33).
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During the 1970s and 1980s, magazines began to appear in greater numbers,3 though 
they still had to run the gauntlet of government restrictions. Among the political 
magazines, Taiwan Political Review (Taiwan Zheng Luri), the Eighties (Bashi Niandai, 
launched by Kang Ningxiang in 1979) and Formosa Magazine (Meilidao Zazhi) we:- e 
most outspoken in their criticism of the KMT.4 The articles they ran promoted 
Taiwanese consciousness, addressed Taiwan's future status and called for political 
reforms (Li, 1987).5 As Tien (1989) points out, the frequency of confiscation and 
suspensions connected with such publications increased rapidly from about 1984 
onwards, confirming Winckler's argument that the KMT actually stepped up its 
surveillance of the media through the period up to 1987.6
The overall aim of the KMT's policy with respect to print media, then, was to keep 
public discourse in line with party positions and discourage political discussion. 
'Mandarinisation', of both newspapers and magazines, meant effectively that as far as 
possible 'Mainlanders' were placed in positions of stewardship of media content, 
whether as owners, editors or staff members. Fortification, on the other hand, entaih d 
rigorous censorship of any materials which might weaken the resistance of readers to 
Communism. It also meant that until 1988 the import of publications (including 
newspapers, books and magazines) from abroad was strictly limited.
3
In 1966, there were 953 magazines in Taiwan. By 1971, the number had grown to 1,534. In 1981, it was 
2,244 (Directorate-General o f Budget Accounting and Statistics, 1996: 260).
4 The title "Eighties" for a magazine which began publication in 1979 indicated that the opposition, 
especially the pro-independence faction, was deliberately questioning the legitimacy o f  the KMT and the 
ROC, in whose official calendar 1979 was reckoned to be the 68lh year o f the Republic. A similar practice 
had been adopted by the pro-independence publishers o f Formosa Magazine, knowing full well that the 
KMT loathed this “alien” term for the island o f Taiwan.
5 The Formosa Magazine was particularly active in urging people to call for political reform. In 1979, 
when the U.S. was ready to withdraw diplomatic recognition o f the ROC, the founders o f  the Formosa 
Magazine lead an unprecedented mass rally against the KMT government. As a consequence of 
disturbances which later became known as the 'Formosa Incident', eight leading opposition figures were 
subsequently sentenced to from 12 years to life imprisonment.
6 From 1950 to 1981, 141 such measures were carried out. In 1984 alone there were 211, then 275 in 
1985 and 302 in 1986. Actually, a banned magazine would usually resurrect itself under a new name 
(Tien, 1989:256-260).
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4.2.2 Audio-visual Media: Radio, Cinema and Television
In the case of audio-visual media, the KMT’s Mandarinisation and fortification 
measures were more blatant, and right up to the transition of the late 1980s the 
government operated a virtual oligopoly of radio and television.
(1) Radio broadcasting
Radio broadcasting was introduced to Taiwan during Japanese rule in 1928, soon after it 
had appeared in the West. By the end of the occupation, the number of radio static: .s 
had reached six (Ng, 1996: 194), all of which were confiscated by the KMT government 
in 1945. Table 4.1 shows that in the first few decades of KMT rule, licences were 
granted for a small number of privately owned radio stations, but almost exclusively to 
'Mainlanders' (Wang, 1993).
Table 4.1: Allocation of radio broadcasting resources in Taiwan
Ownership Number of 
companies
Transmitters Transmission 
capacity (kw)
Proportion of 
transmission 
capacity
Private 20 64 304 1.8%
Military 6 176 8,524 51.4%
Government 6 56 609 3.7%
KMT 1 139 7,159 43.2%
TOTAL 33 435 16,596 100%
Source: (Cheng, 1993: 34-35).
Mandarinisation was introduced only gradually, partly because most listeners did not 
understand spoken Mandarin, but also because non-Mandarin programmes, which had a 
wider appeal, were capable of absorbing commercial advertising. As a result, a high 
proportion of the broadcast output during the 1950s was in the Taiwanese languages. In 
1963, the government issued a directive stipulating that the proportion of non-Mandarin 
broadcasts from a given station could not exceed 50 per cent (Su, 1993: 239), and the 
Broadcasting Act of 1976 reduced this further to 45 per cent.
With respect to 'fortification', it was forbidden to receive radio broadcasts from abroa 1, 
and the possession of short-wave radios was illegal.
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(2) The national cinema
Before the television service gained momentum in the early 1970s, a moderately large 
cinema-going population sustained the Taiwanese-language film industry. For more 
than a decade (roughly between 1956 and 1968), Taiwanese-language film productions 
overwhelmed their Mandarin counterparts in numbers (Lent, 1990: 63; Li, 1997: 252). 
The KMT Mandarinised production by subsidising its own film studios, especially the 
Central Motion Picture Company (CMPC, established in 1954) and by setting up an 
award scheme for films in Mandarin Chinese only. The CMPC assumed the form of 
vertical integration, with its own production, distribution and exhibition capacities. The 
rise of the CMPC also signified the decline of Taiwanese-language film-making in 
Taiwan.
In addition to swordsman and romance movies, there were two distinct categories of 
Taiwanese films, 'Policy Films' and 'Taiwan New Cinema'. Both categories tended to 
base their films on 'national' histories, focusing on a specific historical event or situating 
the story in a particular setting. While Policy Films tended to represent stories set in the 
distant past and faraway localities (notably the Chinese mainland), Taiwan New Cinema 
placed an emphasis on stories closer to Taiwan itself, both temporally and spatially 
(Lent, 1990). Another point worthy of note is that both categories of film production 
emerged in part as a result of the party-owned CMPC's significant involvement (see 
Chapter 7). Hence, both categories of film practices, to varying degrees, reflected the 
interests and ideologies of the CMPC and ultimately those of the ruling party.
In terms of the regulation of the film industry, Taiwan's system used to be among 'the 
most rigid in Asia' (Hong and Sun, 1999: 534), with the KMT government exercising 
tight control through a variety of measures. Externally, the KMT's fortification of the 
film industry was implemented via a quota system, first established in 1949. However, 
this policy was undermined by greater imports of foreign films in the 1980s. In 1984, 
the KMT government lifted its embargo on Japanese films, which had been introduced 
when Japan derecognised Taiwan in the early 1970s. The entire quota system was 
finally abandoned in 1986 under pressure of major U.S. distributors (Lent, 1990: 74-75). 
As a result, Taiwan's national film industry, which was already affected by the 
expansion of television, was further eroded in the 1980s by the greater presence of 
foreign films, especially U.S. productions.
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(3) National television
Television arrived in 1962, and over the following eight years three separate 
broadcasting organisations were set up. The first of these, the Taiwan Television 
Company (TTV), was a joint venture of the Taiwan provincial government (which was 
the major stakeholder), four Japanese corporations and Taiwan commercial interests. It 
was inaugurated, auspiciously enough, on National Day, 10 October (the anniversary of 
the 1911 revolution, which gave birth to the ROC). The second commercial network, 
established in 1979 following a directive issued by Chiang Kai-shek, was the China 
Television Company (CTV), in which the KMT-controlled Broadcasting Corporation of 
China (BCC) retained the controlling interest. The third organisation, the Chinese 
Television Service (CTS), which was co-owned by the military and the Ministry of 
Education, began transmissions in 1971.7
Mandarinisation was applied more rigidly to television than to radio. Although, at the 
inception of the television service, there were no formal restrictions on non-Mandarin 
television programmes, strict prior censorship existed. For example, whereas scripts for 
Mandarin programmes required only self-censorship by high-ranking personnel within 
the company, Taiwanese-language programmes had to be approved by the Taiwan 
Garrison Command. In 1972, the Cultural Division of the KMT 'ordered' television 
companies to reduce the proportion of Taiwanese language programming. Later, the 
1976 Broadcasting Act stipulated that the percentage of non-Mandarin television
7 The share ownership o f these television companies was apportioned as follows
(1) TTV: Taiwan Provincial Government 49%; Fuji, Hitachi, NEC, Tokyo Shibura each 10%, making 
40%; local private investors 11%. (2) CTV: Broadcasting Corporation o f China (KMT-owned) 50%, 
private radio stations 28%, other commercial interests 22%. In 1979, BCC stock increased to 60%. (3) 
CTS: military 51%, Ministry o f  Education 49%.
It is remarkable that local private investors had an 11% stake in TTV in the 1960s and the Japanese had 
40%. The Japanese share in the ownership o f  TTV was arguably a product o f  mutual benefit. The 
Japanese electronics giants aimed at importing their television sets to Taiwan; the KMT government for 
their part needed capital and technology. Therefore, the Japanese companies were invited to join in the 
establishment o f TTV. Later, the Japanese share in TTV was reduced to 20 per cent (see also Lee 2000: 
127-128).
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programming was to be reduced annually.8 This provision was not abolished until 1993. 
(See Table 4.2)
Table 4.2: Proportion of programming in the Taiwanese languages
1972 1976 1977 1990 1991
TTV 17% 10% 11% 8.5% 9.3%
CTV 20% 12% 12% NA NA
CTS 16% 12% 10% NA NA
Sources.Lee (1980: 157); Su (1993: 270).
The KMT party and government controlled the overriding majority of radio 
broadcasting resources (see Table 4.1). The same was true of television. The executives- 
in-chief of all three terrestrial television companies had always been Mainlanders'. In 
fact, during the period from the early 1970s up to the early 1990s the KMT party-state- 
military bloc increased its share-holdings in the television industry, as Table 4.3 shows.
Table 4.3: Share capital of the party-state-military bloc in television
TTV
1970s
CTV CTS TTV
1980s
CTV CTS TTV
1990s
CTV CTS
Party
Gov't
Military
49%
50%
49%
51%
49%
60%
10%
72%
49%
68%
10%
76%
Note: figures are rounded. Source: Wang (1993: 89, 94, 98).
Fortification, applied to the broadcast media, involved restricting the imports of foreign 
programmes and reducing the proportion of programming from abroad. The proportion 
of imported programming on television was significantly reduced within a limited 
period of time (see Table 4.4) and on average remained less than 20 per cent (Wang et 
al., 2000: 60). All foreign material was subtitled in Chinese and some of it was dubbed 
in Mandarin.
g
From 1970 onwards, traditional Taiwanese puppet drama (budaixi) began to appear on television. One 
series, entitled 'Shi Yanwen', achieved audience ratings o f up to 90 per cent. This worried the KMT 
government, which suspected that schoolchildren identified so strongly with the fictonal hero Shi Yanw n 
that they admired him more than President Chiang Kai-shek. The KMT thus banned Budaixi from being 
shown on television. Not until 1982 was traditional Taiwanese puppet drama allowed to be televised 
again. When it was, it was dubbed in Mandarin, which alienated much o f  the traditional (mainly 'native 
Taiwanese') audience, and ratings plummeted to about 30 per cent (see Sinorama, February 1998: 144- 
153).
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Table 4.4: The ratio of imported programmes on television channels
1969 1975 1976 1982 1991 1998
TTV 33% 16% 24% 14% 18% 16%
CTV 35% 19% 19%
CTS 11% 14%
Note: Figures are rounded. Sources: Lee (1980:158); Taiwan Television Company 
(1976: 23-24); Wang et al. (2000: 61).
This combination of Mandarinisation and fortification in media policy was designed to 
shore up official Chinese nationalism in the face of what was seen as media imperialism 
linked to heavy economic and political dependence on the U.S. The operation seems to 
have been quite successful, since the influence of America and Japanese media 
continued to be 'restrained' and 'insignificant' (Lee, 1980: 165).
The KMT's media policy since 1949 can be summed up as follows. First, laws and 
directives on the media bluntly defined specific missions and goals that the media had 
to fulfil. For example, Article I of the Broadcasting Act prescribed that broadcasting 
must promote Chinese culture and national missions (against communism and 
Taiwanese Independence), and must defend and publicise government policies. 
Secondly, the government reserved the right to punish any infringements of media 
regulations by administrative decree rather than by means of the judicial process. 
Thirdly, the party-state-military bloc was charged with applying prior censorship to all 
kinds of programming except news. Fourthly, the party-state-military bloc secured both 
material and ideological profit from the media by being directly involved in its 
management from the outset (Cheng, 1988: 39-40). According to Chin-Chuan Lee, tins 
'bureaucratic-commercial complex' — an historic party-state-military bloc with 
commercial interests -  has dominated cultural consumption in Taiwan (Lee, 1980).
The television industry provides a particularly compelling example of the reciprocal 
needs of the media and the KMT state. It is small wonder, then, that the television 
industry has long maintained an oligopoly; and it is no surprise either that even after the 
liberalisation of the press in the late 1980s, the KMT remained reluctant to loosen its 
control of broadcasting and of television in particular.
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Three possible explanations of this development deserve consideration. First, despite its 
willingness to sanction reform in other areas, the KMT found it difficult to give up ns 
ownership of the broadcasting media, since, ideologically speaking, this was to its 
advantage. Secondly, the consequences for the cause of national identity of suddenly 
opening the industry to voices from within the burgeoning Taiwan consciousness 
movement would have been incalculable. Thirdly, the KMT derived stupendous profits 
from its ownership of broadcasting media in Taiwan. In 1988, the three television 
networks earned advertising revenues of about US$ 450 million. Four years later, in 
1992, these revenues had practically doubled to US$900 million (Feng, 1995: 46). Since 
then, the amount of advertising revenue galvanised by the terrestrial television channels 
has not been significantly threatened by their transnational counterparts (Wang et al., 
2000: 59-60).9 The KMT has been remarkably successful in making a profit for itself by 
engaging in cultural and monopoly enterprises.
4.3  Id e o l o g y  a n d  D is s e n t  in  t h e  A g e  o f  T e l e v is io n
In addressing the differences between 'mainstream' and 'critical' approaches to media 
inquiries, Hall points to the pivotal role of ideology in any theory which 'seeks to 
explain both the monopoly of power and the diffusion of consent' (Hall, 1982: 86). At 
this point, I present more of the background to the study with a brief discussion of some 
of the techniques employed by the KMT-controlled media, and television in particular, 
to assert their ideological hegemony and to repress political dissent.
The KMT's authoritarian use of the media as a tool of socialisation and indoctrination 
frequently bordered on jingoism. The discourse of Chinese nationalism was all- 
pervading and extended from the mundane, such as the daily broadcast of the national 
anthem on the radio and television, to the arcane, such as the meticulous frame-by- 
frame replacement in a foreign movie of the word 'Taiwan' with the words 'Republic of 
China'. The opening words of the national anthem are 'Three Principles o f  the People, 
the doctrine of our Party'. In schools this would be sung while facing a statue or other 
likeness of either Sun Yat-sen or Chiang Kai-shek. This fostered a considerable cult of
9
Advertsing has long been the main financial source o f the terrestrial television channels. For example, 
between 1994 and 1996, advertsing revenues constituted above 90 per cent o f the income which 
fiananced all the three channels (Liu, 1998: 158).
personality around Generalissimo Chiang. The hegemonic pitch at which the discourse 
was conveyed was presumably designed to gain the active consent of the Taiwanese 
people. Undoubtedly, another function was to exclude from their consideration any 
alternative definitions of society.
Taiwan's remarkable economic growth, limited territory and high population density 
were instrumental in the relatively rapid penetration of television, and by the mid-1970s, 
it had reached every comer of the island. At the same time, the KMT bluntly made its 
'media nationalism' explicit in the Broadcasting Act of 1976. This stipulated that the 
official language of broadcasting would be Mandarin, that programming must not 
conflict with the national policies of anti-communism and recovery of the mainland, and 
even that 'popular entertainment programmes must be educational and must be based on 
promoting Chinese culture' (Broadcasting Act 1976: Art. 17, Para 2, emphasis added).
A bigger threat to Chinese nationalism that they aimed to prevent derived, as they saw it, 
from cosmopolitan attitudes acquired abroad or localism (Taiwanese consciousness) 
originating within the island. This ensured that the airwaves over Taiwan were more or 
less exclusively filled with ideologically 'correct' programming. To the KMT mindset, 
the risk of'contagion', whether foreign or native, was real. Since U.S. aid had ceased in 
1965, Taiwan's economy increasingly relied on overseas trade. Greater integration with 
the global economy necessitated more business and technical exchanges overseas and 
hence more assiduous personal surveillance and import controls on cultural materials. 
Strict customs controls prohibited the import of foreign publications, all of which, but 
especially those produced on the mainland, were branded 'illegal'. At the same time, 
writers and intellectuals continued to explore new avenues, prompting the KMT to 
restrict or suppress certain cultural movements, especially in the area of literature and 
thought. Taiwanese literature written in the Japanese colonial era was banned. An 
experiment by a younger generation of writers to replace so-called 'anti-communist 
combat literature' (which the KMT eagerly endorsed) with a Westernised vernacular 
literature was attacked by cultural conservatives close to the KMT. A revival in the 
early 1970s of Taiwanese vernacular literature was condemned, as were any works 
offering a critique of the effects of imperialism or liberal reflection on contemporary 
Taiwan (Winckler, 1994: 33-34).
89
Not surprisingly, in view of their provenance, broadcasts from all three networks had 
certain features in common which reflected the nationalist perspective of the KMT 
regime. For example, no pictures of CCP leaders were allowed to appear since these 
leaders were regarded as 'rebels'.10 The capital of the Peoples' Republic, meanwhile, was 
always referred to as Beiping, its official name during the period up to 1949 when the 
KMT government was based in Nanjing.11 Television always glossed over the existence 
of a people known as 'Taiwanese' because they held that all 'Taiwanese' originally came 
from the mainland. These were some of the ways in which television aimed to limit or 
disparage not only foreign views but also indigenous identity and local culture, while at 
the same time preventing any valid criticisms of the KMT. However, once discussion. >f 
national identity other than the sanctioned Chinese one was no longer proscribed and 
the broadcast media could no longer simply ignore the political opposition active from 
the late 1980s onwards, they resorted to demonisation and vilification instead.
When political competition became more substantial in the early 1980s and the non- 
KMT candidates organised a party of their own — Minjindang, or the Democratic 
Progressive Party — the KMT broadcast media attempted to cast doubt on their 
legitimacy by refusing to call this opposition grouping by its full name. Thus the DPP 
was often represented as the 'Min-X-dang'. Moreover, the media continually ridiculed 
the appeal of the independence movement by means of a word-play associating 
'independence'with'poison'.12
It was therefore doubly surprising that, in contrast to the KMT's earlier claim that no 
spare broadcasting bands were available, a DPP-affiliated consortium was granted a 
licence to launch a new terrestrial television channel (Formosa Television, FTV) in mid- 
1995. Since then, the DPP has been less critical of the KMT's remaining monopoly, at 
least tacitly accepting the status quo of continued KMT control of the first three
10 The KMT referred to Mao Tse-tung (also spelt as Mao Zedong) as 'Bandit Mao'; and this practice was 
continued until the late 1980s. The KMT substituted the first syllable 'Ze' o f Mao's given name, Ze-dong 
(Tse-tung is the most common W estern spelling) with the word 'Zei', which means 'bandit'.
11 The particle 'jing' in 'Beijing' and 'Nanjing' means 'capital'. Thus during periods when Beijing (literally 
'northern capital') was not officially the capital, its name was changed to 'Beiping' (literally 'northern 
peace'). The KMT continued this practice to emphasise that Nanjing (literally 'southern capital'), thoug!’ it 
was occupied, like the rest o f the mainland, by the communists, remained in their eyes the official capital 
o f China.
12 W ith its many homophones, Chinese provides tremendous scope for punning. In this case the words for 
independence [du] and poison [du] are both pronounced 'du'.
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terrestrial television channels. Also, legislation for public service television was 
eventually enacted in 1997 and hence a fifth terrestrial channel was set up in Taiwan, 
largely as a compromise between the KMT and the DPP, which had originally lobbi; d 
for such a channel. While agreeing with the legitimacy of this demand, the DPP had 
become less critical of the KMT's media policy as a result of having been granted its 
own channel. The KMT attitude was that, having already bought off the DPP by 
granting the party the fourth channel, and thereby safeguarding the monopoly of its own 
channels, it had been in two minds about the need to create yet another channel. What 
helped the KMT decide was pressure from the directors of the original three channels, 
who claimed that, owing to competition from the growing cable and satellite concerns, 
it no longer made economic sense for them to grant CPT spare airtime free of charge. 
This case shows that the market was beginning to pay a more important part in the 
equation.
4 .4  T h e  C h a n g in g  M e d ia  L a n d s c a p e
The media landscape of Taiwan since the late 1980s has been radically transformed. 
The previous centrally controlled mono-cultural climate has started to give way to a 
more open and relaxed media environment in which, thanks to cable and satellite 
broadcasting, a variety of foreign cultural experiences are accessible. After the political 
transition of 1987, the patron-client relationship of state and media began to change. 
There were two main reasons for this: one political and the other economic.
First, the political transition of 1987 and the lifting of martial law led to the 
decriminalisation of various types of public protest and assembly. Free speech began io 
flourish. People began to express their dissatisfaction with media content more openly. 
The DPP's campaign against the KMT's monopoly over broadcasting expressed itself in 
such actions as the launching of illegal radio stations and the jamming of signals from 
the three KMT-owned television channels. Nevertheless, since radio broadcasting and 
terrestrial television had long been central to the KMT's rule in Taiwan, the regime was 
reluctant to loosen its grip. Whether it was from fear of compromising its nationalist 
agenda or simply because it wished to retain a lucrative profit base, the KMT did 
everything it could to retain its monopoly. It seemed, however, that part of the cost of 
this inertia was that the KMT had to look on helplessly as other areas of its formerly
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rigid media policy crumbled under the onslaught of market forces. The increasing 
penetration by cable/satellite television is a case in point. In the late 1980s, the then 
illegal cable television systems began to spread over the island.13 The KMT considered 
satellite television from abroad less dangerous than indigenous challenges to its
broadcasting oligopoly. In 1988, home reception of satellite television was legalised
while pirate radio broadcasting by opposition groups, particularly those in favour of 
independence, faced harsh penalties.
Pushed by both the political opposition and market forces, there followed a general 
loosening of controls over the media, first in relation to newspapers from the late 1980s, 
and then, during the 1990s, in relation to broadcasting. The media market as a whole 
was becoming more competitive (Lee, 2000). The expansion of cable/satellite television 
was especially impressive. By 1997, 4.3 million out of a total of 5.5 million households 
could receive cable, indicating a level of penetration second only to the Benelux 
countries (Cable and Satellite Asia, March/April 1997: 10).
Satellite television beamed from Japan came to Taiwan in 1984. The reception of
satellite television was subsequently legalised in 1988, three years in advance of the
launch of the popular Hong Kong-based STAR channel in 1991. Other satellite channel 
operators soon followed suit: TVBS and Chinese Television Network (CTN), both 
based in Hong Kong with significant Taiwanese investment interests, started 
broadcasting in 1993 and in 1994 respectively. Not surprisingly, the highest penetration 
rate of cable and satellite television in Asia means that Taiwan has become the most 
important market for these satellite channel operators. Indeed, STAR TV admitted this 
in its 1995 Home Penetration Report (Cable and Satellite Asia, March/April 1997: 10).
In his work on questions of television and national identity, Monroe Price prompts us to 
ask questions about how national television functions in the midst of globalisation and 
responds to pressures towards regionalism (Price, 1995: 18-19). In the Taiwanese 
context, regionalism can donate the cultural flows within the Greater China region
13 The KMT applied double standards in policing them. Those run by opposition figures were cut o ff and 
their equipment was confiscated. It appeared that those delivering foreign entertainment programming 
could get away with it, while those offering alternative political news or documentaries were treated as a 
potential threat to KMT rule. Legislation on cable television was not enacted until 1993. However, a 
provision o f  the Cable Television Act o f that year, which sought to prohibit political parties from owning 
cable television, was quietly abandoned to allow the KMT itself to become directly involved in the 
industry and take its financial share.
92
(China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) while globalisation involves cultural flows from 
outside the region.
The exchange of audio-visual media products between Taiwan and China started from 
virtually nothing. Not until 1993 did Taiwan legalise the import o f audio-visual media 
products from China, but the imported products were subject to prior approval by the 
authorities. Similarly, the censorship of information and entertainment from outside, 
especially from Taiwan, continues to be strictly imposed in China. The provision of 
international news is still highly centralised inasmuch as the municipal and provincial 
stations remain dependent on CCTV, the China Central Television based in Beijing 
(Lynch, 1999). So far the mutual links between Taiwan and China in terms of media 
and communications remain limited.14 However, future growth is predicted. Thus, a 
number of global media giants have expressed interest in the Greater China market, as 
illustrated by the actions of Time Warner and Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation. To 
gain a foothold in China's television market, Time Warner formed an alliance with 
Hong Kong-based China Entertainment Television (CET), which claims to have 
reached 33 million viewing households including nearly five million in Taiwan 
{Financial Times 16 June 2000). At the same time, News Corporation's Phoenix 
Chinese Channel (launch in 1996) has targeted the Greater China market, including 
China's more than 1,000 million television viewers (Thussu, 2000: 212). Another 
operation of News Corporation is STAR TV, which has for many years been a great 
success in the Taiwan market (the largest single Chinese community outside China) -  
seen by STAR as its laboratory for further advance to the potentially huge China market. 
Therefore, it is fair to say that the future communications landscape within the Greater 
China region will have a great impact on the media industry in Taiwan.
14 China’s state-owned satellite television channel CCTV-4, which is specially converted from PAL into 
NTSC for the Taiwan market, is not popular among the Taiwanese audience. More than 60 per cent of 
Taiwan’s cable/satellite television households never watch CCTV-4 and less than 3 per cent o f 
households with cable/satellite television regularly watch CCTV-4 (see Liu and Lin, 1996: 12; see also 
Chapter 8 concerning the contribution o f ‘propaganda’ and negative reportage o f Taiwan to CCTV-4’s 
lack o f popularity). However, there are other satellite and cable television channels showing mainland- 
produced historical dramas such as Sanguo yanyi ( The Tales o f  Three Kingdoms) and Shuihu zhuan (Tne 
Water Margin) which retain a large audience in Taiwan. The same is true on the mainland o f Taiwan- 
produced ‘Mandarin pop’ music, and historical or romantic dramas.
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4.5 C o n c l u s io n
This chapter has argued that the media have been crucial in helping to consolidate the 
KMT regime in Taiwan. As a diaspora regime determined to retake the Chine e 
mainland, the KMT used the media to overcome the substantial barriers to its 
communication with the 'native Taiwanese' population. As we have seen, the KMT 
deliberately exploited the media under its control to promote Chinese nationalism, 
suppress all dissident views, and make commercial profits. Because of the vital 
importance of media control, the KMT was reluctant to liberalise the broadcasting 
media (and television in particular) even after the political transition of 1987-1988. 
Only when the challenges posed by the opposition and market forces became irresistible 
did the regime finally accept the need for liberalisation.
Despite the KMT's longstanding control of the national media, the extent to which a 
unified Chinese identity has been successfully fostered is open to debate. As I have 
demonstrated in this chapter, the changing media landscape in Taiwan been 
characterised by significant but contradictory phenomena: on the one hand, Taiwanese 
consciousness has grown despite the KMT's efforts to repress it; on the other hand, A 
locally nurtured Taiwan-centred identity has continued to develop since the political 
democratisation of the late 1980s despite the veritable flood of foreign cultural products 
pouring into Taiwan through the penetration of cable/satellite television.
It is therefore clear that in order to grasp the complexity of the processes involved, an 
empirical analysis of the relationships between the media and national identity is 
essential. Before presenting such an analysis, in the next chapter I will reflect on the 
methodological issues relating to the research and explain the study's chosen research 
method.
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5.
Methodological Triangulation
In the preceding chapters, and especially Chapter 2, the competing theories of 
nationalism, identity-formation, cultural globalisation and hybridisation were discussed. 
The analysis so far has demonstrated just how inconclusive and complex are the 
relationships between the media and national identity. In order to grasp this complexity, 
research needs to be based on multiple sources of data and analytic methods. The aim is 
to arrive at a range of the most reliable answers through a process of triangulation, 
meaning 'a comparative assessment of more than one form of evidence about an object 
of inquiry' that can be used to 'develop a concept, construct, or proposition' (Lindlof, 
1995:239).
This chapter discusses how the question of the media-identity relationship may be 
explored empirically. It first draws on the literature concerning the tcxt-readcr 
relationship. The underlying argument is that, apart from taking into account its 
historical conjunctures (in terms of state-society relations, the global-local nexus, etc.), 
national identity-formation can be seen as a mediating process between text and reader. 
This proposition absorbs, but goes beyond, both the dominant ideology thesis and the 
polysemy thesis, a critical synthesis which is useful for empirical analysis. In the latter 
half of this chapter, I pinpoint two main areas of inquiry on which the present research 
is focused and detail the methodological considerations involved in designing the 
empirical case studies.
5.1 T h e  T e x t - R e a d e r  R e l a t i o n s h i p
The question of media power is certainly of relevance to the present study. However, it 
cannot be explored properly unless an equal weight is given to both the media text and 
the media audience (readers), a focus which is central to 'reception studies' (Jensen and 
Rosengren, 1990). Unfortunately, as Hall, Livingstone and among others (Hall, 1994;
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Livingstone, 1998) have cautioned, there is a neglect of the text in the 'new audience 
research', which deviates from the original 'encoding/decoding model' (Hall, 1980) and 
is 'threatening to write the media, as the focus of research, out of existence' (Schroder, 
1994: 338). To remedy this situation, some have advocated 'the third generation 
reception studies' to ensure that both text and reader are taken seriously (Alasuutari, 
1999; Tulloch, 2000).
Despite criticism of the overuse of the terms text and reader in television studies (Gozzi, 
1999: ch.9), I retain them here but with more specific meanings. The term text refers to 
mediated productions such as a television programme; and, the term reader is employed 
to emphasise the active nature of audience interpretation. In other words, text with 
reader are not to be conflated (Anderson, 1996: 86; Fiske, 1987: 85) on the conceptual 
level in an inquiry which is concerned to determine how they relate to each other.
At the empirical level, I agree with Livingstone's suggestion that we cannot separate 
text and reader in research (Livingstone, 1994). As she suggests:
Text and audience can no longer be seen as independent or studied 
separately. Rather than conceiving of powerful texts and passive viewers or 
of indeterminate texts and powerful viewers what is required is a negotiated 
position that recognises the complexity of the interaction between text and 
viewers ... Meaning emerges from the specific and located interaction 
between text and reader. (Livingstone, 1994: 249)
Therefore the present research is concerned with the complex signification process of 
national identity within media texts, among the audiences, and most importantly, at the 
intersection between text and reader. Indeed, it makes sense to integrate them into the 
one, more general issue of the text-reader relationship (Livingstone, 1998). It is this 
relationship, involving the interaction between the power of the media and the power of 
the audience, which offers the most important key to the whole project.
In the literature, there are two competing theses concerning the media text and the 
reader: the dominant ideology thesis and the polysemy thesis. The former inherits most 
of its intellectual strength from Marxism, especially the Althusserian concept of 
'ideological state apparatuses' and the Gramscian notion of 'hegemony,' and affiliates 
itself with the critical tradition of media and cultural studies. The latter thesis, while 
originating in literary and cultural studies, has found a home within liberal pluralism. 
Each thesis has its own specific assumptions about the nature of television texts ai d
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television’s role in social reproduction and societal transformation. The dominant 
ideology thesis regards television texts as carrying and constructing a relatively 
coherent ideology which is effective in reproducing social relations of domination in 
modem societies, while the polysemy thesis sees television texts as semioticaliy 
democratic and ideologically open, thus contributing positively to the enhancement *f 
social pluralism.
In what follows I outline in turn the main assumptions and features of the dominant 
ideology thesis and the polysemy thesis. Methodologically, the dominant ideology 
thesis relies heavily on certain kinds of textual analysis, whereas the polysemy thesis 
relies on participant observation, in-depth interviews, and ethnography. In the present 
study, the empirical analysis will apply both methodological approaches -- through a 
critical synthesis — to focus on the text-reader relationship in matters of national 
identity-formation.
5.1.1 The Dominant Ideology Thesis
From the perspective of the dominant ideology thesis, television is said to have 
reproduced the dominant ideology of the dominant class, as revealed in its output of 
information and entertainment. Thus, it is argued, news and current affairs programmes 
have been framed to be in favour of the establishment and the status quo (Tuchman, 
1978). Television represents a distorted world in which the interests of the dominant 
class are protected. In reporting student movements, industrial disputes, or 'terrorist' 
activities, dominant discourses are relayed through the elite, experts and credible 
official sources, while oppositional views are marginalised in a negative way (Gitlin, 
1980; Glasgow Media Group, 1980; Murdock, 1981; Schlesinger, 1978; Schlesinger et 
al., 1983). In a similar vein, the main characters in entertainment programmes are said 
to have been constructed to favour the dominant race, gender and class (Fiske and 
Hartley, 1989:21-27).
Two general varieties of the dominant ideology thesis postulate a link of some sort 
between the ideas of the dominant class and the ideological role of the media. The first 
approach posits a strong link between the dominant ideology and the media, as 
represented in the so-called 'propaganda model'. This model identifies a number of
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'filters' (e.g. ownership, advertising, and anti-communist ideology) through which 
information is selected and framed (Herman and Chomsky, 1988: 298)
The second approach is manifested in the metaphors of 'primary and secondary definers 
of social events' (Hall et al., 1978). Compared with the first approach, this is a weak 
version of the dominant ideology thesis, in so far as the media 'do not simply "create" 
the news; nor do they simply transmit the ideology of the 'ruling class' in a 
conspiratorial fashion' (Hall et al., 1978: 59). Nevertheless, the media are said to stand 
'in a position of structured subordination to the primary definers' and reproduce the 
definitions of the 'powerful' sources who 'have privileged access to the media' (Hall et 
al., 1978: 59).
According to this second approach, the media give priority to the views of the dominant 
class not only through the symbolic construction of the world but also through the 
mechanism of omission. The focus of media attention is placed on individuals rather 
than corporate entities, and the media fail to provide information about the underlying 
relations of political and economic power, as required by the public in the consideration 
of policy options. In so doing, it is argued, the media block the development of 
alternative views (Golding, 1981).
If we accept the existence of a dominant ideology in television discourses, a furth t 
question needs to be asked: how can the source of that domination be located? Hall 
provides an important clue by suggesting that media institutions are 'free of direct 
compulsion and constraint, and yet freely articulated themselves systematically around 
the definitions of the situation which favoured the hegemony of the powerful' (Hall, 
1982: 86). Investigations from the perspective of political economy shed light on this 
issue by revealing the intimate relationship between the dominant class and the media.
First and foremost, attention has been paid to the ownership of the media industry and 
the direct involvement of the media with the powerful elite. According to this view, 
neither the technological nor managerial revolution has fundamentally changed the 
structural relationship between the dominant class and the media. In spite of the 
proliferation of television channels, there is evidence of growing trends of media 
concentration, cross-media ownership, and links between media personnel and 
government officials (McChesney, 1997; Murdock, 1990). It has also been argued that
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the shifts in the methods of corporate control at the managerial level have not really 
challenged the owners as the primary allocative controllers of organisational orientatirn 
and editorial policy (Murdock, 1982: 132). Moreover, despite claims of autonomy, 
television contents are found to be in accordance with the owners' interest, as the 
detectable (though not always explicit) political commitments of some media moguls 
are translated into the output of the media which are under their control (Curran, 1996). 
According to this perspective, there is a tendency of media conglomerates to limit the 
range of information and protect related commercial interests, since owners of television 
networks are generally closely affiliated with, and have shared interests with, the 
economic and political establishment.
Apart from the issue of ownership, there are a number of no less common connections 
of the media with dominant groups. There is an indirect link of the media with the 
government. The dominant classes have been able, at different times in history, to 
control the media through taxation, subsidy, censorship, and license requirements. 
These measures have shaped and regulated the media content with considerable success 
(Curran and Seaton, 1991; Schlesinger, 1978). Furthermore, the increasing influence of 
the market does not create a free, open, pluralist marketplace of ideas, as the proponents 
of the market anticipate. The ideological range of the media, as Curran (1996) observes, 
remains limited despite the proliferation of media channels.
According to the dominant ideology thesis, then, television reflects a dominant ideology 
which stems from the direct involvement and indirect connection of the state and 
commercial interests in the media industry. Despite various versions of the dominant 
ideology thesis among the theorists, there is agreement about the role of the media in 
ideological domination and its ideological effects.
5.1.2 The Polysemy Thesis
Originating in opposition to the dominant ideology thesis, the polysemy thesis is in 
accord with what has been called the interpretative turn in media studies. The thesis 
suggests that there are multiple meanings within television texts, and by extension, there 
are idiosyncratic readings of television texts by active audiences.
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Applying Hall’s encoding/decoding model in his empirical research (which w s 
originally published in 1980), David Morley sees the need to modify the model because 
the decodings of the text do not correspond with the class division of the viewers 
(although the importance of class is to certain extent confirmed in the study). Moreover, 
other divisions such as race and gender emerge are also shown to be relevant (see 
Morley and Brunsdon, 1998). Morley's work has since been regarded by John Fiske — 
the most influential proponent of the polysemy thesis — as supportive of his own 
arguments (Fiske, 1987). While it has had a profound impact on the field of media 
studies, the polysemy thesis has also generated extensive debate among media theorists. 
Simply put, the most problematic concern is that the polysemy thesis in most extreme 
view downplays the relevance of television effects and renders textual analysis 
unnecessary.
The polysemy thesis posits two lines of argument in conceptualising television texts as 
polysemic: the first may be described as the institutional imperative, and the other is 
based on textual features. First, it is argued that television caters for a diverse audience 
in order to be popular, and hence it must produce an ideologically open text for various 
sub-cultural groups if that text is to be accepted. The market success of television as an 
institution relies on the extent to which it is capable of meeting the diverse and 
competing interests of its audience through its products -- the television texts (Fiske, 
1986, 1987).
Secondly, polysemy describes the textual properties of the television medium. As the 
most recognised proponent of the polysemy thesis, Fiske (1987) describes the television 
text as a 'producerly' text, which simultaneously incorporates the openness of the 
'writerly' text with the accessibility of the 'readerly' text. The textual devices of 
television (irony, metaphor, jokes, contradiction, and excess, etc.) therefore provide the 
potential for polysemic readings. Fiske concludes that television, 'far from being the 
agent of the dominant classes ... is the prime site where the dominant have to recognise 
the insecurity of their power, and where they have to encourage cultural difference with 
all the threat to their own position that this implies' (Fiske, 1987: 326).
Fiske's early work (Fiske, 1986, 1987) reflects much of the liberal pluralist position. 
According to the pluralist concept of capitalist democratic society, the media operate m 
a free market and employ relatively autonomous media professionals. The media
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present a wide range of views which compete with each other, and yet none of them is 
predominant all the time. Within the liberal pluralist formulation, pluralistic points of 
views replace the dominant ideology (see Curran et al., 1977: 4-5).
5.1.3 A Critical Synthesis
Each of the two theses, as outlined above, has its own particular conception of the 
character of television texts and, by implication, that of the television audience. Both 
have their advantages and disadvantages. Both have exerted a profound influence on the 
field of media and cultural studies, though at the same time each of them has met with 
severe criticism (Abercrombie et al., 1980; Condit, 1989; Seaman, 1992). Theorists who 
are involved in the debate have refined their original arguments in response to criticisms.
Morley argues for the existence of the ’preferred’ reading position and insists that there 
are limits to television’s polysemy (Morley, 1992: 36-39). Murdock has toned down the 
economic determinism reflected in his earlier formulation of dominant ideology (i.e. the 
link between the media ownership structure and the dominant ideology). Following Hall 
(1986), Murdock regards the economic as the necessary point of departure but not of 
destination. He adopts the concepts of articulation and structuration, acknowledging that 
the dominant ideology operates through multiple articulations (Murdock, 1989). Fiske's 
position is severely criticised by Murdock as 'simply another version of the market 
system's own claim' (Murdock, 1989: 229) that there is no need to increase diversity of 
representations and cultural forms within the established system because the audience 
can draw on what is provided in the dominant media and produce meanings and 
pleasures for themselves. The unrestrained celebration of idiosyncratic polysemy and 
audiences’ resistance that is evident in Fiske's earlier work is also criticised by those 
who recognise the interpretative power of the audience (Kellner, 1995; Morley, 1992). 
In response, Fiske has made some revisions of his earlier thought and now shows signs 
of distancing himself from both postmodernism and liberal pluralism (Fiske, 1994).
As the representative scholars of the hitherto opposing theses have now modified their 
initial views and taken more eclectic positions, there seems to be no need to take sides 
with or abandon either thesis. Also, the question of what kind of evidence can be 
counted as acceptable to support either thesis remains open to dispute. Each thesis has 
its own explanatory power as long as it is not misused and carried to an extreme (i.e.
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textual determinism or sociological reductionism). The same is true with respect to 
different methodological approaches, namely content analysis, textual analysis, and in- 
depth interviews. We should bear in mind that the power of the media over the audience 
and the resistance of the audience to the media are contingent upon the relationship of 
interaction between texts and the acts of reading, and cannot be regarded as 
predetermined or fixed.
The question at stake, however, is how we move forward and what do we gain by 
synthesising the opposing views that have been oscillating between the definitional 
power of the media and that of the audience (cf. Dahlgren, 1991: 12). Drawing on the 
insights offered by media scholars who work in diverse research traditions, I summarise 
graphically what has been written about the text-reader relationship, in which powerful 
media may co-exist with an active audience (see Figure 5.1). As shown in Figure 5.1, 
following Hall (1980), the encoding and decoding of a text do not take place in 
isolation/stasis. Rather, the text-reader relationship is considered as an ongoing process 
of intersection which goes beyond either seeing the text as inscribing a determinate 
meaning or the reader as producing indeterminate meanings (Morley, 1992).
Thus, the formation of national identity can be viewed a mediating process in which the 
media interact with the audience over time; both participating parties approach arid 
affected each other. Audiences are knowing subjects (constantly though not always) 
reflexively interacting with the mediated knowledge/sentiments disseminated by the 
media. Likewise, the media -  in cases where profit making and hegemony maintenance 
are the aims (as is the case with the media under the KMT in Taiwan) -  have not 
produced texts obliviously of how audiences may receive them. Therefore, the text- 
audience relationship is somewhat close to what has been termed 'the discursive space 
that contains both text and audience' (Silverstone, 1999a: 74).
Livingstone goes further to argue against the assumption that audiences meet media 
texts with an established set of interpretative resources that exist independently of the 
media (Livingstone, 1999). She also takes issue with the binary opposition between the 
'transmission' and 'ritual' models of communication, suggesting that both are essential .o 
the mediated/mediating process of knowledge. From this, it appears that a crude 
separation of audience from (media) texts is not helpful to an understanding of the 
question of national identity formation. Similarly, informed by the concept of cultural
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hybridity (see Chapter 2), it seems appropriate to see national identity-formation as a 
mediating process which should not be viewed as a struggle in zero-sum terms between 
two or more definitions of nationhood. Rather, it is a long-term process of mutual 
accommodation -  but power remains unequal at any given point in time -  between 
media production and media consumption, and, in the Taiwanese context, between the 
(erstwhile characteristically Chinese) state and the (Taiwanese) citizenry.
We may theorise this mediating process of national identity-formation as occurring in 
what Schlesinger calls the 'national cultural space', where the media and education 
systems, among other social institutions, engages with people's everyday experiences in 
mediating among various definitions of nationhood. This 'national cultural space' is too 
enormous to be explored in detail in the present study. In order to examine this 
mediating process of national identity-formation from the vantage point of media 
studies, the mediated text-reader relationship in question can be objectified as 
constituting the 'discursive space' (using Silverstone's term) in a metaphorical sense.
This discursive space is an analytic construct. First, it cannot exist on its own right 
without the individual as well as institutional actions of encoding and decoding the 
media texts in question. Secondly, it necessarily contains a flow of diverse meanings -  
generated in the encoding-decoding intersection from moment to moment -  which are 
far from transparent in terms of determining (for the researcher) what is intended (or 
inscribed) in, and what the audience receive (or construct) from, the media texts.
Figure 5.1 seeks to conceptualise the discursive space that contains both text and reader 
without neglecting its necessarily multivalent and dynamic nature. Connected with tl e 
discursive space in question, there are a number of components ranging (from a to e). 
These constitutive components of the mediating process do not occur in sequence but as 
a totality. Of course, the text-reader relationship can be drawn in many ways. The 
presentation in Figure 5.1 does not exhaust the possible conceptualisations. However, it 
is useful for the purpose of summarising the main elements involved in the text-reader 
interaction and for relating the present study to the broader picture, although not all of 
the elements marked in Figure 5.1 are analysed empirically in this study. In what 
follows, I offer a brief discussion of each component of this mediating process in turn.
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Figure 5.1: The text-reader relationship as a mediating process
Contexts (changing historical conjunctures, e.g. state-society relations, the global-local nexus, etc.)
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(e) Moments of mutual yet 
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(a) The political economy o f the media, whose dynamics in the case of Taiwan have 
been addressed in Chapter 4, is vitally important in shaping the infrastructure of the 
discursive space in which text and reader intersect. In Chapter 6, I will touch on the 
centrality of television serial dramas in Taiwan's television ecology, and the way in 
which imported American series have been placed in a marginal position since the early 
1970s. Additionally, I will detail the film genres of 'Policy Films' and 'Taiwan New 
Cinema', whose emergence (in the 1970s and the 1980s respectively) was closely linked 
to the political-economic contexts of the Taiwanese film industry.
(b) The production process o f  media texts (within the media institutions and among the 
media professionals) in relation to the audience is a crucial aspect of the mediating 
process, as revealed in the work of John Tulloch and others in their investigations of the 
interaction between producing a soap opera and locating the implied audience in the 
ongoing production process (Henderson, 1999; Tulloch, 1999).
(c) Other socially circulated discourses ('inter-textuality') reinforce a given text to 
persuade and/or help the audience to comprehend a particular text and produce diverse 
interpretations. Inter-textuality operates not only between different kinds of media but 
also within a particular medium such as television itself. The stress on inter-textuality is, 
as McGuigan points out, most noticeable in Williams's concept of televisual flow  (for 
the various ways in which flow operates, see Allan, 1997) in the sense that 'no 
programme communicates in splendid isolation from the surrounding programmes' 
(McGuigan, 1993: 180). Or, as Morley points out, 'in the process of decoding and 
interpreting the messages of the media, other messages, other discourses are always 
involved, whether or not we are explicitly conscious of it' (Morley, 1992: 77).
(d) Interpretative resources/frames. In the chapters on the audience (Chapters 8 and 9), 
I will seek to identify the interpretative resources/frames employed by the audience 
members to make sense (and use) of the media. These interpretative resources/frames, 
or cultural competences, originate from personal, communal and mediated sources 
including one's social positioning (e.g. age, class, gender, ethnicity), media-facilitated or 
media-focused 'interpretative communities' (Lindolf, 1988: 92-93; Schroder, 1994: 344- 
345), and personal biographies. In order to analyse the audience as a set of sub-culturil 
groups (differentiated by age, gender, ethnicity, etc.) rather than as a random collection 
of individuals, we need to probe how audiences' differential interpretations are related to
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their social positionings. As Morley argues, 'the audience must be conceived of as 
composed of clusters of socially situated individual readers, whose individual readings 
will be framed by shared cultural formations and practices pre-existent to the individual' 
(Morley and Brunsdon, 1998: 129-130).1
(e) Moments o f  mutual yet asymmetrical articulation between text and reader produce 
different but possibly co-existing reading positions. Hall identifies 'three hypothetical 
positions': 'preferred', 'negotiated' and 'oppositional' (Hall, 1980: 136). The two chapters 
on audience reception (Chapters 8 and 9) will focus on the meanings as received and 
constructed by reference to past and present audience receptions in relation to television 
in general and two popular media texts in particular. At the same time, this analysis 
cannot afford to lose sight of the meanings that are intended and inscribed. As I will 
explain in detail later in this chapter and further analyse in Chapter 7, the textual 
analysis of two popular media texts is aimed at unpacking the intended and inscribed 
meanings (ideologies) within the texts.
All these components, being appropriately analysed by reference to the changing 
historical conjunctures, will certainly contribute to an understanding of the discursive 
space that contains both text and reader. Unfortunately but perhaps inevitably, not all of 
the components contained in the summarised graph will be analysed in detail in the 
present research; and the analysis will be presented in separate chapters, each of which 
has its specific aim. However, in the concluding chapter I will move the discussion from 
the level of the specific back to that of the general -  by means of methodological 
triangulation -  to clarify how national identity is shaped through a mediating process 
between television and audience.
5.2 R e s e a r c h  D e s ig n
In order to explore the aforementioned discursive space in which text relates to reader, 
there are two main sets of questions to which this thesis attends. One concerns the
1 This claim, made by Morley, seems to be impossible to disapprove. Yet there are difficulties involved in 
probing the question o f the determinations between one's specific readings and social positionings. For 
example, it is impossible to take all the social positional factors, potentially infinite, into consideration in 
a single study. This is an enmeshed question with theoretical, methodological and empirical implications. 
W e will return to it later in this chapter when dealing with the research design for audience analysis.
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question of media construction of national identity; the other concerns audience 
reception/interpretation in relation to national identity. For the former question, I 
conduct both quantitative and qualitative analyses of media representations over time. 
To explore the latter question, in-depth interviews of family viewers are undertaken. 
Multiple methods and multiple sources of data include the following: (1) quantitative 
content analysis of the prime-time television serial dramas broadcast on terrestrial 
channels between 1971 and 1996; (2) qualitative (con)textual analysis of Victory and 
City o f  Sadness, two representative local films produced during the heyday of Taiwan's 
national cinema in the 1970s and 1980s; (3) interpretative analysis based on in-depth 
interviews of 19 viewing families which are nuclear in pattern and have access to cable 
television.
Below I offer an account of the premise on which each analysis is based as well as the 
methodological considerations involved.
5.2.1 Content Analysis of Television Serial Dramas
The first part of the empirical study (Chapter 6) attempts to answer the seemingly 
simple but actually formidable question: how Chinese or Taiwanese, in terms >;f 
temporal, spatial, linguistic and other attributes, are Taiwan's prime-time television 
serial dramas (most of which are produced domestically)? The television serial drama 
has persistently been the most important genre, contributing greatly to the finance of 
terrestrial television, and continues to be one of the most popular television genres (in 
terms of ratings) in Taiwan. The analysis will focus on the temporal and spatial 
attributes of representations within the television serial dramas.
(1) Premise: why analyse television dramas?
The premise of this analysis is based on the argument that 'time and space are ... the 
basic co-ordinates of all systems of representation' and 'all identities are located in 
symbolic space and time' (Hall, 1992: 301, emphasis in the original). Moreover, an 
analysis of the television serial drama also has theoretical implications, which are 
addressed in the following sections.
107
It has been argued that film and television 'play a powerful role in the construction of 
collective memories and identities' (Morley and Robins, 1995: 91); and the various 
kinds of television drama appear to be particularly important in this respect (Collins, 
1990a; Ma, 1995; Martin-Barbero, 1993, 1995). As one of television's principal and 
locally produced outputs and one that has been broadcast with predictable regularity 
(five days a week since the early 1970s), Taiwan's television serial dramas have 
undoubtedly played an important role in the process of moulding collective memories, 
marking personal biographies, and binding the nation together -  processes which have 
been identified in other countries (see Moores, 1988). In the case of Taiwan, the serial 
dramas have become fixed in the prime-time slot on all terrestrial channels since the 
early 1970s and remain so to the present day. This constitutes the cultural context that 
Raymond Williams describes as 'a dramatised society':
For the first time a majority of the population has regular and constant 
access to drama, beyond occasion or season. ... It is that drama, in quite 
new ways, is built into the rhythms of everyday life. On television alone it is 
normal for viewers -  the substantial majority of the population -  to see 
anything up to three hours of drama, of course drama of several different 
kinds, a day. And not just one day; almost every day. This is part of what I 
mean by a dramatised society. In earlier periods drama was important at a 
festival, in a season or as a conscious journey to a theatre ... What we now 
have is drama as habitual experience; more in a week, in many cases, than 
most human beings would previously have seen in a lifetime. (Williams,
1983:12)
Among the various genres of television dramas, the soap opera has produced 
particularly rich empirical evidence with reference to questions of cultural globalisatic n 
and local identity pertinent to the present research. In what follows, I therefore use the 
soap opera literature as the closest, if not perfectly equivalent, point of reference for 
Taiwan's television serial dramas.
A link has been noted between the classical Hollywood melodrama and the soap opera 
in the serial form (Feuer, 1984; Modleski, 1990: 193), a link which has encouraged film 
scholars to study television soap operas (Allen, 1989). Apart from analytic approaches 
derived from the tradition of film studies, other traditions have been significant in 
shaping soap opera studies: for example, the sociological tradition (Cantor and Pingree, 
1983); the Latin America telenovela tradition (e.g. Martin-Barbero, 1988, 1993, 1995; 
Rowe and Schelling, 1991); the feminist approach (e.g. Ang, 1997; Brunsdon, 1995); 
and the ethnographic approach (e.g. Seiter et al., 1989). In addition, cross-cultural
108
reception studies of soap operas are also important in highlighting the variations of 
interpretation and reception of a soap opera among its international audiences (Ang, 
1985; Katz and Liebes, 1987; Liebes and Katz, 1990). Equally important is the 
empirical examination of the genre (e.g. Geraghty, 1990) and its national and regional 
specificities (e.g. Liebes and Livingstone, 1998).
These studies of diverse research traditions generally point to some key characteristics 
of the genre which are also manifested in Taiwan's television serial dramas: complexity, 
the centrality o f characters, continuity and intimacy. The first and second of these 
characteristics are closely related. To meet the needs of a continuing serial, multiple 
plots are required to combine a variety of narratives, conventions and central characters.
The third characteristic of soap opera is its continuity ('seriality'), which means having a 
unique narrative structure, giving no definite ending and immediate narrative closure, 
and requiring in the audience an historical sense of time which parallels his/her 
everyday life to that of the continuing serial (Feuer, 1984). Characters in the soap opei s, 
like those in the television serial dramas in Taiwan, have memory and history. As Allen 
argues, 'the frequent viewer can recognise not only appropriate and inappropriate 
behaviour in a given character, but appropriate responses of a given character to another, 
based on the two characters' relationships in the show's past' (Allen, 1987: 151). This 
'continuity' serves as a specific textual code for soap operas, so that 'tomorrow at the 
same time' (Ming-tien tong yi shi-jian) has also long been the conventional phrase in 
Taiwan about television serials that is used to address the audience at the end of every 
episode.
The fourth characteristic of soap operas is their intimacy. Soap operas (including 
television serial dramas in the Taiwanese case) are particularly capable of involving the 
viewers in a personal way. Derived from the predominant mode of studio production, 
which is employed to achieve higher efficiency for episodic presentation and economy 
of production costs (Allen, 1987; Newcomb, 1987), the sense of intimacy is achieved by
(1) a combination of the genre's emotionally laden performance and (2) the television 
medium's transformation of its technical weakness into superiority. In relation to the 
first, soap operas are usually set in domestic locations, where personal relationships (e.g. 
conflict and love) among the characters are highlighted from a deeply moral perspective 
(Thorbum, 1987: 638). All these elements create a strong sense of audience
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involvement — 'a sense of becoming a part of the lives and actions they see' (Newcomb, 
1987: 620). The second dimension of the quality of intimacy is the television medium's 
small frame -- a technical limitation that the soap opera transforms into an advantage 
because it reinforces the sense of intimacy (Allen, 1985; Thorbum, 1987).
(2) Methodological considerations
Content analysis has been chosen for the present study of Taiwanese television serial 
dramas for a number of reasons. In Taiwan, domestically produced televisi: n 
programmes have not generally been accessible for research. The researcher had no 
direct access to recordings of television serial dramas and could not offer an 
interpretation based on direct viewing of the programmes. Therefore, the analysis is 
based on the written descriptions of the television serial dramas collected from the print 
media.
There are some justifications for adopting the method of quantitative content analysis. 
Since the present study is retrospective and historical in nature, longitudinal data are 
essential. The longitudinal design is of great value in revealing the historical trends of 
Taiwan's prime-time serial dramas so as to understand the relationship between 
television representation and the formation of national identity. The content analysis 
serves this analytic purpose better than other methods (Riffe et al., 1998). Furthermore, 
content analysis can be complementary to a qualitative analysis (Curran, 1976). Thus, 
despite all its limitations, content analysis is the best, if not the ideal, method for 
application in this present study of Taiwan's television serial dramas.
Both quantitative and qualitative methods have their own advantages and disadvantages 
(Curran, 1976; Leiss et al., 1990). On the one hand, content analysis has distinctive 
advantages: it has the 'ability to supply some objective answers' (Leiss et al., 1990: 223). 
It is particularly useful in 'dealing with large amounts of data, patterns that otherwise are 
difficult or impossible to detect' (Leiss et al., 1990: 223). On the other hand, content 
analysis also has its weaknesses. In particular, it is less suitable than qualitative textual 
analysis for measuring meaning because of its focus on the manifest content (Curran, 
1976; Leiss et al., 1990). There are difficulties in striking a balance between qualitative 
and quantitative analyses of the copious television serial dramas broadcast during a long 
period of time. One difficulty is the need for 'a trade-off between breadth and depth'
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(Allen et al., 1997: 91). Given that a complementary in-depth analysis of television 
serial dramas over time is impossible in the case of the present study, a quantitative 
analysis -- biased towards 'breadth' -- will be followed by a textual analysis of two films 
released during the same period.
5.2.2 The (Con-)Textual Analysis of Popular Films
The second part of my empirical analysis (Chapter 7) aims to explore the question of 
how national identity has been discursively constructed in popular media texts at a 
given point in post-war Taiwan. As well as reconstructing the contexts in which the two 
films were produced (in the 1970s and 1980s), the analysis attempts to shed light on the 
ways in which the meanings of the national past were inscribed in two locally produce d 
films (the 1976 film Victory and the 1989 film City o f Sadness).
(I) Premise: why analyse film s?
The premise of this analysis is that national identity cannot exist independently of the 
realm of cultural expression. This being the case, a textual analysis of popular texts 
should throw light on the relationship between identity formation and media texts.2 
Among the means of communication, the film is as important as television in 
representing national history (Landy, 1996), and this is particularly significant because 
the members of a nation are supposed to share a common past (Anderson, 1991; 
Hobsbawm, 1983). As Billig points out, 'nations not only have to be imagined, but also 
have to create their own histories, or interpretations of themselves' (Billig, 1995: 70). 
These national cinematic discourses, therefore, can be considered as part of what has 
been referred to as the 'narrative of nation' (Anderson, 1991: 204-205; Hall, 1992: 293), 
meaning
A set of stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national 
symbols and rituals which stand for or represent the shared experiences ... 
which give meaning to the nation. (Hall, 1992: 293)
2
It has been argued that media texts have the potential to constrain audience activity and can reveal some 
characteristics o f the society which produces and consumes them (Liebes and Livingstone, 1998: 155). 
Furthermore, textual analysis provides routes for scrutinising the possible operations o f  the dominant 
ideology in a given society and can serve as 'a necessary complement to audience research' (Joyrich, 1996: 
12).
I l l
Furthermore, materials about the past have been constantly recycled in the production of 
fictional entertainment as well as news, where a meaningful link to the past is on offer. 
Indeed, it may be argued that the hitherto dividing line between history and news is 
becoming blurred (Dayan and Katz, 1992; Lang et al., 1989). The meanings of 'the 
present' and 'the past' are altered now that we live in a time-compressed world driven by 
the technologies of instantaneous and synchronic communication across space. The past 
is defined by the present-past relation, as is what is meant by the present (Duara, 1993). 
Screening the pasts otherwise inaccessible to many is thus related to the question of 
who has the power to (re)write history, particularly when we consider that the cinematic 
versions of the past can be technically made more real than the past in itself (McQuire, 
1998: 145, emphasis in the original).
For these reasons, film inevitably constructs the past by selectively visualising the past 
to which only a limited (and decreasing) number of people have ever had access. As 
such, films construct the past through a process of selection, determining what sort of 
past is to be remembered (and/or forgotten). For instance, in film propaganda the past is 
constructed to be against 'them' and simultaneously for solidarity among 'us' (Taylor, 
1998). The selective and sometimes exclusionary representations of the past, in turn, 
have implications for how a nation is imagined.
(2) Methodological considerations
Drawing on the insights offered by these scholars, the textual analysis will examine he v 
the two films in question narrated the national past and constructed historical memories. 
Both films set the historical scene in one of Taiwan's most turbulent eras -  the transition 
from the period of Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule to that of Taiwan under the 
KMT. Hence, a comparative textual analysis of how the two films narrate the national 
past can complement what is generated from the content analysis of television serial 
dramas.3
Apart from the importance of film in its own right, film is selected for detailed 
investigation because no other systematic material in audio-visual form is available.
3 It should be noted here that, since 'all the historical films are fictional' (Sorlin, 1980), the analysis w 11 
not naively subject films to the tests about evidence that are applied to written history; instead, it focuses 
on the ways in which the past were constructed by these films.
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Despite difference between film and television in their aesthetic and industrial aspects 
(Ellis, 1992), the separation of film studies from 'television studies' is not useful.4 Films 
have long been part and parcel of television programming. Viewers arguably have 
access to more films on television than in the cinemas (Gomery, 1983).
There are a number of reasons for selecting these particular films {Victory and City o f  
Sadness) for a comparative analysis. They were the best-selling Taiwan-made films in 
the years of their release and have been screened on television several times since then.5 
Furthermore, both films were produced by companies which had substantial 
involvement in the television market. Victory was made by the CMPC, which remains 
the largest film company in Taiwan. Owned by the KMT, it was identical to the three 
national television companies in terms of ownership structure. The makers of City o f  
Sadness, including the film's director, developed their professional life at the CMPC in 
the late 1970s. City o f Sadness was produced by an independent production company 
(ERA International Ltd.), which had a fair share of Taiwan's television market through 
the company's connection with TVBS, one of the most popular satellite television 
channels in Taiwan.
Importantly, the two films are highly relevant to the question of national identity in 
Taiwan. Along with some other films made between 1971 and 1993, the two films were 
officially endorsed as among 'the most memorable' of the national cinema.6 Setting the 
narrative scene in the locale of Taiwan, both films dealt with past events that 'actually' 
occurred and touched on the relations between the KMT and the 'native Taiwanese'.
4
Different cultural forms and programme types may still share some discourses as they are conditioned 
and circulated in the same society. As Tulloch and Lupton find in their research, different types o f  AK S 
television texts including the health promotion advertisements and soap opera 'tend to draw on a similar 
stock o f discourses' (Tulloch and Lupton, 1997: 12).
5 Box-office statistics here cover the area o f Taiwan's capital city Taipei, rather than the whole o f Taiwan. 
In terms o f  the Mandarin films, the 1976 Victory fared only second to a Hong Kong martial arts film. For 
the 1989 City o f  Sadness, the box office revenue in Taipei alone was above NT$ 50 million, i.e. nearly 
double the revenue (NTS 28 million) for the film in second place (Imagekeeper Monthly, December 1995, 
special issue no. 1: 264).
6 The other films included The Everlasting Glory (1974), Eight Hundred Heroes (1976), In Our Time 
(1982), Strawman (1987), A Bright Summer Day (1991), and The Wedding Banquet (1993), etc. The 
Taiwan Cinema Year, a film festival sponsored by the Government Information Office (GIO) in 1993, 
was intended to promote the national cinema. The GIO made a video compilation o f clips from these 
films, with the National Anthem as its soundtrack. The video was aired on television and other outlets in 
an attempt to rejunvenate Taiwan's declining film industry.
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In analysing the two films, I first contextualise them in their respective socio-political 
contexts and then conduct a textual analysis. It should be noted here that the term 
'textual analysis' is often seen in the literature as the opposite of 'content analysis', and 
as covering a wide range of competing or overlapping approaches — such as those 
contained in the book Channels o f Discourse (Allen, 1992) — drawn from diverse 
research traditions. I choose deliberately not to define the term 'textual analysis' but to 
focus on the ideologies registered in the narration process of the film. Thus, the focus of 
my analysis is not on the textual properties per se but on the ideologies as reflected in 
the cinematic texts.
5.2.3 In-depth Interviews with Viewing Families
Through two waves of in-depth interviews of 19 families, the third part of my empirical 
analysis seeks to explore a number of questions. First, it attempts to account for their 
past and present viewing experiences in the domestic context (see Chapter 8).
Secondly, it looks at how the families interpret the two films in question and 
furthermore, to map the range of viewers' receptions in relation to their sense of national 
identities (see Chapter 9). In her inquiry into viewers' representations of characters m 
two British soap operas, Livingstone argues that they arise from the communicatk n 
between the text, the viewer, and the historical context which conditions both the text 
and viewers. She rejects 'the ideas of independently existing texts' on the grounds that 
'one can have no independent access to texts prior to being read or to viewers ignorant 
of television texts' (Livingstone, 1988: 105-106). This suggests that audience 
interpretations of the two films from the course of the informants' lives would provide 
rich information about the intersection between text and reader.
(1) Premise: why study viewing fam ilies?
The reasons for including the viewing families in this project are straightforward: most 
people watch television with their families at home (Silverstone, 1994), talk about 
television with family members (see Baym, 2000: 14-15), and the family is a primary 
unit of socialisation. No other single medium has so far taken the place of television, 
occupying so much shared time spent by ordinary family members. Thus, television is 
very much a domestic medium and forms a vital part of people's daily routines
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(Scannell, 1988: 25-26). Furthermore, the family can be seen as one crucial site where 
individuals acquire, and negotiate over, their sense of ethnic and national identities -  it 
is one of the 'building blocks or key sites of nationalistic sentiment' (Sibley, 1995b: 108).
The symbolism required by national imagination is, more often than not, connected with 
the imagery of the familial. Indeed, the metaphorical link between the home and the 
nation is strong. As Morley argues, 'historically, what is at stake here was both the 
nationalisation of the domestic and the domestication of the national' (Morley, 2000: 
107). But, the home (as well as the national home) itself is not always filled with care, 
happiness, harmony and warmth. The home is also replete with possibilities of 
domination and conflict between generations and genders, not to mention a gendered 
division of labour (Sibley, 1995a). The home is, as Neil Smith argues, 'both castle and 
prisonhouse, ... socially if not always physically walled, and access out as well as in is 
controlled in various ways' (Smith, 1993: 104).
The home is also the place 'where the global meets the local' (Morley, 1992: ch. 13) as 
television facilitates intensive interactions between the familial, the local and the global. 
As some theorists have argued, cultural globalisation can be seen as being embodied in 
people's everyday lives. The ways in which people experience television, and interpret 
any particular television-mediated representation of the world (near or remote in time/in 
space) are crucial as to understanding how people actually make sense of their place in 
the world at large, namely, what national identity means for them.
(2) Methodological considerations
In light of the metaphorical affinity between the biological family and the national 
family, and because the text-reader relationship is the focal point that this thesis 
attempts to explore, in-depth interviews with television families are necessary.
Based on depth-interviews with 19 viewing families, the audience analysis examines 
some of the ways in which television viewing might be related to audiences' sense of 
national identity. The data were collected by two waves of interviews with each family. 
The first wave focused on the informants' past and present television viewing 
experiences. The second wave looked more closely at the contexts within which their 
viewing experiences, in association with their social position, were articulated with their 
sense of national identities. To look for clues to the interaction between the text and the
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reader, the opening sequences of the films (i.e. Victory and City o f  Sadness) were 
shown separately (on video) to the informants in the course of the interviews.
One of the key methodological questions in any audience research is: which segment of 
the audience is to be studied? This is question of great theoretical importance. As 
Gamham points out,
The issue in dispute thus became not whether we had to see the audiences as 
socially constructed and any effects as socially mediated, but what in any 
given case were the appropriate social markers. Were they class, gender, 
ethnicity, age, geographical location, etc.? This is a problem that no 
audience researcher can escape, since unless the audience is conceived in 
terms of isolated individuals and any effects are conceived as entirely 
random, some structuring of the sample to be studied has to take place and 
such a structuring will, of course, be prescribed by one's hypothesis as to 
what the most relevant social structural mediations are likely to be. 
(Gamham, 2000: 127)
Gamham goes on to pinpoint the questionable way in which audience researchers 
determine their focus: 'if one is concerned with class power then class will be top of the 
list, if with gender relations then gender, and so on' (Gamham, 2000: 127). Worse st' l, 
he argues, is
... the apparent rich variation in actual audience interpretations and their 
theorisation as an active resistant audience then led ironically, in the name 
of an "ethnography" of the embedded audience, not just to the disappearance 
from research of the intervening social structural variables that the whole 
effects tradition had developed to explain variations in effects, but also... 
the disappearance of the audience as anything other than a random 
collection of individuals so embedded as to dissolve into the huge 
complexity of the everyday (Gamham, 2000: 127).
For the purpose of this study, the informants were recruited primarily from the segment 
of the urban, middle-class families who reside in the Sanchong district of Taipei County, 
where is separated by a bridge from the capital city, Taipei. To qualify as part of the 
sample, it was decided that all the families should be (1) equipped with colour television 
set(s), VCRs, and cable/satellite access; (2) nuclear In pattern; and (3) identifiable in 
terms of ethnic background. As a result, the sample consists of six 'Mainlander', six 
'Hakka' and seven 'Hokkien' families.
The first criterion is set because one concern of the present study is with the interplay of 
the local and the global in terms of audio-visual consumption; and among the segments 
of the audience, families with television, VCRs, and cable/satellite access are more
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likely to have richer experiences in this respect. This criterion inevitably precludes 
families with other class positions.7 But it can be justified because 'there is an infinite 
range of [socio-demographic] factors' (Morley, 1992: 125) which are practically 
impossible to include in a single study such as the present one; and it is unlikely that 'all 
such factors would be of equal effectivity' (Morley, 1992: 125).
The second criterion, families in the nuclear pattern, is set because the nuclear family is 
predominant in urban Taiwan. The third criterion, ethnic background, is set because it is 
among the most important of a range of factors which are likely to mediate the sense of 
national identity in Taiwan. Taiwan was historically troubled by serious conflicts 
between the Hakka and the Hokkien, and in the early years of the KMT regime between 
the 'native Taiwanese' and the 'Mainlanders'. Ethnic background has been generally 
understood as one of the most salient factors in affecting one's political behaviour, e.g. 
in terms of voting and party allegiance in multi-ethnic Taiwan. Ethnicity remains a 
sociologically important factor today, but, because of inter-ethnic marriage over the last 
50 years, the significance of ethnicity is in decline. This changing 'ethnoscape' thus 
complicated the recruitment of families on the basis of ethnicity. For the convenience of 
recruitment from groups of varied ethnic origin, only the youngsters' paternal 
grandfather was taken into consideration.8
Structured as such, the sample can at least be differentiated in terms of ethnicity, se ;, 
and age. There is no lack of evidence in previous studies concerning the importance of 
one or more of these factors (e.g. Gillespie, 1995; Liebes and Katz, 1990). Thus, an
7 For Taipei County as a whole, the rate o f colour television ownership was approximately 135 per 100 
households. Cable television also spread through the majority o f viewing families in the 1990s. Since the 
1990s viweres have become less dependent on the VCRs to gain access to programmes unavailable on the 
terrestrial television channels. This might account for why the household ownership o f VCRs sharply 
decreased during the same period. In the short period between 1992 and 1996, the proportion of 
households possessing VCRs dropped by 18 per cent (from 83 per cent in 1992 to 65 per cent in 1996). 
The national population as a whole reflected a similar trend. The proportion o f households owning VCRs 
was 69.2 per cent in 1993 but subsequently decreased to 66.3 per cent in 1994 and to 62.2 per cent in 
1995. (Directorate-General o f Budget Accounting and Statistics, 1996.)
g
The difficulties in recruiting informants were overcome with the help o f my wife, a teacher at a middle 
school in Sanchong. She enabled me to contact roughly 60 o f her former students from different grades 
(aged 17-19 when interviews were undertaken). Having made explicit the purpose o f the research ( 'f a r r 'y  
television viewing'), more than half o f these students agreed to take part in this project. In the end, i9 
household interviews were arranged with the consent o f the students' parents. This method o f  informant 
recruitment generally meets the demands o f the research. On the one hand, these family viewers were 
unknown to me personally before interviewing, and thus granted me an appropriate distance with the 
informants. On the other hand, it also enabled me to acquire trust o f the informants with whom the co­
interviewer (my wife) had been familiar.
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effort will be made to determine the relative importance/unimportance of these factors 
with respect to the families' past/present viewing experiences, interpretations of the two 
films in question, and sense of national identities. However, I intend to make no a priori 
claim to whether any of these factors is important or unimportant because, as Morley 
reflects, 'this is fundamentally a question which cannot be resolved on purely theoretical 
grounds, but has also to take into account empirical evidence' (Morley, 1992: 125).
5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter I have considered the key methodological questions involved in this 
thesis, arguing for a critical synthesis of the dominant ideology thesis and the polysemy 
thesis, a synthesis that benefits from both research traditions but which does not rely on 
simplistic assumptions about the text-reader relationship. I also argue that the te>.> 
reader relationship, from a historical perspective that covers different time spans, should 
be approached by reference to multiple sources of data analysed by multiple methods.
The aim of the empirical analysis as a whole, therefore, is not to arrive at a single 
definitive answer to the question of television's role in national identity-formation in 
Taiwan. The analyses of separate sets of data conducted from different angles and by 
different methods should result in a range of complementary and/or inconsistent 
evidence. Since this thesis is concerned with the complexity of television, politics and 
audience in the long-term mediating process of national identity-formation, a 
methodological triangulation based on the multiple sources of data is intended to 
produce a range of the most reliable answers rather than a single definitive one.
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Part II
Empirical Analyses
Part Two presents the results of the selected empirical case studies. In each chapter, 
analytical methods are discussed before the examination of the research data and the 
interpretation of the key findings. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are 
employed to examine the inter-relationship between media representation and audience 
reception.
Chapter 6 analyses the synopses of a sample of television serial dramas. The synopses 
are drawn from the available secondary data relating to prime-time television serial 
dramas -  the programmes most popular with the viewers and vital to the advertising 
revenues of television in Taiwan -  over the last three decades. The chapter seeks to 
assess the linguistic, generic, temporal and spatial attributes of television 
representations between 1971 and 1996, when the KMT exercised monopoly control of 
terrestrial television in Taiwan.
Intended as a complement to Chapter 6, Chapter 7 conducts a comparative textual 
analysis of two representative films of the national cinema {Victory and City o f  Sadnes ;). 
The analysis focuses on how national past events which remain closely related to 
contemporary Taiwanese identity have been utilised in the media texts produced at 
different times. The premise of this comparative analysis is that a close examination of 
how the national past has been portrayed by the national cinema may explicate how 
media fictions engage in the ideological dissemination and discursive reconstruction of 
a national identity.
Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 are based on depth-interviews with 19 viewing families, 
looking into some of the ways in which television viewing might be related to the 
audience's sense of national identity. Informed by two waves of in-depth interviews 
with these families, the two chapters give details about informants' past and present 
television viewing experiences, interwoven with their personal biographies. The two 
chapters also explore the contexts within which the audience's viewing experiences 
were articulated with, or divorced from, their sense of national identity. On the basis of 
two separate sessions of co-viewing the opening sequences of the two films in question 
( Victory and City o f Sadness), the analysis provides clues to the interaction between f  e 
text and the reader.
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6.
Taiwanese Television Serial 
Dramas
As noted in Chapter 5, some previous studies have pointed to the potential of television 
drama (widely defined) for shaping the sense of national identity among the viewers. 
The present chapter examines more closely the question of television representation n 
Taiwan by conducting a quantitative analysis of television drama synopses.1 The aim is 
to map the terrain of Taiwan's television in terms of its temporal, spatial and linguistic 
attributes between 1971 and 1996.
The analysis provides quantitative evidence on the unique nature of television drama 
representation. Most importantly, the impact of the excessive 'presence' of Mainland 
China on Taiwan's television is considered. Since the early 1970s, Taiwan's television 
has placed an emphasis on China in terms of its temporal, spatial and other attributes. 
Taiwan's television serial dramas have been temporally and spatially located in the 
Chinese mainland, and have consistently provided a large proportion of representations 
that have linguistically privileged Mandarin over the local (Taiwanese) languages.
6.1 T elevision Serial D ramas in Taiw an
This section gives a historical account of Taiwan's serial dramas. The term 'television 
serial drama' is used because it is better than other terms (e.g. 'soap opera') for capturing 
the historical specificity of Taiwan's television fictions. The genre has always been 
called lianxu ju  (literally, 'serial drama') by the television industry and its audience.
1 The time frame o f sampling the television serial dramas for this analysis is purposively selected: tne 
period between 1971 and 1996, from the point at which television emerged as a nation-wide medium and 
Taiwan was no longer recognised as the representative o f'C h ina ' to the point at which the Taiwanese 
people elected the first native-born head o f state by direct vote.
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In terms of the supply, production and scheduling of terrestrial television in Taiwan, the 
proportion of imported programmes (mainly from the United States) has decreased 
significantly since the early 1970s. This is mainly due to the increasing commercial 
competition among television channels and the additional legislative constraints on the 
proportion of imported programmes. The 1976 Broadcasting Act limited the quantity of 
imported programmes to 30 per cent of overall television programming. The appearance 
of China Television Company (CTV) in 1969 prompted Taiwan Television Company 
(TTV) to decrease the proportion of imported programmes from the previous level of 33 
per cent to 22 per cent. Similarly, after the launch of Chinese Television Service (CTS) 
in 1971, the other two channels reduced the proportion of foreign programmes further to 
about 17 per cent (Lee, 1987: 197). The legislative constraints imposed by the 
government were largely symbolic, since before the 1976 Broadcasting Act took effect 
all three television channels had already reduced the proportion of imported 
programmes.
Of the various kinds of television programming in Taiwan, television serial drama has 
been an integral and indispensable part since the inception of the first television service 
in 1962. As indicated in a comprehensive survey of Taiwan's television programming 
between 1962 and 1993 (Liu, 1996), before 1987 the serial drama was the most 
important type of programme on Taiwan's television, consistently constituting over 35- 
50 per cent of overall television programming. Though the proportion declined after 
1988, the serial drama remained in second position in terms of its share of television 
output (after variety shows).
The average episode of a television serial drama lasted from 30 to 60 minutes in the 
1970s. In 1977, the Government Information Office restricted the maximum number >f 
episodes of a television serial drama to 60. The number was further reduced to 30 the 
following year. This limitation was later loosened to 40 episodes per television serial 
drama in the 1980s. The reasons why such trivial restrictions were imposed was never 
made clear, but it was certainly related to the vicious circle caused by the genre's 
popularity and commercial competition among television companies. In the early 1970s, 
television's overuse of the genre's popularity led to the saturation of evening television 
by serial dramas. For example, CTS once offered drama-only programming in the 
evenings, so that four television serial dramas were aired consecutively from 7 p.m. The
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high level of supply also killed the creativity and originality of the genre on the 
production side. This in turn caused dissatisfaction among the audience. The 
government then started restricting the number of television dramas per evening and the 
number of episodes per drama.
Since the early 1990s, the limitation on the number of episodes has virtually ceased to 
exist in so far as some popular prime-time television serial dramas have contained more 
than 100 episodes. Usually an episode lasts one hour, including a total of 15-20 minui;s 
for advertising, between 8 and 9 p.m. With respect to the genre’s scheduling, all the 
three terrestrial channels have shared a high degree of homogeneity as they have all 
scheduled prime-time television serial dramas into the same television time slots on 
weekdays. Thus, the genre's high daily consumption rate has demanded highly efficient 
methods of television production.
As a result of the genre's fierce competition across channels and its vital importance in 
profit-making for the entire television industry (similar to the importance of the soap 
opera genre to the commercial broadcasting industry in the United States, see Allen, 
1987), the serial drama in Taiwan has tended to have a larger budget than other types of 
programmes. Nevertheless, these factors have not always been associated with a hi- h 
content quality. Competition across channels has generally led television companies to 
copy the 'secrets' of market success from one another, and this has resulted in the 
increasing homogeneity of the entertainment output of Taiwan's television. Because of 
the genre's homogeneity and lack of creativity, television serial dramas have been 
criticised severely by intellectuals but have continued to enjoy high popularity.
Another important feature of Taiwan's prime-time television serial dramas is that nearly 
all of them have been made in Taiwan. More often than not, they have attracted a larger 
audience than imported American serials and series (Liu, 1997). This supports the 
conclusion of Silj and others, who find that in the European context national fiction 
normally outperforms imported American series in the audience ratings (Silj, 198>Q). 
Taiwanese television serial dramas have also competed successfully with their Hong 
Kong counterparts for overseas Chinese markets in Southeast Asia and North America -  
an experience similar to that of Mexico and Brazil, where telenovelas have been very 
successful in both domestic and overseas markets (Rogers and Antola, 1985).
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In short, the popularity of Taiwan’s television serial dramas and their centrality for the 
television industry make them a good choice for closer investigation through an 
historical analysis of television representations. In terms of both television production 
and consumption, prime-time television serial drama represents a genre which 
successfully meets the demands of the industrial economy of its producers and the 
expectations of its audience. On the production side, the genre is said to provide a 
highly efficient way to 'control the tension between similarity and difference inherent in 
the production of any cultural product' so as to 'predict audience popularity' (Feuer, 
1992: 142, 144). On the consumption side, the genre enables the audiences to choose, 
expect and comprehend what will be screened in a specific programme.
Reflecting many of the characteristics of the serial drama that have been identified n 
Chapter 5, Taiwan's television serial drama is emotionally laden with a focus on 
interpersonal and intimate relationships. But, unlike the soap opera in some Western 
countries, Taiwan's serial drama is a genre with a relatively clear ending since each 
series lasts only a few months but is broadcast on a daily basis, always in a prime-time 
viewing slot (Cai, 1994). The competition among different serial dramas and among 
television channels has always been fierce. For decades since the early 1970s, there 
have always been two or more serial dramas available at exactly the same time slot from 
different channels, and this has become increasingly common in recent years due to the 
multiplication of television channels.
6.2 Analysis of Television  D rama Synopses
6.2.1 Sample Descriptions
The sample frame for the present research covers a 302-month period of prime-time 
television serial dramas included in Taiwan's television listings. This enables the 
researcher to adopt a multi-stage, systematic sampling to acquire the data for analysis 
(Krippendorff, 1980; Riffe et al., 1998). The sample months for 1971 were first 
purposively selected as November and December due to the fact that the third terrestrial 
television channel was launched on 31 October of that year. For the other 25 yea^s 
between 1972 and 1996, 50 months were selected according to a systematic sampling jf 
the total population of 300 months. The first sampling month randomly resulted in the
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selection of April. Taking a sampling interval of five months, October was therefore 
chosen as the second sampling month. Accordingly, the same two months (April and 
October) were selected for each year between 1972 and 1996.
I then located the television listings for each of the sample months for each year. This 
produced a total of 61 days of television listings for each year and a total sample of 
1,575 days of television listings for detailed analysis.2 Then the prime-time television 
serial dramas appearing in each sample month's listings were identified. 'Prime-time' 
here refers to the time slot between 8 and 9 p.m. on weekdays (Mondays to Fridays), 
which has been called 'Golden prime time' by the television channels themselves. This 
is because advertising in that time period produces more revenue for the television 
stations than any other single time slot. In addition, the television audience between 8 
and 9 p.m. is larger and more heterogeneous than at other times. Between 1971 and 
1973, there was an amazing growth of serial dramas, which were broadcast every 
evening from Mondays to Fridays. Given that there was no typical serial lasting for one 
hour in that period, all of them were selected as long as they were broadcast between 7 
and 9 p.m. on weekdays. The one-hour serial dramas at prime time in Taiwan have 
normally been scheduled between 8 and 9 p.m. on weekdays, and this schedule has been 
stabilised on all three terrestrial television channels in Taiwan since 1974, with the 
exception that between 1978 and 1981 CTV scheduled its one-hour serial dramas 
between 9.30 and 10.30 p.m. on weekdays. In this way, the researcher identified a 
sample of prime-time television serial dramas for content analysis. The total sample 
consists of 267 different serial dramas (see Appendix I for the full list) between 1971 
and 1996. The vast majority of the serial dramas in the sample were made domestically, 
with just two being imported from Japan and Hong Kong.
6.2.2 Descriptive Synopses of the Television Serial Dramas
There is a lack of ready-made, adequate reference sources for the study of television 
serial dramas in Taiwan. Thus, for this study the descriptive synopses of the television 
serial dramas had to be prepared in advance before coding (see the example synopses in 
Appendix II). The main aim was to supply, for each selected television serial drama,
2 Television listings for eleven days in April 1975 were excluded, since no regular programming was 
broadcast in the days following the death o f Chiang Kai-shek on 5 April.
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key information (concerning main characters, plot summary, setting, and broadcast 
language, etc.) obtained from the print media. The main sources used were the national 
newspaper United Daily and the TV Guide published by TTV). These provided 
programme information, publicity about actors and actresses, viewers' letters, 
programme reviews. Of course, the synopses, as composite accounts of fragmented 
programme information, are incomplete. However, they are still useful for 
understanding the key changes in the orientations of television serial dramas over the 
years.
6.2.3 Coding Procedure and Reliability
The descriptive synopses of prime-time television serial dramas were used for coding in 
the following way. After training two independent coders, the researcher took 
responsibility for pre-testing the reliability between the two coders and adjusting the 
categories for each variable in case the inter-coder reliability was not satisfactory.
The coding scheme was developed in accordance with the coding protocol (see 
Appendix III) for the purpose of exploring the sub-generic, linguistic and spatio- 
temporal preferences in the programming of television serial dramas in Taiwan. The 
categories for a number of variables were constructed on the basis of traditional 
principles of content analysis to be appropriate, exhaustive, mutually exclusive and 
independent, and they were derived from a single classification principle in order reflect 
the purpose of*the research (Budd et al., 1967: 42-45; Holsti, 1969: 95-101). To achieve 
better reliability between coders, I devised categories for each variable in the coding 
scheme which were as simple as possible, because 'a large number of complex concepts 
increases the chances that coders will make mistakes, diminishing the reliability of the 
study' (Riffe et al., 1998: 107).
Six main variables are included in the coding scheme. The first variable, TIME-SPAN, 
is categorised as (1) 1971-1979, (2) 1980-1987, and (3) 1988-1996. These categories 
were constructed in order to examine the trends of Taiwan's serial dramas in different 
periods of time. The spans of time are divided by critical events concerning Taiwan's 
identity politics and television landscape. Thus, the appearance of three terrestrial 
television channels in Taiwan and the expulsion of the Republic of China (Taiwan's 
official name) in 1971 mark the beginning of the first time period. The recognition of
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Beijing (and simultaneously the de-recognition of Taipei) by the United States in 1979, 
and the Formosa Incident of 1980 in protest over political reforms against the KMT, 
introduce the second time period. The political transition, the lifting of martial law, and 
the liberalisation of the press in 1987-1988 start the third time span. 1996 was the first 
year when the Taiwanese elected the head of state by direct vote and also the final year 
of the KMT government’s monopoly of the viewing market for terrestrial television. 
After 1996, the KMT government still dominated the existing three terrestrial television 
channels. However, the appearance of two additional terrestrial television channels — 
Formosa Television Company (FTV) and Public Television Service (PTS) -- in 1997 
and 1998 respectively ended the KMT’s monopoly of terrestrial television viewing 
markets.
The second variable, CHANNEL, is classified as follows: (1) Taiwan Television 
Company (TTV), (2) China Television Company (CTV), and (3) Chinese Television 
Service (CTS). Since all three television channels are owned by separate branches of the 
Nationalist government (the government, the KMT party, and the military), this raises 
the important question of whether they differ in their representations, given that they 
also compete with one another.
The third variable is LANGUAGE, and the following categories are used: (1) Mandarin, 
(2) Taiwanese (Hakka and/or Hokkien), (3) Mixed, and (4) Other (unknown). The unit 
of analysis is the predominant natural language dubbed or spoken by the main 
characters in the serial dramas, or, alternatively, a mixture of Mandarin and Taiwanese 
if neither is predominant.
The fourth and fifth variables are PLACE and TIME. Almost all of Taiwan's prime-time 
television serial dramas were locally made and had targeted the local market, hence 
television serial dramas were presumed to concentrate much more on Taiwan itself (in 
geographical and temporal terms) than any other places. This assumption is also based 
on the theoretical connection between spatio-temporal sensibilities and national 
identities (Anderson, 1991: 24; Morley and Robins, 1995: 72). This assumption, in 
relation to the case of Taiwan, suggests that it is revealing to ask whether the duality of 
the television industry -  it is controlled by the KMT but is commercially run and 
financed by advertising -  has resulted in the time-space preferences of television serial 
dramas.
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The fourth variable, PLACE, assesses the geographical settings of television serial 
dramas. It consists of three categories: (1) the Chinese mainland, (2) Taiwan, (3) other 
(including unknown cases). This is useful for examining how Mainland-centred or 
Taiwan-centred Taiwan’s television output is.
The fifth variable is TIME, which assesses the historical settings in television serial 
dramas. The categories for classifying this variable are (1) the remote past (defined as 
any time before 1949), (2) the recent past (defined as any time after 1949), and (3) other 
(including unknown cases). The dividing period between the remote past and the recent 
past is taken as 1945-1949. The year 1945 represents a moment of historical transition 
and, of identity confusion, when the Taiwanese people eventually escaped from the rule 
of an alien Empire (Japan) but found it equally difficult to embrace the 
maladministration of another externally imposed republic. A much more significant 
shift occurred when the Nationalist government moved from Mainland China to Taiwan 
in 1949. Suffice it to say that the period from 1945 to 1949 produced a state of 
uncertainty among the people, who had just experienced the impact of the transition 
from colony to republic. As already noted in Chapter 3, this moment of historical 
transition did not pass smoothly. It turned into a national trauma for the Taiwanese 
people when the government, newly arrived from the Chinese mainland, cracked down 
on the popular protest for political reforms on February 28, 1947.
The sixth variable, SUB-GENRE, seeks to explore whether there has been any shift ;n 
the generic location of television serial dramas. It uses the following sub-generic type s: 
(1) romance/family, (2) action/martial arts, (3) history, and (4) other (including 
unknown cases. The categories for coding the SUB-GENRE variable in the formal 
analysis were achieved by combining eight categories previously used in the pre-test.3 
Each television serial drama was coded according to the information contained in the 
descriptive synopses, For example, as shown in Table 6.1, the television serial drama 
Xing xing zhi wo xin (TTV, October 1983) was coded as belonging to the 
romance/family sub-genre. The second and the third examples of serial dramas, Yi dai
From the population o f the synopses o f  267 television dramas, a random sample which covered 
synopses o f 74 television serial dramas was used for the pre-test. The number o f  cases for the pre-test was 
obtained by a formula, n = [(N -l) (SE)2 + PQN] /  (N-l) (SE)2 + PQ, in which n = the sample size for the 
reliability check in the pretest, N= the population size (number o f content units in the study), P= «. ,e 
population level o f agreement (set at the level o f 0.90 in the study), and Q= (1-P). See Riffe et al. (1998: 
125).
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bao jun  (CTV, April 1974) and Justice Bao (Bao qing tien, CTS, April and October 
1993), were coded as belonging to the history sub-genre. The fourth example, Yi tian tu 
longji (TTV, April 1994) was coded as belonging to the action/martial arts sub-genre.
In the pre-test, two coders independently coded 74 cases (the synopses for 74 televisk n 
serial dramas). Through the pre-test, coder training was completed, the coding scheme 
was adjusted, and the coding protocol was revised. A widely used coefficient of 
composite reliability was employed to measure inter-coder agreement and the category 
reliability of individual variables (Holsti, 1969: 140).4 The reliability figures were as 
follows: reliability for variables TIME-SPAN or CHANNEL was judged to have 
reached the upper limit; 0.92 for variable LANGUAGE; 0.94 for PLACE; 0.89 for 
TIME; and 0.69 for SUB-GENRE. The reliability for coding variable SUB-GENRE 
between the two coders was judged to be unsatisfactory. Accordingly, the original eight 
categories for the variable SUB-GENRE (romance/family, action/war, martial arts, 
docudrama, history, fantasy, farce, other) were re-aggregated into four categories 
(romance, action/martial arts, history, and other). The two coders repeated the coding 
process according to the revised coding scheme. The result produced a much higher 
composite reliability co-efficient (0.89): of the 74 coding decisions each coder made, 66 
produced agreement.
However, this increased reliability should be treated with caution owing to the weakness 
of the formula used for the reliability check. As Holsti warns, ’by chance alone, 
agreement should increase as the number of categories decreases'. For a more careful 
examination, I then adopted the Scott's Pi, an index specifically developed for coding 
data into nominal categories. The index of reliability (pi) is considered to be more 
correct than the formula for simply calculating composite reliability (Holsti, 1969: 140;
4 In the formula C.R. = 2M  /  (N1 + N2), M is the number o f  coding decisions on which the two coders 
agree, while N1 and N2 are the number o f coding decisions made by the two coders respectively. Taking 
the variable PLACE as an example, each coder made 74 coding decisions, and on 70 o f  these there was 
agreement. By calculating 2(70)/74+74, the reliability co-efficient was then obtained as 0.94.
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Riffe et al., 1998: 129-131).5 The resulting index was computed as 0.83. This result 
should be acceptable, given that agreement between coders was particularly difficult to 
achieve when identifying genres (Allen et al., 1997, 1998).
After the pre-test, the two coders completed the entire sample of the synopses of 267 
television serial dramas. Where disagreement occurred, the present author served as an 
additional coder to examine discrepancies and make a judgement between them by re­
reviewing the original data in the print media to check for errors. The coding result was 
then statistically tested by using SPSS.
6.3 Interpreting  the R esults
Because the data used in this analysis are limited in terms of depth, there is clearly a 
danger that the results might be questionable. It has to be recognised that the content 
analysis undertaken here is in itself incomplete. It does, however, serve as a useful 
preliminary analysis for the subsequent in-depth examination of the available visual 
data (cinematic texts) and the viewers' interpretations.
6.3.1 The General Trends
It is found that that the representations of prime-time television serial dramas were 
generally consistent over time. As indicted in Table 6.1, this consistency holds for 
channels, broadcast languages, sub-genres, and historical as well as geographical 
settings over the three time-spans. Taiwan's prime-time television serial dramas, 
regardless of channels, tended to use Mandarin. They also highlighted a lot of Mainland 
and pre-1949 contents. Half of the television serial dramas were consistently devoted to 
the romance/family sub-genre. This general finding is based on the selected sample of
5 The Scott's Pi formula is Pi = (  % observed agreement -  % expected agreement ) /  1 -  % expected 
agreement. The process o f computing for the variable SUB-GENRE is briefly explained here. T ie 
expected agreement (about 35%) is obtained by first calculating the expected agreement by chance for 
each o f the four categories. In this case, out o f a total o f 148 coding decisions (each coder coded the 
synopses o f  74 television serial dramas), value 1 (romance/family) was used 51% o f the time (i.e. 76 o f 
the decisions were to select value 1 as the correct coding o f the variable); value 2 (action/martial arts), 
value 3 (history), and value 4 (other) were used 23%, 15%, and 11% o f the time respectively. So the 
expected agreement by chance alone would be (0.51)2 + (0.23)2 + (0 .15)2+ (0.11)2 = 0.3476. Therefore, Pi 
is (0 .8 9 -0 .3 5 )  / 1 -  0.35 =0.83.
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Taiwan’s prime-time television serial dramas; however, it should be noted that daytime 
trends may differ.
Table 6.1: Trends in prime-time TV serial dramas by time-span for other 
variables
TIME-SPAN 1971-1979 
N = 104(100%)
1980-1987 
N = 81 (100%)
1988-1996 
N = 82 (100%)
Total 
N = 267 (100%)
CHANNEL
TTV 29 (28%) 26 (32%) 27 (33%) 82 (31%)
CTV 31 (30%) 28 (35%) 28(34%) 87 (33%)
CTS 44 (42%) 27 (33%) 27(33%) 98 (37%)
LANGUAGE
Mandarin 81 (78%) 81 (100%) 79 (96%) 241 (90%)
Taiwanese 21 (20%) 0 0 21 (8%)
Mixed 0 0 3 (4%) 3(1%)
Other 2 (2%) 0 0 2(1%)
PLACE
Mainland China 55 (53%) 45 (56%) 37 (45%) 137 (51%)
Taiwan 46 (44%) 30 (37%) 38 (46%) 114(43%)
Other 3 (3%) 6 (7%) 7 (9%) 16(6%)
TIME
Before 1949 51 (49%) 45 (56%) 39 (48%) 135 (51%)
After 1949 52 (50%) 35 (43%) 40 (49%) 127 (48%)
Other 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 3 (4%) 5 (2%)
SUB-GENRE
Romance 50 (48%) 38 (47%) 48 (59%) 136 (51%)
Action 27 (26%) 27 (33%) 11(13%) 65 (24%)
History 17(16%) 11 (14%) 13(16%) 41 (15%)
Other 10(10%) 5 (6%) 10(12%) 25 (9%)
Notes: All historical differences by time-span except Language were insignificant (chi- 
square tests). Figures in parenthesis are rounded.
Television serial dramas have consistently constituted the major part of Taiwan's prime­
time television output. There was little difference among the three television channels,
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since they all adopted similar scheduling strategies. The television serial drama was, 
without few exceptions, a prime-time genre for all the three television channels.
Though the proportion of broadcast languages changed significantly from the first to the 
second and third time-spans, it remained consistent throughout the time-periods from 
1980 to 1996, when Mandarin was clearly the predominant broadcast language >f 
prime-time television serial dramas (see Table 6.1: between 1980 and 1987, all serial 
dramas were broadcast in Mandarin; and between 1988 and 1996, over 96 per cent of 
serial dramas were in Mandarin).
With respect to the geographical settings, television serial dramas tended to place 
greater emphasis on the Chinese mainland than Taiwan itself. As shown in Table 6.1, 
137 out of 267, i.e. over 51 per cent of all serial dramas under analysis, set their 
narratives in Mainland China. That said, there is a noticeable drop in mainland content 
from 53 per cent to 45 percent. Though the difference between three time periods is not 
statistically significant, this nevertheless suggests a decline of interest in the mainland 
as a geographical setting on Taiwan television. In terms of the historical contexts of 
television serial dramas, the proportion of pre-1949 content was consistently about 50 
per cent. The ratio of the pre- to post-1949 content changed very little across the three 
time periods (see Table 6.1).
The change in the composition of drama genres is also statistically insignificant. 
Romance/family was the most important sub-genre. This is not surprising, given that the 
representation of personal interactions within the familial context is one of the key 
characteristics of the serial drama. What is striking is that the action/martial arts 
(including kung-fu) and history sub-genres consistently constituted over 40 per cent of 
the serial drama genre in the first two time-spans, while the proportion decreased 
slightly to about 30 per cent during the third time-span (see Table 6.1). Though the 
composition of television serial drama genres showed no significant change, the sub­
genres differed in their locations of geographical and historical settings. As Table 6.2 
shows, the romance/family sub-genre was more likely to locate its geographical and 
historical settings in a post-1949 Taiwanese context, while the action/martial arts and 
history sub-genres tended to represent pre-1949 Mainland China.
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Table 6.2: Prime-time TV serial dramas by sub-genre for time and place
variables
GENRE Romance Action History Other Total
TIME
Before 1949 33 62 29 11 135
After 1949 100 2 12 13 127
Grand Total 133 64 41 24 262
PLACE
Mainland 33 60 36 8 137
Taiwan 94 3 4 13 114
Grand Total 127 63 40 21 251
Note: Figures do not include cases falling into the 'Other' category for both variables 
TIME (5 cases) and PLACE (16 cases). Both differences are significant at P < 0.001 
on the chi-square test.
The aforementioned, apparent consistency of Taiwan's prime-time television serial 
drama, however, requires a more careful interpretation. I will now consider in more 
detail each of the main variables in turn: language, place and time.
6.3.2 Broadcast Language
It is indisputable that Taiwan's television serial drama output has given preference to 
Mandarin rather than Taiwanese. Although, during the first time-period (1971-1979), 20 
per cent of prime-time television serial dramas were broadcast in Taiwanese, there was 
no single serial drama that was broadcast predominantly in Taiwanese at prime time 
over the two periods between 1980 and 1996.6 All the prime-time television serial 
dramas ceased to broadcast in Taiwanese from 1974 onwards, except for a 1979 serial 
drama used for propaganda purposes at a time of national crisis when the U.S. de­
recognised Taiwan. The serial drama in question was Han liu (Apr. 1979). It was 
produced by CMPC and co-broadcast by all the three television channels in the same
6 No prime-time television serial drama in the Taiwanese languages appeared until 1997, when the fourth 
terrestrial television channel, FTV, was launched. The original three channels then followed suit.
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time slot, and presented a traumatic story of Communist tyranny on the mainland. The 
most obvious reason for this pattern of language use is that the KMT government's 
linguistic policy on broadcasting favoured Mandarin. However, two points are wort! y 
of note here. First, television broadcast a higher proportion of serial dramas in 
Taiwanese during the first period than during the later periods. In particular, from 1971 
to 1974, many serial dramas in Taiwanese were broadcast at prime time. This is because 
the television market, previously monopolised by TTV, became fiercely competitive in 
a very short time when CTV appeared in 1969 and CTS joined the market in 1971.
Secondly, the three terrestrial television channels clearly acknowledged that many 
viewers had no command of Mandarin, a phenomenon that was especially true in the 
early years of the television service. This accounted for television's subtitled 
presentations, a routine service for any programme on television since the beginning of 
television broadcasting. After the three terrestrial television channels secured a larre 
audience, they excluded all programmes in Taiwanese from prime-time television and 
began reducing the proportion of non-Mandarin programmes. It should also be noted 
that the policy of 'Mandarinisation' preceded the imposition of statutory linguistic 
restrictions on Taiwanese languages in the 1976 Broadcasting Act. However, three 
prime-time television serial dramas in mixed Mandarin and Taiwanese appeared on 
television in the third period (see Table 6.2, all in 1995), a previously unseen 
phenomenon. The reasons for this are: first, the linguistic restrictions on Taiwanese 
languages on television were finally abolished in 1993; secondly, the mixed use of both 
languages in Taiwan has been becoming common in everyday life. Predictably, 
Taiwan's prime-time television increasingly mixed the Taiwanese and Mandarin 
languages as a result of the KMT's policy changes. This unique form of language 
mixing might be interpreted as a sign that hybrid identities were becoming increasingly 
common.
6.3.3 Televised Place, Televised Time
Table 6.2 indicates that Taiwan's television output privileged Mainland China as a 
geographical setting for prime-time television serial dramas. In the first two time spans 
(1971-1979, 1980-1987) the spatial setting of serial dramas was predominantly 
Mainland-centred (52 and 55 per cent respectively). Despite a decline in the third time
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span, Mainland-centred settings in the narrative of serial dramas remained prominent 
(45 per cent). This finding is of great interest: why did approximately half of Taiwan- 
made television serial dramas set their action on the mainland? Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine a case in which the proportion of television drama requiring geographically 
distant locations could be greater than it is in Taiwan, or in which the actual locations 
themselves could be further removed from the production base.7
As shown in Table 6.2, Taiwan's television serial dramas tended to look back in time. 
Television projected a significant proportion of serial dramas to the historical past. 
About half of all the serials over the three time periods were set in a time prior to 1949.
The above analysis, based on the separation of place and time, obscures an answer to 
the question: 'Whose past was represented?' We need to take into account both place 
and time together, as shown in Table 6.3. Thus, the pre-1949 past tended to be 
associated with the mainland settings within the television serial dramas. Of 131 dramas 
with historical settings in the pre-1949 period, the content of 127 was Mainland-based, 
while the content of only four was Taiwan-based. It thus appears that Taiwan itself, 
within the melodramatic world of prime-time television, had no history, or, at least, no 
pre-1949 history. In other words, television representations as such seemed congruent 
with the Nationalist view of history. After the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan 
in 1949, it tended not to highlight the past of Taiwan (or events occurring there) in 
isolation; nor did it unfold Taiwan’s sensitive past, as revealed for example in the clash 
between the Taiwanese and the Nationalist government during the February 28 1947 
Incident, an event often exploited by Taiwanese nationalists to appeal to the ‘native 
Taiwanese’.
7
For example, a 1954 study by Head o f a series o f dramas on U.S. television found that the setting was 
American in 88 per cent o f cases (Fiske and Hartley, 1989: 28).
Table 6.3: Trends in prime-time TV serial dramas by time and place
variables
PLACE Mainland Taiwan Row Total
TIME
Before 1949 127 4 131
After 1949 10 110 120
Column Total 137 114 251
Notes: Figures do not include 16 cases falling into the 'Other* category for both 
variables TIME and PLACE. Chi-square values after Yates' continuity correction for 
a 2 x 2 table show differences significant at P < 0.001.
Such uses of pre-1949 history in Taiwan's television might be explained in the 
following ways. First, the Nationalist government had good reasons to be nostalgic in 
order to keep alive the memories/images relating to the Chinese mainland among the 
populace, since it had vowed to recover the mainland as the sole legitimate ruler of all 
of China. Accordingly, the television industry tended to focus on the mainland and the 
pre-1949 history of China, thereby seeking to forge a sentimental link between the 
Taiwanese people and the rest of China across the Taiwan Strait. Secondly, given that 
the pre-1949 history of Taiwan was regarded by the Nationalist government as a highly 
sensitive issue, and that all television programmes except news bulletins were subject to 
prior censorship, the television industry was under a great deal of pressure to avoid this 
subject. By converting Table 6.3, the cultural geography of Taiwan's prime-time serial 
dramas can be mapped approximately as in Figure 6.1.
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Then
Before 1949 Before 1949
Mainland
China
Taiwan under Japanese rule 
and during the transitional 
years 1945-1949
I (n=127) II (n=4)
There Here
III (n=10) IV (n=110)
Mainland 
China under 
Communist 
rule
Taiwan under 
Nationalist rule
After 1949 After 1949
Now
Figure 6.1: Temporal and spatial attributes of prime-time TV serial dramas
The discussion so far certainly suggests that Taiwan's television output was far from 
'Taiwanese' in terms of the linguistic, geographical and historical settings o f ti e 
melodramatic world of serial drama. Indeed, the Nationalist government deliberately 
sought to exploit television to serve the purposes of regime consolidation and nationalist 
indoctrination, as manifested in laws which stipulated that television should promote 
Chinese culture and support a national unification policy (see Chapter 4). Also, 
according to the Code for Radio and Television Program Production, "the themes of 
dramas should be ideologically healthy" (Government Information Office, 1997). 
Another production code for television programmes, which took effect in 1983, also 
prescribed that each terrestrial television channel must broadcast at least 90 minutes of 
Peking Opera (known as guo j iu , literally, national opera) (Government Information 
Office, 1997). This view might suggest that the return and growth of Taiwanese 
consciousness (see Chapter 3) was independent of television representations in Taiwan, 
or was perhaps due to a conscious resistance from the audience to those representations. 
However, this argument, if it is to be justified, requires much more evidence concerning
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the extent of television’s 'Chineseness'. In fact, it is much easier to falsify the statement 
that Taiwan's television was 'Taiwanese’ than it is to verify the statement that it was 
distinctly 'Chinese'. Several factors prevent such verification.
First, it could be argued that television serial dramas might simply use the Chinese past 
as an exotic background, as in a costume drama, with more of a focus on interpersonal 
relations than on actual historical events. It is equally possible that the television 
industry in the Taiwanese context might simply use an historical setting as a means of 
avoiding censorship. For example, different versions of Justice Bao {Bao qing tian) 
screened at different times achieved popularity because of their dramatic plots, in which 
Justice Bao, in ancient times, fought against the corrupt establishment. Such a plot 
could not possibly have been set against a contemporary background under the 
Nationalist government's authoritarian regime, at least not before 1988. Thus, there may 
be good reasons for not regarding all television serial dramas set in the historical past >f 
China as distinctly 'Chinese'.
The second limitation is concerned with the very definition of national culture. Many 
peoples in East Asia have long shared traces of the supposedly 'Chinese' culture. These 
include, for example, traditional classic, historical novels such as The Tales o f Three 
Kingdoms',; the Chinese script; the art of calligraphy; Confucianism, etc. Also, the past 
historical meaning of 'Chineseness' was very different from today's meaning (see 
Chapter 3). 'Chineseness' can be produced and consumed by anyone as a commodity 
and hence its nationalist meaning is altered. Some recent examples will illustrate this 
point. A Chinese legend was utilised to make Mulan: The Legend o f a Warrior, the 
Walt Disney animation. Equally, the supposedly Chinese historical background on 
which Crunching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (a Mandarin film made by the Taiwanese 
director Ang Lee) was based did not prevent if from being a very popular hit in the 
United States. Therefore, not all of the pre-1949 television output set in the Chinese past 
historically and geographically can be seen to conform to today's understanding of 
'Chineseness'.
For all these reasons, the content analysis undertaken for this research cannot be used 
very easily to distinguish between the 'Chinese' and 'Taiwanese' pasts represented on 
television. Such a task calls for other sources of data and more qualitative methods. 
Thus, the question 'whose past was represented?' needs to be replaced by a rather
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different question: 'how was the Taiwanese past represented in the locally produced 
media products?' In order to answer this question, it is necessary to supplement the 
television study by the analysis of cinematic texts expressive of the history of Taiwan 
since the Second World War.
6.4 Conclusion
To conclude this chapter, it is clear that Taiwan's television serial dramas have been 
characterised by predominantly Taiwan-made Chinese contents set against the 
background of Mainland China. This China-oriented focus has been consistent and has 
changed little in terms of broadcast languages and setting over the last three decades. 
This chapter thus offers quantitative evidence that a large amount of China-oriented 
television output was diffused by the KMT-controlled television system. However, the 
question of the 'Chineseness' of these programmes and its effects has not yet been 
answered. In other words, we can be quite certain that Taiwan's television did diffuse 
Chinese rather than Taiwanese national pasts and nationalist imageries over the last 
three decades, but there are key issues that require further exploration: What exactly 
was diffused? And how did the spectators construct their national identity through the 
consumption of these nationalist imageries?
In view of the perhaps unparalleled over-representation of the 'other place' (Mainland 
China, 51 per cent of 267 television dramas, see Table 6.1) in Taiwan's television 
dramas, it is tempting to argue that viewers might develop a national identity based on 
that prevailing in Mainland China. However, a substantial proportion of television 
dramas have been set in Taiwan (43 per cent of 267 television dramas, see Table 6.1) 
and these may have counterbalanced this presumed effect. Thus, to answer this question, 
it is necessary to examine both media representation and audience reception. With 
respect to media representation, the content analysis -  though important in detecting 
manifest trends — requires a complementary analysis that is more sensitive to the latent 
aspects of the media representations. This analysis will be presented in the next chapter.
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7.
Cinematic Construction of the 
Homeland
To complement the content analysis offered in the previous chapter, this chapter offers a 
comparative analysis which explores how nationhood was discursively Constructed and 
how the pre-1949 Taiwanese past was articulated within two cinematic texts: Victory 
(1976) and City o f Sadness (1989). First, I will examine the cultural geography of 
Taiwan under the KMT regime, of which the national cinema was a constitutive pa»1. 
This is followed by a comparison of the socio-political contexts in which the two films 
were produced and an analysis of the film genres to which they belonged. Then, a 
detailed textual analysis focuses on how the two films provide an indispensable 
classificatory system of identities such as that of 'us versus them'. In the conclusion I 
will discuss the implications of the two films for the forging of national identity in 
Taiwan.
This chapter argues that both films can be seen as 'nationalist texts' which construct the 
national past differently, employing contrast narrative/discursive strategies and creating 
a strong sense of 'them' vis-a-vis 'us'. However, both films also convey implicit 
messages seeking to reconcile diverse ethnic groups in Taiwan. In their different ways, 
they have helped to shape a shared sense of national identity at different stages in the 
development of post-Second World War Taiwan.
7.1 T a iw a n :  E l u s i v e  P a s t s ,  C o n t e s t e d  T e r r i t o r i e s
Aimed at integrating Taiwan into a larger 'Chinese' cultural identity by weaving a 
seamless narrative of Chinese nationhood, the ruling KMT has emphasised Chinese
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(over Taiwanese) history for decades since the inception of its rule.1 In line with this 
practice, as the overview of the prime-time television serial dramas in the previous 
chapter has shown, a significant proportion of television representations were mobilised 
in Taiwan to preserve China as the presumed homeland and construct the spatial and 
temporal continuity across the Taiwan Strait.
By policing the mediated national culture in the locale of Taiwan, the KMT created an 
imaginary homeland (i.e. China) placed 'within an absent space [of China]' (Johnson, 
1994: 239) and inserted 'into the lockstep seriality of absent Chinese time' (Johnson, 
1994: 239). These measure were undertaken to make China the homeland and 
Taiwanese the nationals despite (or because of) 'the fact that the Republic of China on 
Taiwan exists without the crutch of national space' (Johnson, 1994: 239). The ways in 
which official KMT nationalism reconstructed cultural (but also political) 
geography/historiography exemplified the forms of what Anderson (1991: 183) termed 
'political museumising' (i.e. of China) and 'organised forgetting' (about Taiwan).
The KMT regime in exile not only materialised the eternal presence of an absent China 
(as the homeland, the centre and the tree), but also naturalised the absence of an ever­
present Taiwan (as a temporary base for returning to the homeland, a periphery and a 
leaf) in the time/space of post-Second World War Taiwan. In short, China as the 
homeland and Taiwan as the 'NoWhere' were substituted for Taiwan as the 'NowHere'. 
Johnson unequivocally pinpoints the operational logic underlying the cultural 
geography of the nationalist account. Official nationalism on Taiwan, as Johnson argues,
stands as the extreme case, a nation-state existing in the absence of the 
national territory. [The] Arrival of the Republic of China (ROC) central 
authority on Taiwan was the reflex of its expulsion from China, and other 
states have come to recognise China as the People's Republic of China 
(PRC).... [The] Survival of the ROC as a nation-state within the island, 
however, hinged on denial: one of the most successful nation-states 
explicitly credited its achievements to its non-being. Taiwan is China, not 
Taiwan, and yet the condition of it remaining so was isolated from China -  
exactly the condition of its prior Japanese nationality. Like the Japanese, the 
ROC succeeded where the Ch'ing [Qing] had failed: they turned the Taiwan
1 It is no wonder, then, that Chiang Kai-shek proclaimed that 'the promotion o f  civic education must pay 
special attention to the teaching o f  "Chinese History" and "Chinese Geography'" (Johnson, 1994: 184). 
Young pupils were required to memorise the historical and geographical details about China but not about 
Taiwan. Since the KMT claimed to be the legitimate government for the whole o f China, the continuing 
reminder o f Chinese history/nationhood was regarded as necessary for supporting its goals o f  recovering 
the mainland and reverting the indigenous Taiwanese people to 'genuine' Chinese.
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Straits into a giant moat and sealed out the Chinese. In this act of self- 
preservation, the state created a problem in space and serial incorporation, 
the coextension of China in time. (Johnson, 1994: 185)
The pasts of Taiwan in the colonial Japanese era and in the February 28 Incident of 
1947 were regarded as taboos, and were prohibited by the KMT from circulating in the 
public realm. As Johnson points out, in the case of Taiwan, there are ’two aspects of 
national history that were organised into oblivion: the Japanese era and the February 28 
Incident. From the official standpoint, this chronotope would call attention to the very 
object of forgetting’ (Johnson, 1994: 207). In the field of anthropology, the concept of 
’taboo’ is defined as a kind of avoidance practice, by which societies under certain 
circumstances proscribe people, practices, topics and ideas. As Olick and Levy argue, 
this is certainly not morally neutral; rather, the proscribed object is treated as ’dangerous, 
disgusting, dirty, morally repugnant, contagious, degenerate, or as embodying some 
combination of these qualities' (1997: 923).
In this regard, it was unusual in the 1970s for the KMT to play an active part in 
recalling the forbidden past of colonial Taiwan, as it did in the film Victory. However, 
the taboo of the past, as Olick and Levin stress, under some circumstances 'is survivable, 
but not without some redemptive or cleansing effort’ (Olick and Levy, 1997: 925). The 
taboo of the past is not unfolded without some purposes to serve. It is therefore not 
surprising that Victory made public Taiwan's previously proscribed colonial past (which 
as we have seen, does not figure in prime-time serial drama, see Chapter 6) while at the 
same time suggesting the correct ways to make sense of that past. Likewise, City o f  
Sadness transgressed the taboo of screening the February 28 Incident, and, in calling for 
tolerance and accommodation, can be read as a response to the rising tide of Taiwanese 
nationalism. In short, the two films made use of the hitherto proscribed pasts in their 
different ways, either setting or changing the terms of discourse and the boundaries of 
identities in Taiwan.
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7.2 C o n t e x t u a l  A n a ly s i s  o f  t h e  F i lm s
A comparative analysis of two films, Victory (Meihua,2 1976, approximately 90 minutes) 
and City o f Sadness (Beiqing Chengshi, 1989, 158 minutes) is useful for clarifying how 
national identity is constructed by the media. Both films re-enacted historical events ;n 
black and white, thereby enabling viewers to witness 'history in the making' (White, 
1989: 284). Moreover, central to the question of national identity is the way in which 
both films represented the encounters between the incoming 'Mainlanders' and the 
indigenous Taiwanese in the late 1940s. The two films are comparable in terms of the 
historical time in which they were set, a particularly turbulent period in which Taiwan 
swiftly changed its status from a colony under Japan, through a restored part of China, 
to the last stand of the KMT government in exile. Taiwan at the historical juncture 
between 1945 and 1949 could be represented in different ways, depending on one's 
historical point of view: as a Taiwan joyfully returning to the embrace of the 
motherland or as a newly decolonised Taiwan which fell victim to yet another 
subjugation. In fact, Victory is closer to offering the former account while City >/ 
Sadness is closer to the latter. This sharp contrast of emphasis in the cinematic 
representations of the national past, at intervals of (merely) 13 years, testifies to the fact 
that 'national histories are continually being re-written, and the re-writing reflects [the] 
current balance of hegemony' (Billig, 1995: 71).
With respect to questions of historical representation and historical reception, the socio­
political context is of critical importance (Staiger, 1992). The following analysis thus 
attempts to trace the socio-political contexts in which these films came into existence in 
the first place, and to examine how these films were publicly received.
7.2.1 Victory as a ’Policy Film’
The term 'Policy Films' refers to films which supported the KMT's policy and were 
produced by the Central Motion Picture Company (the KMT-owned CMPC, the largest 
film production company in Taiwan) and various independent production companies 
over the years between the 1950s and 1987. Hundreds of such films were produced in
2
In Chinese, 'Meihua' means 'Plum Blossom,' which was officially recognised as the national flower by 
the KMT government when the latter was the central government o f Mainland China.
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Taiwan — from the anti-communist film Awakening from a Nightmare (Er meng chu 
xing, 1950) to the anti-Japanese war film Flying the National Flag (Qi zheng piao piao, 
1987).
Victory, hailed as a patriotic film, came out in 1976 with remarkable market success. 
The film’s director was Liu Jia-chang. Liu, who was bom into a Chinese Korean family 
and went to college in Taiwan and settled there afterwards. The market success of 
Victory not only made Liu a household name in Taiwan almost overnight, but also 
popularised the theme song (entitled 'Mei-hua\ the same as the Chinese title of the film), 
presumably written by him as a 'Chinese patriotic song'.
Owned by the ruling KMT, the CMPC was required to promote official policy. It 
invested heavily in making Policy Films. The showing of these films at a time of 
national crisis promoted the success of these films at the box office. Most of the Policy 
Films employed specific genres such as war and espionage, and portrayed positive 
heroes who were loyal to the Chinese nation and were determined to fight the 
Communists and/or the Japanese. The Policy Films were intended not only to circulate 
in Taiwan but also to compete with the Communist propaganda in the overseas Chinese 
communities such as Hong Kong and those in Southeast Asia and North America. 
Schoolchildren were taken en masse to view these films. Also, Policy Films enjoyed full 
official support. For example, the availability of military personnel enabled the films to 
produce particularly spectacular presentations of war scenes.
In the early 1970s, the CMPC suddenly invested in making a number of films featuring 
the second Sino-Japanese war of 1937-1945. This move was unusual insofar as the 
CMPC had rarely featured the anti-Japanese theme in its post-Second World War 
productions. Several factors stimulated this change. First, Taiwan in the early 1970s 
suffered increasing diplomatic isolation as the KMT government was forced out of its 
UN China seat in 1971. This was followed by Japan's de-recognition of the ROC 
(Taiwan) in 1972. There was thus a potential market for Policy Films which capitalised 
on the anti-Japanese sentiment.
Secondly, Taiwan's increasingly difficult diplomatic relations were followed by the 
sudden death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975. Under conditions of crisis from within and 
without, the KMT government was in greater need of popular support from below. But,
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as Sibley point out, 'there is ... a particular history which is invoked in times of national 
crisis which is ... exclusionary' (Sibley, 1995b: 108-109). The anti-Japanese Policy 
Films thus served a three-fold purpose of continuously eradicating the cultural influence 
that Japan had left in Taiwan, consolidating the KMT rule, and promoting solidarity 
among the Taiwanese people by the creation of the national 'other' (in this case, the 
Japanese).
Thirdly, the overseas market also played a part in the shift of emphasis in Policy Films. 
As the KMT government lost its diplomatic battle with Communist China, China could 
easily boycott films with outright anti-communist themes in the overseas Chinese 
markets, especially Hong Kong and Southeast Asia. Also, the Communist regime in 
Beijing was, at that time, boasting of its own contribution to the defeat of the Japanese 
invaders. As one of the main cultural arms under KMT control, the CMPC was obliged 
to fight back in the continued propaganda warfare with Communist China. In the 
struggle over the power to interpret history, the CMPC had to offer a KMT version of 
that history, insisting that the KMT forces under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek 
were the ones who actually fought and won the war against the Japanese.
All these factors accounted for the popularity of films with anti-Japanese themes in 
Taiwan in the 1970s. However, what is less clear is why some of these films -  including 
Victory — were set in Taiwan. Victory was the first CMPC-made anti-Japanese war film 
which set its narrative scene in Taiwan. In reality, there was no evidence of a direct 
military encounter between the Taiwanese and the Japanese colonial government during 
the war. On the contrary, more than 200,000 Taiwanese conscripts had been mobilised 
for Japan's war efforts in China, Indochina, and the Philippines. In this sense, Victoiy 
represented a rewriting of history in order to represent the 'native Taiwanese' as patriotic 
defenders of the Chinese nation, and to show the 'Chinese' people across the Taiwan 
Strait fighting together in the Second World War against the Japanese invasion (and, in 
the case of Taiwan, Japanese colonial rule).
This shift in portrayal of the Taiwanese native population was coterminous with a 
similar trend in the political arena. In the early 1970s, the KMT government began 
seeking support from within Taiwanese society. To compensate for the regime's loss of 
recognition from abroad, the KMT government was more concerned than ever with its 
internal legitimacy. The same political strategy could be found in the so-called
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'Taiwanisation' policy, initiated by the then premier Chiang Ching-kuo. He had started 
recruiting some natives to take high-ranking positions as an exercise in political 
symbolism from 1972 onwards. It is not surprising, then, that Chiang Ching-kuo in 
1976 suggested that everyone should see Victory.
7.2.2 City o f Sadness as an Example of the ’Taiwan New Cinema'
In the early 1980s, the CMPC experimented with several low-budget films made by a 
number of young directors. In 1982, three directors made an anthology film, In Our 
Time [Guangyin de gu shi]. This was soon followed by another anthology film in 1983, 
the Sandwich Man [Erzi de da wan ou\, which was co-directed by Hou Hsiao-hsien and 
others.3 Both films were generally referred to as the first films opening up the so-called 
Taiwan New Cinema'. However, the actual term Taiwan New Cinema' gained currency 
much later, beginning in January 1987, when Taiwan was moving towards 
democratisation and 53 film practitioners issued 'the Declaration of Taiwan New 
Cinema' in one of the country's largest newspapers, The China Times. In contrast to 
Policy Films, Taiwan New Cinema adopted a more socially realist stance in the practice 
of filmmaking. It is argued by film scholar June Yip that Taiwan New Cinema 
'contributed toward the definition of a distinctly Taiwanese "nation" through its 
groundbreaking attempts to construct historical representations of the "Taiwan 
experience" on film, to claim cinematic space for Taiwanese "popular memory'" (Yip, 
1997: 140).
What remains unclear is why the CMPC in the early 1980s became the harbinger of 
Taiwan New Cinema. One plausible reason is that the box office gross receipts for 
Policy Films as a whole fell in the audience market of the early 1980s. The Taiwanese 
audiences seemed to be tired of the propagandistic Policy Films. As Deng Xiaoping 
rose to power and talked of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue in the late 1970s, 
the psychological threat of a Communist invasion was significantly scaled down, m 
short, the socio-political context that had made Policy Films popular had now been 
transformed. In response, the CMPC recruited a group of new-generation filmmakers 
such as Edward Yang and Hou Hsiao-hsien and granted them more freedom to make
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low-budget films. However, this change was far from being at the organisational level. 
The change was simply aimed at cutting costs and spreading risks, not to increase 
creativity and autonomy. As a matter of fact, the CMPC re-ran some Policy Films, 
including Victory, on television and at the chain cinemas in 1984 and continued to make 
Policy Films until 1987.4
The emergence of Taiwan New Cinema also owed much to the efforts of the young 
filmmakers themselves. They had initially worked for the CMPC before they came into 
prominence. They managed to produce, within the institution of the KMT-own CMPC, 
socially critical films which were centred on indigenous Taiwanese experience. 
Beginning with the release of In Our Time in 1982, Taiwan New Cinema received 
favourable comments from the cultural liberals. At the peak of this film-making 
movement in 1989, financed by an independent production company rather than the 
CMPC, the now world-renowned director Hou Hsiao-hsien made City o f  Sadness. Just 
as the production of Victory reflected the context of Taiwan in the 1970s, so the 
production of City o f Sadness reflected the new socio-political context of Taiwan in the 
late 1980s. The film has often been identified as Hou Hsiao-hsien's ’post-martial law 
film’ and his response to the dramatic process of democratisation that had steadily 
gathered momentum since the late 1980s. Taiwan in the years after the lifting of martial 
law was expected to continue its move towards political democratisation. Decades of 
strict censorship and tight control of the media by the government were loosened, 
allowing more open debates over social, cultural and political matters in the newspapers, 
magazines and other channels of the media. What made City o f  Sadness unique in the 
late 1980s was that it touched on some politically sensitive issues (especially the 
February 28 Incident of 1947) which had been previously prohibited and had never been 
included in any other films made in Taiwan. Such a film could not have been made 
prior to the 1987-88 political transition, which marked the beginning of a more
3
Most o f  the filmmakers who engaged in making 'Taiwan New Cinema' were bom in Taiwan as part o f 
the post-Second World War generation. Hou Hsiao-hsien, however, was bom in China and moved to 
Taiwan with his parents before 1949.
4
The once popular Policy Films fared poorly in their comeback showings at the cinemas. The once best­
selling films attracted very little audience attention. For example, the 1976 Victory sold a total o f  only 676 
tickets at the cinemas (with the box office gross receipts amounting to only NT$ 41,918) when it was 
shown again in 1984 at the cinemas (see Lu, 2000).
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liberalised cultural environment, even though, at the time of the film's release, there was 
no clear indication that the KMT had relaxed its control of media content in Taiwan.5
Taiwan in the late 1980s was at the turning point of history in terms of political 
democratisation. However, the pace of democratisation moved back and forth. After 
decades of authoritarian rule, people's hope for a brighter democratic future was 
overshadowed by the fear of a conservative backlash. This was especially true in the 
wake of the violent regression that shut down the pro-democracy students in Beijing in 
June 1989. The shadow of Tiananmen Square loomed over Taiwan, as no one could be 
certain that the KMT government would maintain the process of democratisation. Under 
these circumstances, City o f Sadness appeared and became the acid test of the KMT's 
political intentions.
Like the context in which the film was made, the nature of the film's historical setting 
was equally transitional. The historical period between Japanese colonisation and the 
KMT take-over of Taiwan saw a short-lived hope for political liberation being replaced 
by disillusion and bloody repression. In a way, therefore, the film, at a critical moment 
of political transition, seemed to be urging the KMT to learn from the past and not to act 
against the popular call for democracy. The metaphorical use of the past to engage with 
the politics of the present was exactly what made City o f Sadness controversial. The 
film also reflected a renewed interest in the national past of Taiwan, as the film director 
Hou Hsiao-hsien, himself a second-generation 'Mainlander', disclosed in an interview: 'I 
have lived in Taiwan for over forty years, but only when I made City o f  Sadness did I 
begin to learn about Taiwan's history' (cited in Cinemaya, 21/1993: 4).
This section has addressed the respective socio-political contexts that prepared the wry 
for Victory and City o f Sadness. It demonstrates, to use Hogan's words, that 'national 
identity is a discursive imagining asserting the common values and the shared history 
and way of life of the people it addresses. This discourse is in constant flux, remaking 
itself in response to changing social conditions' (Hogan, 1999: 751). It is also true that 
the cinematic representation of the past is itself a cultural construction, 'reflecting social,
5 Following the award o f  the Golden Lion at the 1989 Venice Festival, it was decided to release the film 
overseas before allowing general release in Taiwan. The international acclaim it received was 
undoubtedly a factor in overcoming KMT reluctance to exhibit a film which featured such a sensitive past 
to a Taiwanese audience.
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political, economic, and cultural dynamics of the time' (Chambers II and Culbert, 1996: 
10). Both films utilised the 'national' past to serve the needs of the present. The 
following analysis will therefore concentrate on the variations in the historical 
representations of nationhood offered by the films.
7.3 C in e m a t i c  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  C o m p a r e d
7.3.1 Plot Structure
Both films firmly centred on the destiny of an extended family in Taiwan. Victory tells 
the story of an extended family who lived in an unnamed village during the period 
between Taiwan's subjection to Japanese colonial rule and Taiwan's reunion with China 
in 1945. The father is a member of the local gentry who abhors the Japanese colonisers 
and dreams about Taiwan's eventual return to the embrace of the Chinese motherland. 
His two sons, Juguang and Juyong, by fighting the Japanese in their different ways, 
eventually contribute to China's hard-won victory over Japan as well as Taiwan's 
restoration to Chinese rule. The complete plot summary for the film can be found m 
Appendix IV.
City o f  Sadness revolves around the fates of an extended family during the period 
beginning with the Japanese surrender in 1945 and ending with the February 28 Incident 
in 1947 and its aftermath. The only difference from the Lin family in Victory is that the 
family in City o f Sadness falls victim to the Chinese Nationalist regime (KMT) rather 
than to the Japanese. The family patriarch, A-Lushi, has four sons and has lived most of 
his life under Japanese colonial rule. His eldest son, Wenxiong, has been head of a local 
gang, running a nightclub and shipping goods between Taiwan and the mainland. His 
refusal to work with the Shanghai gangsters to smuggle goods leads to him being 
murdered. Wensen, the second son, is a medical doctor who has never returned home 
after being sent by the Japanese to war in the Philippines. Wenliang, the third so.i, 
returns home shell-shocked and traumatised after being sent to Shanghai by the 
Japanese during war. The youngest son Wenqing is an intellectual who reads Karl Marx 
and a photographer who has been deaf and mute since childhood. Because of his 
involvement in the February 28 Incident, he is eventually arrested and executed by the 
KMT government. The film ends with the transplantation of the KMT government onto
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Taiwan after its Communist rival eventually wins the civil war on the mainland. 
Appendix IV offers a plot summary (in chronological order) of the film.
7.3.2 Symbolic Systems of Classification
Table 7.1 sketches the symbolic systems of classification provided by the two films, 
indicating significant similarities and differences.
Table 7.1: Systems of classification provided in the two films
Victory City o f  Sadness
Languages in use Mandarin, Japanese Mandarin, Hokkien, 
Shanghaiese, 
Cantonese, Hakka, and 
the Wenzhou dialect, 
Japanese
Narrated Time • Roughly 1939-1945 1945-1949
Narrated
Place
Taiwan
China
Screened but 
unspecified village in 
southern Taiwan
Screened but 
unspecified places in 
the Chinese mainland
Taipei, Jiufen, Badouzi 
(mentioned and 
screened)
Nanking and Shanghai 
(mentioned but not 
screened).
The 'other* (who are 
'they'?')
Japanese Mainland Chinese (the 
Nationalist government, 
Shanghaiese)
Self-
identification 
('who are 
we?')
Taiwanese
Chinese
Two characters 
(Juyong, Juguang) but 
only on two occasions
Many (the father of the 
Lin family, Wenying, 
Juguang, a group of 
young pupils, and some 
other subsidiary 
characters)
Wenxiong, Wenqing, 
Kuanmei, Kuanrong 
and others
None
Identity recognised by the 
'other' ('who are 'we' in 
'their* eyes?')
• Identity-mixing
(sometimes Taiwanese 
and sometimes 
Chinese)
•  Taiwanese (called by 
the Shanghaiese)/ 
Taiwanese compatriots 
(called by the 
Nationalist government)
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(1) Languages in use
In Victory, all the Taiwanese characters except for Juyong, who lived under Japanese 
colonialism, speak Mandarin. Juyong's use of Japanese in Victory functions as an 
exception proving the rule that other Taiwanese villagers are Chinese in nature. It th; .s 
emphasises homogeneity. In contrast to Victory, City o f  Sadness gives the viewers an 
imaginary Taiwan as being ww-Chinese in the late 1940s. As opposed to Taiwan as a 
nearly monolingual society in the film Victory, City o f Sadness represents the 
Taiwanese society of the 1940s as a multilingual one in which a range of mutually 
unintelligible languages was in use. The use of seven spoken languages of largely 
mutual unintelligibility in the film City o f  Sadness punctures the myth of congruence 
between the KMT and the Taiwanese people. These seven spoken languages (the 
Shanghai dialect, Cantonese, Hokkien, Hakka, Japanese, Wenzhou dialect, and 
Mandarin) epitomise the immigrant and colonial character of Taiwan in the 1940s and 
thus emphasise heterogeneity.
The multilingual Taiwan of the late 1940s is clearly depicted in City o f  Sadness, as 
illustrated by the following conversation between Wenxiong and the Shanghai gangsters, 
which requires a translation between different spoken languages.
(Framed by the Shanghai gangsters, Wenliang is arrested by the Nationalist 
soldiers for his involuntary involvement in fighting the second Sino- 
Japanese war between 1937-1945 on the side of Japan. Wenxiong goes with 
his subordinate A-Jia to seek help from the Shanghai gang).
Wenxiong (in Hokkien, speaking to the Shanghai gangsters): Sorry to 
interrupt you while you have fun here. The soldiers arrested Wenliang.
Since you have good relationships with them and the [Chinese] New Year is 
approaching, please give us a hand to get him out of prison. ... Tell them 
(speaking to A-Jia)!
A-Jia (in Cantonese): My boss says that he needs your help to get Wenliang 
out of prison.
One of the Shanghai gang (as translator) (in Shanghaiese): His boss 
wants us to help rescue Wenliang from prison.
Head of the Shanghai gangsters (looking surprised, speaking in 
Shanghaiese): Oh, Wenliang was arrested. We don't know about it.
The translator (in Cantonese, speaking to A-Jia): We know nothing about 
it.
A-Jia (angrily responds in Cantonese): Fuck. His arrest was entirely set up 
by you. How can you pretend to know nothing?
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Wenxiong (in Hokkien): Don't say these useless words to them! Tell them, I 
will reward them for helping Wenliang to get out.
A-Jia (in Cantonese): My boss says that he will pay you for your help.
The translator (in Shanghaiese, speaking to the head of the Shanghai gang):
They say they will pay us for our help.
(The Shanghai gangsters look at one another in agreement.)
Wenxiong (puts the money on the table, speaking Hokkien): It's all here.
(2) Narrated times and narrated places
With partial coincidence in temporality, the narrative time of City o f  Sadness (between 
1945-1949) continuously followed that of Victory (roughly between 1939-1945). 
Equally, both films set most sequences of story events as happened in Taiwan.
The Chinese mainland is represented in Victory as an object o f desire, the unforgettable 
homeland from where helpers came to rescue the people of Taiwan from calamity under 
Japanese colonialism. By contrast, in City O f Sadness the Chinese mainland is 
represented to be more like an object o f  fear, the unfamiliar homeland from where 
villains came.
As portrayed in City o f  Sadness, against the backdrop of the Nationalist crackdown, a 
Taiwanese nationalist sentiment is particularly manifested in Kuanrong's total devotion 
to what he calls 'the beautiful future of our homeland'. According to Yip, though 
unspecified, the 'homeland' that Kuanrong refers to is not the Chinese mainland but 
Taiwan itself (Yip, 1996), as suggested by the film's excessive representation of 
Taiwan's landscape of silence in moments of political violence perpetrated by the KMT 
regime over the 'native Taiwanese' people. Moreover, in City o f  Sadness Kuanrong 
leads a guerrilla to fight against the incoming Nationalist troops. Thus, 'the homeland' 
referred to by Kuanrong is unlikely to the Chinese mainland.
(3) Representing the 'other'
In Victory, the Japanese are identified as the evil and bloodthirsty 'Other'. The Japanese 
are enemies of the main characters. In City o f Sadness, by contrast, the Japanese are as 
vulnerable as the main characters; indeed, the departing Japanese are represented as 
friends of theirs. It is not the Japanese but the 'Mainlanders' (Shanghaiese and the
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Nationalist government) who are represented as the 'Other' who lead the main characters 
into great loss and misfortune.
(4) Self-identification
The self-identification of the main characters in Victory is mixed. Sometimes they 
identify as Taiwanese but mostly as Chinese:
(Wenying is teaching in class).
Wenying: (singing the theme song of the film Victory) Meihua [literally,
'plum blossom'], meihua, all over the world. The worse the weather, the 
more it blossoms! Meihua is our national flower. ... No one should forget 
we are Chinese even though we are under alien [Japanese] rule.
(A pupil looks tired and nods).
Wenying (Look serious): How can you be so mindless? We should be at 
every moment prepared for victory. Accordingly, you should influence your 
parents to strive for that goal.
In Victory, there are only two occasions when the protagonists identify themselves as 
'Taiwanese': first, when he meets a Japanese girl, Juyong boasts that 'we Taiwanese can 
accomplish anything with our bare hands'; and secondly, when his brother Juguang 
encourages Taiwanese comrades who have joined the Chinese army to take the 
opportunity to 'honour us Taiwanese' by total devotion to the Chinese nation. The 
identity of 'Taiwanese' is positively positioned within, and seen as consistent with, the 
larger identity of 'Chinese'. Compared with the KMT's previously exclusive denial of 
'Taiwanese' identity,6 this amounts to a great effort by the KMT to use the identity to its 
advantage, and thus epitomises the regime's early attempt to incorporate the 'native 
Taiwanese' into the Chinese nation by means of sophisticated encouragement rather 
than mere suppression. The reasons for this shift are not hard to find. As analysed 
earlier in this chapter, the KMT regime found itself having to seek an alternative source 
of legitimacy when it rapidly lost international support for its survival in the early 1970s.
By contrast, the self-identification of the main characters in City o f  Sadness is mo e 
clearly Taiwanese. The sadness of being treated as colonised by people of the same 
blood pervades the narratives of the film, as instanced in Wenxiong's lament:
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(Narrowly escaping arrest by the Nationalist soldiers, Wenxiong hides 
himself in his friend's house.)
The Friend: What happened?
Wenxiong: Fuck. The soldiers came to arrest me, saying that I am a traitor 
[to the Chinese nation].
The Friend (looks shocked, saying nothing)
Wenxiong: We islanders are among the most unfortunate: out with the 
Japanese, in with the Chinese. Everyone eats and rides on us but no one 
loves us.
Furthermore, in Victory 'we' (the self) in the eyes of 'them' (the 'Other') are mostly seen 
as 'Chinese':
(The Japanese soldiers arrest some villagers who are suspected of hiding 
Nationalist secret agents in order to protect them from arrest. One of the 
villagers, Zhang Yidao, rises up time and time again from being badly 
slapped down to the ground, still refusing to confess.)
Japanese soldiers (look confused): Who are you?
Zhang Yidao: Chinese.
Japanese soldiers (look scared): Who are you really?
Zhang Yidao: Chinese!
All other prisoners (rise to join him and answer in chorus): Chinese!
Japanese soldiers report to Ikeda (Japanese military officer): No one 
confesses.
Ikeda (speaking to the Japanese soldiers): I told you so! Torture would 
never work on these Chinese people!
As opposed to this, in City o f  Sadness 'we' (self) in the eyes of 'them' (the 'Other') a/e 
uniformly called 'Taiwanese', as indicated in the film in a radio broadcast given by the 
Nationalist Governor-General of Taiwan:
Taiwanese compatriots -- Yesterday I declared temporary martial law again.
Now with the utmost sincerity, I want to tell the vast majority of the good 
and virtuous Taiwanese people, that my declaration of martial law is 
entirely for your protection. You must not listen to the rumours of wicked 
people. You must not be suspicious or afraid. There shall not be the slightest 
harm to our law-abiding brethren. You must feel at ease. I have declared 
martial law again solely for the purpose of coping with the very small 
number of the desperate and rebellious. As long as they are not annihilated
6 KMT's first Governor-general o f  Taiwan, Chen Yi, was reported in Taiwan New Life Daily (16 M ar:h 
1947: 3) as saying that 'enemy agents and rebels exploit the term "Taiwanese" to provoke trouble and turn 
people against one another. We must not be fooled by this lie. We all come from the same root, and all o f 
us are compatriots o f the Republic o f China'.
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there will be no peace for our virtuous brethren. Since the occurrence of the 
February 28 Incident, I have broadcast three times. (Broadcast speech by the 
Nationalist Governor-General of Taiwan, Chen Yi, quoted from the film 
City o f  Sadness, English translation adapted from Kerr, 1965: 295)
(5) Gender roles in the two film s
In what follows a new theme for textual analysis is added in addition to those 
introduced in Chapter 6 — gender roles within the film narrative.
Male characters in both films are more or less similar: they are characterised by their 
public roles, work, patriotism, activism, and so forth. For example, we may consider the 
case of Juyong, who is initially the least patriotic character of the film Victory. Juyong's 
reversion to the role of a Chinese patriot, like everyone else in the film, can be 
attributed to the mechanism of Confucianism, referred to here as a devotion to filial 
piety, respect for social authority, and etiquette in everyday behaviour.
Unlike everyone else, he is the only one within the family who is unable to please l. ’s 
patriarch father for his jobless idleness, Japanese-like behaviours (such as speaking 
Japanese and wearing Japanese slippers), and subsequent working with the Japanese at 
the power plant. Because of his unpatriotic 'collaboration' with the Japanese, his pariah­
like father slaps Juyong in the presence of other people. Juyong is even condemned as 
'nonhuman' for not being patriotic enough: his father calls him an 'animal' and Xiaohui 
urges him to behave like 'a man'. He does not receive recognition from anyone, and in 
particular from his desired 'bride', Xiaohui, until he performs the appropriate role of 
being 'Chinese' and 'patriotic'. Before that transformation, he is portrayed as useless to 
society, is condemned for neglecting his filial duties, and is described as not 'masculine' 
enough to be loved by Xiaohui.
Not until the beheading of his father by the Japanese military and his own 
condemnation by the villagers for failing to observe filial piety does Juyong change: he 
then bombs the Japanese power plant, a military target which the KMT secret agents 
dispatched from the Chinese mainland failed to destroy on a previous mission. The 
film's turning to Confucian tradition for assistance in moral regulation, especially in its 
emphasis upon filial piety, is actually a deliberate move to extend the solidarity feelings 
of the family to the level of the nation.
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Because the two films represent males as being public, active and patriotic, the least 
patriotic character Juyong in Victory in the end turns out to be the most patriotic, and 
the deaf-mute Wenqing in City o f  Sadness turns out to be devoted to the resistance 
against the KMT. However, the female roles are represented very differently in the two 
films, as is shown in Table 7.2. The female characters in Victory are more public, active 
and patriotic, and are even eager to die for the nation, whereas in City o f  Sadness the 
female characters are more private, passive, and exhibit indifference to the national 
cause. Only in terms of motherhood do the females in the two films seem to ha’ e 
something in common. The question is how to explain these differences in the 
representations of female roles.
Table 7.2: Female roles as represented in the two films
Victory City o f Sadness
Public (e.g., Wenying, Minzhu) Personal (e.g., Kuanmei)
Work (Wenying, Minzhu) Home (all female characters)
Activism (all female characters to Talk or silence (all female
varying degrees) characters)
Individualism (Xiaohui, Minzhu) Community (all female characters)
Martyrdom (Wenying) Survivors (all female characters)
Patriotism (all female characters to Patriotism (irrelevant to all female
varying degrees) characters)
Motherhood (Wenying, Xiaohui) Motherhood (Kuanmei, and some 
other unnamed widows in the Lin 
family)
I first examine the roles played by the female protagonist Wenying in Victory. The 
portrayal of Wenying expresses the typical image of national martyrdom that is often 
employed as a constitutive part of Chinese nationalist discourse. Duara points out that 
the notion of self-sacrifice is vitally important in the Chinese nationalist discourse: 
'Martyrdom is the root sacrificial form ... The same mechanism may perhaps be at work 
in the national martyr, but the sacrificial action here also produces the authentic. (Duara, 
1998: 299-300). In making Wenying a national martyr, the episode of self-sacrifice thus 
helps to rebuild Wenying's authenticity and inspires the other villagers in the film io 
make their own sacrifices for the nation.
Wenying supports the family after her husband Juguang has joined the Chinese army in 
the mainland. She is also the one who teaches pupils to be patriotic and saves pupils 
from conscription by the Japanese military. Yet she turns out to be suspected
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(mistakenly) by the villagers of being unfaithful to her husband (and by implication to 
the Chinese nation) by having an affair with a Japanese military officer. Not until she 
commits suicide to prove her innocence do the villagers realise how patriotic, faithful 
and authentic she is. Wenying's self-sacrifice, in the film, inspires the villagers to fight 
because the Japanese are the ones they hold responsible for the rising death toll 
(including the deaths of Juyong's parents and Wenying). The sacrifice of Wenying in 
the film thus confirms Duara's observation that 'nationalist patriarchy in China sought to 
mobilise the weight of these historical representations to discipline women's bodies 
within the public sphere as figures of self-sacrifice' (Duara, 1998: 300).
Female characters in Victory not only assume the traditional responsibility of 
motherhood but also publicly devote themselves to the nation. In addition to Wenying, 
other females in the film also serve the 'nation' in various ways, as shown in the 
patriotic behaviour of Minzhu (and to a lesser extent, Xiaohui):
(Minzhu is in the queue, signing-up as a volunteer battlefield nurse)
The solider: What's your name?
Minzhu: Jiang Minzhu.
Juguang (now a military officer in the Nationalist forces) (speaking to the 
soldier): No, she cannot sign up.
Minzhu: Why?
Juguang: Do you know where we are heading?
Minzhu: I know. The frontline.
Juguang: Good. So, you cannot go with us.
Minzhu: Why?
Juguang: Because you are a woman.
Minzhu: Why can't women go? Aren't women allowed to be patriotic and 
fight the Japanese? ...
(Juguang is amazed by her patriotic spirit and eventually agrees to her 
participation.)
On the matter of patriotism, it seems that no gender difference is registered in Victory. 
Instead, gender is constantly utilised in discourses of national identities and nationalism, 
confirming the validity of Hogan's argument that 'national identities are strongly 
gendered, and ... this gendering serves to anchor national identities in nostalgia and 
traditionalism' (Hogan, 1999: 745). As the analysis of Victory shows,, the characters
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Wenying, Xiaohui and Minzhu dutifully take up the traditional roles of motherhood but 
are also able -  like men — to serve the nation.
In contrast to the active, public and patriotic female roles in Victory, the females in City 
o f Sadness are private and passive and embedded in the home, feeling indifferent to the 
national cause. An example is the main protagonist, Kuanmei, in City o f Sadness. She is 
quiet, docile and vulnerable to the social disturbances around her. In writing her diary, 
she records her private feelings about her lover’s (Wenqing's) arrest by the KMT:
Wenqing’s niece wrote me a letter saying that Wenqing has been taken away 
by the [KMT] soldiers. 'It is against the law of nature and doesn't make any 
sense,' complains Wenqing’s father, that 'the [KMT] soldiers arrest a deaf- 
mute and charge him with the crime of treason.' I don't care whether God 
exists or whether there is the law of nature, I just want him [Wenqing] back.
However, positioned in the film as the most important 'implied narrator' (Kozloff, 1992), 
Kuanmei's private diary reveals many details about what is happening. All the female 
characters survive at the conclusion of the film while all the male protagonists have died 
(e.g., Wenxiong, Wenqing, Kuanrong) or have gone insane (i.e., Wenliang). Thus 
women function in the film as survivors and more importantly as witnesses to the tragic 
past.
7.3.3 Modes of Historical Narration
This section will focus on how the 'narrative of nation' (to use Benedict Anderson's and 
Stuart Hall's phrase, see Chapter 5) is constructed in the two films. The following 
analysis draws insights from John Rusen's typology of historical narration (Rusen, 
1987). According to this typology, the traditional mode of historical narration lays 
emphasis upon the memory of origins that constitutes established forms of life, 
preserving a continuity (permanence) of originally constituted forms of life, forming an 
identity by affirming pre-given cultural patterns of self-understanding, and considering 
time in the sense of eternity. As opposed to the traditional mode of historical narration, 
the critical mode of historical narration privileges memory of deviations, not only 
problematising established forms of life but also challenging given ideas of continuity. 
By challenging the established identity, the critical mode of historical narration also 
creates a new identity. Moreover, its sense of time is that time is no longer considered 
as eternal but as being an object of judgement in the process of narrating the past.
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The narrative of Victory matches the traditional mode of historical narration while the 
narrative of City o f Sadness epitomises the critical mode of historical narration (see 
Table 7.3). In their different ways, both films function as national pedagogy and 
national allegory, suggesting what pieces of the national past should be remembered and 
what moral lessons should be learned.
Table 7.3: Typology of historical narration in the two films
Memory of Continuity as Identity by S en se of time
Victory • Origins 
constituting 
present forms 
of life
• Permanence of • 
originally 
constituted 
forms of life
Affirming pre- • 
given cultural 
patterns of self- 
understanding
Time gains the 
sense of 
eternity
City o f • 
Sadness
Deviations 
problematising 
present forms 
of life
• Alteration of • 
given ideas of 
continuity
Questioning • 
given patterns 
of identity
Time gains the 
sense of being 
an object of 
judgement
Source: adapted from Rusen (1987: 91). 
(1) Narrating the nation in Victory
Despite the unusual inclusion of pre-KMT Taiwan in the film Victory, it does not seem 
to run against the official canon of Chinese nationalism. At the heart of its historical 
narration is the myth of a 'shared sacred origin' transcending ethnic and political realities, 
formulated as 'the various images of timeless harmony to the primordial past, despite 
the real history of dynastic upheaval, barbarian conquest and alien religious influences 
(Chun, 1995: 29). Rather than imagining Taiwan in the colonial era as exotic and 
Oriental, Victory presents it as identical to other parts of China, as if Taiwan were 
completely unchanged by half a century of Japanese colonialism. The film portrays the 
Taiwanese under colonial rule as being Chinese in character, patriotic to the Chinese 
nation and ready to answer the nationalist call to fight the Japanese. This portrayal is in 
stark contrast to the hitherto official attitude towards the Taiwanese, whom were 
regarded by the KMT regime as being tainted by Japanese colonialism and not 
authentically Chinese so that they need to be re-educated in Mandarin, Chinese History 
and in particular the orthodoxy of Chinese nationalism. This renewed portrayal of the 
Taiwanese under Japanese colonialism reflects, as mentioned in the preceding section, 
the KMT regime's greater need in the early 1970s to gain support from within
158
Taiwanese society. Only one of the Taiwanese characters (Juyong) in Victory is not 
patriotic because of his 'collaboration' with the Japanese. In the end, Juyong's sin of 
being unpatriotic can only be cleansed by his courageous self-sacrifice in his last- 
minute action when fighting the Japanese.
Each character of Victory, regardless of age, gender, and class differences, is 
represented as contributing to the eventual victory of the second Sino-Japanese war. The 
elders, in defence of the ancestors' tombs and wearing traditional 'Chinese' suits 
(symbolically suggesting their 'Chineseness'), defy the Japanese soldiers. As the village 
leaders, they set patriotic role models for the rest of the villagers. The very young, the 
Taiwanese schoolchildren calling themselves 'Chinese' in the film, fight their Japanese 
counterparts in the streets. The lower-class villagers sacrifice themselves to rescue the 
KMT secret agents.
To sum up, the film serves to glorify the nation's record of victory over the alien 
Japanese and therefore naturalises the 'Glorious Restoration' of the Chinese rule on 
Taiwan. The rhetoric of common ancestry, Confucian ethics and self-sacrifice in Victory 
is translated into a nationalist sentiment that sweeps away individual consideration, 
demanding that all the Taiwanese in the film are totally devoted to the Chinese nation. 
Not surprisingly, the family and the village in the film are portrayed as a miniature 
version of the Taiwanese society, whose fate is portrayed as inseparable form that of the 
whole Chinese nation. The Japanese, depicted as enemies of the Chinese nation, are 
directly or indirectly responsible for all the deaths of family members in the film. This 
is typical of nationalist narratives in the sense that there can be no 'us' without a 'them' 
(Billig, 1995: 78). All this implies that, as long as victory over the enemy is eventual .y 
achieved, the misfortune of the broken family can be compensated with the well being 
of the nation. The connection between the Taiwanese family and the Chinese nation is 
thus made explicit: one's obligation to the family should be extended to loyalty to the 
nation; more importantly, the family is vulnerable to the enemies if the nation is in 
danger.
(2) Narrating the nation in City o f  Sadness
As explained in Chapter 3, the February 28 Incident of 1947 represented a Taiwanese 
consciousness that was distinct from Chinese nationhood. The repercussions of the
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Incident have persisted over decades. The Taiwanese Diaspora in Japan and the United 
States who were in favour of the idea of Taiwan independence later exploited it. Not 
surprisingly, the Incident has been persistently labelled as a Communist-inspired 
rebellion by the KMT government. Ahead of any public discussion of the Incident, City 
o f Sadness, made in 1989, was the first instance of cultural expression which 
transgressed the longstanding taboo and went so far as to visualise the Incident. It 
brought this highly sensitive event to public awareness.
City o f Sadness metaphorically uses the deaf-mute character of Wenqing to indicate that 
though he cannot physically hear and speak for himself, he bears eyewitness to the 
events that occur around him. This, in a way, symbolises the way in which the silenced 
past will eventually speak aloud despite the KMT's efforts to keep it secret. Wenqing’s 
disability also makes him appear vulnerable to the treachery of others and ultimately 
leads him to become a martyr to a heroic cause. The female characters are portrayed as 
survivors of victimhood who continue to narrate the tragic past in private regardless of 
the KMT's concealment of the historical truth. Kuanmei (Wenqing's wife), as the 
principal narrator of the film, reveals the buried past through her diaries and her letters 
to Wenqing's niece, suggesting the persistence of the private sphere vis-a-vis the policed 
public sphere.
As for the identity of the 'Taiwanese', City o f Sadness goes further in its effort to give it 
embodiment. First, when misrecognised as a 'Mainlander' and besieged by the 
Taiwanese rioters, Wenqing reveals with difficulty his Taiwanese identity so that he 
narrowly escapes being killed by the retaliative action of the native 'native Taiwanese' 
against the 'Mainlanders' in response to KMT suppression:
(Amidst the February 28 Incident)
Rioters (with knives and sticks in their hands): Where are you from? (in
Hokkien)
Rioters (looking impatient and aggressive): Who are you? (in Hokkien)
Wenqing: Taiwanese (speaking Hokkien with difficulty and almost
inaudibly).
Rioters: Where are you from? (in Japanese)
(Wenqing does not know how to respond and is in danger of being hurt until
Kuanrong comes to rescue him).
Kuanrong: He has been a deaf-mute since the age of eight. How can he
hear you? (blaming the rioters for attempting to hurt Wenqing) (in Hokkien).
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This suggests that one could only act defensively in choosing to identify as either 
Taiwanese or Chinese in that turbulent era: the Taiwanese in the 1940s found/reaffirmed 
themselves as 'Taiwanese’ because they suddenly realised that they were not treated as 
'Chinese' by the KMT government.
Despite the representation of a Taiwanese nationalist sentiment arising from the 
disenchantment with official Chinese nationalism, City o f Sadness nevertheless 
represents the Incident to the disappointment of Taiwanese nationalists. It exposes the 
violence exercised by the KMT government in a rather oblique way, as opposed to its 
direct address of violent Taiwanese mobs beating 'Mainlanders'. Moreover, it implies 
that the organised resistance to the KMT government was led by left-leaning 
intellectuals and thus echoes the official charge of the Incident being a communist- 
agitated rebellion. Moreover, by representing Kuanrong as the one who is heavily 
cultivated in Japanese culture, the film conveys a hidden message that conforms to the 
official account: if the Taiwanese were not so morally and culturally contaminated by 
their exposure to Japanese culture in the first place, the tragic Incident would not have 
happened.
However, the film still had implications for national identity in Taiwan as it encouraged 
Taiwanese society to define itself. City o f Sadness exposed the February 28 Incident at a 
time when the Incident remained officially denied by the KMT government, and it 
initiated a series of public controversies over interpretations of the Incident. The call >f 
the film for mutual understanding and reconciliation between different ethnic groups, 
and more importantly its stress on the need to leam from the tragic past, was prominent 
in the film. It conveyed a complex picture of Taiwan in the 1940s as heterogeneous in 
nature. On the one hand, it articulated some views commonly held by the Taiwanese 
nationalists in their representation of the KMT government as an alien regime doing 
violence to the 'native Taiwanese'. On the other hand, it also reminded viewers that not 
only the 'native Taiwanese' but also the 'Mainlanders' suffered during the Incident.
However, I maintain that the film remains a Taiwanese nationalist text, as opposed to a 
Chinese nationalist text such as Victory. In contrast to Victory's objectifying Taiwan in a 
presumably Taiwanese past in line with the grand narrative of homogenous Chine e 
nationhood, City o f Sadness no longer defines Taiwan exclusively through the lens of 
Chinese nationalism but as a place where people of heterogeneous cultures are in
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conflict but have to share a common future. Last but not least, City o f  Sadness can be 
read as a 'national allegory' which is suggestive of socio-political and moral meanings 
(Tay, 1994: 153, 159). For example, even the most dedicated Taiwanese nationalist in 
the film, Kuanrong, is deliberately named as such to imply 'forgiveness' (kuan) and 
'tolerance' (rong). The film clearly attempts to draw a moral lesson from the tragic past, 
trying to move beyond that past and creating a time/space for different ethnic groups in 
Taiwan to imagine the reality of the commonly shared 'Now Here'.
7.4  C o n c l u s i o n
The above analysis has probed the nationalist ideologies inscribed in the two selected 
films, providing evidence on the questions of 'how relations of domination in the wider 
society underlie the media construction of relations and identities, how these processes 
take place in texts' (Fairclough, 1995: 127).
At first sight, the two films seem to differ from each other in every major respect. First, 
the two films narrate the national past differently. Victory employs a traditional mode of 
historical narration. City o f Sadness employs a critical mode of historical narration.
Secondly, the two films adopt different discursive strategies. Victory adopts a discursive 
strategy of assimilation, aiming at the construction of national sameness. City o f 
Sadness adopts a discursive strategy of dissimilation, aiming at the construction of 
intranational differences (de Cillia et al., 1999: 151). In Victory, there is a salient, 
harmonic correspondence of the two basic identities (Taiwanese and Chinese); there is 
no conflict between the two. However, in City o f Sadness, contradictory relations 
between the two identities persist throughout the film.
Moreover, the importance of creating 'the other' can be applied to the cinematic 
construction of the national self. In Victory the Japanese are clearly referred to as 'the 
other' as opposed to 'us' (the 'Chinese'). In City o f Sadness it is the Chinese 'Mainlanders' 
who have replaced the role of the Japanese. This clearly exemplifies the function of 
social categories in identifying who 'we' are and implying who 'we' are not (Tajfel, 1982) 
at the heart of any national imaginations.
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It seems explicit, from the above analysis, that Victory is a Chinese nationalist film 
while City o f Sadness represents a Taiwanese nationalism in embryo. Nevertheless, it is 
not impossible to see what Victory shares with City o f Sadness. Both films explicitly or 
implicitly make a distinction between ’us’ and 'them', and exploit martyrdom to 
stimulate a nationalist sentiment. Moreover, to varying degrees, both films seek to 
reconcile the existence of various cultures and diverse ethnic groups within Taiwan. 
Victory attempts to incorporate the 'native Taiwanese' into the grand narrative of 
Chinese nationalism and calls for solidarity at the moment of national crisis during the 
1970s. Likewise, City o f Sadness tries to make peace with the tortured past and calls for 
a mutual understanding and tolerance among the different ethnic groups. Taken together, 
in their different ways, they have helped to shape a shared sense of national identity at 
different moments in the development of post-Second World War Taiwan.
Feature films are unusual because they are viewed not only at the time of their original 
releases but also for many years afterwards. Hence, the ways in which the past is 
represented within films have become constitutive elements of public discourse 
concerning the past. Textual analysis of the films thus needs to be accompanied by an 
examination of how a past audience interpreted a text and how a current audience 
interprets a text that was produced in the past. In the following chapters, I will offer an 
analysis of contemporary family viewers with special reference to their uses of 
television (Chapter 8), their senses of nationhood, and the ways in which they have 
interpreted the two films (Chapter 9).
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8.
Families Watching Television
Drawing on informants' media-focused life histories, this chapter details the informants' 
past and present television-viewing experiences. Following a section on how the two 
waves of interviews with the viewing families were conducted, this chapter gives 
empirical substance to the following arguments.
First, with respect to their historical and current viewing experiences, the inter-family 
differences structured along ethnic lines are less salient than the intra-family differences 
structured by gender and age. Watching television has been a national activity 
transcending the family boundaries in a context in which the traditional rigid 
differentiation between 'native Taiwanese' and 'Mainlanders' has become increasingly 
blurred in Taiwan. Secondly, the very existence of television as a nation-wide mediu n 
since the early 1970s has contributed to the sharing of national cultural space by 
viewers around the island, and this shared viewing experience is marked in their 
collective memories. Thirdly, the increasing provision and consumption of global or 
transnational media in Taiwan has generally not weakened national identity.1 On the 
contrary, as is most evident in the case of young informants, there has been greater 
access to foreign television programmes than ever before, but political identification 
with Taiwan has become stronger rather than weaker. Finally, the global or 
transnational media have not rendered national media marginal. That is to say, Taiwan's 
television landscape has changed dramatically, yet television remains a domestic (in 
both senses of the word) medium and the audience is not as segmented and fragmentary 
as is usually supposed.
1 Although it may be argued that the sense o f  Taiwanese identity could have been stronger but for 
penetration o f  the global media, this argument is hard to verify by reference to the evidence obtained by 
the present study.
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8.1 T h e  R e s p o n d e n t  F a m il ie s
As was noted in Chapter 5, two waves of in-depth interviews with the same 19 families 
were conducted in the periods March to May 1998 and September to November 1999. 
All the families interviewed were nuclear in sociological pattern, were recruited from 
the urban middle class, and were equipped with colour television sets, VCRs and 
cable/satellite access. At the time of interviewing, all these families had gained access to 
cable/satellite television for several years, and 12 families had one or two additional 
television sets. Although the recruitment process was constrained by the practical issue 
of access (see Section 2 of Chapter 5 for a discussion of the methodological 
considerations involved), the sample nevertheless reflected a degree of diversity in 
ethnicity, gender and generation.
(1) The sample
Not all members of each family were present when the researcher entered their homes. 
The first wave of interviews consisted of 55 informants (19 aged between 17 and 18 and 
the other 36 in their 40s and 50s). The same families were visited the following year 
with a slightly different composition: the resulting sample included 57 individuals (24
•y
young people and 33 parents in their 40s and 50s).
To sum up, 62 informants were interviewed at least once, either on the first or secot d 
visits; 50 informants took part in both sets of interviews. More specifically, 24 
informants were under 25 years old, 38 were between 40 and 60. There were 32 males 
and 30 females. In terms of occupation, the informants were, at the time of interviewing, 
7 housewives, 5 professionals, 11 small-business owners, 15 semi-skilled workers, 4 
unemployed persons, and 20 students. Many of them worked or studied in Taipei City. 
The sample, broken down by factors of ethnicity, gender and generation, is shown in 
Table 8-1 (see also Appendix VII for details of each family member differentiated by 
ethnicity, gender and age).
2
Five o f  the original informants -  all were youngsters' parents -  were not available for interviewing on 
the second visits. At the same time, another seven informants who did not take part in the first interviews 
were present (five younger or older siblings o f the 19 youngsters and two o f  their middle-aged parents).
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Table 8.1: Informants classified by gender, generation and ethnicity
Of
'Mainlander*
families
(n=19)
Of Hakka
families
(n=18)
Of Hokkien
families
(n=25)
Gender Male (n=32) 10 9 13
Female (n=30) 9 9 12
Generation Parents (n=38) 12 12 14
Children (n=24) 7 6 11
Ethnicity 'Mainlander' (n=14) 12 2 0
Hakka (n=13) 1 10 2
Hokkien (n=24) 2 2 20
Mixed (n=11) 4 4 3
It must be acknowledged that the families under study did not fully approximate the 
population at large, as the sample under-represented the largest Hokkien group and 
over-represented the families of Hakka and 'Mainlander' origins. Such an ethnic 
composition of the sample families was intended to maximise the range of variations in 
their viewing experiences.
(2) The interviews
The families were interviewed on weekday evenings in their homes. All the interviews 
were carried out by the same two interviewers (my wife and I) acting in pairs. The 
interviews were undertaken in a semi-structured manner for reaching a trade-cff 
between 'open* and ’closed' interviews (Lewis, 1991: 83-84): the informants were 
allowed setting the agenda that they considered relevant; at the same time, I were able to 
focus on some specific questions.
The informants were given a firm guarantee of anonymity. The tape-recorder was 
switched on as soon as the interviews started. Field notes of each interview were written 
after each interview was completed. In general, the interviews proceeded in a
Considering youngsters might not be articulate in the presence o f  their parents in the homes, 19 
youngsters had been assembled, before the first-wave interviews with the viewing families, to talk 
through their own biographies, identities, and viewing experiences.
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comfortable and dialogical manner and the participant informants were free to leave or 
join in at any time. The interviews were mainly conducted in Mandarin, but 
occasionally the informants expressed ideas in the Taiwanese languages (i.e. Hokkien 
and Hakka).4 Probes were carefully used in the interviews in order to maintain rapport.
(i) The first wave of interviews. A general topic guide (see Appendix V) consisting of 
questions related to personal background, viewing experience, and national identity was 
used in the first wave of interviews. Each interview lasted about one to one and a half 
hours.
(ii) The second wave of interviews. The second wave of interviews used a more 
focused topic guide (see Appendix VI). Each interview lasted approximately two to two 
and a half hours.
In addition, in the course of the second wave of interviews, two separate viewing 
sessions of the two films were arranged to examine the interaction between viewer and 
text. The two films were shown on video and questions about each film were posed 
separately. The 1976 film Victory was about 90 minutes in length while the 1989 film 
City o f  Sadness lasted about 3 hours. Because of time constraints, only the opening on v 
sixth of each film was shown: the first 15 minutes of Victory and the first 30 minutes of 
City o f  Sadness. It should be noted that this arrangement of film viewing was not 
exclusively intended to clarify how the audience members interpreted a particular film, 
but rather the aim was to explore viewers' reception of two representative Taiwanese 
film categories, namely 'Policy Film' and 'Taiwan New Cinema', produced in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Also, the film viewing sessions were intended to trigger their memories, 
helping them to recall aspects of the banal discourses and historical narration related to 
national identity in Taiwan of previous decades. As the previous chapter indicated, 
certain forms of nationalist discourse were embodied in the two films and spread over 
the national cinema.
4 All informants were competent Mandarin speakers. Occasionally they responded to questions or defined 
the situation in the languages other than Mandarin (i.e., Hakka and Hokkien). The interviews proceeded 
very well since, I speak good Hakka and fairly good Hokkien and the co-interviewer a native speaker of 
Hokkien.
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(3) The transcripts
All the audio-recorded interviews were transcribed in full in written Chinese. The 
transcript was numbered page by page and indexed by family. The codes (FI-FI9) 
assigned to the families represent the order in which the taped interviews were 
transcribed rather than the chronological order of the original interviews: F1-F6 
represent the six 'Mainlander' families under study; F7-F12 represent the six 'Hakka' 
families, and F13-F19 are the 'Hokkien' families. A problem emerged when transcribing 
those interviews that had involved the use of the colloquial Taiwanese languages other 
than Mandarin. The written Chinese characters fit Mandarin much better than the 
Taiwanese languages (i.e. Hokkien and Hakka). Thus, transcribing the interviews 
involving Hokkien and Hakka in written Chinese might reduce the subtleties that 
distinguish the Mandarin and Taiwanese languages. Being fully aware of this, some 
techniques were employed in the transcribing process to reduce any serious loss of the 
meanings the informants originally intended. These techniques involved listening to the 
tapes as many times as possible and consulting competent Hakka or Hokkien speakers.5
(4) The presentation o f  the data
Another important question concerns the presentation of the data. This is a contentious 
matter with qualitative interviewing data because it inevitably has ethical, 
methodological and theoretical implications. The aim of this research is to give voice to 
the informants as much as possible, yet a balance needs to be struck between using the ir 
actual spoken accounts and interpreting those accounts. The excerpts made from the 
transcribed texts are not claimed to be representative or typical of the informants' 
accounts. Inevitably, the excerpts are selective. The main aim of the selective 
presentation is to illustrate key aspects of viewing experience and national identity 
pertinent to the thesis.
The analysis drawn from the two waves of interviews is divided between two chapters. 
The present chapter focuses on the informants' past and present viewing experiences in 
the domestic context, while the next chapter centres on the questions of how they 
decode the two films and how they make sense of national identity.
5 Only the extracts used in the thesis were further translated into English. The translation eliminated 
pauses and other insignificant details.
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8.2  T e l e v is io n  H o u s e h o l d s  in  T a iw a n
This section is concerned with the formation of television households in Taiwan. It is 
built around informants' recollections of television's entry into the living rooms. This is 
important because audiences need to be understood in the contexts in which they watch 
television in terms of both meaning construction and daily routines. The domestic and 
cultural context of viewing is of critical importance in the sense that people watch 
television in their homes and each individual/family has a specific history. What I wish 
to present is a snapshot of some aspects of their personal/family biographies drawn from 
their own accounts of their media-focused life histories.
8.2.1 Watching Television at the Advent of the Television Service
Interviewing the parent generation, who are in their 40s and 50s, helps to reconstruct the 
reception context of the historical audience. Compared with the pervious generation, 
they are more adaptive to Taiwan's Mandarin-centred television service. Unlike the 
present generation, who were bom in a media-saturated environment, they have 
witnessed television's entry into their homes and have rich memories of early television 
in Taiwan. Their encounters with early television, as will be documented below, were 
similar to the experience of people in other countries (O'Sullivan, 1991; Spigel, 1990, 
1992).
The introduction of a television service gave rise to the historical emergence of 
television households in Taiwan. Yet, at the inception of the television service in 
Taiwan, watching television was more a communal than a family activity. Many of the 
parents witnessed the coming of television service in their own years of adolescence 
and/or childhood. Watching television in the early years of television was an experience 
described by them as parallel to cinema going. The advent of the television age also 
seemed to bring pleasure to all and prestige to some. One woman from a relatively rich 
background recalled their impressions of early television:
We had one of the first television sets in our neighbourhood. I remember it 
was a Hitachi television set. Made in Japan, you know. The television set 
was initially placed in the living room. Subsequently it was relocated high 
in the front area of the house because too many neighbours came for a look.
It was fascinating to watch television in a crowd. In this sense, watching 
television was somewhat like going to the cinema. Whenever television was
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on, people from the neighbourhood always assembled in my home. (F4: 
Mother, Hokkien, aged 46)
People who were from relatively poor backgrounds confirmed this communal character 
of the early television-viewing experience. Although the television service started in 
Taiwan in 1962, the majority of the informants did not own a television set in their 
homes at that time. Many parents from relatively poor backgrounds recalled that they 
had often watched televisions owned by their neighbours. For some of them, the 
decision to buy a television set of their own was motivated by such an experience:
Most people in the neighbourhood did not own a television set. Our landlord 
had one. His television set was always moved in and out of the house, 
treating neighbours to watching prime-time television serial dramas. (FI 1: 
Father, Hakka, aged 53; emphasis added)
It's exciting to watch television with so many people at one's neighbour's.
The children were jostling against one another for a better view while adults 
gathered to talk in front of the television. Very much like seeing a movie 
projected occasionally by a travelling exhibitor at the local evening market, 
you know, it was free  to all in the neighbourhood. (F8: Mother, Hakka, aged 
46)
I bought my first television set partially out of rage. Our eldest child, then 
under school age, enjoyed watching something such as cartoons or budaixi 
at a neighbour's house. However, he sometimes came back in tears because 
the neighbour's children bullied him by threatening not to let him watch.
(FI6: Father, Hokkien, aged 53)
8.2.2 Television’s Entry into the Living Rooms
Television's entry into the home not only accelerated the differentiation of domestic 
space but also brought a radical change to the organisation of domestic time. At the time 
of interviewing, the households were nearly all defended by burglar-proof doors and 
windows, and thus the inside was conspicuously segmented from the outside. As a 
result, the home was physically more separated than ever from the outside world. 
Modernity makes an ever-stronger distinction between the private and public spheres, 
but at the same time it allows an ever-closer link between the two through the media 
and television in particular.
In the early 1970s, when television sets could be purchased at more affordable cost, 
most of the parents interviewed witnessed television's entry into their living rooms. The
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presence of television in the households had implications for the organisation of time 
and space in the home. These trends coincided with a period of profound social change. 
The family was becoming sociologically nuclear; domestic space was becoming 
differentiated; family members increasingly spent discretionary time in familial leisure 
activities in front of a television set. In what follows, I retrace what it was like when the 
television medium historically entered into the ordinary homes in the early years of 
television broadcasting in Taiwan.
In the first years following the end of the Second World War only immigrant 
'Mainlander' families in Taiwan were nuclear families. Today, the nuclear family is the 
prominent family pattern in urban Taiwan. This prominence is the direct result of the 
industrialisation process that was initiated in the early 1960s and that accelerated in the 
1970s. Industrialisation brought a radical change to Taiwanese society. A plethora of 
factories in labour- intensive manufacturing industry sprang up in the cities and 
surrounding towns. Vacancies for paid jobs were becoming open to young people and 
women, and subsequently these groups constituted the main source of cheap labour that 
sustained manufacturing industry.6
Against this background, an army of migrant labourers began moving from the rural to 
the urban and industrialised areas.7 Urbanisation and industrialisation also gave rise to 
modem apartment buildings in Taiwan. The typical three- or four-room apartments were 
becoming commonly available in the urban areas.8 It is obvious that these apartments 
would not have been built had the number of nuclear families in Taiwan not been on the 
rise at that time. Many of the parents who were interviewed had participated in t in s  
movement of internal migration. They had come to, and later settled in, the area
6 Young people aged between 15 and 24 constituted half o f the labour force employed by manufacturing 
industry at the beginning o f the 1970s and women constituted 40 per cent in 1972 and the proportion was 
rising (Chen, 1992: 157-160).
7
It was estimated that in the early 1970s more than 1.5 million rural residents relocated themselves in this 
way (Chen, 1992: 139).
g
Before the typical three- or four-room apartments appeared, Taiwan's rural residents used to live in the 
'lineage villages' which were inhabited by villagers who nearly all bore the surname o f a single family 
(see also Cartier, 1996: 217). The residencies were crowded and the degree o f privacy was limited.
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surrounding Taipei some 20 to 30 years previously. They had moved out from their 
extended families in the rural areas and established nuclear families in Taipei.9
The majority of the 19 families interviewed had acquired television sets and other 
domestic appliances at the start of the 1970s. Most of them had bought a first television 
set (usually with a black-and-white picture) in the 1960s and early 1970s.10 Televisior. s 
entry into these families' homes coincided with a rapid differentiation of domestic space 
in which rooms for particular use were created. Since then, the modem division of 
domestic space has popularised, if not created, a functionally specific place known as 
the living room (or Ke ting in Chinese) in the Taiwanese home. For most of the 
interviewed families, the availability of the living room was closely intertwined with the 
appropriation of the television set. For some families, it is intriguing to note that the 
appropriation of a television set even preceded the availability of a living room and 
modem domestic furniture. Both the living room and the television set signified the 
insertion of modem life into the Taiwanese home.
We never had a living room before we moved into an apartment. At the 
beginning, we didn't even know what to do with it. I was tempted to do 
something to fill the space, anyway. So we bought in stuff, you know, such 
as the television set. (F2: Mother, Hakka, aged 49)
This experience, recalled by a mother of Hakka origin, was common to the parent 
generation interviewed. One further example from a Hokkien family (F I7) is given 
below:
Father (Hokkien, aged 50): Two other families and us lived together with 
our landlord. The space was so limited that my wife and I had to dine and 
rest in the same room. We didn't have a separate kitchen, let alone our own 
living room! We didn't have a place like home until we bought our first 
apartment several years later.
M other (Hokkien, aged 47): A place of our own. That's exactly what 
motivated us to work hard.
The interviewer: What was your first apartment like?
g
From 1960, immigrants from all comers o f the island moved to Taipei County. M ore than 60 per cent o f 
these internal immigrants were from outside the Taipei metropolitan area. In particular, Sanchong was the 
first o f  Taipei's satellite towns that was urbanised; it became one o f Taiwan's 20 most populous towns as 
early as 1958 (Zhang, 1996: 253-254).
10 It was estimated that by 1977, for the island as a whole, television had entered 88 per cent o f 
households. From 1979, colour television sets gained prominence over black-and-white sets. By 1972, 
about 80 per cent o f broadcast output concisted o f colour television programmes (Lee, Thomas 1987: 
256-257).
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Mother: Much smaller than this one. However, at that time we were quite 
satisfied. At the very least, we had a place of our own, just like many other 
families.
Father: And a comfortable living room, at least.
The interviewer: When did you own your first television set, then?
Mother: Believe it or not, we bought our first television set even earlier 
than our sofas. Actually, we couldn’t wait to buy one when we had our own 
apartment.
8.2.3 The Organisation of Domestic Space and Time
At the time of interviewing, the informants' air-conditioned homes were furnished whh 
a variety of audio-video appliances surrounding the television set. On the walls were the 
posters of popular idols from home and abroad. In the comers of the living rooms were 
assembled a good collection of videocassettes and music CDs from different countries. 
Within easy reach of everyone in the living room, bottles of imported wine and a coffee 
maker were commonly seen, as well as the tea set used specifically for indigenous 
Formosan tea. The fact that five of the 19 families had a Japanesque parlour also 
testified to the colonial cultural legacy in contemporary Taiwan. In short, their living 
rooms exhibited a hybrid culture, blending the global with the local, in all its myriad 
forms. In most cases, the traditional place for the practice of ancestor worship had 
disappeared from the domestic scene.
In the early 1970s, television was an emergent leisure technology for family viewing. 
Even though domestic time was relatively scarce for those employed in the factories, 
they managed to use the newly bought television sets:
Both of us worked in factories eight or nine hours a day in three shifts. More 
often than not, we did overtime to earn more money. ... When we did get 
together at home, we turned on the television and watched whatever was on.
You know, you've just got to watch it, otherwise the cost of the television 
set would be a waste. (FI9: Father, Hokkien, aged 52)
In the 1970s, a peculiar satellite family factory system, in which manual workers 
processed goods at home for central factories, emerged in Taiwan. Numerous 
households were incorporated into the overall picture of growth in Taiwan's export- 
oriented industry. Their living rooms were transformed into small production bases for 
large export manufacturers (Hsiung, 1996). In these circumstances, television was used 
by the audience to alleviate the hardship of life in an industrialising economy. However,
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there was a constant tension between the desire to watch television and the necessity to 
work, as a man of 'Mainlander' background recalled:
Our living room was once changed into a factory within which we 
processed goods for a large export manufactory. ... Radio or television was 
always turned on as it eases the laborious and boring working hours. ... But 
you could not watch television too attentively; after all, substantial work 
needed to be done at the end of the day. (FI: Father, 'Mainlander', aged 53)
8.2.4 Television, Modernity and Shared Memories
The informants were prone to call up memories of their early lives when asked to talk 
about their first encounters with television. They recalled rich experiences shared by 
their contemporaries, namely the transition to modernity that transformed the general 
living situation from poverty into wealth.11 One informant expressed an experience that 
was shared by many other informants under study:
We were once less affluent. For example, at that time, we could not afford 
apples, which were very expensive and all imported from abroad. ... My 
generation experienced Taiwan's transition from the times of scarcity to 
those of abundance. My children have no idea about the great hardships that 
we experienced, and perhaps none of them believes that these things ever 
happened. ... Television arrived just at about the same time as when making 
one's living in Taiwan was becoming easier. ... People began buying things, 
first a television set, then a refrigerator and then something else. Things 
unavailable and unimaginable to the earlier generation suddenly became 
things material to our life. We had to move with the times: we watched what 
others watched and lived a life as modem as others did. (FI3: Father, 
Hokkien, aged 48)
(1) National events televised
The experiences of the audience themselves at moments of national crisis, e.g. during 
mourning or celebration, stands as strong proof of this television-mediated modernity. 
In the case of Taiwan, the television medium was capable of conveying messages -  in 
the forms of signs, sound and images -  across the physical and language boundaries to 
the historically emergent 'television households'. In particular, when it was televised, a 
crisis situation in Taiwan became national in terms of both its reach and intelligibility.
11 Watching television was once a luxury for some viewers o f early television. The informants recalled 
that in the early years television sets had cost a fortune and therefore had to be used very carefully. For 
example, the 'doored' television set had to be closed after viewing, and when viewing, it was essential to 
switch channels as little as possible. There was even an awareness that television viewing might have to 
be limited in order to save electricity.
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Thus, television is influential in making historic events instantly witnessed, commonly 
experienced and strongly felt in moments of national (as well as global) crisis. Nothing 
is more illustrative of this than the impact of live broadcast 'media events' (Dayan and 
Katz, 1992). For example, the informants' memory landscape included the 1969 Little 
League World Series Final in which Taiwan won the first of its seventeen Little League 
World Series championships. The game was broadcast live and was the first ever 
national media event to enchant a very large audience:
Everyone stayed up watching the 1969 Little League World Series Final.
The newly established baseball team from Taiwan defeated its super 
American rival and became the world baseball champion for the first time.
This event mattered to us much more than the human landing on the moon 
around that time [in 1969]. People in front of television were excited. We 
were feeling on top of the world. Firecrackers were lit everywhere all the 
night through. I could never forget that night. (F10, Father, Hakka, aged 45)
This episode of 'victory over America and winning a world championship' was repeated 
nearly every year from 1969 to the 1980s. Williamsport (Pennsylvania, U.S.), where the 
Little League World Series was annually hosted, became a household place-name in 
Taiwan. To get there, Taiwan's baseball team had to defeat Guam, Japan and Korea in 
the qualifying contests in order to represent the Far Eastern region. All games were 
broadcast live to Taiwanese viewers. The Little League World Series served to ease the 
national frustrations caused by the worsening situation of diplomatic isolation. The 
national flag of the ROC was raised and the national anthem was played at these 
matches. When Taiwan won the world championship, national leaders (Chiang Kai- 
shek and Chiang Ching-kuo) sent the players congratulatory telegrams, and these were 
read out aloud and verbatim by sportscasters to the viewers. On their victorious return 
from the United States, the young baseball players were saluted by a crowd and the 
ROC (Taiwan) was hailed by the media as Bangqiu wangguo (literally, 'the baseball 
kingdom'). At the time of interviewing, the 1970s live broadcasts of the Little League 
World Series remained within the living memory of the parents. More importantly, this 
was a memory that was collectively shared and which arose from the common 
experiences of the populace at a particularly crucial historical conjuncture for Taiwan.
A number of critical events, perceived by the Taiwanese people as indicative of the 
dangers that lay ahead, encroached upon Taiwan psychologically in the 1970s: the 
expulsion of the ROC from the United Nations (1971), U.S. President Nixon's visit io
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Beijing and the bilateral Shanghai communique between Chima and the Umited States 
(1972), the oil crisis (1974), the death of Chiang Kai-shek (19^5), the Vietnam War and 
the fall of Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City). Then the U.S. recojniised the PRC„ terminated 
diplomatic relations with the ROC (Taiwan), and withdrew it:s military deployment on 
the island (1979-80). All these events had repercussions on Taiwan as a whiole. Among 
these events, the death of Chiang Kai-shek deserves particular -attention. Although today 
his reputation is a matter of contestation (largely in accordance with one’s ethnic 
background and political stance), he remains the one historic figure to whom many in 
the present feel connected. Undoubtedly, in the 1970s viewers* regardless o f  their ethnic 
background, mourned over his death. On the one hand, the informants’ recollections 
suggest that television had great power to frame this event. On the other hand, it is also 
clear from their reflexive oral accounts that people creatively interpreted this historic 
media event. One woman of 'Mainlander' origin recalled:
The funeral procession of Grandpa Chiang was broadcast live on television.
We mourned over his death and dressed in black. The death of Grandpa 
Chiang was particularly and unspeakably painful to my father. In effect, he 
lost his moorings and felt spiritually doomed because all his hope of 
returning to the homeland was gone with the death of Grandpa Chiang. (FI: 
Mother, ’Mainlander', aged 50)
Another woman (of Hokkien origin) reflected on her experience of weeping in front of 
the television.
I was weeping in front of a black-and-white television when his fumeral 
ceremony proceeded. ... Through the television screen, you saw mourners of 
all ranks. I couldn’t help bursting into tears, and indeed, weeping with the 
television. It's never been clear to me, though, whether I really cried over his 
death. I just felt that everyone else in Taiwan was crying. I couldn't help it 
really. ... I did not cry over Chiang Ching-kuo's death, anyway. (F10: 
Mother, Hokkien, aged 42)
Other informants described a similar experience but also drew attention to what might 
be called 'the sense of ontological insecurity' (see Chapter 2 for Giddensi's analysis 
discussion of this concept) which permeated Taiwan at that time:
When the news of Chiang Kai-shek's death was heard, all the tthree 
television channels interrupted colour television programmes for a few days.
Only sober, black-and-white images were broadcast; a sense of exceissive 
sadness and moumfulness pervaded the island. I wept, too. ... In retrosjpect, 
it was not much about Chiang's death in itself, but about us, our misforttune.
At that time, we felt like a child abandoned, you know, by everyone- the
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world [the UN], Americans, and Chiang Kai-shek himself. (F5: Father, 
'Mainlander', aged 45)
Every one mourned over the death of Chiang Kai-shek as if Taiwan were 
sinking without his leadership. Through all channels of the media, the 
government addressed the nation to unite together for the survival of the 
ROC in the spirit of immortal Grandpa Chiang. ... Seventies Taiwan was 
very different from Taiwan today. You wore a mourning band somehow or 
other. Schoolchildren were organised to pay their last respects around 
Chiang's coffin, weren't you? ... His remains were permanently preserved [in 
special chemicals] as if he was still alive with us. So was Chiang Ching-kuo.
They had their remains preserved in the hope of being buried one day in the 
mainland, but recovering the mainland was a lost cause. (F I7: Father, 
Hokkien, aged 50)
(2) Memories o f  television serial dramas
In addition to the historic media event, since the early 1970s national television in 
Taiwan has offered a great number of television serial dramas with predictable 
regularity. As noted by many scholars (Ma, 1995; Martin-Barbero, 1995), the broadly 
defined 'television dramas' have played a complementary role in moulding collective 
memories and binding the nation together.
As indicated in the interviews, decades of day-to-day encounters with television serial 
dramas have given substance to the collective memories of the viewers, especially the 
parent generation under study. For example, television serial dramas such as Han liu 
(TTV, CTV, CTS, April 1979), Bao qing tian (CTS, April 1974) and Bao biao (CTS, 
October 1974) were commonly remembered by the parents.
Among the previous prime-time television serial dramas recalled by the informants, 
Han Liu is particularly worthy of note. It was produced by CMPC (who also produced 
the 1976 film Victory and many other Policy Films) and co-broadcast by all the three 
television channels in the same time slot. The series dramatised the Communist tyranny 
on the mainland since 1949. Its widespread appeal among viewers deepened their fear 
and distrust of the Communist regime against the backdrop of the United States' de­
recognition of Taiwan and the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's call for a dialogue 
between China and Taiwan on the subject of reunification. Virtually all the parents 
under study recalled that the serial drama had strengthened their determination to fight 
to the death should the Communists invade Taiwan. They also recalled that they had
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voluntarily donated money for the cause of buying warships and fighter jets, and that 
they had felt at that time that any talks with the Chinese Communists would be yu hu 
mou pi (literally, 'negotiation with a tiger for the tiger's skin' [meaning 'naive and 
dangerous']). The remnants of this mistrust of the Communist regime were still apparent 
among the respondent families at the time of interviewing, even among those who were 
in favour of eventual re-unification with the mainland (and among those who were more 
willing than ever to have stronger ties with the Chinese mainland).
8.3  V a r ie t ie s  o f  C u r r e n t  V ie w in g  E x p e r ie n c e s
I now turn to the current viewing experiences of the interviewed families, structured by 
time and programme genres. The analysis begins with a section on the activities of 
family Viewing, focusing on the aspects of when family viewers collectively watch 
television and what they watch. It is then followed by an inquiry into the solo viewing 
experiences of individual family members.
8.3.1 Fam ily V iew ing
The activity of watching television was identified by all the informants as something 
they did whenever they had spare time. However, freedom to watch television was first 
of all constrained by the extent to which they could release themselves from other 
activities. The time factor varied from person to person. The most convenient time for 
family members to watch television together was at prime time and/or at weekends. At 
other times, watching television was not a family activity. In general, the largest 
television set of the family remained in the living room. Families possessing additional 
television sets tended to place the additional television sets in the children's rooms, 
particularly if the younger generation had started to go to work or had enrolled in 
colleges.
12 Morley rejects the individual-centred approach altogether and argues that 'the basic unit o f 
consumption o f  television' is the family/household rather than the individual viewer (Morley, 1992: 139). 
But he admits that, in an actual study, this involves an analysis o f the individuals who make up the unit 
(Morley, 1992: 4).
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When they did get together around the television set, what they watched at weekends 
differed significantly from what they watched on weekdays. At weekends, when they 
were released from work and school, they tended to watch television until late in the 
evening in order to view 'variety shows' (which combined a game show, pop music, and 
comedy) and/or films on television or video. Among the variety shows, the most 
popular were produced and broadcast by the terrestrial channels. Mandarin-speaking 
films (of which a large part were produced in Hong Kong and Taiwan) constituted 
approximately half of their shared film viewing in their homes, with English-speaking 
films (which were mainly American productions) constituting the other half.
On weekdays, the families also tended to gather around the television in the living room 
between 8 p.m. and 10 p.m. The family members who were at home would watch 
television together after their meal. The absent member(s) later joined in to watch 
television when they returned home. The television set had already been switched on 
and other family members were in place. The absent person(s), being 'late' in the first 
place, normally watched the programme which the other members of the family were 
already watching. In other words, he or she (or they) did not actively choose what to 
view but simply sat down with the other family members who were settled in front of 
the television.
The interviews revealed that the family member mostly likely to be late in starting to 
watch television was the head of the family. Thus fathers and husbands were most likely 
to watch what other family members were already viewing. Some fathers/husbands 
reported that it did not really matter to them what they were watching, since they just 
needed to rest for a while and be with their families. This conformity was also a 
reflection of the fact that the most popular television genre (prime-time television serial 
drama) was shown between 8 p.m. and 9 p.m. Because these dramas had continuing 
story lines, it seemed inappropriate for fathers and husbands to suggest switching the 
television to another channel. Normally the genre's most attentive viewers -  mothe/s 
and wives — would supply the returning fathers/husbands with updated plots and details 
of new characters so that they (the fathers and husbands) could easily get themselves 
involved in what other family members were already enjoying. Interestingly, the fathers 
and husbands claimed that they did not particularly enjoy the serial dramas and insisted 
that they were not attentive viewers.
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This appears to differ from the generalised finding of many previous studies, that in the 
domestic viewing context, father and husbands are more dominating, uninterrupted and 
attentive viewers (Morley, 1986). The present research suggests that for the fathers and 
husbands who were interviewed, co-viewing with family members was meaningful in 
its own right. The act of viewing, as a social activity in the home, mattered much more 
than the pleasure generated by the programmes. The male adults, as both fathers and 
husbands in their families, gained great pleasure from this passive act of viewing. They 
considered their conformative co-viewing with wives and children to be a befitting 
characteristic of being husbands and fathers. This perhaps corresponds to Confucian 
paternalism: being 'the ruler of virtue' in the home. I will illustrate this point by quoting 
some excerpts from what husbands and fathers said in front other family members 
(wives and children) in the course of the interviews:
The prime-time serial drama seldom fascinates me. It only works for her 
[the man's wife]. She can even weep over the deaths or sufferings of the 
characters, who are not real to me; I never could. What I can do is to be with 
her, comfort her, and make her feel it's not the end of the world. (F I7: 
Father, Hokkien, aged 50)
I'm not the authoritative kind of man. I let them watch what they like. If I 
ask them to switch to other channels, they will kill me! ... After all, they 
know when my [favourite] programmes will be on. (F3: Father, 'Mainlander', 
aged 47; emphasis added)
This pattern of conformist viewing by fathers did not seem to be salient for youi g 
people. From time to time, youngsters were the ones who came home late for family 
viewing, but they did not behave in the same way as their fathers. They did not stay 
long in front of the television if they did really like the programme. They excused 
themselves from family viewing by pretending to do homework, or they just sneaked 
into their own rooms. About half of the young people interviewed had a television set of 
their own or shared one with siblings in their own rooms. When they found themselves 
in conflict with the viewing choices of other family members, it was not unusual for 
them to just stop watching or to go their own rooms and watched their preferred 
programmes instead.
In addition to the variety shows, films on television and/or on video at weekends, ar d 
prime-time television serial dramas between 8 and 9 p.m., the interviewees tended to 
co-watch television news, current affairs, and discussion programmes, particularly when
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an important event occurred. Taiwan is a changing society in which individuals feel 
obliged to keep themselves up to date and to respond to the changes that are occurring. 
Young people in the transitional time of life between adolescence and adulthood are 
becoming more politically concerned about society as a whole. They thus maintain 
some of their previous viewing habits while becoming interested in other television 
programmes. In the viewing time available to them, they show a strong interest in 
informational programmes. They still watch what they used to watch when they were 
younger (e.g. cartoons, children's television, etc.), but they watch considerably more 
news, current affairs and discussion programmes. In co-viewing these programmes with 
their parents and/or siblings, young people not only feel more closely related to the 
society that they previously did not care very much about, but also comprehend better 
their parents' stances on major social issues. Most importantly, young people now find 
that their own voices are heard in their homes on serious issues, and parents are less 
dominant. It seems that once a shift occurs in the parent-children relationship at this 
stage in the family cycle, parents are surprised by their children's ability to express more 
mature opinions. Some forms of inter-generational political education actually take 
place reciprocally between parents and children, mostly in the talk generated by family 
television viewing, rather than by parents dominating their children's opinions.
One mother talked with delight about this shift in her children:
With the passage of time, Taiwan is now really different from the Taiwan in 
which we grew up. ... Our parents told us not to get involved in politics, not 
even to talk about politics. We were taught [by the parents] to have ears but 
not mouths. They [the parents] were simply scared. ... Nowadays, children 
are really articulate. You know, sometimes he [the woman's son], stimulated 
by television news, really speaks like a college student. His knowledge 
about current affairs has overtaken us! I've got to be attentive to the news 
events so as to make sense of how reasonable his opinions are. (F9: Mother, 
Hokkien, aged 50)
The young people who were interviewed, for their part, also enjoyed sharing their 
opinions on social issues with their parents, as this indicated that their parents accepted 
them as independent individuals, and also served as an acid test for their opinions before 
they were expressed in public outside the home. As they gained more specialised 
knowledge in their work and/or in college, young people also took delight in exchanges 
of opinion with their parents. They were in a better position to converse with their 
parents when the latter seemed more tolerant of, and open to, what they said. Through
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such subtleties in the shifting power relations between generations, the participants 
negotiated positions towards a variety of issues in the public sphere within the locales of 
their homes. This is a form of reciprocal political education between the parents and the 
young generation. One young interviewee recalled how his opinion contributed to his 
parents’ voting choice in the county mayoral election held in 1997:
They used to support the DPP in the county mayoral election. When the 
DPP candidate [named You Qing] for the first time defeated Li Xi-kun of 
the KMT and got elected, they were excited. But they felt disappointed at 
You's government of late and decided not to vote in the recent election.
They simply felt disenchanted with the DPP. ... I watched discussion 
programmes on the issue of the electricity shortage with them. I told them if 
the DPP candidate Su Zheng-chang lost the county mayoral election, the 
KMT’s mayoral candidate would certainly be worse, and the KMT would 
certainly re-start the abortive project of the new nuclear power plant. You 
know, we had two nuclear power plants that had already been built in Taipei 
County. My brother was with me on that matter. ... I urged them [the 
parents] to vote for Su Zheng-chang by saying I would do so if I had the 
right to vote. They did listen to me and went to vote for Su Zheng-chang at 
last. (F I9: Daughter, Hokkien, aged 19)
Similar instances indicated that family viewing served as an important channel for the 
exchange of ideas between family members and enabled them to negotiate the meaning 
of citizenship. This kind of television-related (or television-induced) talk aL o 
functioned as an intermediate arena through which they engaged (or rehearsed their 
engagement) in the public sphere by means of conversation with their next of kin in the 
private sphere behind closed doors. Thus, researchers have argued that television has the 
potential for forging a link between the private sphere and the public sphere (Jensen, 
1990; Morley, 1990). The interviews show that, on the one hand, television provided the 
needed stimulus for talk among members of the family, thereby overcoming the 
occasional uncomfortable state of silence. On the other hand, television co-viewing with 
family members also had moral implications. The exchanges of opinion on a particular 
television serial drama set the boundary of what moral values or points of view the 
family itself upheld. This confirms Lull's argument: 'A felling of family solidarity is 
sometimes achieved through television-induced laughter, sorrow, anger, or intellectual 
stimulation' (Lull, 1990: 39).
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8.3.2 Solo Viewing
The activity of watching television does not always involve all the family members. 
Sometimes one family member is the sole viewer. Among the informants, housewives 
and young people were the persons who were most likely to have experience in solo 
viewing.
Full-time housewives (seven in 19 interviewed households) normally watched television 
alone in the daytime. They preferred the morning edition of television news because of 
its human interest and soft appeal together with the more 'useful' information related to 
bargain shopping and practical tips on homemaking. In the afternoons they also watched 
the re-runs of serial dramas that had originally been shown in the prime-time schedules. 
They did so either to see some sequences that they had previously missed or to watch 
serial dramas they had not actually seen before.
As for the young people, they showed great interest in a variety of programmes made in 
Taiwan and abroad. They tended to watch alone late in the evening when their parents 
were asleep. Between about 11 p.m. and 1 a.m. cable television channels were full of 
American films or Japanese serials which had the power to arouse interest among young 
people. They also managed to find time to watch television after school or on the days 
when they had no school. Those who had just been released from the pressure of getting 
a place at college were able to spare more time to watch television. Moreover, for those 
who were just becoming adults, their use of their time was subject to less regulation by 
their parents. In this phase, they were also more curious about other cultures, especially 
those of Japan and the United States. This led to shifts in their viewing preferences: they 
generally became more interested in watching foreign programmes via cable.
Young people were also interested in learning foreign languages (in particular, English 
and Japanese), since Taiwan was now more eager than ever to embrace globalisation 
and its historical dependence upon the United States and Japan. Also, Taiwan's urgent 
need to upgrade from labour-intensive to skill-intensive hi-tech manufacturing, coupled 
with its heavy reliance upon foreign trade, also presumed that benefits would be gained 
by learning 'the language(s) of advantage'. Accordingly, parents saw no particular 
reason to regulate young people's viewing of foreign programmes. The only regulatory 
intervention by parents was to urge their children to record programmes for viewing at a
183
later time. For young viewers who had television sets in their own rooms, the freedom 
to view television was even greater.
They spent much time enjoying Japanese television dramas and also manga (comics) 
translated from Japanese and 'J-Pop' (Japanese pop music), which were bought to f  11 
personal collections.13 These popular products were easily accessible via the channels of 
cable/satellite systems, exchanges between peers, or video rental shops. 14 They 
frequently watched Japanese television dramas such as Tokyo Love Story and Terms fo r  
a Witch. These were in urban settings and lasted for about 10 or more episodes, with the 
central plot of modem romance between good-looking male and female characters. 
These television dramas were also readily available on video from the local rental shops.
In addition to Japanese pop culture, these young viewers also showed greater interest in 
foreign films, especially those from America. At the same time, however, their interest 
in various forms of local culture was also aroused. Popular music in the Taiwanese 
languages (predominantly, Hokkien) began to gain more recognition from cultural elites. 
Popular singers such as Wu Bai had many fans among young people, particularly their 
albums sung in Hokkien. The local puppet drama, budaixi, a blend of traditional 
performance and modem audio-video production technology, had numerous fans among 
all generations of the Taiwanese people.15 Some of the interviewed young people were 
themselves fans of the local pop music or the budaixi, or both. They possessed 
impressive collections of local music on CDs and also the puppets of the budaixi.
8 .4  N o t  Y e t  A  F r a g m e n t e d  A u d ie n c e
It is commonplace to say that media audiences have become more segmented and 
fragmented than ever as a result of the proliferation of television channels and othjr
13 However, most o f  the young informants did not see themselves as belonging to the so-called hazitsu, 
meaning 'a tribe who ape everything Japanese from the latest hairstyles to the cut o f  their trousers' ( The 
Economist, 20 July 2000: 68).
14 For fear o f  offending China, Japan has not signed bilateral copyright protection agreements with 
Taiwan. This has helped to create a huge black market for Japanese popular culture in Taiwan.
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leisure technologies. Segmentation is related to the fact that there is ’greater 
specialisation in media offerings' and there are 'greater opportunities to choose specific 
types of content from the many new distributors' (McQuail, 1997: 133). Fragmentation 
increases as audiences' discretionary time becomes more dispersed over various media 
sources. Yet the process of audience segmentation and fragmentation might be less 
dramatic than is usually supposed. McQuail cautions us that 'one should not 
underestimate the continuing collective and socially patterned character of "individual" 
consumption' (McQuail, 1997: 133), since 'the fragmentation and dispersal of audiences 
has so far only gone a limited way' (McQuail, 1997: 137).
Since 1990, the penetration rate of cable television in Taiwan has risen dramatically 
from 16.1 per cent in 1990 to 79.3 per cent in 1996 (Liu, 1997: 55). The number of 
commercial satellite channels available to Taiwan has increased to 219. Together with 
the five broadcast channels (inclusive of one public service television channel, the PTS), 
these cable and satellite services mean that most viewers, depending on the area in 
which they live, have some 60 to 80 channels to choose from. The spread of cable 
television in Taiwan has attracted the audience away from the main television networks, 
as can be seen from the ratings for individual programmes.16 At first sight, all the above 
evidence suggests the existence of a segmented and fragmented audience in Taiwan. 
However, as I shall seek to show, this trend has not deprived the television media of a 
large and engaged audience on a national scale.
First, in terms of audience share rather than ratings, Taiwan's terrestrial television 
channels remain in a stronger position than most cable/satellite channels. They have 
retained much of their traditional advantage regardless of the growing competition from 
non-terrestrial channels. By June 1997, the three old terrestrial television channels still 
had more than half of the audience share. Since the mid-1990s, the rapid growth of 
cable television vis-a-vis terrestrial television (in terms of audience share) seems to have 
slowed down. The market share for the three old terrestrial channels dropped sharply
15 Budaixi was originally suppressed by terrestrial television because its performance was in H okkim  
rather than Mandarin. In recent years, budaixi has not only launched a specialised satellite television 
channel (Pili Satellite Television) for transmission to home viewers via cable, but has also made the first 
puppet film, Sheng Shi Chuan Shuo (The Legend o f  the Sacred Stone). Its popularity confirms the 
growing appeal o f a revived local culture.
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from 64 per cent in 1994 to 55 per cent in 1995 (Liu, 1997: 131) but then stabilised at 
51 per cent in 1996 and 52 per cent in 1997. 17
Secondly, each respondent in the present study normally watched a handful of television 
channels on a daily basis, and as a family they had regular access to a limited channel
IO
repertoire. That is to say, some channels to which they were frequently exposed 
tended to overlap. The most frequently watched television channels by the viewing 
families under study consisted of both terrestrial and non-terrestrial channels. The most 
commonly viewed channels are listed in Table 8-2. All these channels except for HBO 
are general interest and/or news and current affairs channels, addressing a national 
rather than special interest audience. Certainly, some other channels catering for special 
interests were watched frequently by individual viewers within a family, as shown 
below in the last section, on personal viewing. But, it is clear from the interviews that 
the terrestrial television channels retained their central place on viewers' commonly 
shared channel repertoire. In view of this shared television experience within and across 
the family boundary, and also the time spent in sharing television as demonstrated in the 
earlier discussion on family-centred viewing, viewers can be considered neither 
genuinely segmented nor fragmented.
Thirdly, the sheer explosion of television channels in the Taiwanese case should not be 
equated with the diversification of television programme formats. Among the channels 
distributed via cable there are at least five around-the-clock Mandarin-speaking news 
channels which are exclusively devoted to news and current affairs programmes. But 
the news output of these channels is homogeneous both vertically (within a single
16 A recent ratings survey by AC Nielson Taiwan indicated that the prime-time terrestrial television had 
decline in popularity: from a combined ratings figure o f more than 80 per cent in the 1980s to 21.98 per 
cent o f late {The China Times Evening, 28 June 2000).
17A similar trend can be seen elsewhere. For instance, in the case o f the United States, as McQuail points 
out, 'the spread o f cable ate rapidly and heavily into the audience share o f the three main television 
networks, but this process halted and stabilised in 1993' (McQuail, 1997: 145). Equally, a long-term, large 
scale and empirical study o f British audiences does not support the idea o f the 'fragmentary audience' 
(Gauntlett and Hill, 1999: 288-289).
18 This largely confirms the findings generated by recent surveys o f viewing behaviours. One study found 
that a Taiwanese viewer who had access to both terrestrial and non-terrestrial television channels 
normally watched less than seven television channels on a daily basis (Zhong, 1996). Two other surveys 
found that more than 80 per cent o f viewers frequently watched less than 10 television channels (see Liu, 
1997:318).
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channel) and horizontally (across all the channels). The multiplication of news channtis 
has not expanded the heterogeneity of programme content. This is also the case with 
other particularistic television channels and with the generalist channels.
Table 8.2: Channels most frequently watched together by family members
Channels Main broadcast 
languages
Signal
transmission
Programming
types
TTV Mandarin Terrestrial General
FTV Hokkien and Mandarin Terrestrial General
CTS Mandarin Terrestrial General
CTV Mandarin Terrestrial General
TVBS Mandarin Satellite via cable General
TVBS-N Mandarin Satellite via cable News
HBO English (subtitled in 
Mandarin Chinese)
Satellite via cable Films
STAR TV Mandarin Satellite via cable General
FTV Satellite Hokkien and Mandarin Satellite via cable News
CTN Mandarin Satellite via cable News
Fourthly, although there has been an increase in foreign programmes available to 
Taiwanese audiences, these are watched very selectively. In the early 1990s, among 
channels delivered over the cable systems, 30 per cent came from abroad. About 60 per 
cent of the other cable channels, although based in Taiwan, generally did not produce 
their own programmes but relied mainly on programmes purchased from foreign 
programme providers. Only 40 per cent of Taiwan-based cable/satellite channels 
produced programmes for their own output (Liu, 1997: 138-147). A significant 
proportion of these self-produced programmes were low-cost discussion programmes on 
issues of the day or talk shows using the phone-in format.
Access to foreign television programmes via the widely circulated cable systems is easy, 
but the viewers under study watched them rather selectively. For example, channels 
featuring foreign films were watched more frequently than foreign news channels. 
Programmes dubbed and/or subtitled in Mandarin Chinese were more likely to be
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watched than those without dubbing or subtitles.19 Language thus remains a barrier that 
is hard to cross for Taiwanese audiences. Even for a group of professionals under study, 
news bulletins broadcast by foreign channels like CNN did not fare well. They watched 
CNN only when something vitally important and/or relevant to Taiwan occurred. As 
one of the professionals among the family viewers explained, 'I don’t remember exact’y 
when I last watched CNN. Yes, I did when the disastrous earthquake hit Taiwan a 
month ago’ (F I5: Mother, Hakka, aged 44). Another professional who worked in Taipei 
City reported that he watched CNN occasionally when national elections were held or 
cross-Strait tension arose in order to find out 'how the outside world are seeing us1 (F2: 
Father, 'Mainlander', aged 54).
Foreign news channels cannot compete effectively with domestic news channels on a 
day-to-day basis. Terrestrial television has secured itself a niche market, particularly in 
the area of television fictions and variety shows. Three popular Hong Kong-based 
satellite television channels (STAR TV Mandarin Channel, TVBS, and CTN) are cases 
in point. Some years ago, all of them radically localised themselves to cater for local 
audiences and secure their popularity in Taiwan. This strategy seems to have been 
successful, because most viewers under study were unaware that the channels were not 
Taiwan-based and did not see any differences between these 'foreign' channels and 
Taiwan-based channels.
Last but not least, the characteristics of cultural identities -- such as indigenous tastes 
and cultural proximity — are very important, particularly in relation to viewers' 
reception of home-made and imported television dramas. These factors have sustained 
the popularity of domestic soaps and offer an explanation of why television dramas 
imported from Hong Kong, Japan, China and even Korea generally enjoy greater 
popularity in Taiwan than those from the West. Moreover, the 'television ecology' 
(Cunningham and Jacka, 1996: 23-24) within which foreign programmes are aired and 
then viewed is just as important as cultural identity. Thus, according to the parents 
under study, the American soaps like I  Love Lucy enjoyed great popularity in the late
19 However, language is not the only barrier facing 'foreign' broadcasters who seek to attract Taiwanese 
viewers. A  notable example is China's state-owned China Central Television (CCTV). Though CCTV's 
overseas service (CCTV-4) offers programming primarily in Mandarin and is legally accessible to the 
majority o f  Taiwan's television households, all o f the informants stated that seldom watch it as they found 
its newscasts 'propagandists' and its entertainment programming 'dull' compared to other television 
channels available to them.
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1960s, when Taiwan had not yet developed its own drama tradition and offered only a 
single channel. But in the early 1970s, when a nascent multi-channel television system 
came into existence, the American series/soaps lost momentum. (On the dominance of 
domestic programming on Taiwan’s television since the late 1960s and early 1970s, see 
Chapter 6). The ever-intensifying multiplication of television channels in recent years 
has (thanks to the penetration of cable/satellite television into Taiwanese homes) 
brought an increasing number of foreign programmes to Taiwanese audiences. But, 
paradoxically, foreign programmes like American series/soaps have never regained their 
former popularity in Taiwan. The viewers now have a plethora of domestic and/or 
imported series/soaps from neighbouring countries (such as Japan and South Korea) and 
they prefer these to the America programmes.
We therefore have a great deal of evidence to show that there have been limits to the 
fragmentation and segmentation of the television audience in Taiwan. The terrestrial 
television channels remain robust. Viewers continue to share a limited channel 
repertoire, in which national and generalist television channels remain prominent in 
viewers' day-to-day viewing activities. Four terrestrial channels -  even if PTS (the 
newly established and only public service channel in Taiwan) is excluded -  still hold an 
audience share as big as that as the cable/satellite channels. Foreign (as well as global) 
television channels only fare well when they meet the demands of the local audience.
On balance, the newly proliferated television channels have given viewers new horizons 
insofar as they have brought an expanded television experience unparalleled by those 
that were afford by early television. Yet we should not exaggerate the extent of 
audience segmentation and fragmentation: watching television remains a predominantly 
collective activity, shared by viewers within and beyond the instantaneous, domestic 
contexts. Terrestrial television remains 'national' in terms of programme provision and 
programme demand. The cable channels that are watched most frequently by a large 
audience are those with a generalist appeal. Television channels beamed from outside 
Taiwan have sought popularity by adopting a variety of localisation strategies that 
involve reducing their 'foreignness' to local viewers (e.g. STAR TV Mandarin Channel, 
CTN, TVBS) -  for example by dubbing/subtitling programmes in the local languages or 
Mandarin Chinese. Thus, as two Australian researchers point out, 'television has always 
been and remains primarily a domestic medium. [...] Television remains a gloriously
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hybrid medium, with a plethora of programming of an inescapable and essentially local, 
untranslatable nature' (Cunningham and Jacka, 1996: 12).
8 .5  C o n c l u s io n
This chapter has argued for the place of television since the early 1970s in the formation 
and sharing of Taiwan's (symbolic and mediated) national life for viewers dispersed in 
all comers of the island. As I have shown, the arrival of television exposed viewers to, 
and connected them with, the public realm and the world at large. By making this 
private-public connection, the television medium brings viewers into contact with 
worlds that are both near and remote (in time and in space) (see Silverstone, 1999b: 93). 
In this way, television has helped to bind space and compress time. It has created family 
viewers and viewing families by entering into domestic living rooms and penetrating 
people's daily routines. Most importantly, television introduced a sense of cultural 
modernity to Taiwanese audiences. The appropriation of national identity and viewers' 
fusion with modem society at large mn parallel to the collective television experience. 
This socially shared viewing experience, particularly at moments of national crisis, 
celebration and mourning, has become deeply rooted in viewers' collective memories. It 
has become a part of their own personal biographies and intimate social interactions 
within and across the family boundaries. Moreover, as part of the national cultural space, 
television has helped to shape a knowable and communicable community among the 
Taiwanese people, who were previously divided by ethnic difference and the lack of a 
common language.
Despite the evident radical change in Taiwan's television landscape, I have argued in 
this chapter that television remains a domestic (in both senses of the word) medium, and 
that a segmented and fragmented audience has not yet superseded a national and 
engaged audience. Through occasions of family-centred viewing and talks invoked by 
such viewing, viewers still negotiate their multiple identities on the basis of a variety of 
actors such as ethnicity, gender and generation. On the one hand, television regulates 
and circulates public knowledge about the present and the past of the society to which 
viewers belong. On the other hand, television provides the audience with a common 
reservoir of popular culture in which television fictions -  that are often emotionally 
invested and tell stories in the serial form -  have a conspicuous presence. This fusion of
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public knowledge and popular culture for the purpose of national consumption not only 
sustains but also constantly reconfigures the sense of an imagined national community.
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9
Audience Reception and 
Mediated Nationhood
Having detailed the viewing families’ past and present experiences with television in 
the preceding chapter, this chapter explores the audience’s reception of mediated 
nationhood, especially as revealed in the ways in which the informants interpreted the 
nationalist texts of the two films (see the textual analysis in Chapter 7). This is followed 
by an analysis of the audience’s multiple sense of nationhood with reference to what I 
shall call ’Taiwan-centred identity’, an identity which encompasses hybrid modes of 
identification yet centres on Taiwan itself. The cultural context in which the informants 
have come to appropriate this identity can be explained by means of the concept of 
’time-place sensibilities'. I use this term to refer to an ensemble of feelings that is 
structured along the lines of time and place and is in itself socially structured and 
culturally mediated.
The analysis presented in this chapter is informed by the two waves of interviews with 
the same 19 families. The results of the analysis support the following arguments. Wi h 
respect to the audience's interpretations of the two particular films, viewers are 
constrained as well as empowered by the texts. This is manifested in, on the one hand, 
their shared sense-makings of the texts on the level of denotative meanings, and on the 
other hand in their various interpretations of the texts. Viewers not only employed 
interpretative frames from a myriad of textual and extra-textual resources but also took 
a middle course when these interpretative frames were at variance with one another. A 
related argument is that social positional factors such as ethnic background, age and 
gender differences contribute in varying degrees to the constitution of the primary 
interpretative frames that are adopted by the audience to decode the media texts. In 
particular, the viewers’ interpretations of the films in question are affected (but not 
determined) by the social positional factors they occupy, as is most evident in the case 
of those who have a clear sense of ethnic identity. Furthermore, although there were
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significant variations in the viewers' perceptions of nationhood, a predominant thread 
can be found in their sense of 'Taiwan-centred identity', a concept which helps to 
illustrate the ways in which they appropriated the sense of national identity along the 
'continuum of hybridities' (Pieterse, 1995: 56). As will be shown in this chapter, most 
informants identified to varying extents with both Taiwan and China as their 
'homelands' but invested each with different meanings. To understand this peculiar form 
of hybrid identity, I will further explore this double consciousness in relation to the 
'time-place sensibilities'.
9.1 V ie w e r s ’ In t e r p r e t a t io n s  o f  t h e  F il m s
In the course of the second wave of interviews undertaken between September and 
November 1999, the opening sequences of the two films (i.e. the 1976 film Victory and 
the 1989 film City o f  Sadness) were shown to the informants with two aims: first, o 
stimulate discussion among the viewers; and secondly, to trigger their memories of the 
events in the historical fictions and the 'real' world (and also to stimulate their 
expectations of the story-lines of the films, because I did not show them the films in 
full). After showing the two films, the informants were asked to recall and reconstruct 
the central plots for each film as a whole,1 but questions were carefully framed to reduce 
their instinctive feeling that this was a memory test. For example, informants were 
asked: 'How will you talk about the film to an absent friend/family member?' and 'How 
will you tell an absent friend/family member what the film is about?'
I have found that, despite differences in their evaluations of the films, individuals who 
occupied different social positions told similar stories. The film Victory was describ; d 
by those who had viewed the film in an earlier period as a film about Taiwan's return to 
China following the defeat of Japan in the Second World War, and the film City o f  
Sadness was described as a film about the victimisation of the Taiwanese people during 
the transition of power from the Japanese to the KMT. For example:
It [ Victory] is about people across the Strait fighting against their common
enemy, the Japanese invaders. Ke Junxiong [the real name of the actor who
1 In the field o f media studies, scholars have employed similar techniques, asking interviewees to retell 
the stories they originally received from the media in order to examine what meanings had been received 
and constructed by the viewers (e.g. Kitzinger, 1993; Liebes, 1988; Livingstone, 1991; Philo, 1990).
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played Lin Juyong in the film] sacrifices himself to free Taiwan from 
Japanese colonial rule. Taiwan is then restored to become part of the ROC 
[Republic of China] again. (F7: Father of Hakka origin, aged 47)
[Victory is] about China's eight-year resistance against Japanese invasion 
when Taiwan was under Japanese colonial rule. Some native Taiwanese and 
millions of Chinese were sacrificed to end Taiwan's status as a Japanese 
colony. (F4: Father of'Mainlander' origin, aged 51)
It [City o f Sadness] is about the February 28 Incident. In the midst of the 
Incident, thousands of native Taiwanese who defied the KMT were killed 
and the Taiwanese took revenge on some Mainlanders too. You know, at the 
time when Taiwan was returned [in 1945] to the ROC, there were many 
misunderstandings between the KMT and the native Taiwanese. (FI: 
Mother of'Mainlander' origin, aged 50)
It [City o f Sadness] is about the lack of trust between the KMT and the 
Taiwanese people. The Taiwanese demanded democracy and better 
administration but the KMT responded by ruthless suppression. Of course, 
during the February 28 Incident, not just the native Taiwanese but most 
people [including the 'Mainlanders'] suffered. (FI5: Father of 'Hokkien' 
origin, aged 47)
As indicated above, with regard to the retellings of stories in both films, there is r  >t 
much difference between people of different ethnic origins (cf. Liebes and Katz, 1990). 
The consensus over denotative textual meanings is widely shared between those 
interviewed. This confirms the view that narrative structure and other textual properties 
not only exist but also structure audience comprehension (Condit, 1989; Radway, 1988). 
However, in matters of interpretation differences do arise. In this respect, Livingstone 
makes a useful distinction between comprehension and interpretation (Livingstone, 
1998: 174-184). This indicates that the text (with its textual properties and narrative 
structure) has the power to suggest what is to be read at the denotative level; but the 
reader also has power, by using textual and extra-textual resources, to interpret the text 
in various ways at the connotative level.
While acknowledging that the audience interpret the media text in various ways, I wish 
to stress here, on the basis of the above findings, that the text still has power. This 
power is not determinate in the sense that it inscribes a single dominant ideology, but 
rather it sets limits on the range of potentially indeterminate audience interpretations.
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The analysis offered in this section echoes Nicholas Gamham, who advocates using the 
term ’determination' in the ’soft’ sense:
... I here use the word determination in the ’soft' sense used by Raymond 
Williams ..., not as fixing a simple causal relationship, but as a setting of 
limits. It does not predetermine human action in any unilateral sense, but it 
does make some course of action more likely than others, if only because it 
makes some more difficult than others, and also acknowledges that there are, 
at any one time, certain absolute, often material, limits to the range of 
human action. Determination also implies that humans learn from their 
historical experiences in ways which create habits and thus inertia, and in 
ways which provides warnings against certain course of action and thus 
make such actions less likely in the future. (Gamham, 1990: 6)
The interplay between text and reader thus opens up a discursive space in which the 
meanings generated are located between the determinacy of textual closure and the 
indeterminacy of audiences' diverse interpretations.
Further questions raised in this chapter are as follows: To what extent and in what sense 
are viewers constructive or receptive? Is it typical or unusual for a viewer flexibly or 
even contradictorily to interpret a text by drawing from a variety of textual and extra- 
textual resources? How plausible is it to suggest that viewers share a certain degree of 
consensual interpretation despite all their divergent readings? Equally important is 
whether viewers' interpretations of a given text have evolved as the historical context 
(external to the viewer and the text) has changed. In what follows I will address these 
issues in turn by referring to the viewers' actual verbal accounts concerning the two 
films in question.
9.1.1 A Constructive and Receptive Audience
In this section I argue that viewers are both constmctive and receptive in relation to the 
two films. This can be examined in terms of a major component of the two films in 
question: historical events. As explained in Chapter 7, Victory expresses Chinese 
nationalism while City o f Sadness expresses a sense of ‘Taiwanese nationalism’ which 
implicitly considers the KMT as a repressive and alien regime. They represent different 
versions of the national past. Although viewers' interpretations of these historical films 
cannot be reduced to a matter of accuracy/inaccuracy, it is important to determine how 
viewers see historical causation in terms of who should be held responsible for (or wh it 
leads to) a particular historical event (Grindon, 1994). Viewers of these films can be
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said to have experienced the ’presentness' of the past, which for them retains a strong 
emotional significance.
In this respect, the interviews revealed that the ethnicity-based interpretative frames are 
more pronounced than those derived from other social positions in shaping viewers' 
interpretations. In general, parents of Hokkien and Hakka descent are more likely to be 
in favour of the past as depicted in City o f  Sadness than the past described in Victory. 
That is to say, they feel sympathetic towards the 'native Taiwanese' who were oppressed 
by the KMT (as represented in City o f Sadness). The reverse is true for parents of 
'Mainlander' background, who are more receptive to the view that Taiwan was 
'liberated' from Japanese colonial rule by China's hard-won victory over Japan at the 
end of the Second World War. Thus, the parents interviewed adopt a 'preferred reading' 
position, insofar as messages intended and inscribed respectively in the two films are 
received correspondingly. Needless to say, great care must be taken in generalising from 
their verbal accounts, but on the whole informants show that they are receptive to the 
media texts, which already place some limits on how the national past is interpreted.
However, viewers are also resistant and constructive in the sense that they are able to 
adopt 'oppositional codes' in decoding not only the films which presumably contradict 
with their own ethnic positioning, but also the films they generally evaluate more 
positively. For example, the suggestion that the Taiwanese contributed to the battle 
against Japan in the second Sino-Japanese war between 1937-1945, as Victory implies, 
is more likely to be questioned by parents from 'Mainlander' families. And 'native 
Taiwanese' viewers from 'Hakka' and 'Hokkien' families tend to protest over the 
reticence of the film City o f Sadness about the role of 'Mainlanders' as 'wrongdoers' in 
exacerbating the sufferings of the 'Taiwanese' in the February 28 Incident of 1947:
Taiwan's return to the embrace of China in 1945 was made possible only by 
China's eight-year battle with the Japanese 'ghosts' [literally, 'inhuman 
Japanese']. The Taiwanese themselves did very little to end Japanese 
colonial rule. The film [Victory] flatters the Taiwanese a bit too much on 
this matter. (F4: Father, 'Mainlander', aged 51)
It [City o f Sadness] only shows how Taiwanese 'rioters' used violence 
against ordinary 'Mainlanders'. But actually the reverse was the case. 
Backed by the Nationalist troops, it was the 'Mainlanders' who did violence 
to the Taiwanese. ... Besides, it makes Governor Chen Yi the scapegoat for 
crimes [i.e. the killing of thousands of Taiwanese and the imprisonment of
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many more] committed by Chiang Kai-shek himself. (FI6: Father, Hokkien, 
aged 53)
The analysis so far has revealed that viewers can be said to be both receptive and 
constructive, depending on their interpretations of events related to the films, as well as 
their interpretative frames associated with social positional factors, in particular 
ethnicity. Most importantly, we have seen that the same audience decodes the same text 
according to various interpretative codes/frames that range from the 'preferred' to the 
'oppositional'. The above findings confirm the possibility suggested by Stuart Hail. 
Reflecting upon the original 'encoding/decoding model' he outlined in an earlier paper 
(Hall, 1980), he states that 'It's very possible for an individual or group at one moment 
to decode in what I call the "hegemonic codes" and at another moment to use 
oppositional codes' (Hall, 1994: 256). In what follows, I offer a more detailed account 
of the interpretative codes/frames that the viewers adopt in decoding the two films.
9.1.2 Interpretative Frames at Work and at War
As will be detailed below, in interpreting a text, viewers not only employ interpretative 
frames from a myriad of textual and extra-textual resources but also take a middle 
course when these interpretative frames are at variance with one another. Social 
positional factors such as ethnic background, age and gender differences are relevant .o 
viewers' interpretations of the text. These factors constitute the primary interpretative 
frames that the viewers employ to decode the media texts.
On the one hand, the interplay of family ethnic backgrounds and personal biographies 
provided various interpretative frames/resources. On the other hand, informants had a 
certain degree of interpretative freedom in relation to social positional factors such as 
ethnicity, age, and gender. Interpretative frames can be seen as embodying a myriad of 
'selves' (identities forged out of ethnic backgrounds, gender and age) that are activated 
by the viewers to construct the potential formation of 'ourselves'. However, more often 
than not some of these 'selves' are in a state of contradiction. There were numerous 
examples of this during discussions with family members about the two films. I w 11 
consider one example below from the interviews with a 'Mainlander' family (F2, see 
Appendix VII). It should be noted here that though the family is a 'Mainlander' family 
according to the children's paternal father, it actually displays a degree of diversity in
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terms of individuals' ethnic backgrounds, as the family consists of the 'Mainlander' 
father, the mother of Hakka origin, and a daughter and a son.
(1) Ethnicity-based interpretative fram es
Instances of verbal exchanges concerning City o f Sadness and Victory among viewers 
from this 'Mainlander' family clearly demonstrate that different interpretative frames are 
not only always at work but are also constantly at war. Equally important is the fact that, 
when they were decoding, viewers often connected their interpretations of the films 
with a wider social agenda such as cross-Strait relations and the inter-ethnic relationship. 
I quote the exchanges of opinion among them at length:
Father ('Mainlander', aged 54): Hou Hsiao-hsien [the director of City o f 
Sadness] is quite opportunistic because he makes the film to satisfy the 
rising tide of Taiwanese consciousness.
Mother ('native Taiwanese' of Hakka origin, aged 49): He is better than Liu 
Jia-chang [the director of Victory]. At the very least, he caters for the 
Taiwanese people rather than the KMT government. Mainlanders like you 
just cannot appreciate a film like City o f Sadness.
Father: I'm not speaking as a Mainlander. If he [Hou Hsiao-hsien] was not 
opportunistic, he would not have made the film after Lee Teng-hui assumed 
the presidency. I would still hold this view even if I were not a Mainlander.
Son (aged 16): Am I a Mainlander?
Daughter (aged 18): Of course not.
The parents (responding in chorus): Yes, you are.
Mother: But, they [the children] identify with Taiwan more than you do. 
[Indicating the father]
Father: How can I possibly not identify with Taiwan? ... People think you 
are [Mainlanders]. They judge you by your accent. Besides, you don't speak 
Hokkien.
Son: How can I be a Mainlander? I was bom here [in Taiwan]! Though I 
cannot speak Taiwanese [Hokkien], I can fully understand what they say in 
Taiwanese [Hokkien].
Daughter: We're all 'Taiwanese', aren't we?
Father: Yes, we are. But, we should not distance ourselves from other 
Chinese on the mainland. A film like City o f Sadness is wrong, portraying 
people from the mainland as though they were all as dishonest as Shanghai 
gangsters.
Mother: I am with you on this. But for people living through the early years 
of Nationalist rule on Taiwan, it's quite natural for them to take a dislike to 
the mainlanders. Don't you remember, my father strongly opposed our
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marriage at the beginning. The elder Taiwanese' generation used to abhor 
the Mainlanders. City o f  Sadness does not exaggerate the case.
The children (responding with curiosity): Did he [the grandfather] really?
Father: Right. Yet he treated me nicely afterwards. ... Some Mainlanders 
did take advantage of the native Taiwanese during those years. But in regard 
to the February 28 Incident of 1947, how could you expect the KMT 
government to stabilise the disturbing situation without recourse to force? 
Just think about that. Those native Taiwanese spoke Japanese, attacked the 
security forces, and aimed for Taiwan Independence. Well, I admit that 
many of those killed were innocent.
Mother: The majority of them!
Father: OK. But you shouldn't hold all the Mainlanders responsible for that. 
My father came to Taiwan two years after the Incident.
Mother: The point is not about who should be held responsible but how 
different ethnic groups may see each other as equals.
Daughter: We're doing just that. Unlike your generation, one's ethnic 
background no longer concerns us. In my class, consisting of 40 boys and 
girls, you can't tell who is native Taiwanese and who isn't.
Son: That's right. We're all new Taiwanese [a catch-phrase coined by Lee 
Teng-hui].
Father: Yes, we should 'look forward' [another phrase coined by Lee Teng- 
hui]. But on the contrary City o f Sadness is backward looking. It's 
counterproductive to lay bare the distant and unpleasant past.
Mother: We can always learn from the distant past, no matter how 
unpleasant it may be. Without the film, the Mainlanders would not have 
understood how unfairly the native Taiwanese were treated in the early 
years of KMT rule.
Father: I doubt that anything can be learned from it [City o f  Sadness]. We 
in Taiwan should stand together as one man rather than blame each other for 
the distant past.
Mother: Yes, particularly when we're living under the shadow of China's 
invasion.
Father: If there is ever a Chinese invasion, we Taiwanese will suffer a 
hundred times more painfully than in the February 28 Incident of 1947. We 
do not want to have the tragedy repeated.
Daughter: So we Taiwanese shouldn't divide ourselves into ethnic groups 
that are hostile to one another.
Father: Yes, that's exactly what I mean. If people of different ethnic origins 
in Taiwan cannot make peace with the past and live in harmony with one 
another, how can we possibly confront the Chinese communists?
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The above extracts2 show interpretative frames at war with one another. As Storey 
argues, following Morley, 'the text-reader encounter does not occur in a moment 
isolated from other discourses, but always in a field of many discourses, some in 
harmony with the text, some which are in contradiction with it' (Storey, 1999: 79). This 
applies to the audience as individuals and as a family. Reflecting their ethnic 
backgrounds, the father tended to view City o f  Sadness more oppositionally than the 
mother did. Their opinions diverged particularly when it came to depicting and 
assessing the 'bygone and unpleasant' past depicted in City o f  Sadness. While the father 
tried to evade it, the mother acknowledged that the revelation of the past by the film 
made a positive contribution towards mutual understanding between ethnic groups. 
Interestingly, their exchange of opinions about the film turned to the potential threat 
(felt and/or imagined) from China. The film was mobilised by them to imagine the 
catastrophic consequences that might occur if China waged war upon Taiwan.
The distinction between 'Mainlanders' and 'native Taiwanese' (the Hakka and Hokkien 
people) remained explicit for the parent generation. Nevertheless, whilst distancing 
himself (or being excluded by his wife, who is of Hakka background) from the 
essentialist category of '(native) Taiwanese', the father of 'Mainlander' background 
could still endorse the idea of the 'new Taiwanese' and was comfortable to use the 
phrase 'we Taiwanese'. Interestingly and somewhat contradictorily, both the father and 
the children were referred to by the mother as 'Mainlanders'. But she distinguished 
between the father and the children according to her own judgement of the degree of 
their identification with Taiwan. The father, on his part, claimed his identifications with 
Taiwan while protesting against the ethnicity-based social exclusion he had experienced.
(2) Generation-based interpretative fram es
The children were less concerned than their parents with the distinction based on 
ethnicity, refusing to see themselves as 'Mainlanders' and counterbalancing the father's 
claim with their own lived experiences. Despite differences in their interpretations of
2
The extracts are all in one section. W ithout any prompting by the interviewer, the family members 
continued to discuss the films they had just viewed. Afterwards, they apologised to the interviewer and 
explained that they were accustomed to having that kind o f  media-activated discussion/debate among 
themselves. Similar situations occurred in the course o f interviewing other families.
200
the issues related to the film, all members of the family called for solidarity among 
people whom they referred to as 'we in Taiwan' or 'we Taiwanese'.
The children were more conscious than their parents of the mediated nature of cinematic 
representations. Relatively less bound by previous viewing of the old films, they were 
more media-conscious in so far as they viewed the films as films. For example, the son 
said, 'I wasn't sure at first if the film [Victory] is set in Taiwan, or if it is in China. ... 
Yes, it is in Taiwan! Something depicted by the film occurred in Taiwan.' Or, as the 
daughter said, 'both films used black-and-white footage to make us believe that the.,e 
things did happen to Taiwan.' More details about how these young people regarded the 
two 'old' films will be offered later in this chapter.
(3) Gender-based interpretative fram es
In contrast to the ethnicity- and generation-based interpretations of the films, the 
gender-based interpretations seemed less salient in their assessment of the films related 
to national identity. But, as indicated below, it seems tenable that the gender-based 
interpretative frames have a greater influence than others in their representations of 
characters in both films. Differently put, viewers' representations of characters are not 
necessarily consistent with their general attitude toward the film. For example, despite 
his generally negative evaluation of City o f Sadness, the father of 'Mainlander' 
background did not conceal his preference for Wenxiong (a Taiwanese gangster in the 
film) over the 'Mainlanders' (the Shanghai gangsters in the film). Wenxiong was seen by 
him as more moral, conscientious, sociable and even more 'masculine' (he described 
Wenxiong as behaving 'like a man') than the Shanghai gangsters. It can also be argued 
in this case that viewers' general interpretations of the films did not prevent them from 
taking pleasure in viewing them. Equally, the paternalist elements reflected in both 
films were resisted by the female viewers. For example, the mother of 'native 
Taiwanese' background was not happy with the frequent scenes (in City o f  Sadness) in 
which women characters never dined with the males around the dining table:
Women suffered more than men in old times. You see, they [the female 
characters in the film] talk little but do much [for men]. Yet they are not 
even allowed to dine with men at the same table. (F2: Mother, Hakka, aged 
49)
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And, as is evident in the following divergent representations of one character (Winying 
in Victory) by the children, viewers' character representations were related to their moi i\ 
judgements, which in turns were usually gendered. The character Winying in Victory is 
a schoolteacher who asks her Japanese friend (Ikeda) to rescue her young pupils from 
being recruited to fight the war for Japan. Yet rumour has it that she has an affair with 
the Japanese military officer she asks for help. As a result, she falls victim to the shame 
and exclusion imposed by the villagers. Upon hearing of these disgraceful events, 
Winying's mother-in-law immediately commits suicide because she feels ashamed about 
Winying's alleged infidelity. Deeply shocked by her mother-in-law's sudden death, 
Winying proceeds to drown herself in order to clear her own name.
She [Winying in Victory] should not have committed suicide, because she 
did nothing wrong. Her mother-in-law's suicide is unreasonable or even 
ridiculous to me. Winying didn't have an affair with Chitian [Ikeda in 
Japanese, a Japanese military officer in the film]. Even if she had, her 
mother-in-law had no business to commit suicide. (F2: Daughter, aged 18)
As far I am concerned, she [Winying in Victory] seems to be a plausible yet 
improbable figure. She acts like a saint, sacrificing herself for her family, 
pupils and others in the community. Yet how could she leave her young 
child untended and recklessly commit suicide? ... It's no wonder that others 
would suspect her of infidelity; she shouldn't have met Ikeda in private in 
the first place. (F2: Son, aged 16)
Viewers' varying interpretations also extend to the characters in the films. In this respect, 
gender plays an important part. The informants interviewed are emotionally charged 
with moral judgement towards the various characters of the two films. The male 
viewers identify with the male characters Juyong (in Victory), Wenqing and Wenxioi g 
(in City o f Sadness); but the female viewers are sympathetic to the female characters 
like Winying, Xiaohui (in Victory) and Kuanmei (in City o f Sadness). Most strikingly, 
in the course of interviewing, viewers made no reference at all to the fact that the 
characters they were talking about were fictional and not 'real'. For example:
He [Wenqing in City o f  Sadness] is somewhat alienated from his family and 
society. After all, he is a different sort of man from his father and brothers.
A deaf-mute intellectual bom into a gangster family, you know. No one, not 
even his wife [Kuanmei in City o f Sadness], really understands him. ... He is 
weak but brave, for what he does requires moral courage. I would do what 
he does [i.e. in City o f Sadness, Wenqing finances the forces opposing the 
KMT troops and comforts the victims' families] under the same 
circumstances. (F I8: Father, Hokkien, aged 49)
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I'm particularly sympathetic to her [Kuanmei in City o f Sadness]. She is 
never consulted in any situation but has to endure all the painful 
consequences caused by her brother's and her husband's 'resistance' to the 
KMT. If I were her, I would persuade Wenqing not to get involved in 
politics; after all, you cannot fight the KMT troops with bare hands. (F I5: 
Mother, Hakka, aged 44)
She [Xiaohui in Victory] pretends not to have fallen in love with Juyong.
But in fact, I know she cares for Juyong in her heart. What a pity that 
Juyong is too insensitive to feel her love. (F6: Mother, 'Mainlander', aged 49)
Juguang [in Victory] unforgivably develops a romantic relationship with a 
Chinese girl in the mainland while Wenying is left alone to take care of the 
family in Taiwan. Many businessmen who invest in the mainland are just 
like that. [The informant refers here to some of the Taiwanese businessmen 
who invest in the Chinese mainland and have mistresses there]. (F10: 
Mother, Hokkien, aged 42)
As instanced above, a variety of interpretative frames employed by viewers to interpret 
the films were always at work and sometimes at war. Reflecting their differences in 
ethnic background, generation and gender, viewers within a family made divergent 
readings in relation to the films. Furthermore, a particular viewer might read a film in 
ways which were prima facie contradictory. For example, the father read City o f  
Sadness in an oppositional manner but emotionally identified with the main characters 
of the film. By contrast, the mother's reading of the significance of the events in City o f 
Sadness was close to the 'preferred reading position' as intended in the narrative of the 
film. Yet she particularly felt sympathetic to the female characters and was not happy 
with how the Taiwanese women had suffered in the traditionally paternalistic Taiwan 
society. Nevertheless, this did not prevent viewers from reaching a range of consensual 
interpretations of the films. Some aspects of the textual meaning (denotative or 
connotative) could still be shared through television talk among the family viewei >. 
This point is substantiated by that fact that the family members affirmed a commonly 
shared ‘identity’ in relation to the ‘nation’ (as framed in their accounts of'we in Taiwan',
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’we Taiwanese', or 'new Taiwanese'),3 despite all the other differences in their 
interpretations of the films.
9.1.3 The Evolution of Viewers’ Interpretations of the Texts
This section traces the historical evolution of viewers' interpretations of the two films in 
order to reveal variations in their identifications with the nation. Janet Staiger suggests 
two methodologically complementary solutions to the question of the historical 
reception of films. The first employs the available historical evidence to resituate 
viewers' reception within the specific contexts in which films were produced and 
exhibited; the second is to undertake an interview with members of the current audience 
who had viewed the films in previous periods (Staiger, 1992: 87). Thus, in Chapter 7, 
by means of some historical information and public discourse related to the films, I 
examined both the representation and reception of the two films in their respective 
historical contexts. Here I will apply the second approach.
Bound by the historical contexts in which they were respectively produced, Victory and 
City o f  Sadness offer competing versions of the national past available to the viewing 
population. It is intriguing to explore how an audience might, in different socio-political 
contexts, perceive the two films. Differently put, the analysis is not only concerned with 
how audience members perceive the films differently, but also with 'how people through 
the struggle over memory experience the presentness of the past' (Walkowitz, 1998: 56). 
This struggle leads to the different ways in which viewers position themselves vis-a-vis 
a given text. As the snapshot offered below shows, they shift their positions from 
moment to moment.
3
As indicated earlier in the thesis, ‘national identity’ is taken in this thesis to mean ‘an abstract 
collectivity’ or ‘a specific form o f collective identity’(see 2.2.1 section 3 for a definition) with an 
emphasis on its fluid, discursive and relational character. Expressions such as ‘W e in Taiwan’, ‘We 
Taiwanese’, or ‘new Taiwanese’ are indicative o f an emerging collective identity which is still in the 
process o f discursive construction. It should also be explained here that this identity is not necessarily a 
‘national’ identity, if  the term ‘national’ is to be associated with the desire to establish (or He 
establishment of) a de jure  independent Taiwanese state. Yet, I am hesitant to characterize this identity as 
a ‘post-national’ identity devoid o f nationalist implications because it is an identity made possible by the 
interpenetration o f Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism.
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(1) 'Everyone watched it, so did  I': conformist viewers
Most parents reported that they had seen the films when they were first released in 1976 
and 1989. It is intriguing to ask why they viewed these films in the first place. It seems 
that there was a detectable need for them to engage with the national social life through 
viewing these films. For example, in response to a question about this, many answered 
in ways similar to the reply of a 'Mainlander' woman:
I don't know. Everyone watched it, so did L ...You just went to see the 
films. ... Everyone you knew was talking about these films, as if they were 
worth viewing. As for Victory, Chiang Ching-kuo [Chiang Kai-shek's son, 
then premier] recommended that people should see the film. Singers in the 
variety shows sang its theme song. I remember, correct me if I am wrong, a 
military march was even adapted from it. ... As for City o f  Sadness, it soon 
achieved prominence. Newspapers talked of it being Taiwan's pride. It 
gained an international award before its release in Taiwan. It soon became a 
required movie for viewing. One couldn't wait to view how good it actually 
was. (FI 1: Mother, 'Mainlander', aged 52, Italics added)
(2) 'But Taiwan has changed': reflexive viewers
Regardless of gender, many parents admitted that they had wept or witnessed others 
who were weeping when they first saw City o f Sadness and/or Victory. However, at the 
time when the interviews were undertaken, they tended to distance themselves from the 
film(s) while still justifying their earlier acceptance of, or resistance to, the film(s):
Few people did not weep when they saw the film [ Victory] at that time. But 
Taiwan has changed now; ...the film only makes me laugh today. It's full of 
KMT propaganda, which no one would believe as much as it was believed 
in the 1970s. It's hard for one who did not live through those years to 
imagine how the film could possibly move the viewers. It touched the right 
chord! At that time, people just needed patriotic films to lift their spirits 
when Taiwan was faced by a demoralising reality as well as an uncertain 
future. (F10: Mother, Hakka, aged 45, italics added)
I saw both films when they were released. To be honest, I was bored by 
them. But I never saw either film afterwards. I didn't want to. Above all, 
both films were heavily invested with extreme political ideologies. While 
Victory is ridiculous in every respect, City o f  Sadness makes you feel 
psychologically burdened. I admit that City o f Sadness is of artistic value, 
but I'd rather see Hollywood movies, which are more entertaining. (F5: 
Father, 'Mainlander', aged 46)
These memories related to the historical period in which the narratives of the films were 
set and which shaped and re-shaped their attitudes toward the films. Their memories
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about the national past, transferred from the last generation before them, served to 
counter the narratives embedded in the films. For those who were convinced that they 
knew about the past as it actually was, through the exercise of a 'reality check' on the 
historical details as represented in the films they were capable of subversive decoding:
Amid the February 28 Incident of 1947, my uncle 'disappeared' after he was 
arrested by the KMT soldiers. Just like Wenqing [the main character in the 
film]. Even today no one knows where he is buried. Those who survived the 
Incident suffered as much as those were killed. Every time my uncle was 
mentioned, my father was filled with anger. He refused to leam Mandarin 
and never trusted 'Mainlanders' throughout his life. City o f Sadness did 
belated justice to what my uncle, my father, and his contemporaries had 
suffered. But City o f Sadness should have made their sufferings more 
explicit if  it wanted to tell the historical truth. We cannot blame City o f  
Sadness for that. Above all, it was made in 1989, when the KMT 
government was still authoritarian and tried to cover things up. Now we 
should have another film which speaks out on the subject more honestly 
than City o f  Sadness. (FI 9: Father, Hokkien, aged 52)
The story of Victory was entirely made up. The ['native'] Taiwanese did not 
act, dress or talk like that during the 1940s. All the characters except Juyong 
were more like 'Mainlanders'. The film made us believe that these characters 
were ['native'] Taiwanese who collaborated with the KMT government, 
fighting for the latter's nationalist cause. Nothing like that ever happened in 
Taiwan! So the film dared not show us where the events took place. 
Throughout the film, the alleged patriotic village was unnamed! (F I6: 
Father, Hokkien, aged 53)
Compared with their early encounters with the films under study, there was a shift in
viewers' attitudes toward the films. In general, all of the viewers modified and/or
moderated their previous responses. In particular, viewers who had previously favoured
Victory proved to be more critical of the film; and those who had once negated City o f
Sadness became more sympathetic. Most strikingly, viewers seemed to be capable of
adapting themselves to the change of political climate in Taiwan, as revealed in the
discrepancies between their earlier and later attitudes to the films:
With the government's seal of approval, it was no time before Victory 
became popular. Just like its predecessors such as Everlasting Glory, 
Victory praised patriotic sentiment and was thus endorsed by the 
government. Its soundtrack [a song entitled Mei-hua, written by the film's 
director] was played excessively on television and the radio. Everyone I 
knew could sing the song. I can still sing it today! Can you? ... You can say 
we felt empowered by the film at that time. (FI8: Father, Hokkien, aged 49)
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I heard that the government once attempted to ban the film [City o f  Sadness] 
from being shown. It turned out that the government did not take that 
excessive action. This prompted me to watch the film when it was on 
release. I wanted to know how the film dealt with the February 28 Incident 
of 1947, which was compared to the Tiananmen Square Massacre by the 
press. I was disappointed, however. The film did not say much about the 
Incident itself. To be fair to the film, it did contribute to the public 
discussion of the Incident, as a flood of relevant information came to light 
thanks to the film’s release. On its release, you could feel that a great 
transformation took place in Taiwan. I mean, Taiwan was no longer 
enclosed by the KMT's ideological dogma as it was in earlier times. (F I3: 
Mother, Hokkien, aged 46)
I was reluctant to see the film when it was on release in 1989. I was told it 
was about the February 28 Incident of 1947 in which the Taiwanese were 
killed by Mainlanders. You know, a Mainlander like me would not be too 
happy about such a film. When I did see the film some years later, it was not 
as bad as I had previously thought. To be sure, the past, however unpleasant, 
needs to be remembered. Having said that, the Taiwanese need to leave their 
sense of suffering aside and should not revenge themselves on the 
Mainlanders. (F6: Father, ’Mainlander’, aged 54)
(3)'M y interest in Taiwan's past has been increased': purposive viewers
For various reasons, many of the parents interviewed turned down my offer to leave the 
films on video for them to view at lull length. This was partly because of their limited 
time, but also because they reported some dissatisfaction with one or both of the films, 
usually because of ethnic considerations. In general, the children showed a greater 
interest than their parents in the films, especially City o f Sadness.
About half of the young informants had not previously seen City o f Sadness. They were 
keen to retain the videotape in order to view the whole film. One young viewer 
responded to my offer, ’it's nice to view it at full length. My interest in Taiwan's past has 
been increased (FI 1: Daughter, aged 19, italics added). Others responded in similar 
ways: 'we should know more about what happened to this piece of land [Taiwan]' (F16: 
Son, Hokkien, aged 21). With the past being more remote from their own personal 
experiences, the young viewers seemed more open to the films' representation of the 
past. However, they were also more media-conscious insofar as they considered the 
films as just one of many sources that enabled them to formulate their own 
interpretations of the past. About half of the young viewers had viewed City o f  Sadness 
before interviewing. They generally acknowledged the artistic and historical value of
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this film, but they showed little interest in keeping the video for re-viewing. They 
declined to accept the offer because ’It's too long’ (F5: Daughter, aged 18) or 'It's a good 
film but you’ll feel sad after viewing it’ (F8: Son, Hakka, aged 19). However, the film 
was considered by young people to be worth recommending for others to view on the 
grounds that ’it brings our past back' (F I: Son, 'Mainlander', aged 19).
The case of Victory was different. None of the young informants had ever viewed the 
film before interviewing. When the video was shown to them, they did not find it 
entertaining. For various reasons, including their lack of familiarity with the actors and 
actresses, they tended to distance themselves from the film. For example, during the co­
viewing session young viewers made comments such as 'This film is so old-fashioned 
that my generation would not pay to watch it' (F7: Daughter, aged 18). One young 
viewer sang its theme song but mischievously changed its lyrics: 'Mei-hua, mei-hua... 
it's not my national flower' (F12: Son, Hakka, aged 18). Many of the young viewers 
declined the offer to keep the video so they could watch the whole film. However, some 
were mere positive: 'I want to know what a policy film of the 1970s was like' (F I: 
Daughter, aged 18), 'I like to get a sense of the times in which my parent grew up' (FI 3: 
Daughter, Hokkien, aged 18).
9 .2  T a iw a n e s e  I d e n t it y  a n d  It s  H y b r id  f o r m s
Having illustrated the complex interactions between media representation and audience 
reception, the following analysis examines how the informants locate themselves in 
regard to the question of national identity. It is clear from the informants' verbal 
accounts that their sense of national identity is at once ambivalent and dynamic. It is 
ambivalent in the sense that it is characterised by a mixture of contradictory feelings 
between being Chinese and being Taiwanese. The sense of national identity held by the 
informants is ambivalent in the sense that they simultaneously have, in varying degrees, 
a double national consciousness. The peculiar sense of national identity inhabits two 
(lived and/or imagined) 'homelands': on the one hand, Taiwan is home to them and 
more than merely a province (of China); on the other hand, the Chinese mainland is the 
place with which they maintain a close sentimental link. It is also dynamic, marked by 
continuous social change, political action and geopolitical conjunctures. Despite hybrid 
modes of identifications with the national community, the identity to which informants
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have subscribed can be summed as Taiwan-centred identity1. In what follows I will first 
map this hybrid form of national identity and then consider the extent to which the 
informants actually exhibit this double consciousness.
In the interviews for the present research, a higher proportion of informants (virtually all 
of the parents and some of the youngsters) more or less identified themselves as 'both 
Taiwanese and Chinese'. I do not wish to generalise this high degree of Taiwan-centred 
identity to the whole of the Taiwanese population. As shown in the systemic opinion 
polls conducted by pollsters since the early 1990s, at least 32.7 per cent and at mcst 
49.9 per cent of the Taiwanese people have identified themselves as 'both Taiwanese 
and Chinese'. Those identifying themselves as 'Chinese only' range from 10.1 per cent 
to 48.5 per cent, and generally this response has declined in frequency. Those 
identifying themselves as 'Taiwanese only' range from 16.7 per cent to 45 per cent, and 
this response has increased in frequency.4
This Taiwan-centred identity has continuously influenced the Taiwanese people as they 
have had to cope with the realities unfolding around them. Many of them have a more 
massive fund of personal knowledge about the Chinese mainland than other places, 
including Taiwan. Nevertheless, such identification is not equal to the narrowly defined 
'hybridised identity' in the sense that the component identities are no longer 
distinguishable and have equal weight. That is to say, although the Chinese mainland 
has never been relegated to a place to which they feel indifferent, a sense of belonging 
to Taiwan as a political community has increasingly been placed at the heart of national 
identity. The hybrid character of national identity in Taiwan has thus remained strong, 
but the priorities and hierarchies of the two (or more) component identities have 
constantly been rearranged. For some young informants, this is particularly true, as they 
have given priority to their Taiwanese identity, favouring the self in relation to Taiwan 
over the self in relation to China.
Mainland Affairs Council (April 2000). Retrieved November 21 2000 frr m
http://www.mac.gov.tw/mlpolicy/pos/p8905c_l.htm. In broader terms, the present analysis suggests thai a 
higher proportion o f people identify themselves as 'both Taiwanese and Chinese' than has been suggested 
by previous polls. There are various explanations for this discrepancy. My sample is small (with a total o f  
62 individuals) and there might also be a geographical bias (all the interviewed families are residents in 
Sanchong, Taipei). However, previous polls may also have had some limitations, for example because all 
but one o f them were conducted by telephone rather than by in-depth interviews. Such telephone surveys 
allow little room for the audience’s open interpretations.
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At the analytical level, Taiwan-centred identity can be differentiated into two types (see 
Figure 9.1). The numbers in the Figure correspond to areas in which Taiwan-centr d 
identity may be located.
Ethno­
cultural
China
Civic-
political-
Taiwan
'China' yet to be defined
Taiwan is part of'China'.
Type (1) applies to those 11 out of 62 in the sample: FI (father, mother), F2 (father), F3 
father), F4 (father), F6 (father, mother), F7 (mother), F9 (father, mother), F12 (father).
Type (2) applies to the majority of the sample (44 out of 62): for example, F2 (mother, 
son, daughter), F4 (son), F5 (Father, mother, daughter), F7 (daughter), F8 (son), F9 
(son), F10 (mother), F ll  (father, mother, daughter), F12 (son), F13 (father, mother), 
F I5 (Mother), F I6 (father, mother, and two sons), F I7 (father, mother), F I8 (father, 
mother), F19 (father, mother).
Exceptions to both types: Informants who identify themselves as 'Taiwanese only' and 
reject Chinese identity in both the cultural and political senses (7 out of 62), including 
F10 (daughter), F13 (daughter, son), F I4 (daughter), F I7 (son), F19 (son, daughter). 
Figure 9.1: Mapping Taiwan-centred identity.
Type (1) in the Figure 9.1 represents a sense of Taiwan being part of China, although 
what is meant by 'China' and 'Taiwan' to the informants is largely undetermined. (What 
is clear is that Taiwan is more than the place where they live.) Informants who possess 
this kind of Taiwan-centred identity hold that Taiwan should eventually re-unite with 
the Chinese mainland. But, for them, the pursuit of a de jure  independent Taiwan is no
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option for a variety of reasons. Moreover, re-unification should be realised on 'oir' 
terms, e.g. China must be a democracy devoid of communist dictatorship.
Type (2) represents a 'third space' between a China in the ethno-cultural sense and a 
Taiwan in the political-civic sense. Informants who possess this kind of Taiwan-centred 
identity tend to see Taiwan as a de facto independent state. They are open to the options 
of both de jure independence and re-unification with the Chinese mainland. This second 
type of Taiwan-centred identity is more hybridised than the first type. On the one hand, 
it has a more clearly defined boundary between what is meant by 'China' and what is 
meant by 'Taiwan'. On the other hand, it remains open to the further development of 
meanings afforded by this 'third space'.
For informants whose sense of national identity is akin to either type (1) or type (2), the 
consensus they nevertheless share is the maintenance of the status quo, which is seen to 
be in the interest of Taiwan. At the empirical level, their differentiated subscription to a 
Taiwan-centred identity suggests the intersection of various interpretative 
resources/frames associated with social positional factors among which ethnicity and 
generation are most manifest. Both ethnicity and generation, as will be illustrated below, 
structure informants' sense of national identities to varying degrees. By comparison, 
gender seems to be of less significance.
(I) Differences between ethnic groups
First and foremost, ethnic background is an important interpretative resource in relati; n 
to one's sense of national identity in Taiwan. Taiwan's population is divided into two 
broadly defined ethnic categories, namely, the 'Mainlanders' and the 'native Taiwanese'. 
The terms 'Mainlanders' normally refers to the Chinese immigrants (and their offspring) 
who followed Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime into Taiwan between 1945 and 
1949. The term 'native Taiwanese' refers to people of Hokkien and Hakka origins 
(whose ancestors settled in the island for centuries). It should be noted that such a
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categorisation of ethnicity is problematic and artificial.5 Yet, despite a decline in its 
significance, the categorisation of ethnicity retains much of its social importance with 
regard to popular attitudes toward the issue of Taiwan's present and future relations with 
China.
’M ainlander’ families: Taiwan-centred identity is less prevalent in some of the 
mainland-born 'Mainlanders' over the age of 50, many of whom have come to feel 
threatened by the rapidly advancing Taiwanese consciousness in contemporary 
Taiwanese society. As one 'Mainlander' woman remarked, 'I think we're Chinese and 
Taiwanese at the same time. ... They [native] Taiwanese [here, she refers to the 
Hokkien-speaking Taiwanese] used to call us Mainlanders and did not see us as 
Taiwanreri (F7: Mother, 'Mainlander', aged 47). In a similar vein, another 'Mainlander' 
father protested, 'the native Taiwanese call us Mainlanders, while people on the 
mainland call us Taibao [literally, 'Taiwanese compatriots'] on our visit to the mainland. 
We are not treated as locals everywhere' (F6: Father, 'Mainlander', aged 54). His wife 
(F6: Mother, 'Mainlander', aged 49) readily agreed with him.
Some of the 'Mainlander' parents also strongly oppose the idea of Taiwan declaring 
formal independence from China. Not only do they fear a Chinese invasion, but they 
also consider the loss of Chinese identity to be quite unacceptable. They hold an 
ambivalent attitude toward their identities of being Chinese and Taiwanese. The 
different ways in which they employ the term Taiwanese is also worthy of note: the 
same person talked of 'we Taiwanese' and 'they Taiwanese' at the same time. As one 
'Mainlander' father said to the interviewer:
They [native] Taiwanese are unrealistic, dreaming about Taiwan 
independence. As soon as Taiwan declares independence, the Chinese 
Communists will attack Taiwan. We will all be killed! The Taiwanese 
nationalists can go to the United States but we have only the sea to jump 
into. ... Unification is not at all bad as long as we insist on not uniting with 
the mainland right now. ... You see, sooner or later China will certainly
5 As was suggested at the beginning o f  the thesis (see Note on Romanisation and Terminology), like the 
'Mainlander' group, the Hakka and Hokkien groups are o f Chinese descent. The Hakka do not share 'a 
mother tongue' with the Hokkien. As for the aborigines, they have nothing in common with the other 
'Taiwanese' groups (the Hakka and Hokkien) in terms o f descent ties, ethnic tradition and mother-tongue 
languages. The conventionally defined ethnic category o f 'Mainlander' is even more problematic. 
'Mainlanders' came to Taiwan from vastly different parts o f the Chinese mainland. Moreover, most 
'Mainlanders" in contemporary Taiwan, including the 'Mainlander' informants under study, are 
themselves second-generation immigrants. They were bom  and/or reared in Taiwan rather than in the 
mainland itself.
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become a superpower that can match the United States. At the end of the 
day, Taiwan and the mainland will be re-united. Why do we refuse to be 
great Zhongguoren [literally, ’Chinese'] and insist on being little Taiwanese?
We Taiwanese should not be so short-sighted. As the Chinese saying goes,
'Don't stand against your destiny'. (F2: Father, 'Mainlander', aged 54)
This informant's wife added, 'Great or not, it is wise to maintain the status quo: no 
independence and no unification. Then, we can have the best of both worlds: being 
Taiwanese and Chinese' (F2: Mother, Hakka, aged 49).
However, there are exceptions. For example, one father of'Mainlander' origin (himself a 
second-generation 'Mainlander') recalled his experience of returning to the mainlai d 
years ago. During his stay in the hometown where his father lived before the 
Communist take-over of the Chinese mainland, he sensed many differences between 
Taiwan and Mainland China. The excitement of meeting relatives turned sour as he 
found that there was a gap between them in terms of social values, moral judgement, 
and alike. He said to the interviewer that 'they are too greedy, always requesting more 
[money] from us'. This trip became a journey of self-discovery: 'during my two-week 
stay with many relatives there, I realised that we are of common ancestry, but 
fortunately of different citizenship. I told myself at that time, "Anyway, I will be home 
[Taiwan] soon." ... And, I like things to be kept like that' (F5: Father, 'Mainlander', aged 
46).
’Native Taiwanese’ families: Many parents in the 'native Taiwanese' families are also 
anxious about a possible Chinese invasion if Taiwan declares its independence. 
Nevertheless, they consider this issue in a variety of ways. Two of them are worried 
because 'we justify it as long as we dare not tell the international society that Taiwan is 
already an independent state' (F13: Father, Hokkien, aged 48) and 'our government still 
says that we want to be united with the mainland. In so doing, we're committing 
political suicide' (F I8: Mother, Hakka, aged 48). This does not mean that the non- 
'Mainlander' parents do not accept their Chinese identity. A typical response in the 
discussions was: 'I'm first and foremost Taiwanren. But I'm also Zhongguoren.' 
Meanwhile, some parents are more reflexive when identifying themselves as such. For 
instance:
Being educated under the KMT and bombarded by its media, I found it 
difficult not to associate myself with Chinese identity. I cannot declare that I 
am no longer Zhongguoren [literally, 'Chinese'] from now on. ... However,
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if my memory serves me, my parents never called themselves 
Zhongguoren. ... They did not speak Mandarin at all ... throughout their 
lives. They felt themselves sentimentally closer to Japan than the mainland.
(F9: Father, Hakka, aged 51)
In response to the question of whether they preferred to call themselves Taiwanren or 
Zhongguoren, almost all of the informants immediately had a lively or even contentious 
discussion on the subject. The discussion swiftly moved to the issue of 'unification 
versus independence' without any follow-up probes, as is exemplified in the debate 
among the members of a 'native Taiwanese' family of Hokkien origin (FI 6):
The interviewer: Do you see yourself as Chinese or Taiwanese?
Father: I'm really bored by the debate over 'unification' and 'independence'.
The same issue has been debated on television for many years. Of course,
I'm Taiwanren. The ongoing debate over 'unification versus independence' 
seems unnecessary to me. Taiwan has been separated from the mainland for 
a century. There is already an independent Taiwan!
Mother: No. This is nothing but self-deceit. We [s/c] still bear the name of 
the Republic of China, which does not exist in the international system.
Father: Who says it doesn't exist? Whatever it is called, we nevertheless 
have a country of our own. Besides, nearly 30 countries still diplomatically 
recognise us regardless of pressures from China.
Mother: That doesn't work. They are all small nations of little importance.
Son (aged 21): We have spent lots of money buying their diplomatic 
recognition. ... Our government should spend that money in developing our 
own economy. ...
Son (aged 18): Sooner or later we should change the official name of our 
country from ROC to the Republic of Taiwan.
Mother: It's of no use. No country will recognise us.
Father: At least those who currently recognise us will do so.
Mother: So it is completely unnecessary to rename our country as the 
Republic of Taiwan since the number of countries recognising us will not 
increase.
Father: What matters even if no country recognises us is that we still have 
a country of our own. I still carry the ROC passport when I travel around the 
world.
Mother: It matters.
Son (aged 21): Don't forget China will certainly invade Taiwan if we go for 
the Republic of Taiwan.
Father: Indeed, China always reacts unreasonably. If they can kill their 
own students in Tiananmen Square, they will never be soft on us.
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Mother: That's exactly why I don't support the idea of declaring Taiwan's 
formal independence.
Son (aged 18): It seems that the maintenance of the status quo is the best 
choice for now. Above all, what matters is that we can go on being 
Taiwanren without taking any risk of war.
(2) Differences between generations
Generation provides an interpretative frame that is particularly sensitive to the passage 
of time. While the young generation tends to separate citizenship from ethnic origins, 
parents seem to have a more ambiguous national identity. To some extent, parents, 
regardless of their gender, possess a stronger sense of what I have referred to as 
'Taiwan-centred identity'. They maintain a sentimental link with the Chinese mainland, 
although they see themselves as Taiwanese citizens. Young informants, regardless of 
their gender and family ethnic backgrounds, see themselves as less 'Chinese' than the 
generation of their parents.
The following exchange of opinions among the informants in one family (FI9) 
exemplifies how the sense of national identity is negotiated between generations. It is 
clear from their verbal accounts that the media do have an impact on national identity.
Father: My parents used to call the Mainlanders 'A-San' [translated from 
Hokkien, literally 'people from Tang Mountain']. 'Tang Mountain' was what 
they used to call the mainland. ...
Mother: 'Tang Mountain' refers to the Chinese mainland, as opposed to 
Taiwan, an island [on the sea].
Father: Possibly. I'm curious what my parents would call themselves. 
Certainly not A-San, though our ancestors were also from the mainland.
Daughter: How many generations have we been here?
Father: I'm probably the 10th generation since our ancestors came from the 
mainland to Taiwan. And you are the 11th.
Son: We think we're Zhongguoren but actually we're not. The paper we read 
is called the China Times. The television we watch is called the China 
Television Company (CTV). That's why we take it for granted. ...
Daughter: And the media still call China 'the mainland' rather than 'China', 
as if Taiwan was part of China.
Son: China or not, I'd rather call myself Taiwanren.
Mother: Or Shin-Taiwanren ['New Taiwanese'], perhaps? You may not 
know [speaking to the interviewer] that that's the media's buzzword, coined 
by President Lee Teng-hui during last year's election.
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Daughter: Absolutely. We should stop calling ourselves Zhongguoren. We 
should learn from my Malaysian classmate, who is studying with us as an 
overseas Chinese student. She does not call herself Zhongguoren but 
Huaren [a broader term than 'Chinese’; it refers to those who are Chinese by 
descent but who do not necessarily have Chinese citizenship] instead. 
Equally, we Taiwanese are Huaren, rather than Zhongguoren, because the 
latter only refers to citizens of the PRC.
Among all the viewers, the sense of being Taiwanese is growing. But this is more 
evident in the young generation than their parents. The phrase 'we Chinese' still came 
out somewhat unconsciously, from time to time, in the parents' talk when they were 
interviewed. The young people, on the contrary, seemed to use the phrase 'We Chinese' 
far less frequently.
However, with respect to matters of political significance, the majority of them used the 
phrase 'we Chinese' with qualifications and quite consciously. The young people 
asserted that they are less 'Chinese' than their parents: 'the idea that Taiwan must be re­
united with China belongs to the older generation' (F4: Son, 'Mainlander', aged 19), and 
'I'm Chinese by birth but Taiwanese by choice' (F9: Son, 'Taiwanese', aged 19). The 
sense of national identity remains bound up with aspects of ethnicity and citizenship, 
but there is a general trend for young people to lay a greater emphasis on the latter. On 
the one hand, the youngsters who were interviewed dismissed the significance of ethnic 
differences in their everyday lives. On the other hand, they seemed to see themselves as 
'Chinese' in general ethnic and cultural terms while distancing themselves from the 
other people of Chinese descent outside Taiwan. Some young informants made tins 
explicit by saying: 'We live here, they don't. We're Taiwanese of Chinese descent, just 
like Singaporeans who are only Chinese in blood' (FI2: Son, aged 18), or 'I might be 
called a second- or third-generation "Mainlander", but I'd like to see myself as a first- 
generation "Taiwanese'" (F2: Daughter, 'Mainlander', aged 18).
9.3  T h e  T a iw a n e s e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  F e e l in g : T im e -P l a c e
S e n s ib il it ie s
The section draws together the findings gained from this and previous chapters to 
discuss the text-reader intersection from a broader perspective. Moving forward fro.n 
seeking to understand how an audience interprets a particular text, in what follows I will
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consider the reciprocal circularity between encoding and decoding, as summarised in 
Figure 5.1.
There seems to be a certain degree of correspondence between the spatio-temporal 
attributes of Taiwan's television serial dramas as a whole and the Taiwan-centred 
identity held by the audience. This correspondence may be merely coincidental. But I 
wish to argue for their interrelation by proposing the concept of the 'time-place 
sensibilities'. Before clarifying this concept, I will first evoke another concept, that of 
the 'structure of feeling', which was originally developed as early as 1954 by Raymond 
Williams in an analysis of dramatic texts (Eldridge and Eldridge, 1994). Williams 
introduced this concept in an attempt to go beyond orthodox Marxist cultural analysis 
and its separation of base and superstructure (Higgins, 1999; Wallis, 1993). For him, 
the structure of feeling that defines dramatic conventions is 'widely experienced' as 
'living processes' (Williams, 1977: 133)
The structure of feeling manifested in dramatic conventions 'covers both tacit conse it 
and accepted standards' (Williams and Orrom, 1954: 15, emphasis in the original), and 
the very existence of these conventions suggests a close interrelation between the text 
and the audience in a given society. As Williams argues, 'the dramatic conventions of 
any given period are fundamentally related to the structure of feeling in that period' 
(Williams and Orrom, 1954: 21). For him, a structure of feeling is 'a social experience 
which is still in process' (Williams, 1977: 132, emphasis in the original).
As Eagleton elaborates, the structure of feeling as a concept mediates 'between an 
historical set of social relations, the general cultural and ideological modes appropriate 
to them, and the specific forms of subjectivity (embodied not least in artefacts) in which 
such modes are lived out' (Eagleton, 1996: 110). It is this interrelation that Williaris 
attempts to characterise by the term 'structure of feeling':
It is as firm and definite as 'structure' suggests, yet it is based in the deepest 
and often least tangible elements of our experience. It is a way of 
responding to a particular world which in practice is not felt as one way 
among others -  a conscious 'way' -  but is, in experience, the only way 
possible. ... It is accessible to others ... [by] a form and a meaning, a feeling 
and a rhythm -  in the work of art, the play, as a whole. (Williams, 1987: 10)
How can the television dramas with a lasting pattern in terms of their temporal and 
spatial attributes (as analysed in Chapter 6) and the contrasting cinematic
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representations of 1940s Taiwan (as analysed in Chapter 7) be related to a specific form 
of social consciousness ('Taiwan-centred identity')? It seems that this identity cannot be 
separated from the banality of nationhood as represented in the media, which constitutes 
a map by which people locate/identify themselves. Edward Shils highlights the 
importance of one's image of the world in foregrounding one's distinct identity:
Every person has a 'map' in his [sic] head. It is a more or less vague image 
of the 'world' which is significant to him. It is one of the ways in which he 
'locates' himself; it helps him to establish his own essential quality by 
contrast and identity which with the objects of his environment. It is a 
cognitive map but it is not an emotionally neutral matter. It is a map which 
not only classifies but locates in a spatial sense. (Shils, 1972: 356, emphasis 
the original)
Informed by Williams's 'structure of feeling' and Shils's map metaphor, I wish to 
propose a focused concept of 'time-place sensibilities', a peculiar form of 'structure of 
feeling' which has been embodied and experienced in the process of cultural 
reproduction (production and consumption) throughout Taiwan's television age. The 
concept of'time-place sensibilities' originates from our empirical analysis of Taiwan's 
television dramas, and helps us to account for categories of similarities and differences 
that relate media representation to the perceptions of national identity. By 'time-place 
sensibilities' I refer to a multiple sense of feeling structured along the lines of time and 
place, one which is associated with the ideas of national territory ('homeland') as well as 
national past ('history'). The concept is of particular relevance to the idea of national 
identity because a certain sense of past/place (time/space) is required to form historical 
consciousness of, and geographical attachment to, the imagined national community 
(Friedman, 1994: 142; MacCormick, 1999:193).
To be sure, the time-place sensibilities one possesses have gained from, and been 
mediated by, multiple sources ranging from formal pedagogy to lived experience and 
media exposure. They can be roughly divided, along the axes of time and space, into 
four types as indicated in Figure 6.1, but I have modified this representation into a new 
Figure (i.e., Figure 9.2) on the basis of my analysis of television serial dramas in terms 
of their temporal and spatial attributes.
Considering the longstanding structure of Taiwan's television representation, and using 
the concept of the time-place sensibilities analytically, it can be assumed that the 
marked area of Figure 9.2 is perhaps shared by the informants and the majority of the
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Taiwan-born people. They are relatively poor in Types II and III sensibilities as 
opposed to their relative richness in Type I and Type IV sensibilities. However, the 
distribution of time-place sensibilities varies in practice from person to person and is 
uneven among individuals who occupy different social positions (e.g. in terms of 
ethnicity, gender, generation, class, etc.). The temporary balance, at a given point in 
time, of one's own time-place sensibilities is subject to a constant reorganisation. As 
John Thompson points out, mediated experience is gaining momentum -  though lived 
experience remains fundamental -  in the process of self-formation (Thompson, 1995: 
233). Against the background of a media-saturated environment, time-place sensibilities 
are related more closely than ever to the television-mediated experience. The televised 
stories about places and places beyond are important, as Thrift argues, since 'first of all, 
they tell us which places and people we belong to and care about or, to put it another 
way, which community (or communities) we can claim to be a part of. Second, they tell 
us whether and how we care about other places and people' (Thrift, 1997: 164). 
Needless to say, television has been one of the key spaces in which stories about China 
and Taiwan have been frequently told to the Taiwanese people.
THEN
THERE
Mainland
China
Before 1949 Before 1949
Taiwan under Japanese rule 
and during the transitional 
years 1945-1949
HERE
Mainland
China
under
Communist
rule
Taiwan
under
Nationalist
rule
After 1949 After 1949 
NOW
Figure 9.2: The time-place sensibilities (in relation to national identity)
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The possession of time-place sensibilities does not necessarily have to accord with one's 
class position; nor is it hierarchically distributed. The concept of time-place sensibilities 
is close to what has been called 'cultural cognition' (Hoijer and Werner, 1998), which 
refers to the socially shared activities in which audience members make sense of 
themselves, the media, and the world where they inhabit. This is also closely related to 
an area of concern cutting across the line between the 'public knowledge project' ar.d 
'the popular culture project' proposed by John Comer (Comer, 1991: 268).6 The concept 
of time-place sensibilities is intended to blur the division of 'public knowledge' and 
'popular culture' by embracing both the cognitive and affective dimensions. Analytically, 
therefore, time-place sensibilities can be further divided into two major patterns: 
cognitive time-place sensibilities and affective time-place sensibilities. In both patterns, 
the time-place sensibilities are socially possessed and performed.
We may further differentiate the concept. People's time-place sensibilities in relation to 
national identity are constituted along two conceptual axes: one axis represents the 
continuum from the collective to the personal; the other axis represents the continuum 
from the cognitive to the affective. This enables us to distinguish between fc lr 
subcategories: (1) common knowledge about China/Taiwan; (2) common allegiance 
towards China/Taiwan; (3) personal knowledge about China/Taiwan; (4) personal 
allegiance towards China/Taiwan. Thus the concept of the time-place sensibilities is 
flexible enough to deal with contradictions and temporary priorities as illustrated by the 
ways in which the informants identified themselves with the hybrid range of Taiwan- 
centred identity. In short, these subcategories of time-place sensibilities may either 
reinforce or contradict one another, bur they ultimately suggest how members of 
Taiwanese society might subscribe to a particular sense of national identity.
This categorisation can be applied to the analysis of media representation. The media 
play a particularly important role in conveying common knowledge about, and 
developing a common allegiance towards, China/Taiwan. They thus reinforce the 
cognitive and affective dimensions of time-place sensibilities. As demonstrated in
6 Many have argued for the linkage between, rather than the separation of, journalism and popular culture 
(see, in particular, the chapters collected in Dahlgren and Sparks (1991). Some scholars have tried to take 
into account both dimensions: the aesthetic/affective aspects o f television news and the cognitive 
dimension o f television fictions (e.g. Liebes and Katz, 1990; Livingstone, 1988, 1991).
220
Chapter 7, City o f Sadness is salient in conveying both a higher degree of ’common 
knowledge' and 'common allegiance' towards Taiwan than Mainland China, while 
Victory retains knowledge and allegiance towards the Chinese mainland.
The other subcategories of time-place sensibilities on the individual level may be 
termed 'personal knowledge' and 'personal allegiance'. By 'personal' I do not mean that 
these two subcategories of time-place sensibilities arise independently of the broadly 
defined media. But it is plausible to assume that there is a certain experience that is not 
addressed or articulated by the media on a regular basis (such as the idea of seeking 
Taiwan's de jure  independent statehood). In short, the media may have the potential ‘ o 
encroach on the personal, but the two do not merge into one. This further differentiation 
of the time-place sensibilities has implications for national identity in relation to 
audience reception. For instance, as previously discussed in this chapter, some 
informants possess a great deal of historical knowledge about (Mainland) China but 
resist identifying with China politically; and some identify with Taiwan politically but 
at the same time feel unable to sever their sentimental attachment to China as the 
homeland.
To sum up, the media can be considered to have served as one of the principal vehicles 
for transmitting and structuring the interpretative resources, including the time-place 
sensibilities, among the audience members. The resulting distribution and possession of 
the time-place sensibilities among the audience members is uneven and is inevitably 
mediated by one's social positioning (e.g. in terms of ethnicity, gender and age). 
Likewise, one's possession of time-place sensibilities, in turn, affects one's reception of 
the mediated content. The time-place sensibilities, in constant interaction with one's 
social positioning, shape the ways in which the audience members make sense of a 
particular media text, which is itself already temporally and spatially structured. It is 
because of this ongoing and context-dependent text-reader interaction that one should 
take television's role in mediating national identity seriously.
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9 .4  C o n c l u s io n
The relationship of the viewers to the two popular texts under study ( Victory and City f  
Sadness), each of which is heavily invested with nationalistic implications and with its 
own endorsed version of the national past, can be summarised as follows.
On the one hand, viewers are constrained as well as empowered by the texts and by the 
culture they share; thus they are capable of sharing the texts on the level of denotative 
meanings. The power of the media (text) should be stressed not on the grounds 
suggested by the dominant ideology thesis, but because it is the media (texts) which 
make available particular 'reading positions' among the possible infinite identifications 
and disseminate particular forms of knowledge/sentiments among the audience.
On the other hand, the audience are knowledgeable and resourceful agents who possess 
'already-constituted cultural knowledges and competences which are drawn on at the 
moment of interpretation' (Moores, 1990: 14). They interpret the texts in various ways, 
not only by employing interpretative codes/frames from textual and extra-textual 
resources (Livingstone, 1998) but also by their ability to accommodate various 
interpretative codes/frames that are sometimes at variance with one another. As has also 
been emphasised in this chapter, viewers' relations with particular interpretative frames 
derived from social positional factors such as ethnic background are not fixed (for 
instance, a person of 'Mainlander' origin may still interpret City o f  Sadness with 
sympathy). Overall, in the course of interpreting a text, a viewer not only makes use of 
various interpretative frames, but also occasionally distances himself/herself from these 
and other interpretative frames. Of particular importance in this respect is the way in 
which the Taiwan-centred identity shared by the informants is socially structured and 
cultural mediated.
Based on the text-reader intersections analysed above, we have suggested that the media 
have provided commonly shared interpretative resources (e.g., the time-place 
sensibilities) in mediating between the double senses of national identity. Thus, the 
viewers' interpretations of the texts in question are always context-dependent. As we 
have seen in our discussion of the ideas of the hybrid yet centred Taiwanese identity and 
the time-place sensibilities, the intersection between media representation and audience 
interpretation has both shaped and been shaped by viewers' sense of national identity. In
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the final chapter that follows, the discussion will move back to the general level by 
integrating all the empirical evidence and connecting it with the broader theoretical 
agenda.
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10
Conclusion: Mediating 
National Identity
Having completed the empirical analyses, I now return to the key research question of 
how -  if at all — the media, in particular television and the cinema, have contributed to 
the formation of national identity in Taiwan. To answer this question satisfactorily, it is 
necessary to address the paradox raised at the beginning of this thesis, which is this: that 
despite two factors which might least be expected to favour it — on the one haul, 
decades of top-down media control aimed at promoting a unified Chinese identity and, 
on the other, a high level of penetration of foreign programming by cable/satellite 
television -- a Taiwan-centred identity has effected a significant (re-) emergence and 
development.
In order to resolve this paradox, we need to consider the relationship between media and 
national identity as one of necessarily conjunctural mediation between media 
representations and audience receptions of nationhood. I adopt the idea of conjunctural 
mediation because it builds on the strengths of -  but also goes beyond — the diffusionist 
vs. constructivist (Sahlins, 1989), transmission vs. ritual (Carey, 1989), and powerful 
media vs. active audience approaches to the intersection of mass media and nation il 
identity. What is stressed here is that that these polarising views in the nationalism and 
communication literature should be considered as complementary rather than mutually 
exclusive.
In this chapter, a summary of the main empirical findings will be followed by a 
discussion of the nature and scope of the aforementioned paradox, and a consideration 
of why the dominant perspectives in the literature fail to resolve the paradox. With the 
empirical evidence in hand, we will then move forward to discuss how the idea of 
conjunctural mediation can overcome this explanatory barrier and help to clarify the 
role of the media, and television in particular, in shaping national identity in Taiwan. 
Finally, I will consider the implications of the thesis in terms of two broad concerns of
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media studies: (1) the superiority of the ’mediation' model over the ’transmission' model; 
and (2) the importance of a media perspective within theories of nationalism and the 
analysis of national identity.
10.1 T h e  M a in  E m p ir ic a l  F in d in g s  o f  t h e  St u d y
(1) The Prime-Time Television Serial Dramas
The empirical analysis of television serial drama synopses between 1971 and 1996 
suggests that Taiwan's television was characteristically Chinese (but not always Chinese 
nationalist) in terms of its spatial, temporal and linguistic attributes. There are two 
persistent patterns: (1) China as the centre and Taiwan as a periphery; (2) China with a 
long history and Taiwan with no pre-1949 (non-Chinese) history of its own. The 
quantitative analysis of the television serial drama synopses between 1971 and 1996 
(see Chapter 6) found that Taiwan's television serial dramas gave priority to Mainland 
China over Taiwan itself. The presence of Mainland China -  as measured by spatial and 
temporal attributes -- has persistently exceeded that of Taiwan in Taiwan's television 
serial dramas.
This China-oriented representation manifested in the prime-time television serial 
dramas was even more salient in relation to the political and educational institutions 
which under-represented the ethnic majority of Taiwan and marginalised local 
expressions. As I pointed out in Chapter 4, the KMT deliberately sought to promote 
Chinese nationalism, popularise a (unified) Chinese identity and suppress any separate 
Taiwanese identity, and therefore directly controlled all the terrestrial television 
channels, strictly enforcing a policy of 'Mainlanderisation', 'Mandarinisation' and 
'fortification'. The vital importance of the media was tied to the diasporic character of 
the KMT regime, which fled to Taiwan after defeat by its communist rival in 1949 and 
sought to do everything it could to return to Mainland China. Everything about 
Mainland China was deliberately preserved in Taiwan by the KMT while Taiwan itself 
was relegated to a peripheral position in the KMT's conception of the nation. Sensitive 
traces of Taiwan's past, including Taiwan's colonial past under Japan (1895-1945) and 
the February 28 Incident of 1947, were rendered invisible in the public domain. The 
comprehensive dominance of the KMT in Taiwan's national life therefore constituted a
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specific cultural geography by symbolically creating in Taiwan the absent presence o f  
China as well as the present absence o f Taiwan (see Section 1 of Chapter 7). For the 
purpose of promoting Chinese nationalism, very little of Taiwan's historical past 
(especially that before Taiwan became a refuge for the KMT in flight) has been 
represented on Taiwan's television.
(2) Two 'nationalist'films
Until 1989, in the rare cases where some traces of Taiwan's pasts were represented, they 
were made to fit neatly into the narrative of Chinese nationalism. As indicated in the 
textual analysis of two Taiwanese films in Chapter 7, the 1976 film Victory represented 
the KMT as the saviour ('hero' in the film narrative) who put an end to the Japanese ru e 
under which the 'native Taiwanese' had suffered for half a century up to 1945. And 
throughout the narrative of the film Victory, the Taiwanese under Japanese colonial rule 
were represented as very patriotic towards the Chinese nation. People on both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait were represented as fighting hand-to-hand against their common 
enemy — the Japanese (the 'villain' in the film narrative). The sameness between the 
'Mainlanders' and the Taiwanese were emphasised, and Taiwanese identity was 
represented as naturally subordinate to Chinese identity. Not until 1989, after the lifting 
of martial law, did another film -- City o f  Sadness — tell a different story. In that film, 
the incoming KMT was represented not as a saviour but as a villain who victimised the 
Taiwanese amid the February 28 Incident of 1947, whereas the departing Japanese were 
represented as much more like friends than enemies to the Taiwanese. Interestingly, 
though, while City o f  Sadness marked a notable shift in representations of the nation, we 
did not detect any such shift in the prime-time television serial dramas by 1996.
In many respects, the two films stand in stark contrast in terms of their construction of 
the nation: Victory is Chinese nationalist in character, whereas City o f  Sadness offers a 
counterpoint to the long sanctioned Chinese nationalist account of Taiwan's past. 
However, there are some similarities between the films: (1) both films create a boundary 
between 'us' and 'them', and exploit martyrdom to mobilise a nationalist sentiment; (2) 
they both seek to reconcile the existence of various cultures and diverse ethnic groups 
within Taiwan. As I argued in Chapter 7, both films sought to bond the nation in 
response to national crises that threatened Taiwan (in the 1970s and the late 198' 's 
respectively). Victory attempted to incorporate the 'native Taiwanese' into the grand
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narrative of Chinese nationalism, and called for solidarity at the moment of national 
crisis during the 1970s when Taiwan was at risk of losing its international status and 
identity. Similarly, City o f Sadness incorporated ‘Mainlanders’ into Taiwanese identity 
and tried to make peace with the tortured past. By showing that ’Mainlanders' also 
suffered during the tragic Incident, City o f  Sadness functioned as a kind of mass therapy, 
calling for mutual understanding and tolerance of different ethnic groups at a time when 
Taiwan was embarking upon democratisation in the shadow of the Tiananmen Square 
Massacre in Mainland China. In their different ways both films helped to shape a shared 
sense of national identity in Taiwan.
(3) Watching television and audience reception
Through two waves of in-depth interviews with 19 nuclear families, I examined the 
ways in which the audience appropriated the quintessentially modem sense of 
nationhood. The examination concentrated on (1) viewers' past and present experiences 
with television; (2) viewers' interpretations of the two films in question. I provid;d 
evidence in Chapter 8 to underline the importance of television in bonding the nation 
together. The emergence of television as a nation-wide medium from the early 1970s 
was vitally important in forming a shared cultural experience for viewers dispersed in 
all comers of the island by connecting them with the public realm and the outside world. 
Central to the findings is that the shared viewing experience, particularly at times of 
national crisis, celebration and mourning, has deeply penetrated the viewers' collective 
memories, thereby giving rise to a knowable and communicable community for the 
Taiwanese people, who were previously divided, not least by the lack of a common 
language. In addition, as I argued in Chapter 8, terrestrial television has continued to 
play a key role in maintaining national identity in contemporary Taiwan. Despite a 
radical change in Taiwan's television landscape, television remains a 'domestic' (in bodi 
senses of the word) medium. The national and engaged audience has not yet been 
replaced by a fragmented audience.
The analysis in Chapter 9 showed that viewers are socially structured by the texts and 
the culture they share. They are able to share the texts on the level of denotative 
meanings. It is the media (texts) which make available particular 'reading positions' 
among the possible infinite identifications and which disseminate particular forms of 
knowledge/sentiments for the audience. However, we should not lose sight of the fact
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that audience members are knowledgeable and resourceful agents who interpret media 
texts in various ways. To grasp the full meanings of the text-reader relationship, I have 
argued that a balanced position should be taken to avoid both textual determinism and 
sociological reductionism. Intersections among viewers' social positional factors 
(especially ethnic and generational background) were found to be important in 
structuring the audience's reception of the two films in question. However, when 
interpreting a text, viewers' relations with particular interpretative frames derived from 
social positional factors such as ethnic and generational background are not fixed, in 
the course of interpreting a text, viewers not only make use of various interpretative 
frames, but also occasionally distance themselves from this or that interpretative frame.
10.2  T h e  L i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  T w o  D o m in a n t  P e r s p e c t i v e s
The research evidence points to the paradoxical presence of two seemingly 
contradictory forces: one is the supposedly centripetal force realised by the national 
media (and television in particular), and the other is the centrifugal force afforded by 
the transnational media (and television in particular). These two forces influencing the 
relationship between the media and national identity in Taiwan are captured in the two 
dominant theoretical perspectives in the literature: the diffusionist view of nation il 
identity-formation and the transmission view of communication. However, as we have 
seen, neither of these two approaches can resolve the paradox.
• As explained in Chapter 3, there was a surge of Taiwanese consciousness (or 
Taiwan Yishi in Chinese) from the early 1970s onwards. Expressed through the 
political opposition and nativist literature movements, Taiwan-centred identity 
steadily gathered popular support and ultimately provided the impetus for Taiwan's 
political democratisation of 1987. This is confirmed by both the historical 
overview (Chapter 3) and the empirical research evidence, which reveals the wide 
range of the informants' national identifications (Chapter 9).
• Apart from most radio broadcasting resources and the largest film studio (CMPC), 
the KMT directly owned all of Taiwan's terrestrial television channels until 1996. 
By means of its Mandarinisation, Mainlanderisation and fortification strategies, the 
KMT has mobilised the media to promote Chinese nationalism and suppressed
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virtually everything that might indicate a distinct Taiwanese identity (see Chapter 
4). For the last three decades the national media (and especially television) 
representations have persistently been Mainland-focused (in terms of their spatial 
and temporal attributes), predominantly Mandarin in their use of language, and -  in 
ideological terms -- Chinese nationalist. The content analysis of Taiwan’s 
television serial drama synopses (Chapter 6) between 1971 and 1996 and the 
textual analysis of the 1976 film Victory (Chapter 7) clearly demonstrate these 
persistent characteristics of Taiwan's audio-visual media representations.
• Since the late 1980s there has been an unprecedented influx of foreign audio-visual 
programmes (via Taiwan's cable/satellite television systems) that could hardly be 
expected to promote Taiwanese identity. Like the majority of television households 
in Taiwan, all of the respondent families have for many years had access .o 
cable/satellite television, whose programming has been mainly from outside of 
Taiwan (Chapter 8).
Despite decades of top-down media control aimed at promoting a unified Chinese 
identity, and the increasing influx of foreign programming via the country's high level 
of penetration by cable/satellite television, Taiwan-centred identity has (re-)emerged 
and grown. This apparent paradox can be resolved if we apply the concept of 
'conjunctural mediation' to fully grasp the dynamic complexity of the media-identity 
relationship in the Taiwanese case. The concept of conjunctural mediation is used here 
to emphasise that, first, the formation of national identity is an ongoing process 
involving historical conjunctures which are specific to Taiwan; and secondly, the med a 
constitute the national discursive space in which text (representation/encoding) and 
reader (reception/decoding) intersect. In the later sections of the chapter, I shall further 
demonstrate the usefulness of the concept in understanding the Taiwanese case, 
especially with respect to the relationship between the media and national identity. 
Suffice to say here that the employment of the concept means going beyond the 
limitations of the two dominant perspectives: the diffusionist view of national identity- 
formation (Sahlins, 1989: 8) and the transmission view of communication (Carey, 1989: 
15).
First, as the explicit rationale behind modernist theories of nationalism, the diffusionist 
holds that national identity is built from the centre outward in the process of nation
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building by extending the control of the state to the peripheral areas. According to this 
view, the formation of national identity is tantamount to a process whereby 'a local 
sense of place and a local identity ... must be superseded and replaced by a sense of 
belonging to a more extended territory or nation' (Sahlins, 1989: 8). However, the 
Taiwanese case contradicts this diffusionist view. Although the KMT government 
relocated itself from the presumed centre (Mainland China) to the periphery (Taiwan) 
and a version of Chinese nationalism was imposed from above, 'Taiwanese' as a 
supposedly local identity was in effect not replaced by the supposedly central, national 
identity (i.e. a unified Chinese identity). Instead, the predominant sense of national 
identity in Taiwan has been Taiwan-centred.
Secondly, as a dominant perspective which underpins the arguments of development 
communication, media imperialism and the like (see Chapter 2), the transmission view 
of communication posits a powerful, one-to-many, uni-linear method of communication. 
Communication is seen by the transmission view as 'a process whereby messages are 
transmitted and distributed in space for the control of distance and people' (Carey, 1989: 
15). The most extreme reflection of this line of argument is that of the determimst 
cause-and-effect model, according to which the media, as Morley and Robins 
summarise, are seen as 'the active and determining forces, whilst culture and identity are 
passive and reactive. Communications technologies are the causal forces, and identities 
are the effect, shaped and modified by the "impact" of the technologies' (Morley and 
Robins, 1995: 71). In opposition to this transmission view of communication, and 
despite the impact of the national and global media, the Taiwan-centred national 
identity has steadily grown in importance. The Taiwan-centred identity was clearly 
expressed in the samizdat press (including the KMT government-suppressed political 
magazines, see Chapter 3) throughout Taiwan's authoritarian period and on the local 
radio stations broadcasting in the Taiwanese languages since the lifting of martial law in 
1987. Of particular importance is the fact that, despite the KMT's enormous power to 
buy votes in rural areas, there has been a striking increase in the number of voters 
supporting the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has now 
taken control of most of Taiwan's county mayoral offices. Chen Shui-Bian (the 
presidential candidate for the DPP), hailed by the DPP supporters as a 'Son of Taiwan' 
and elected to become President of Taiwan in 2000, was careful to balance in his 
inaugural speech the symbolic declaration that 'the Taiwanese people have stood up'
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with a reference to the importance of normalising cross-Strait relations. It appears from 
such political developments that whilst Chinese nationalism has conspicuously failed, 
Taiwanese nationalism has not conspicuously succeeded. Indeed, both nationalist 
currents are under transformation in a way that leaves room for their convergence. 1
The inability of both the diffusionist and transmission approaches to resolve the paradox 
concerning the case of Taiwan reflects their more general failure to account for the 
complexity of the national identity-formation process not just in Taiwan but in other 
parts of the world (for cases beyond Taiwan, see Collins, 1990a; Waisbord, 1998). Both 
views provide only a partial account of national identity-formation, oversimplifying tl e 
relationship between the media and national identity and blinding us to the fact that the 
media are not only carriers of identity diffusion but also sites of identity construction. 
Moreover, both views represent a top-down perspective that fails to recognise the 
mediating process between media representation and audience reception.
Despite the fact that Taiwan's national television was under KMT control for a long 
time, it did not successfully create or maintain a greater Chinese national identity 
among the Taiwanese. Rather, it provided the conditions in which the Taiwan-centred 
identity could develop, particularly in the period from the early 1970s to the late 1980s. 
This identity has been increasingly institutionalised and consolidated since the political 
transition of 1987. Thus, the classic Gellnerian congruence of national culture (taken f >r 
the purposes of this study to be media representation) with national identity cannot be 
sustained in the case of Taiwan, where national television culture has neither fitted the 
Taiwan-centred identity nor created a unified Chinese identity of its own.
Furthermore, in the case of Taiwan, the thesis that an 'invasion' of foreign culture by 
means of cable/satellite television has weakened national identity is also untenable. The 
effects of the media as they are perceived by critics of 'media imperialism' are not far 
removed from those anticipated by the pioneer development communication theorists,
1 Chen Shui-Bian’s election to power - w ith only 39% o f the electorate behind him - was most likely t:ie 
result o f  a combination o f  factors. Most significant among these were, on the one hand, his ability o 
detract from the radicalism of Taiwanese nationalism by promising not to declare Taiwan independence if 
he got elected and, on the other, the division o f the KMT campaign into two competing camps (both of 
which, however, were prepared to appeal to the idea o f ‘Taiwan first’ and/or the identity o f  ‘new 
Taiwanese’).
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the main difference being that while the former are seen as negative, the latter are seen 
as a positive contribution to nation building. Though it may be plausible to suggest that 
Taiwanese identity might have been stronger but for the influence of the global media, 
this possibility is hard to verify empirically. The available evidence points to the fact 
that the influx of transnational infotainment via cable/satellite television has not 
weakened the Taiwan-centred identity.
In responding to the inadequacies of the diffusionist and transmission views, one might 
argue that Taiwan represents a unique case where no congruence between national 
identity and media representation is required. However, I wish to argue that there is a 
certain link between media representation and the audience's reception of nationhood, 
but the two dominant perspectives lose sight of it. That is why I adopt the alternative 
viewing that national identity-formation is a process of conjunctural mediation between 
media representation and audience reception.
10.3 T h e  P r o c e s s  o f  C o n j u n c t u r a l  M e d ia t i o n
(1) Why Conjunctural?
In seeking to make sense of the Taiwanese case, we first need to locate the case within 
its shifting historical conjunctures. The Taiwanese nation is in itself a contingent 
formation; there was no indication of its existence until a century ago. In its recent and 
equally contingent formation, it was forged out of specific historical conjunctures 
conditioned by both external and internal forces.
As explained in Chapter 3, externally, the (re-)emergence of Taiwanese nationalism was 
tied to the increasingly unbearable diplomatic isolation of the ROC, starting from 1971 
with its loss of UN membership and culminating in U.S. de-recognition of ROC in 1979. 
Internally, at the same time, Taiwan became a major economic and trading power. The 
growth of income and the extension of nine-year compulsory education gave rise to a 
Taiwan-born middle class whose support was increasingly needed by the ruling KMT in 
order to compensate for its loss of external support. The rise of the previously illegal 
organised political opposition from the second half of the 1970s kept pushing the limits 
of the KMT's endurance. In response to, and as a result of, these external and internal
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changes, the KMT had to make concessions that gradually distanced itself from the 
hitherto stringent Chinese nationalism and softened its nationalistic policies in the 
political democratisation process. Against this backdrop, the KMT reluctantly engaged 
in a symbolic re-interpretation of its long-held 'One China' policy. What is historically 
new in post-Second World War Taiwan is the co-existence of Taiwan as a part o f  and 
as apart from  'China', which is interpreted variously as a cultural 'China', a political 
'China', a 'China-ROC' and a 'China-PRC'.
Taiwan has been an independent state in all but name; however, its statehood has 
remained ambiguous. Political democratisation since 1987 has put an end to the half- 
century of authoritarian rule under the KMT. The pro-Independence candidate, Chen 
Shui-Bian, was elected in 2000 as Taiwan's President by direct vote. Yet the nation's 
official name is still the Republic of China (ROC), a designation which was originally 
formed in Mainland China after the collapse of the Qing Empire (when Taiwan had 
already become part of Japan in legal terms). The ROC is not a member of the United 
Nations and is currently recognised by less than 30 small nations.2 From across the 
Taiwan Strait, the People's Republic of China (PRC) regards Taiwan as an inseparable 
part of China and threatens to unify with it by force if necessary. Despite (or because c f) 
the ambiguity of Taiwan's statehood, the sense of national identity among the 
population with Taiwan itself has been growing. This trend has been expressed in the 
'Taiwan First' slogan that has been used in election campaigns in recent years by all the 
major political parties including the KMT, and was previously expressed in the 1970s 
student Geshin Baotai (literally, 'Reform for defending Taiwan') Movement (see Li,
1987), which arose in reaction to Taiwan's diplomatic setbacks.
It is thus clear that national identity in Taiwan has been formed under certain specific 
conjectural conditions. Moreover, national identity-formation should be seen as a 
mediating process between media texts and audience members.
2
Faced with impending expulsion, the ROC left the UN in 1971 when the admission o f the PRC to the 
UN was becoming inevitable.
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(2) What mediations?
The term ’mediation’ is defined by Raymond Williams as an ’active' process of relations 
between 'different kinds of being and consciousness’ which are 'inevitably mediated' 
(Williams, 1977: 98):
We should not expect to find (or always to find) directly ’’reflected” social 
realities in art, since these (often or always) pass through a process of 
"mediation” in which their original content is changed. (Williams, 1977: 98)
Williams thus rejects the notion of ’reflection’ and favours the term 'mediation' to 
account for the complexity of social reality. But he also cautions that 'mediation' 
denotes 'constitutive' and/or 'constituting' rather than 'intermediary' (Williams, 1977: 99- 
100). That is to say, we should consider the media as the constituting part of the 
mediation process, rather than as an intermediary between two parties (e.g. the state and 
the nation, or the people and national identity).
Jesus Martin-Barbero also uses the term 'mediations' to denote 'the articulations between 
communication practices and social movements and the articulation of different tempos 
of development with the plurality of cultural matrices' (Martin-Barbero, 1993: 188). He 
discusses the idea with reference to the complex process involving racial mixture, 
modernity and tradition, and the blending of 'social structures and sentiments' (Martin- 
Barbero, 1993: 2) in Latin America. He argues that this complex process should be 
considered 'more as a process of mediations than of media, a question of culture, and 
therefore, not just a matter of cognition but of re-cognition' (Martin-Barbero, 1993: 2). 
He goes on to stress the importance of studying 'reception', meaning 'the resistance and 
the varied ways people appropriate media content according to manner of use' (Martin- 
Barbero, 1993: 2).
Following the recommendations of these authors, I employ the idea of conjunctural 
mediation in my analysis of the Taiwanese case. I thus seek to go beyond the limits of 
the 'transmission' and 'diffusionist' perspectives and offer an alternative account of the 
relationship between the media and national identity. The key propositions are as 
follows:
1. Television has contributed to the historical creation o f a national community 
out o f signs, sounds and images in the territory o f Taiwan. In this way, television 
has played a timely role in binding together 'the nation at risk'.
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Together with the introduction of nine-year compulsory education (in Mandarin only) in 
1968 and the civil service’s widespread use of Mandarin, the emergence of television as 
a nation-wide medium from the early 1970s onwards gave further impetus to the rise of 
a single national community of communication (sociability) in Taiwan, whereas tfe 
population was previously divided, not least by differences in spoken language. The 
crucial difference in the age of television was that it became possible to create in 
Taiwan a community not merely out of signs (i.e. the written Chinese script) but also 
out of sounds (i.e. Mandarin) and images. A Taiwanese nation bearing the name of the 
Republic of China was already in place and became a reality for the Taiwanese people 
who lived there.
Furthermore, the everyday presence of television broadcasting since the early 1970s, 
offering viewers of different ethnic origins a shared time and space (symbolic 
commonalties), has enabled them to imagine a community of common destiny. The 
backdrops against which this community of common destiny became imaginable weTe, 
among others: China’s threatening presence (though there has been no war between 
Taiwan and China since 1958), Taiwan’s diplomatic setback, and America's 
abandonment of formal ties to Taiwan and decreasing military support. Television has 
also bound members of this community together, particularly in moments of national 
celebration, mourning and crisis. As revealed in the recollections of the informants, the 
national events of the 1970s (for instance, the annually held Little League World Series 
baseball contests, Chiang Kai-shek's funeral ceremony, and America's abandonment of 
Taiwan) were broadcast live and watched by virtually every television household in 
Taiwan. What matters here is not only that viewers watched the same programmes, but 
also they felt the same sense of pride, sadness, anger or uncertainty (see Chapter 8 ). 
This confirms that the search for the sense of ontological security, as elaborated 1 y 
Giddens (1990), was at play in making a nation out of the Taiwanese people.
2. Television has contributed to flattening difference and diluting antagonism 
among ethnic groups. Watching television has long been a national activity that 
transcends the family boundaries in a context in which the traditional rigid 
differentiation between ’native Taiwanese' and 'Mainlanders' has become 
increasingly indistinct.
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In contrast to such romanticised definitions of solidarity as 'forms of sharing and co­
operation which are genuine and not enforced, that is it implies supportive tolerance and 
solidarity rather than control' (Barker, 1999: 154), the sense of solidarity that initial y 
took root in post-war Taiwan was based more on necessity than will. Notwithstanding 
the estrangement between the 'Mainlanders' and the islanders in the early years of KMT 
rule, the Taiwanese people of disparate ethnic origins found that they were all 'in the 
same boat' in the face of a military threat from the mainland, a sentiment which was also 
exploited by the KMT to consolidate itself on Taiwan.
On the basis of these observations, I conclude that Taiwan as an 'actually' existing and 
imaginable national community of common destiny — in Anderson's sense of an 
'imagined community' (1991) — has been developing since the early 1970s. This robust 
sense of national identity has in part arisen from, and been reinforced by, the 'everyday 
presence' of television and 'togetherness' of television watching. The role of television 
in mediating the sense of national identity since the early 1970s has been profoundly 
important. The political community practically imagined as the nation was already there 
in Taiwan: national television (and cinema) not only helped to shape it but also became 
a constitutive embodiment of it.
3. From the start, the KMT tightly controlled the media fo r  the purpose o f regime 
consolidation and the promotion o f Chinese nationalism, yet the media have not 
represented a seamless web o f meanings. A popular text, regardless o f  its 
hegemonic or commercial purpose, is not encoded in the manner o f  complete 
ideological closure, fo r  this contradicts its aim o f reaching as large an audience 
as possible.
Ideological closure in the sense that a popular text conveys a single, dominant ideology 
is not borne out in the analysis. As I have argued in the synthesis of the dominant 
ideology thesis and the polysemy thesis (see Chapter 5), there is no such a thing as the 
ideological closure of the text. Thus, to state that media representation under KMT 
control was an expression of Chinese nationalism is not entirely accurate. National 
television is almost entirely funded by advertising, and by virtue of that, ratings are 
important (see Chapter 4; on the importance of the television serial drama for the 
finance of national television, see Section 1 of Chapter 6 ). Yet the audience market was 
principally constituted by the 'native Taiwanese', and with the passage of time the term
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'Mainlander' is losing its historical significance as a meaningful social marker in Taiwan. 
Therefore, no text intended to promote a unified Chinese identity could ignore how it 
might be received by the audience. As we have found in the textual analysis of Victory, 
despite the film's emphasis on Chinese nationalism, it could only gain popularity among 
the 'native Taiwanese' who were the majority of the population by offering some 
positive roles for the 'Taiwanese' characters. Similarly, City o f  Sadness, though 
endorsing a sense of Taiwanese nationalism, conveyed a pedagogic message 
transcending the ethnic antagonism between 'Mainlanders' and the 'native Taiwanese'. 
At the very least, in both films, no one of disparate ethnic origins could be offended as 
long as a positive message of solidarity was on offer. In both films the boundaries 
between 'us' and 'them' relied on a broad definition of 'us' that encompassed inhabitants 
of disparate ethnic origins in Taiwan.
4. The audience should not be seen as a tabula rasa' but consists o f knowing 
agents who draw on textual and extra-textual resources to decode what is 
represented. They interpret the texts in various ways, not only employing but also 
accommodating various interpretative codes/frames which are sometimes at 
variance with one another.
As I explained in Chapter 9, viewers are positioned in relation to socio-demographic 
factors such as ethnicity, gender and age. They are able to draw interpretative resources 
from textual and extra-textual sources for themselves and utilise several (at times 
contradictory) interpretative frames to read the text. They can be conformist to some 
extent but are mostly reflexive and purposeful in relation to the media texts.
More importantly, the readings of the text, like the production of the text, socially 
structured. Through interactions with their family members, viewers come up with 
similar if not always consensual conceptions of the state (society) they (or 'we') are in. 
Despite gaps between meanings as inscribed and intended and meanings as received 
and constructed, a temporal attachment to 'the nation' (i.e. in territorial terms, Taiwan) 
is strengthened from moment to moment via the mediation process between media 
representation and audience reception. In this sense, it does not really matter whether a 
text is inherently Taiwanese or Chinese in nationalistic terms; the social behaviour of 
'collective' viewing is more crucial to the formation of national identity.
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5. The global media, although accessible, have not replaced the position o f  
national media, and national television in particular, in terms o f regular viewing 
patterns. Rather, the global media have localised themselves to become popular 
in Taiwan, and the audience use the global media from a local perspective.
As we found in Chapter 8 , national television (both terrestrial and non-terrestrial) 
remains the prime source of audio-visual infotainment for the Taiwanese viewers. The 
cable channels watched most frequently by a large audience are those with generalist 
appeals. Besides, in order to gain popularity, television channels beamed from outside 
Taiwan have adopted a variety of localisation strategies by reducing their 'foreignness' 
to local viewers. There is also a localised use of global media such as CNN among the 
informants: they watch CNN mostly at times when there are local events with regional 
or global implications (e.g. Taiwan's 1995-1996 missile crisis, the 1996 presidential 
election, and Taiwan's earthquake in September 1999, etc.). Thus, the national audience 
in Taiwan has not yet become 'balkanised'.
6. A structure o f feeling, or 'time-place sensibilities' in the Taiwanese case, 
sustains a hybrid sense o f national identity incorporating 'a Taiwan in the present 
with Chinese pasts'. In turn, this underpins a Taiwan-centred identity.
Billig's theory of'banal nationalism' (Billig, 1995) is of use in theorising the persistent 
mode of Taiwan's television representation: the banality of the nationalism that pervades 
Taiwan's television representation provides the symbolic resources for national 
imagination. Although the KMT deliberately sought to make invisible the Taiwanese 
past (especially the pre-1949 past), television unavoidably represented much of'Taiwan 
in the present tense'. On the other hand, 'Mainland China in the present tense' was 
rendered insignificant on television, although the Chinese past in both the ancient and 
pre-1949 eras were always on television (see Figures 6.1 and 9.2). This was 
accompanied by other conjunctural factors that helped to forge a nation in Taiwan that 
was separate from the Chinese people on the mainland under conditions of ignorant 
isolation from the other (Mainland China in the 'present' tense). Or, to use Meyrowitz's 
phrase, they can be said to have been 'isolated together' (Meyrowitz, 1985: 143) in the 
same place of Taiwan. Ironically, this was to KMT's credit. These other conjunctural 
factors may be summarised as follows:
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• The KMT's anticommunist propaganda, customarily demonising the Communist 
regime (as represented in the repeatedly co-broadcast television serial drama Han 
Liu, which was watched and is still vividly remembered by the informants under 
study; see Chapter 8 ).
• Prolonged military confrontation and antagonism across the Taiwan Strait.
• A lack of trust, contact and understanding between China and Taiwan, which have 
stood in mutual isolation for half a century.
Thus, ironically, the KMT has made its Communist rival virtually invisible to the 
Taiwanese people (who were expected to re-unite with Mainland China). Yet this 
invisibility has posed a psychological threat to the Taiwanese people, thereby alienating 
them from political identification with China.
The prime-time television serial dramas, as analysed in Chapter 6 , have provided a 
unique cultural geography for Taiwanese viewers: 'A Taiwan in the present tense with 
Chinese pasts'. The Chinese mainland has been constantly evoked, though in an 
imaginary way, in these dramas, whereas Taiwan has been deprived of its past (i.e. the 
pre-1949 past). As the interviews with the informants revealed, this has formed a 
peculiar 'structure of feeling' (to use Raymond Williams's term), or 'time-place 
sensibilities' in the Taiwanese case, which in turn have underpinned the hybrid sense of 
national identity. As we saw in Chapter 9, the majority of the informants located 
themselves somewhere in-between, seeing themselves as politically Taiwanese but 
culturally Chinese — an overlapping allegiance which is summed up in the term 
'Taiwan-centred identity'.
On the one hand, as indicated in the interviews with the informants (Chapter 9), the 
trajectory of national identity-formation in Taiwan constitutes neither reversion nor 
replacement. Thus, what is assumed to be the current national identity is not merely the 
return of the previously repressed; rather, Taiwanese consciousness has itself been 
transformed in the process of accommodating the state known as the Republic of China. 
On the other hand, the sense of China as the homeland is further detached from the 
political (Taiwan as apart from  China), whilst at the same time the sense of China as a 
cultural homeland is more or less retained (Taiwan as a part o f  China).
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Furthermore, the informants' sense of national identity exhibits both certainty and 
ambiguity. On the one hand, the informants are in favour of maintaining the status quo; 
for them neither unification with nor formal independence from China is currently an 
option. On the other hand, they regard Taiwan as a de facto independent state and see 
cross-Strait relations as a special state-to-state case, while keeping open both options 
(of formal independence and unification with China). In other words, national identity 
as being for them is located in somewhere in-between what is politically Taiwanese but 
culturally Chinese. As for national identity as becoming, the viewers tend to adopt a 
pragmatic attitude that may be seen as a kind of deferral. Even those respondents who 
believe that Taiwan should be reunited with the mainland (11 out of 62 informants, see 
Figure 9.1) hold an attitude of'unification but not now' and 'unification under some kind 
of political arrangement on our own terms'. In other words, this is still a 'Taiwan- 
centred identity'.
10.4 I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  R e s e a r c h
It has been the purpose of this thesis to explore the relationship between the media (and 
television in particular) and national identity by reference to concepts derived from the 
fields of nationalism, media studies and cultural studies as well as the debates over 
questions of cultural globalisation and hybridity. I shall first consider the implications of 
the research for an understanding of Taiwan's national identity. Then I shall turn to the 
broader implications for situating the role of the media in theories of nationalism and 
the analysis of national identity.
First, in line with the expectations of modernist theories of nationalism, both the 
Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism? in Taiwan are of relatively recent origin. It is a 
principal contention of this thesis that at the root of Taiwan's transition to democracy 
was a significant transfer of power from Chinese nationalism to Taiwan-centred 
nationalism. At the same time, this shift should not be seen simply as the return of what 
was previously repressed. In other words, Taiwanese identity of late and the 'authentic', 
'essentialist' form of Taiwanese identity dating back to the colonial era are not one and 
the same. Rather, national identity in Taiwan is a social product, interwoven with 
changes in relations of gender, ethnicity and generation that have created a space in 
which the hitherto antagonistic nationalist discourses could converge. Nationalism in
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contemporary Taiwan is becoming more civic than ethnic in character: ethnicity as a 
social marker is less significant than ever, and politicians playing the ethnicity card are 
publicly condemned.
Secondly, national identity in Taiwan has assumed a hybrid form; it has absorbed and 
adapted to external cultural influences. Historically, as the periphery of the Qing Empire 
and as a colony of imperial Japan, Taiwan was subsequently overwhelmed by Chinese 
nationalism and the anti-communist ideology sanctioned by the KMT state. The 
hybridised national identity (for which the term 'Taiwan-centred identity' may be used 
as a shorthand expression) was itself shaped by complex power relations between the 
media and the audience, between the state and the citizenry, and between forces of the 
local and the global. As opposed to the conventional conceptions of cultural 
hybridisation, I argue that the hybrid identity in Taiwan has two key characteristics: (1) 
the make-up of that hybrid identity is in part determined by the mass-mediated 'time- 
place sensibilities'; (2 ) the hybrid identity is not an undifferentiated entity in the sense 
that its components are of equal weight; rather people give one or another component 
priority and invest each with different meanings according to the particular context. 
Furthermore, I have found that a clear sense of belonging to Taiwan and an emphasis on 
Taiwanese citizenship have become increasingly important features of this hybrid 
identity.
Thirdly, the formerly rigid boundaries between Chinese and Taiwanese identities have 
been destabilised. There is of course no way of going back to the essentialised and 
romanticised identities asserted by radicals among the Chinese and Taiwanese 
nationalists. Both identities were, in extreme fashion, regressive forms of identification: 
(1) Chinese nationalism was a violent though 'inclusionary' force which allowed no 
room for a distinct Taiwanese identity; (2) Taiwanese nationalism asserted a victimised 
yet 'exclusionary' identity which regarded Chinese culture as something that had to be 
resisted altogether. Because of the relational nature of national identity, it can be said 
that remnants of 'Chinese' identity such as the politically institutionalised and socially 
performed loyalties to the de facto independent Republic of China (ROC) have become 
part of contemporary Taiwanese identity. Different modes of identification with the 
nation do not compete in zero-sum terms but may result in an inter-penetration of 
competing senses of national identity. In the case of Taiwan, however plausible it may
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have been to see national identity as a singularity imposed from above in the early years 
of authoritarian rule, the singular, unified Chinese identity (if it was ever established 
and sustained) lost momentum in the course of societal transformation. However, this 
process was not simply a matter of one particular strand of nationalism being 
superseded by another.
Fourthly, globalisation in terms of trans-border cultural flows has broadened the cultural 
horizon, but Taiwan’s national identity remains robust. This challenges the conventional 
thinking that the consumption of the global media will necessarily result in a weakened 
local/national identity. In fact, the pace and scope of cultural globalisation has not 
prevented the growth of a sense of belonging to Taiwan. Indeed, cultural globalisation 
in association with the continuing importance of national media might inculcate in the 
people of Taiwan ’a progressive sense of place' (Massey, 1993), meaning that it is 
possible to have allegiances to both 'the place' and 'places beyond'. Two forces specific 
to Taiwan seem to have contributed to this trend. The first is Taiwan's democratisation, 
which resulted from the rising tide of Taiwanese consciousness, as discussed in Chapter
3. The second force is the cross-Strait linkage driven by the force of globalisation. 
Through Taiwan's heavy investment in the mainland, the economic ties between the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait have become stronger than ever and have put an end to 
decades of mutual isolation between the two sides. As this interdependence grows, the 
Taiwanese people's sense of national identity assumes an increasingly pragmatic form, 
emphasising the need to avoid any radical move to declare formal independence and to 
maintain Taiwan's de facto independence. At the same time, this pragmatic 
consciousness is changing the perception of the 'national self in relation to the broadly 
defined 'other'. Democratisation allows more balanced and up-to-date information about 
Mainland China to circulate in Taiwan, and globalisation increases the degree of 
economic interdependence across the Strait. This is increasingly nurturing among tie  
Taiwanese people a growing willingness to engage with 'others', especially those in the 
Chinese mainland, and also a growing awareness of having to come to terms with the 
'others' who are located across the Strait. They will have to find a way to negotiate over 
their remaining conflicts of interest on the basis of mutual respect and recognition. This 
suggests that for the Taiwanese there is a real prospect of 'having the best of both 
worlds by being both Taiwanese and Chinese' (to use a phrase akin to that used by the 
informants, see Chapter 9).
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On a broader level, the research has implications for our understanding of the place of 
media in the theories of nationalism and the analysis of national identity-formation. 
Although this formulation -  national identity-formation as a process of conjunctural 
mediation between media representation and audience reception -  will undoubtedly 
require further amendment according to the contingent particularities of any given case, 
I believe that it offers a useful tool of analysis in media studies beyond the Taiwanese 
case. It is likely to be especially useful in studying the relationship between the media 
and national identity in cases where issues of territorial ’unification' versus 
'independence' are of importance. Grounded in empirical evidence, this thesis argu es 
that both the transmission view of communication and the diffusionist view of national 
identity-formation should be replaced by the more sophisticated formulation of a 
conjunctural mediation process between media representation and audience reception 
(and between the powerful media and the active audience). From this perspective, this 
thesis has identified the main ways in which the mass media, and especially national 
television, have contributed to the formation of national identity in Taiwan.
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Appendices
A p p e n d ix  I :  T h e  L is t s  o f  T e l e v is io n  Se r ia l  D r a m a s
1. Xiu ling (TTV, Nov. 1971 )a
2. Da di chang qing (TTV, Nov.
1971 )a
3. Jin qua shi (TTV, Nov. 1971 )a
4. Xiu ling (TTV, Dec. 1971)
5. Da di chang qing (TTV, Dec. 1971)
6 . Xiao cheng gu shi (TTV, Dec.
1971)
7. Jin qua shi (TTV, Dec. 1971)
8 . Hu tu da jian ke (TTV, Apr. 1972)
9. Gan guo bao guo Taiwan (TTV, 
Apr. 1972)
10. Shen Chou hao xia zhuan (TTV, 
Apr. 1972)
11. Gu chu lei (TTV, Apr. 1972)
12. Min jian gu shi: Giu lan ke (TTV, 
Apr. 1972)
13. Qing chun gu wang (TTV, Oct.
1972)
14. Yan cheng gu zhang (TTV, Oct.
1972)
15. Fo zu (TTV, Oct. 1972)
16. A shui mu yu a mu shen (TTV, Apr.
1973)
17. Da jiang ying hao (TTV, Oct.
1973)
18. Ye lang gu (TTV, Oct. 1973)
19. Song gong mi shi (TTV, Apr. 1974)
20. Fa zhou (TTV, Oct. 1974)
21. Yu p i pa  (TTV, Apr. 1975)
22. Jin yu yuan (TTV, Oct. 1975)
23. Rou qing wan lu (TTV, Apr. 1976)
24. Dan qing yuan (TTV, Oct. 1976)
25. Yu mian dan xin (TTV, Apr. 1977)
26. Yi jian wan lu qing (TTV, Oct.
1977)
27. Da di fe i long (TTV, Apr. 1978)
28. Da di er nu (TTV, Oct. 1978)
29. Han liu (TTV, Apr. 1979)b
30. Tie xie zhuang yuan (TTV, Apr.
1979)
31. Bi yuan tian (TTV, Oct. 1979)
32. Qi zhong qi (TTV, Oct. 1979)
33. Jinpu sha (TTV, Apr. 1980)
34. Mang nu shen long (TTV, A;: r.
1980)
35. Xia ying xiang zong (TTV, Oct.
1980)
36. Jin fengyuan  (TTV, Apr. 1981)
37. Caiyun fe i  (TTV, Apr. 1981)
38. Jiang shan wan li qing (TTV, Oct.
1981)
39. Ba li j i  chang (TTV, Apr. 1982)
40. Xia gu rou qing lei (TTV, Apr.
1982)
41. Jin se de gu xiang (TTV, Oct. 1982)
42. Han jiang feng yun (TTV, Apr.
1983)
43. Mingyue tianya (TTV, Apr. 1983)
44. Xing xing zhi wo xin (TTV, Oct.
1983)
45. Xiang tai yang tiao zhan (TTV, 
Oct. 1983)
46. Tie xie yang jia  jiang  (TTV, Apr.
1984)
47. Yi qian ge chun tian (TTV, Apr. 
1984)
48. Leng yue gu xing jian (TTV, Oct. 
1984)
49. Wei zhen si hai (TTV, Oct. 1984)
50. Xiao ao jiang hu (TTV, Apr. 1985)
51. A langyu bin bin (TTV, Apr. 1985)
52. Xin jian  (TTV, Oct. 1985)
5 3. Xing xing yue Iiang tai yang (TTV, 
Oct. 1985)
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54. Yang gui fe i chuan qi (TTV, Apr. 
1986)
55. Fengyun ren wu (TTV, Apr. 1986)
56. Xin jue dai shuangjiao (TTV, Oct.
1986)
57. Zuo ri meng yi yuan (TTV, Apr.
1987)
58. Yong zhe de fen dou (TTV, Oct.
1987)
59. Huang jin  kong que (TTV, Apr.
1988)
60. Zi se de meng (TTV, Apr. 1988)
61. Ba yue gui hua xiang (TTV, Oct.
1988)
62. You chai zong shi an dui ling (TTV, 
Apr. 1989)
63. Shei sha le da ming xing (TTV, 
Apr. 1989)
64. You jian you chai lai an ling (TTV, 
Oct. 1989)
65. Xin ti xiao yin yuan (TTV, Oct.
1989)
6 6 . Ci ke lie zhuan (TTV, Apr. 1990)
67. You chai san du lai an ling (TTV,' 
Apr. 1990)
6 8 . Mo dai er nu qing (TTV, Oct. 1990)
69. Xue shan fe i hu (TTV, Apr. 1991)
70. Jiang hu zai jian (TTV, Oct. 1991)
71. Ban sheng yuan yi shi qing (TTV, 
Apr. 1992)
72. Ying xiong shi jia  (TTV, Oct. 1992)
73. Ren jian tian tang (TTV, Apr. 
1993)
74. Ying xiong shao nian (TTV, Apr. 
1993)
75. Xi shuo qian long (TTV, Oct. 1993)
76. Chu lian san shi nian (TTV, Oct.
1993)
77. Yi tian tu longji (TTV, Apr. 1994)
78. Liang ge yong heng: Xin yue ge ge 
(TTV, Oct. 1994)
79. Tang tai zong Li Shimin (TTV, Oct.
1994)
80. Taiwan Shui hu zhuan (TTV, Apr.
1995)
81. Xiang shuai chuan qi (TTV, Apr.
1995)
82. Qing ai hong chen (TTV, Oct.
1995)
83. Qing jian shan he (TTV, Apr. 
1996)
84. Xin long men ke zhan (TTV, Oct.
1996)
85. Hua luo hua kai (TTV, Oct. 1996)
8 6 . Mu qing (CTV, Nov. 1971 )a
87. Qin shi cun (CTV, Nov. 1971)
8 8 . Da luo dagu  (CTV, Nov. 1971)a
89. Mu qing (CTV, Dec. 1971)
90. Da luo da gu (CTV, Dec. 1971)
91. Long jiang en chou (CTV, Dec.
1971)
92. Sheng nu ling mo niang (CTV, Apr.
1972)
93. Haiyan (CTV, Apr. 1972)
94. Mangjian ke (CTV, Apr. 1972)
95. Tai shan hong yan (CTV, Apr.
1972)
96. Wu ming huo (CTV, Oct. 1972)
97. Da lu (CTV, Oct. 1972)
98. Jia you jiao qi (CTV, Apr. 1973)
99. Ku qing hua (CTV, Oct. 1973)
100. Yi dai bao jun  (CTV, Apr. 1974)
101. Wu sheng guan gong (CTV, Oct.
1974)
102. Xin niang yu wo (CTV, Oct. 1974)
103. Aixin  (CTV, Oct. 1974)
104. Jia you jiao qi (CTV, Oct. 1974)
105. Yi dai hong yan (CTV, Apr. 1975)
106. Da di feng lei (CTV, Oct. 1975)
107. Na li lai de mo sheng ren (CTV, 
Oct. 1975)
108. Chi di (CTV, Apr. 1976)
109. Xiao nu xing (CTV, Apr. 1976)
110. Tain nu (CTV, Oct. 1976)
111. Mi qing (CTV, Apr. 1977)
112. Da jie  (CTV, Oct. 1977)
113. Jiang shan wan li qing (CTV, Apr.
1978)
114. Quan lei da (CTV, Oct. 1978)
115. Ji fan feng yu j i  fan  qing (CTW, 
Oct. 1978)
116. Han liu (CTV, Apr. 1979)b
117. Yi xi qing sha wan lu qing (CTV, 
Oct. 1979) ,
118. Ai zhi ge (CTV, Oct. 1979)
119. Qin chai da ren (CTV, Apr. 1980)
120. Qingsuo (CTV, Apr. 1980)
121. Ming ri zou tian ya (CTV, Oct.
1980)
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122. Yi jia zh i zhu (CTV, Oct. 1980)
123. Zhan guo feng yun (CTV, Apr.
1981)
124. Wang shi zhi duo shao (CTV, Apr.
1981)
125. Xiang jian shi nan bieyi nan (CTV, 
Oct. 1981)
126. Shi yue fen fang  (CTV, Oct. 1981)
127. Bi xie rou qing (CTV, Oct. 1981)
128. Chun nong qing geng nong (CTV, 
Apr. 1982)
129. Ku hai yu sheng (CTV, Oct. 1982)
130. Xiang si wan li xin (CTV, Oct.
1982)
131. Mei hau te gong dui (CTV, Apr.
1983)
132. Shao nian shi wu er shi shi (CTV, 
Apr. 1983)
133. Da zhi fa  (CTV, Oct. 1983)
134. Cheng gong ling shang (CTV, Apr.
1984)
\2>5.Ai he bi shuo zai jian  (CTV, Apr.
1984)
136. Shu jian qian giu (CTV, Oct. 1984)
137. Wu suo nan yang (CTV, Apr. 1985)
138. Ta shi wo ma ma (CTV, Apr. 1985)
139. Xin sheng lei hen (CTV, Oct. 1985)
140. Da jiang jun xiao feng xian (CTV, 
Oct. 1985)
141. Shang cuo tan tang tou cuo tai 
(CTV, Apr. 1986)
142. Yi dai gong zhu (CTV, Apr. 1986)
143. Wo jin  wo de shou (CTV, Oct. 
1986)
144. Jia he wan shi xing (CTV, Oct.
1986) ’
145. Yi dai ge hou (CTV, Apr. 1987)
146. Chang jiang yi hao (CTV, Oct.
1987)
147. Qi wang (CTV, Apr. 1988)
148. Wu ren xing (CTV, Apr. 1988)
149. Wang zhao jun  (CTV, Oct. 1988)
150. Diao chan (CTV, Oct. 1988)
151. Yan zhi kuo (CTV, Apr. 1989)
152. Tian shi zhi ai (CTV, Apr. 1989)
153. Chu tou bo shi (CTV, Oct. 1989)
154. Xin xi you j i  (CTV, Apr. 1990)
155. Tali de nu ren (CTV, Apr. 1990)
156. Xi wang zhi ge (CTV, Oct. 1990)
157. Jin se shi guang (CTV, Apr. 1991)
158. Zhang guan hao (CTV, Oct. 1991)
159. Po xi guo zhao yi jia  qing (CTV, 
Oct. 1991)
160. Qing qing he bian cao (CTV, Apr. 
1992)
161. Jun guan yu shu nu (CTV, Oct.
1992)
162. Zai shi qing yuan (CTV, Oct. 1992)
163. Huang tu di wai de tian kong 
(CTV, Apr. 1993)
164. Xi shuo ci xi (CTV, Apr. 1993)
165. Mei gui hao qing (CTV, Oct. 1993)
166. Mei hua san nong (CTV, Oct.
1993)
167. Yang nai wu yu xiao bai cai (CTV, 
Apr. 1994)
168. 4^ xin (CTV, Oct. 1994)
169. Ai zai ta xiang (CTV, Apr. 1995)
170. Tian shi zhong kui (CTV, Oct.
1995)
171. Guan shi yin zhi ma zu bai quan 
yin (CTV, Oct. 1995)
172. Yi lain you meng (CTV, Apr. 1996)
173. Duan zhang shun niang (CTV, Oct.
1996)
174. Tian gong teng hao ren (CTV, Oct.
1996)
175. Guo z iy i  (CTS, Nov. 1971)
176. YanshuangfeiiCTS, Nov. 1971)a
177. Wan jia  sheng fo  (CTS, Nov.
1971)a
178. Da di zhi chun (CTS, Nov. 1971)a
179. Xing fit chuan (CTS, Nov. 1971)a
180. Xingfu chuan (CTS, Dec. 1971)
181. Yan shuangfei (CTS, Dec. 1971)
182. Wan jia  sheng fo  (CTS, Dec. 1971)
183. Da di zhi chun (CTS, Dec. 1971)
184. Jia qing jun yu wang de lu (CTS, 
Dec. 1971)
185. Du yuan yang (CTS, Dec. 1971)
186. Xiong diying hao (CTS, Dec. 1971)
187. Xi yan (CTS, Apr. 1972)
188. Xi luo qi jian (CTS, Apr. 1972)
189. M azu zhuan (CTS, Apr. 1972)
190. Sheng li zhi lu: Fu yu zi (CTS, Apr.
1972)
191. Qi shifu qi (CTS, Apr. 1972)
192. Bai he hua (CTS, Oct. 1972)
193. Xi luo qi jian  (CTS, Oct. 1972)
194. Sheng long he hu (CTS, Oct. 1972)
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195. Feng shan hu (CTS, Oct. 1972)
196. Yan yang tian (CTS, Oct. 1972)
197. Feng we wei (CTS, Apr. 1973)
198. Dong gang a chun (CTS, Apr.
1973)
199. Xiao xiong di (CTS, Oct. 1973)
200. Piao paioyu  (CTS, Oct. 1973)
201. F[un yin de gu shi (CTS, Oct. 1973)
202. Yan zhi hu (CTS, Oct. 1973)
203. Long hu er nu (CTS, Apr. 1974)
204. Bao qing tian (CTS, Apr. 1974)
205. Bao qing tian (CTS, Oct. 1974)a
206. Bao biao (CTS, Oct. 1974)
207. Bao biao (CTS, Apr. 1975)a
208. Hong xi guan yu Fang shi yu (CTS, 
Oct. 1975)
209. Ying xiong (CTS, Apr. 1976)
210. Shen feng  (CTS, Apr. 1976)
211. Hu dan (CTS, Oct. 1976)
212. Long hu feng yun (CTS, Apr. 1977)
213. Feng huang yu fe i (CTS, Apr. 
1977)
214. Yu fu  rong (CTS, Oct. 1977)
215. Chun hui (CTS, Apr. 1978)
216. Jia zai Taibei (Home in Taipei) 
(CTS, Oct. 1978)
217. Chun feng da di (CTS, Oct. 1978)
218. Han liu (CTS, Apr. 1979)
219. Pian pian chun yang pian pian 
qing (CTS, Apr. 1979)
220. Feng yun hui (CTS, Oct. 1979)
221. Xin you qian qian jie  (CTS, Oct. 
1979)
222. Chun yu zhao yang (CTS, Oct.
1979)
223. Huan fe i hua wu hua man tian 
(CTS, Oct. 1979)
224. Jiang nan you (CTS, Apr. 1980)
225. Xia ke (CTS, Oct. 1980)
226. Jin pai mi shi (CTS, Oct. 1980)
227. Jiang nan chun (CTS, Oct. 1980)
228. Wu tu wu min (CTS, Apr. 1981)
229. Chang jiang yi tiao long (CTS, 
Apr. 1981)
230. Chun wang (CTS, Oct. 1981)
231. Tang san wu jie  (CTS, Oct. 1981)
232. Lei ting qian li (CTS, Apr. 1982)
233. Huo yuan jia  (CTS, Apr. 1982)
234. Wan jia  deng huo (CTS, Oct. 1982)
235. You jian qian shou (CTS, Apr.
1983)
236. Hu shan xing (CTS, Apr. 1983)
237. He chu shi er jia  (Where is my 
home?) (CTS, Oct. 1983)
238. Xiang gang (Hong Kong) 1952 
(CTS, Apr. 1984)
239. Qi huan ju  chang (CTS, Apr. 1984)
240. Tian can zai bian (CTS, Apr. 1984)
241. Si qian jin  (CTS, Oct. 1984)
242. Da di chun lei (CTS, Apr. 1985)
243. Hong fen jia  ren (CTS, Oct. 1985)
244. Lanyu hei (CTS, Oct. 1985)
245. Yang gui fe i  (CTS, Apr. 1986)
246. Hua yue zheng chun feng  (CTS, 
Apr. 1986)
247. Yan yu meng meng (CTS, Oct. 
1986)
248. Chang xiang yi (CTS, Oct. 1986)
249. Xin meng li jun  (CTS, Apr. 1987)
250. Xi cong tian jiang  (CTS, Oct. 19i.7) 
251 .Jiang hua yan yun (CTS, Apr.
1988)
252. Ming yun de suo lian (CTS, Oct.
1988)
253. Shuang mian you xia (CTS, Oct.
1988)
254. Hai ou fei chu cai yun fei (CTS, 
Apr. 1989)
255. Bu liao qing (CTS, Apr. 1989)
256. Liu zhuang shi (CTS, Oct. 1989)
257. Liu ge meng: San duo hua (CTS, 
Apr. 1990)
258. Yang zi bu jiao shei zhi guo (CTS, 
Apr. 1990)
259. Da bingri j i  (CTS, Oct. 1990)
260. Ji du chun feng j i  du shuang (CT >, 
Oct. 1990)
261. Shao nian zhang san feng  (CTS, 
Apr. 1991)
262. Jia you xian qi (CTS, Apr. 1991)
263. Jing cheng si shao (CTS, Oct.
1991)
264. Yuan (CTS, Apr. 1992)
265. Yi nan wang (CTS, Apr. 1992)
266. Biao mei j i  xiang (CTS, Oct. 1992)
267. Shu jian en chou lu (CTS, Oct.
1992)
268. Bao qing tian (CTS, Apr. 1993)
269. Bao qing tian (CTS, Oct. 1993)a
247
270. Ba wang hua (CTS, Apr. 1994)
271. Huan xi lou (CTS, Apr. 1994)
272. Lu chang qing geng chang (CTS, 
Oct. 1994)
273. Xiong di you yuan (CTS, Apr.
1995)
274. Quan shi xi fit (CTS, Oct. 1995)
275. Shi jian fu  qi (CTS, Apr. 1996)
276. Guan gong (CTS, Oct. 1996)
277. A zu (CTS, Oct. 1996)
Notes:
a Repeats on the same channel in the same year were not included for coding. 
b Repeats across channels were included for coding.
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A p p e n d ix  II: E x a m p l e s  o f  T e l e v is io n  D r a m a  Sy n o p s e s
Drama Title_____________ Synopses_________________________________________
Xing xing zhi wo xin (TTV, Set in Taiwan in the 1970s, this is a TV drama focusing 
Oct. 1983) on the difficult situation facing an ill widow (played by
Wu Jingxian). She loves her five children very much and 
works hard to raise them. However, her worsening illness 
prevents he from working. Her eldest daughter Xiu-xiu 
(played by Shi Anni) is still a secondary schoolgirl but 
manages to help her mother to look after the four younger 
children. The fifth child Bing-bing (played by the child 
actor Bing-bing) also plays an important role in the 
drama. The widow is conscious of how serious her illness 
is and she makes a painful decision to give away all of 
her children. She does everything she can to make sure 
that all her five children are adopted by good foster 
parents as soon as possible before her death. The five 
children are finally adopted by five different families and 
they have to separate from their mother and from one 
another. However, for better or worse, they maintain a 
strong sentimental link with their mother and with each 
other. The central themes of the drama are as follows: the 
eldest daughter's filial piety, the widow's maternal love, 
and the close relations among the five children. The 
critics describe the drama as heart-warming and moving -  
one which calls viewers to come together in front of the 
television as it has higher ratings than other competing 
television dramas broadcast on CTV and CTS at the same 
time. This is a TV drama in Mandarin with Chinese 
subtitles, though one of the subsidiary characters (the 
foster mother of the fourth child) speaks Hakka 
occasionally.
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Yi dai bao jun  (CTV, Apr. The programme dramatises the life of Qin Shih-huang
1974) (Yin Zheng), the first Emperor of the Qin Dynasty. He
emerges as the successor of one of the kingdoms and 
defeats six other kingdoms. Thus, China becomes unified 
for the first time in history. However, the Emperor is 
tyrannical, and, fearing that his Empire will be 
endangered by the remaining forces of the defeated six 
kingdoms, he establishes a terrorist regime. He murders 
the intellectuals and bums all written materials except for 
those dealing with medicine and agriculture. He also 
confiscates all metals to prevent them being used to make 
weapons that could be used against him. His tyranny, 
however, does not last long. People rise in protest against 
his rule. Shortly after his death, his Empire collapses and 
is finally overthrown. The drama is broadcast in 
Mandarin with Chinese subtitles.
Justice Bao {Bao qing tien, Justice Bao (played by Jin Chao-qun) is the magistrate of
CTS, Apr. and Oct. 1993) the capital city of the Song Dynasty (960-1279). He
enforces the law fairly and regardless of social class. He 
even brings the son-in-law of the Emperor to justice. He 
is always fighting for justice against villains, the 
aristocracy and the powerful. According to one comment, 
it seems as if the whole of Taiwan is watching TV as the 
drama of Justice Bao unfolds over more than 100 
evenings in 1993. According to Asiaweek, the Taiwan- 
made TV drama Justice Bao 'captivated audiences around 
Asia with its passionate depiction of justice during the 
Song Dynasty' (Asiaweek, March 20, 1998: 36). The 
drama is shown in Mandarin with Chinese subtitles.
Yi tian tu long j i  (TTV, The drama is drawn from the historical novel of the same
Apr. 1994) name written by Jin Yong. Set in China under the
Mongols during the Yuan Dynasty (1280-1368), it 
describes an innocent orphan Zhang Wuji (played by Liu 
Dekai) who happens to have unmatchable martial art 
skills. He wins the respect of members of secret societies 
which are trying to oust the Mongols from China and 
subsequently becomes leader of these societies. Several 
female characters cannot help but fall in love with Zhang 
Wuji, who is a fine man. Because of his unselfishness, he 
is framed by a member of his own staff, the vicious Zhu 
Yuanzhang. He finally leads the Han people to tear down 
the Mongol Empire and secludes himself and his lover 
from society and power, whereupon Zhu Yuanzhang 
becomes the Emperor of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). 
The drama is shown in Mandarin with Chinese subtitles.
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A p p e n d ix  I I I :  C o d in g  P r o t o c o l  f o r  P r im e -T im e  T e l e v is io n  Se r ia l
D r a m a s
INTRODUCTION
This protocol aims to assess the generic, linguistic, spatial (geographical) and 
temporal representations in the prime-time television serial dramas which were 
broadcast on the three terrestrial television channels between 1971 and 1996.
PRIME-TIME TELEVISION SOAPS
This refers to prime-time television serials broadcast during the sample months 
between 1971 and 1996.
PROCEDURE
Before coding a programme from the descriptive synopses of television serial dramas, 
read carefully the instructions for the definitions of the variables (V stands for 
variable) described below.
VI. IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF THE PROGRAMME.
V2. YEAR
The date when the programme is broadcast (year and month).
V3. TIME-SPAN
1= 1971-1979 2= 1980-1987 3= 1988-1996
V4. CHANNEL: 1-TTV, 2=CTV, 3=CTS 
The channel on which the programme is broadcast.
V5. BROADCAST LANGUAGE
The language used by the characters in the programme.
1 = Mandarin Mandarin is the sole or predominant
language used by the characters in the
programme.
2 = Taiwanese (Hokkien and Hakka) Taiwanese is the sole or predominant
language used by the characters in the
programme.
3 = Mixed Both Mandarin and Taiwanese are used by
the characters but neither Mandarin nor
Taiwanese is predominant.
4 = Unknown
V6. PLACE OF SETTING
The geographical (spatial) setting of the narrative of the programme.
1 = Mainland China
The central plot of the programme takes place in Mainland China.
2 = Taiwan
The central plot of the programme takes place in Taiwan.
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3 = Other
V7. TIME OF SETTING
The temporal location of the narrative of the programme.
1 -  Remote Past
The central plot of the programme takes place before the Nationalist government fled 
to Taiwan in 1949.
2 = Recent Past
The central plot of the programme takes place after the Nationalist government fled to 
Taiwan in 1949.
3 = Unknown
V8. GENRE
The genre of the programme.
1 = Romance/Family
The plot turns on central themes of familial relations and romance between main 
characters, with an emphasis on filial piety, heterosexual love, or regard for authority 
as social norms.
2 = Action/Martial arts Either (1) constantly uses physical
violence with primary focus on the causes 
or consequences of illegal activities, or of 
conflicts with a hostile army or country. 
Central figures include criminals, victims 
and those who work in the criminal justice 
system (e.g. private eyes, amateur 
detectives, police, courts, and gangsters). 
Diversionist activities in wartime, or 
peacetime spying, against the enemies are 
also included in this category.
Or (2) kung-fu! martial arts. The kung-fu 
or martial arts dramas usually set the 
narrative scene 'historically’ in the remote 
Chinese (or Taiwanese) past. Sometimes 
there is no explicit spatio-temporal setting, 
but there are usually clues (e.g. the 
costumes) to suggest the Chinese 
mainland (or Taiwan) and the era of 
dynastic China. The characters are mainly 
fictional.
3 = History Either (1) serials with a story adapted
from well-known Chinese (or Taiwanese) 
history, whose plots often centre on 
historic figures. This often overlaps with 
Martial Arts and Romance/Drama, as it 
often includes 'historic figures' with a 
talent for martial arts, or who are involved 
in (un)recorded romance. The central 
figures are presented as historically ‘true’.
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Or (2) the situation is portrayed in a 
’realist' narrative with explicit or implicit 
reference to a particular historical/social 
event, exposing the dark side of a society 
(such as the sufferings of the people in 
Communist China) or touching on a 
sensitive/controversial issues pertinent to a 
society (such as interethnic conflict, social 
inequality, or political taboo).
4 = Other The generic type of programme is judged
from the information contained in the 
descriptive synopses to be something other 
than any of the above. For example, Farce, 
Fictional Fantasy, etc. The descriptive 
synopses of the TV serials do not provide 
sufficient information for assessing the 
____________________________________ programme's generic type.______________
253
A p p e n d ix  IV : P l o t  S u m m a r ie s  o f  t h e  F il m s
(1) Plot Summary o f  Victory
Somewhere near a village supposedly located in southern Taiwan, two boys and two 
girls play among the plum trees of the woods. The boys are brothers: the elder is 
Juguang and the younger Juyong. Two girls, Wenying and Xiaohui, are attracted by 
Juguang. By contrast, Juyong is unattractive to, and disliked by, the two girls. Juguang 
later marries Wenying. They have a baby boy named Jixian. Juyong's marriage proposal 
is persistently refused by Xiaohui. Captain Ikeda (Chitian in Chinese), head of the 
Japanese military police and classmate of both Juguang and Wenying, comes to greet 
the couple on the birth of their son. The celebratory scene immediately turns sour, and 
the gentry, in particular, show their antagonism towards Ikeda. Ikeda himself is aware of 
being uninvited and so leaves soon afterwards. Before he leaves, he leaks an official 
secret to Juguang about the plan of the Japanese military to build a power plant by the 
dam. For this plan to proceed, the Lin family’s ancestor's tombs (by the dam) will have 
to be removed. Juguang strongly opposes the plan, knowing that his father will fight to 
the death to defend the ancestors' tombs, but both Juguang and Ikeda know that the 
Japanese military are determined to carry the plan forward.
Because he is jobless and idle, Juyong finds it hard to please his father and Xiaohui. 
Since he is trained as an electrician, he accepts an offer to work for the Japanese to build 
the power plant. His father is clearly enraged by this and slaps him in public. Juyong 
cannot understand why his father is not pleased that he has got a job. Later, the father is 
excited to leam that Chiang Kai-shek has just declared war against Japan. In desperation, 
he looks for his radio receiver to confirm the news. He finally finds the receiver, alreaoy 
dismantled into pieces, in Juyong's room. He is angry and again slaps Juyong. The 
father does not appreciate that Juyong was trying to fix the radio receiver for him. 
Inspired by Chiang Kai-shek's battle against the Japanese invasion, the father goes with 
three other old men to defend the ancestors' tombs. For this act of resistance, they are 
brutally beheaded by the Japanese soldiers. The local people denounce Juyong for his 
failure to fulfil his filial duties. With the repaired radio in hand, Juyong visits his father's
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tomb and vows to seek revenge. In the meantime, Juguang leaves for the mainland with 
several other young men to fight against the Japanese invasion.1
Wenying is left alone to look after the extended family and takes up teaching in the 
middle school where her husband used to be a teacher. In class, Wenying urges the 
pupils to ’Remember to be Chinese!' She also teaches them that plum blossom is 'our 
national flower, symbolising the Chinese national spirit’. She urges them to 'follow this 
nationalist spirit' and 'to influence your parents and to prepare for the coming victory.' 
In the meantime, Juyong pursues the daughter of the Japanese power plant manag; r. 
Xiaohui, the woman with whom Juyong is actually in love, shows contempt for 
Juyong's efforts to achieve promotion by becoming romantically involved with the 
daughter of the Japanese power plant manager. Xiaohui even laughs at him: 'Your 
sister-in-law is teaching in school. You should return to school to learn how to behave 
like a man!'
Juguang joins the KMT army on the mainland and is soon promoted to the rank of 
military officer. On the battlefield he encounters a volunteer nurse, Minzhu, whose 
parents have been killed by Japanese troops. They immediately like each other. Chitian 
comes to warn Wenying that the Japanese military plan to recruit her pupils for the 
military campaigns in Southeast Asia. Wenying asks Chitian to save the pupils from 
conscription. Not realising her intention, however, the pupils and villagers suspect 
Wenying of having an affair with Chitian. Wenying is misunderstood by her pupils and 
humiliated by the villagers. Shamed by her alleged infidelity, her mother-in-law 
commits suicide. Even her young son is ashamed of her. Wenying can see no way of 
clearing her name and commits suicide by drowning herself in the river by the dam. 
Chitian succeeds in saving Wenying's pupils from conscription but he blames them for 
doubting their teacher’s motives. The pupils and villagers assemble to pay tribute to 
Wenying. They all move slowly towards the power plant, carrying plum blossom and 
singing the 'Plum Blossom' song in chorus as they pay their last respects to Wenying.
Ever since Jixian became an orphan, Xiaohui has looked after the child as a surrogate 
mother. Wenying's death arouses patriotic fervour among the villagers. The
1 The film sequences summarised up to this point were shown to the family viewers in the course o f the 
research interviews.
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schoolchildren go out to fight Japanese children, shouting ’Hit the little Japanese dogs!' 
Four of Juguang's Taiwanese comrades are dispatched as secret agents by the KMT 
military on a mission to destroy the power plant. Before their departure, Juguang 
encourages them to ’grasp the opportunity to show the patriotism of the Taiwanese to 
the fatherland.’ They then sneak back to Taiwan and urged Juyong to work with them. 
Juyong turns them down because he is pessimistic about the success of the mission. In 
fact, the mission fails and the Japanese kill three of the four secret agents; the fourth 
escapes with injuries. The villagers provide shelter for the wounded agent and send him 
back to the mainland. For this, several villagers are arrested, tortured and executed by 
the Japanese authorities. On the way to the execution, all the villagers assemble again to 
sing the ’Plum Blossom’ song as a farewell to the patriots whose sacrifices saved the 
KMT agent. Xiaohui asks Juyong to ’see what these people are doing and reflect what 
you have done!’
Juguang is physically handicapped after saving Minzhu’s life on the field o f battle. The 
KMT secret agent returns to the mainland. Knowing that his brother, Juyong, did not 
join the mission, Juguang feels angry and ashamed. He is informed of his wife's death 
and Minzhu comforts him. The romance between them grows and eventually they are 
married. Juyong himself plans in secret to destroy the power plant. Ignorant of this plan, 
Xiaohui remains distant from him. Juyong successfully destroys the power plant with 
dynamite, but he is seriously injured and dies in prison. Juyong’s act of patriotic self- 
sacrifice earns Xiaohui's love and recognition.
Chitian commits suicide after Japan has lost the war. The film ends with China's hard- 
won Victory over Japan. On their arrival in Taiwan, the KMT armies are warmly 
welcomed by the villagers. Juguang returns to Taiwan with his new wife. The family is 
reunited. At Xiaohui’s suggestion, Jixian calls Minzhu ‘mother’, but rather hesitantly. 
Xiaohui, disappointed to see Juguang already married to Minzhu, gets ready to leave the 
village. As she leaves, we hear Jixian’s cries of ‘mother’.
(2) Plot Summary o f  City o f  Sadness
City o f  Sadness begins with the agonising cries of Wenxiong’s mistress in labour. The 
dark house is lit up as the electricity is restored. The disembodied voice of the Japanese 
Showa Emperor on the radio announces that Japan has surrendered to the Allies.
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Wenxiong's illegitimate son, symbolically named Guangming (literally, 'the light') is 
bom. This is followed by titles that read: 'On 15 August, the Japanese Emperor 
announces an unconditional surrender. Taiwan escapes from the 51-year rule of 
Japan....' Wenxiong renames his nightclub 'Little Shanghai'. Wenqing, Wenxiong's 
youngest brother, meets his friend Kuanrong's sister, Kuanmei. He discloses in writing 
to her that during the war two of his brothers, Wensen and Wenliang, were dispatch; d 
by the Japanese military to the Philippines and Shanghai respectively. He is concerned 
to know if they have returned home safely.
Wenqing is host to Kuanrong and a group of intellectuals in his photographic studio. 
They talk about Taiwan's difficult adaptation to a new regime. For example, the 
Taiwanese do not even know how to fly the 'national flag' correctly. They turn from 
mocking themselves to criticising the KMT government for maladministration. 
Wenliang returns from the mainland, shell-shocked and traumatised. There seems to be 
little hope that the second son, a medical doctor, has survived the war. Kuanrong's circle 
of intellectuals meets in Wenqing's studio. They agree that an upheaval will be 
unavoidable if Chen Yi's misadministration (including ethnic discrimination against the 
Taiwanese, economic exploitation, etc.) continues.
Wenliang recovers from his psychological trauma. In the meantime, Kuanrong's 
Japanese friends are about to be deported by the KMT government. There is an 
unfulfilled romance between Kuanrong and a Japanese girl, Jingzi (or Ogawa Seiko in 
Japanese). Sadly, Kuanrong discloses to Wenqing and Kuanmei his sentimental link 
with the Japanese national spirit that is symbolised by cherry blossom. A group of 
Shanghai gangsters visit Wenliang and propose a plan to smuggle rice out of Taiwan 
and bring drugs back in. Wenliang agrees to the proposal. In the studio, Kuanrong and 
other intellectuals continue to criticise the KMT government for exploiting the 
Taiwanese people. Social unrest, caused by inflation and unemployment, worsens in 
Taiwan as the KMT government's misadministration continues and the civil war on the 
mainland escalates. Kuanrong calls for a popular struggle against the KMT government. 
Wenxiong discovers and calls off the deal between Wenliang and the Shanghai 
gangsters. Wenxiong and Wenliang fall victim to the retribution of the Shanghai 
gangsters. A local gangster, a collaborator of the Shanghai gangsters, stabs Wenliang. 
Then both Wenxiong and Wenliang are accused of being traitors to the nation by secret
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witnesses (presumably the Shanghai gangsters), who accuse him of being involved in 
the Japanese occupation in Shanghai during thee war. The KMT soldiers search the 
family's house and arrest Wenliang. Hidden by this mistress, Wenxiong escapes arrest. 
Wenxiong hides in a friend's house and complaiins that 'We islanders are among the 
most misfortunate: out with the Japanese, in withi the Chinese. Everyone eats and rides 
at our expense but no one loves us'.2
Wenqing's friends' attempt to have Wenliang released from prison by law fails. As the 
lunar New Year approaches (by custom this signifies the union of the family), 
Wenxiong bribes the Shanghai gangsters because they have a good relationship with the 
KMT government. Wenliang is then released Ibut is traumatised again after being 
tortured in prison. The Governor-General, Chen \f i , declares a state of emergency under 
marital law. Witnessing the February 28 Incident, Kuanmei notes in her diary that 'the 
Taiwanese and the “Mainlanders” are killing eaclh other. We are worried that one war 
has just finished, but another war is immediately beginning.' Wenqing and Kuanrong 
visit Taipei in order to find out what is happeniing in Taipei. In front of the hospital 
where Kuanmei works, a group of Taiwanese beat a 'Mainlander' and shout 'Kill him!' 
The doctor stops their violence and treats the injured 'Mainlander'. In a disembodied 
voice-over, Governor Chen Yi calls for calm and promises to lift martial law and release 
all the arrested Taiwanese. Wenqing returns from Taipei and faints in front of Kuanmei. 
Chen Yi's disembodied voice-over is heard agaim: he declares martial law again a» d 
asserts that 'only when the government destroys a Ihandful of the rebels will society ever 
be secure.'
Wenqing tells Kuanmei that he saw many people die in Taipei. He also recalls that he 
narrowly escaped being beaten by a Taiwanese mob because they suspected him of 
being a 'Mainlander'. When confronted by the mob, he tried very hard to say 'I am 
Taiwanese' in Hokkien. Fortunately, Kuanrong saved him from being killed by 
explaining to the mob that Wenqing was a deaf-nnute. Kuanrong is wounded when he 
comes back from Taipei. His mother reveals that tlhe military came to search their house 
because of his involvement in the uprising. His father beats him and tells him that he 
cannot stay in the house. Kuanrong goes to the fiiills with his comrades and builds a
2
The opening sequences o f the film summarised up to th is point were used for co-viewing with the 
interviewees.
258
guerrilla-commune. Wenqing's friends and then Wenqing himself are arrested by the 
military. Some of his friends are shot, but Wenqing is released. He takes responsibility 
for passing on his friends' last words to their widows and children. The last worls 
written in blood (by one of his friends executed by the KMT) read: 'Father is not guilty. 
You must live with dignity.'
Because of the Incident, Wenxiong's nightclub closes. In the meantime, Wenqing visits 
Kuanrong's commune and says that he wants to stay with Kuanrong to 'fight for the 
dead', but Kuanrong dissuades him by asking him to look after Kuanmei. Wenxiong is 
assassinated by the Shanghai gangsters. The funeral is followed by the wedding 
between Wenqing and Kuanmei. Kuanmei writes in her diary that she feels happy with 
her husband and child, regardless of all the turbulence in the outside world. They also 
secretly gave financial support to Kuanrong's guerrilla-commune to 'fight for their 
ideals.' Subsequently, Kuanrong marries a woman who has joined the guerrilla- 
commune. Wenqing and Kuanmei receive a letter from Kuanrong, affirming Kuanrong's 
determination to dedicate himself to 'the beautiful future' of an unspecified 'homeland'. 
Shortly afterwards, Kuanrong is arrest by the KMT military. Wenqing expects the 
military to come at any moment and arrest him. Initially, Wenqing and Kuanmei try to 
escape but eventually they return home because they have nowhere to go. They have 
their picture taken together. As expected, Wenqing is arrested by the military. It turns 
out that only the handicapped, the elderly, females and the very young members of the 
extended Lin family survive the Incident. The film ends with the titles that read: 'In 
December 1949, the mainland falls into the hands of the Communists. The KMT 
government relocates to the temporary capital, Taipei.'
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A p p e n d ix  V : T o p ic  G u id e  f o r  t h e  F ir s t -w a v e  I n t e r v ie w s
BACKGROUND QUESTIONS: age, ethnic background, occupation, etc.
TELEVISION-RELATED QUESTIONS
• Media-focused life stories
• Watching television in the earlier stages of their lives
• Current experience of watching television
• Experience with terrestrial television and cable television
• Television drama experience
• Channel repertoire
• Programme preference
IDENTITY-RELATED QUESTIONS
• The context and the extent to which they feel Taiwanese or Chinese
• Attitude toward other ethnic groups in Taiwan
• Party allegiance
• Thoughts on the issue of independence/reunification with Mainland China
• Expectation of future cross-Strait relations
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A p p e n d ix  V I: Q u e s t io n s  f o r  t h e  Se c o n d -w a v e  I n t e r v ie w s
Aim 1: To find out more about their personal/family biographies.
Aim 2: To find out about their experience with television (terrestrial and cable) and the 
cinema. Concentrate on the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ with respect to their appropriation or 
cable, television viewing preference, choice, and habits (past and present).
• Would you recommend that I should subscribe to cable television? What is the 
advantage of having access to cable television? Would it do me any good to 
subscribe to cable television?
• Why did you have cable installed in your home? How much do you value cable 
television? Is it worth the monthly subscription fees? What do you get from cable 
television?
• Why do you still watch terrestrial television? Can you talk about the differences 
between what is offered on cable and terrestrial television?
• There are so many television channels available from cable and terrestrial 
television; can you share your experiences in making good use of them?
• Can you help me to choose which channels/programmes to view?
• Which channels/programmes do you watch on a daily basis?
• Do you watch the national cinema? Through which media (video, cable, 
terrestrial, movie theatres) do you watch national cinema?
• How much do you like/dislike the national cinema? Why?
Aim 3: To find out how they interact with television fictions, particularly the prime­
time television serial dramas, examining their experience with different sub-genres of 
serial dramas that contain a range of historical and geographical settings. Ask them to 
talk about the serial dramas they are currently watching.
• What makes serial dramas a viewing ‘must’ for you and/or your family?
• Since you watch serial dramas every day, what would you do if you were not at 
home this evening (e.g. at work, at cramming school, etc.)? Is it important to 
know what's on this evening's episode? How do you catch up with the latest 
developments in a particular drama?
• If you had the opportunity to act, which character in the drama would you like to 
play?
• Have you ever viewed the serial dramas exported from the mainland? Are there 
any differences between the Taiwan-made and Mainland-made television dramas?
Activity: Show them the film(s). The first one-sixth length of each film (i.e. the first 15 
minutes of Victory and the first 25 minutes of City o f  Sadness) in order to trigger their 
memory. Then, ask them to reconstruct the story.
Aim 4: To trace the historical evolution of the meanings of each film to them. Is there a 
shift in the meanings of each film? If so, is such a shift correlated with their own 
biographical relationship with the media?
• Could you please reconstruct what Victory is about to an absent friend/family 
member? Could you please reconstruct what City o f Sadness is about to an absent
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friend/family member?
• Can you recall how you felt about these films when you were younger, if you saw 
them before?
• (In case no one within the family has previously seen the films, another question 
should be asked): What's typical of a 1970s film and what makes Victory a 1970s 
film? What makes City o f  Sadness a post-Martial law film? How are films like 
City o f Sadness different from 1970s films like Victory?
• Why did the government want everyone to watch 1970s films like Victory? 
(Consider policy, content, etc.) Do you think City o f  Sadness deserved to win the 
first prize at the Venice Film Festival?
• Would you like me to leave the film(s) so that you can view it/them at full length? 
Do you think it is/they are worth further viewing? Would you recommend the 
film(s) to someone who has never seen it/them?
Aim 5: To find out about their 'historical knowledge' and 'popular memory' in relation 
to the national past depicted in the films, and to determine the extent to which 
historical imagination affects/interacts with their reception of a popular fiction set in 
history.
• What makes you like/dislike, and approve/disapprove of, what is depicted in 
Victory and City o f Sadness ?
• What comes to your mind when someone mentions the Incident of February 28 
1947?
• What comes to mind when you think of what Taiwan was like when it was under 
Japanese colonial rule before 1945?
• What was Taiwan like under the Chiangs?
• How and in what respects has Taiwan changed since 1987?
Aim 6: To identify the national identities of the respondents (similarities and 
difference).
• Do you regard yourself as Taiwanese or Chinese? Why?
• Do you think one can be both Taiwanese and Chinese? When do you feel
Taiwanese? When do you feel Chinese? Can you give me an example?
• Can you help a Westerner to understand what 'Taiwanese' means? Can you
explain to a foreigner the difference between 'Chinese' and 'Taiwanese'? What do
you mean by 'Taiwanese'? What makes you feel different from the Chinese on the 
mainland? Do you think that being Taiwanese means being less 'Chinese' than the 
people in the mainland? What is the distinctiveness of being Taiwanese?
• Have you always thought so? If not, since when? What did you think before?
How would you describe your change of mind? What made you change your
mind?
• Did you vote in the 1996 presidential election? Will you vote in the 2000
presidential election? Which candidate would you most like to be our next
President, and why? Which candidate do you least want to be our next President, 
and why?
• What are your ideas/opinions about the unification/independence issue?
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A p p e n d ix  V II: I n f o r m a n t s  u n d e r  S t u d y
Family__________Members________ Ethnic origin_____ Age (in 1999)
FI Father 'Mainlander' 53
Mother 'Mainlander' 50
Son 'Mainlander' 19
F2 Father 'Mainlander' 54
Mother Hakka 49
Daughter Mixed 18
Son2 Mixed 16
F3 Father1 'Mainlander' 48
Mother Hokkien 48
Daughter Mixed 18
F4 Father 'Mainlander' 51
Mother 'Mainlander' 46
Son 'Mainlander' 19
F5 Father 'Mainlander' 46
Mother Hokkien 45
Daughter Mixed 18
F6 Father 'Mainlander' 54
Mother 'Mainlander' 49
Son 'Mainlander' 19
F7 Father2 Hakka 47
Mother 'Mainlander' 47
Daughter Mixed 18
F8 Father Hakka 49
Mother Hakka 46
Son Hakka 19
F9 Father Hakka 51
Mother Hokkien 50
Son Mixed 19
#10 Father1 Hakka 45
Mother Hokkien 42
Daughter Mixed 18
FI 1 Father Hakka 53
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Mother 'Mainlander' 52
Daughter Mixed 19
F12 Father1 Hakka 46
Mother Hakka 42
Son Hakka 18
F13 Father Hokkien 48
Mother2 Hokkien 46
Daughter Hokkien 18
Son2 Hokkien 20
F14 Father1 Hokkien 45
Mother Hokkien 45
Daughter Hokkien 18
F15 Father Hokkien 47
Mother Hakka 44
Son Mixed 19
Daughter Mixed 16
F16 Father Hokkien 53
Mother Hokkien 50
Son Hokkien 18
Son2 Hokkien 21
F17 Father Hokkien 50
Mother Hokkien 47
Son Hokkien 19
F18 Father Hokkien 49
Mother Hakka 48
Daughter Mixed 19
F19 Father Hokkien 52
Mother Hokkien 50
Daughter Hokkien 19
Son2 Hokkien 22
Notes:
1 Only took part in the first-wave interviews.
2 Only took part in the second-wave interviews.
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